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

TO MATTHURA

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

APRIL, 1928

PROSE STYLE

> "In my opinion it ought to be regarded as one of the functions of a University to inculcate the importance and to cultivate the practice of style."
>
> *Occasional Addresses* (*1893-1916*)—Asquith.

Style in prose is manner of writing words, as style in dress is manner of wearing clothes, and style in cricket manner of making strokes. But these are merely descriptions, style remaining still a subtle, elusive thing, masked in multiform manifestations, and changing in colour and meaning with the accompanying circumstances of theme, thinker, audience and occasion. It is not simply an embellishment like the spangles superimposed on a woman's dress or the polish laid on a piece of furniture. Nor is it just a finishing touch like the beauty spot on my lady's cheek. Yet this, or something like this, is the average educated man's idea of prose style. To him style is extrinsic to subject, at most an enigmatic quality of expression rather than expression itself. He pictures an Eastern scribe converting the inexpressible emotion of an illiterate lover into the song of a nightingale of affection warbling to a rose of loveliness, and feels becomingly superior to such finery as finicking and effeminate. He experiences the pleasure given by style, and may even allow it to influence his choice and judgment of books, but he is content to recognise and enjoy it as art without having any desire to know it scientifically.

In that stimulating book *On the Art of Writing*, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch protests against the intrusion of scientific methods into art, but he cannot prevail against the spirit of the age nor persuade students of to-day that science should be excluded from literature, that theoretical generalisations should be eschewed in literary criticism, that definition and classification are out of place in literary art. "Beetles, minerals, gases, may be classified," he says, "and to have these classified is not only convenient, but a genuine advance of knowledge.. But if you had to make a beetle, as men are making poetry, how would such classification help ?" One answer is that, if one were making a beetle, it would be helpful to know what kind of beetle one was trying to make, and that, if one attempted to make a gas without such knowledge, the results might be distressingly tragic. The fact is that literature cannot be shut away in an idea-tight compartment, æsthetics itself being simply science applied to art, classifying the various arts, defining their functions and limits, determining the conditions of artistic production, and formulating the principles of critical appreciation. So far as style in prose is concerned, Sir Arthur's ideas are unsatisfying to the scientific or philosophical mind which asks what style consists of, whence it comes, and how its many diverse forms can be reconciled. Being professedly an artist, his treatment of the subject is perhaps purposely inconclusive. Though he admits incidentally the connection between matter and style, insists that style can never be separated from the man, and dwells on craftsmanship as a finishing factor, he nowhere synthesizes these scattered reflections, while he defines style as "the power to touch with ease, grace, precision, any note in the gamut of human thought and emotion," a definition which is as little instructive in substance as it is logical in form. This is not the way to knowledge for, as even an artist like Pater says, "all progress of mind consists

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for the most part in differentiation, in the resolution of an obscure and complex object into its component aspects.'' Is it not worth while therefore to enquire what the constituent elements of prose style are, to endeavour to explain it in the abstract, to seek some principle applicable to all the particular forms in which it presents itself? As sea-power has been considered in the abstract apart from the fighting quality of any particular navy or ship, so may prose style be similarly considered apart from the pleasing quality of any particular writer or book, the practical utility of the process being that it prepares the way for a proper understanding and appreciation of the various concrete forms of style.

The fundamental object of writing prose is to communicate thought about some mental or emotional experience, but such thought can only be communicated as the thinker conceives it and has power to present it, clearly for the instruction of some, colourfully for the delight of others attracted more by that facet of truth which is called beauty. First comes the thought, then the personal method of thinking about that thought, and finally the technical composition conveying all these thoughts. In every piece of prose there is thus the thing treated of, the subjective way in which it is treated, and the objective way in which it is presented, and style is compounded of these simples of thought, feeling and form. Every pen is dipped in style, but there is much difference between Stephen's blue-black and the wish-wash that serves Government offices as ink, and all that is penned is not therefore literature or "sincere thought and feeling put in fine form.'' The province of literary style thus encompasses thought and feeling as well as form, while its function is vital and not merely ministerial. A thought seeks expression as much to know itself as to make itself known, the words in which it is first conceived are usually very different from those in which it is finally expressed, and it is during this interval between cloudy conception and clear expression that style comes into being. The treatment of the central thought is developed by clear thinking round and about that thought, by logic forging and fusing the links of argument, by imagination lengthening the chain with added links of allied experiences and associations. Sentence follows sentence, each reproducing some recognizable feature by which it can be traced back to one or other of the formative elements of style, a sentence here which is intellectual, derived from knowledge or reflection and set down as clearly as a musical note, another there which springs from personal emotion and illustrates Francis Thompson's dictum that the object of style is adequately to embody individuality, while a third flaunts some taking turn or trick of technique like Voltaire's contrasted adjectives. The style as a whole is thus always of mixed descent, the predominating strain varying with the subject, the writer, and the writer's artistic equipment. Knowledge and power stand at opposite ends of the sphere of literature, and the style of any piece of literary prose is polarized by its position along the axis round which all literature revolves. According as its prime aim is utility or beauty, according as it informs or inspires, according as it corresponds to the philosophy of Bacon or Plato, so will the qualities of its style be derived mainly from one or other of the three essential ingredients of all style.

Generally speaking, the thought element in prose style conveys information and aims at lucidity, the personal element portrays character and temperament, not excluding eccentricity, and aims at charm, while the technical element displays beauty and aims at effect, but all these elements act and react on one another also, and then coalesce into an intellectual and artistic whole, the purpose of which is to achieve pleasurable intelligibility with taste as well as sense.

This analysis of prose style will probably be challenged. The technical element may be passed by the general reader and the personal element by the literary critic, but both may exclaim that there is a radical distinction between thought and style, matter and form, theme and treatment, between the thing said and the way of saying it. The general reader's arguments will be vague, but the critic will cite reputable literary authority such as Hazlitt's gibe at the Jackals of the North that "of the style they knew nothing, for the thought they cared nothing" and Matthew Arnold's pronouncement that, without ideas of the first order or the best ideas attainable at the time, "you are provincial by your matter, though you may not be provincial by your style." The distinction, it may be admitted at once, is common and even convenient for critical and colloquial purposes, but it is nevertheless arbitrary and also artificial in the sense that it is only made to facilitate thought and speech. A difference there is, but the difference is simply that thought or matter is one of the forces of which style is the resultant. So far as any real distinction is implied, it involves the now discredited idea that style is nothing more than form, nothing but the flavouring put into the pudding, the almond icing added meretriciously to the cake. That this idea is unphilosophical was proved long ago by Wordsworth and De Quincey. Wordsworth considered words the incarnation of thought, "not what the garb is to the body, but what the body is to the soul, themselves a constituent part and power and function in the thought." Before him Johnson and Chesterfield, in accord for once, after him, Carlyle and Samuel Butler, all denied similarly that words are merely the verbal vesture of thought. Flaubert went further and asserted that form cannot be detached from idea, while a living writer, who is both creator and critic, has declared roundly that "style cannot be distinguished from matter."

The truth, as is not unusual, lies somewhere between these extremes. The expressed idea is inseparable from the informing mind, but that mind is only one of the factors determining the form of that idea. Identity of idea and expression, accordance between subject and form, is seldom achieved spontaneously, and is then more an affair of mood and feeling than of thought. Ordinarily even the most sincere writer must seek words to fit his meaning, his expression must come limping after his thought following in its track and striving to keep step with it. Suppose that the same thought or matter were presented to Bacon and Milton, Addison and Burke, Jane Austen and George Eliot, and consider whether the same or similar prose would be produced by each or even by each pair. Would they not all respond to different suggestions from their common subject and express those mental and emotional reactions in their own peculiar language. Again, compare critically the essays of Francis Thompson and Walter Bagehot on Shelley, or Sainte-Beuve's essay on Joubert with that of Matthew Arnold. What do we find? Imaginative insight and rich imagery in Thompson, the work of a true poet—passionless pedestrianism in Bagehot, the work of a man of affairs, solid information stolidly communicated. Sainte-Beuve's essay, written when he was forty-five, is more a review than a criticism, his aim being to enlarge the circle of Joubert's readers, his method to disclose the author through the man. The special defect of Joubert's prose—splashes of illuminating light with restful shadows between—is traced to his character and the quality of his mind, a few extracts are added to whet the appetite, and the one morsel of comparative criticism, which likens Joubert's humour to that of Stern and Lamb, gives English plates the flavour required, but could not have been very satisfying to the Frenchmen for whom it was served up. Matthew Arnold, who wrote at forty-two, cites Chateaubriand to the effect that Joubert deliberately chose "to hide his life" and has little to say about the man, but much about his work. With striking literary art, since his subject was almost unknown to English readers, he begins by comparing Joubert with Coleridge, and having thus made the new familiar, quotes copiously to establish his main point that Joubert's unpremeditated prose was genuine criticism of life of lasting value within its limits. Yet, in spite of such marked differences of intellectual content, emotional response and artistic effect, all these four essays are prose literature written about acknowledged literary characters by unquestioned men of letters.

As another instance, stranger than criticism, since it is taken from life, let us recall the finding by Bertram Dobell of an article on the death of Keats signed " L " in the *London Magazine* of April 1821. Lamb knew Keats, had reviewed his *Lamia*, was writing in the *London* at the time, and had used the initial " L " once or twice. Still, in the face of this circumstantial evidence of Lamb's authorship, Dobell decided otherwise, because, " if Lamb had written it, there would have been in it a sentence or two which would have discovered his craftsmanship." Matter by itself is not style therefore, but neither is it a thing apart from style. Matthew Arnold declared that having something to say is one of the secrets of style, while Pater pointed out that the difference between good and great literary art depends directly on matter. Whether thought and language originated simultaneously, or whether thought came first and recalled signifying words created later, we may safely say that, so far as prose writing is concerned, there is a close connection and interaction between thought and words, that they are concomitant and correlative, that the one cannot come into coherent being without the other. " Matter and expression are parts of one," said Newman and, as such parts, they are related as a seed to its flower, as the sheen on leaves to the sap that feeds it, as the hue of health to the body that bears it. It is thought inspired to creation, or working humanly in synthesis and analysis, in generalisation and selection, that confers on the handicraft of writing the accolade of fine art. The imagination is awakened instead of being put to sleep, the throb of life is felt below the hair-shirt of realism, plagiarism is clothed in the glowing garb of originality, chatter is converted into criticism, and description into interpretation. As an element of style, thought or matter is never over-obtrusive as the personal element occasionally is, nor over-cultivated as the technical element often is, despite the fact that it may be, as in a philosophical exposition or scientific treatise, the main element in evidence. Even in such work, however, where heaviness of expression is too apt to accompany weight of matter, Huxley is a better model than Kant, because the subject demands that no part of the reader's attention should be dissipated in penetrating obscurities of language or unravelling mazes of careless composition. It is not true therefore that "subject is everything" for good matter does not ensure good style any more than costly cloth ensures a stylish gown. Matter, thought, subject, is style's foundation and building material, which the directing spirit of personality shapes into unity and uniqueness, using technique as a scaffolding to put the material in place with due regard to the Greek architectural ideal that ornamentation is an integral part of structure. As the accompanist follows the singer, so should the writer's manner answer his matter. And yet, though no man will write sense as he would nonsense, nor describe a joyful scene of revelry in the same language as a king's coronation or a hero's funeral, every man will do each of these things in his own way, and will so account for the difference between the sense of Swift and Junius, the nonsense of Lewis Carroll and Stephen Leacock, the quiet pictures of Richard Jeffries and the rich rhetorical colouring of De Quincey. The conclusion seems to be therefore that, while form should follow matter generally, it can only do so within the limits imposed by personality and artistry.

Personality, the gorgeous and gruesome re-bloom of the Renaissance, is that undefinable *je ne sais quoi* which marks a man among men. It may accompany great intellect or noble character, but is not incompatible with ignorance, meanness and vice. In art it plays the same part subjectively as thought does objectively, and is to impression what thought is to expression. It is essentially lyrical and never looks at "the subject as in itself it really is." As an element of prose style, it is not only like the mint-mark on a coin showing where it has been struck, but also contributes the characteristic ring that distinguishes the genuine from the counterfeit. In some forms of literature, where feeling is higher or deeper than reason, where beauty of colour transcends beauty of line, it is even more, it is the most vital of the interdependent forces that produce the organism of style, the life-principle of style as secure from reproduction as the nucleus of the protoplasm. A writer may borrow his matter, and must acquire his technique, but his personality is his own for better or for worse. Emerson says somewhere that "great men are more distinguished by range and extent than by originality," and it is true enough that, short of revelation by inspiration through the soul and conscience, originality of idea is not easily come by at this stage of the world's career. When and where an idea begins is as difficult to discover as when and where life begins, and the secret of apparently original writing usually lies therefore in a kind of personal parallax, which presents the familiar as new by a change in the point of observation, or projects the commonplace in an unaccustomed shape of fresh associations and instances. The web is much the same, but not the colour nor the texture of the thread. The phenomena of personality pervade all human activities ; in all handicrafts, in all fine arts, the differentiae of the self-consistent personal touch are constantly in evidence ; even in crime, as Charles Mercier tells us, the specialist preponderates over the general practitioner, each species of specialist has its own mental make-up, and (what is most to our purpose) each criminal tends to repeat his speciality in his own individual way. No man can escape from this shadow of personality, and the writer's intellectual idiosyncrasies, his emotional prejudices, even his physical peculiarities, will appear more or less in all that he writes, in his choice of a communicating medium, in the structure of his sentences, in his use of focalising epithets and phrases, in the amplification of his thought by illuminating flashes of metaphor or illustrative pictures in simile. Hence arises the invalidity of Herbert Spencer's dictum about a specific style showing poverty of speech. It is perhaps a philosophically ideal abstraction of human weakness, a sealed pattern of perfection hidden somewhere in Heaven, but it does not fit in with the worldly facts, because all writers of any literary merit have a specific predominating style which, while allowing versatility and variety in accordance with subject and occasion, yet stamps most of their work with a manner inked indelibly by individuality. Personality acts indeed as a preserving salt for those forms of literature that are not protected from decay by the timeless universality or the vitalising freshness of their thought. It is the reflex of a writer's habit of mind, of the peculiar atmosphere in which his thought moves and has its being, of his special sense of fact, of all the influences of heredity and environment, of education and experience, that combine to make the man. Schopenhauer said that style is " a safer index to character than the face," and Sir Walter Raleigh added that "other gestures shift and change and flit, this is the ultimate and enduring revelation of personality." A man may thus be tested by his written work as Goethe tested him by his associates and Ruskin by his likes and dislikes, and *cherchez l'homme* may consequently be enunciated as the chief canon in the criticism of style. There is of course considerable variation in the extent to which style can be judged by the man or the man discovered in his style. Sometimes this is due to the subject, sometimes to the man himself, sometimes to the conditions under which he lives and works. Still personality will always peep out somewhere even if only in peculiarities of vocabulary or perversities of punctuation, and it is therefore humanly impossible for writing to be as " seraphically free from taint of personality " as Meredith found the song of a lark.

One literary convention, mainly French in origin, requires writing to mirror life without reflecting the writer, but this deliberate objectivity of attitude is a matter of technique and cannot eliminate the personal equation. The so-called impersonal writer thinks that he is detachedly surveying the landscape of life through a lofty window, whereas what he actually sees, as in a looking-glass, are epitomized pictures of life as he knows it either personally or by proxy from books, newspapers, and old wives' tales. If his imagination be not fancifully unlike life, it must follow his previous perceptions, just as his ideas of the universal must be based on gleanings from his past experience. As Bagehot says with characteristic common sense : "Yet people do not surely keep a tame steam-engine to write their books ; and if those books were really written by a man, he must have been a man who could write them ; he must have had the thought that they express, have acquired the knowledge they contain; have possessed the style in which we read them." Wordsworth allowed the general rule by tracing the "gentle spirit of the man" in all that Spencer wrote, and "the exalted sustained being that he was" in all that Milton wrote, but alleged that Shakespeare's art was impersonal, and suggested that this was due to his universal mind being able to reach every variety of thought and feeling without bringing his individuality before the reader. But this faculty of imaginative realisation is common to all creative writers, and no very delicate perception is needed to feel Shakespeare's style bloom and ripen as his character matured and his experience widened, while the readiness with which a fresh or forgotten Shakespearean line is recognised shows that his style was characteristic, even though the characteristics it embodies may not be identifiable with certainty owing to want of knowledge of the man. Personal records and other direct data are almost completely wanting, but inference from his plays and poems are permitted to those who agree with Dr. Brandes that "given the possession of some forty works by any man, it is entirely our own fault if we know nothing about him." If further evidence is needed to refute this other pathetic fallacy of impersonality in literary art, Lamb, Goldsmith and Stevenson may be cited to prove that every book, at least in the literature of power, is perfumed with its author's personality, that style is as personal as gesture or voice or facial expression, that, as Carlyle says, "whatsoever of morality and intelligence ; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness, of method, insight, ingenuity, energy ; in a word, whatsoever of strength the man had in him, will be written in the work he does."

While the elements of thought and personality interest only the serious student for theoretical and critical purposes, the technical element is useful for practical purposes to the ordinary reader and writer. Though Stevenson deprecated too close a scrutiny of the springs and mechanism of literary art, a knowledge of these technicalities must help us all to appreciate and emulate its finest achievements. Someone has said that the so-called laws of style are no more essential to good writing than logic is to right reasoning or grammar to correct speaking. It is true that writing does not become literature simply by knowing and observing these laws, just as logical reasoning does not necessarily convince the mind nor grammatical speaking fire the emotions, yet all these arts are the worse practised as their technical rules are disregarded. Each of us can in fact increase his stylistic stature a cubit or two by taking thought over technique, for man does not put words together with the innate dexterity of a tailor-bird sewing the leaves of its nest, nor does he select the best words for his purpose as the honey-bee flies instinctively to the flowers concealing the fluid it seeks. It does not follow of course that form is everything as Oscar Wilde said, or even, as the De Goncourts held, of more importance than ideas. Technique is rather like recreation in life ; those who play moderately work all the better, and would not work with the same zest and glow if they did not also play. Technique thus has its uses, but its rules are of negative rather than positive value, their purpose being, not to secure excellence under any circumstances, but to show, where the other requisite conditions are present, how excellence may be secured and to help in securing such excellence. They are, in other words, a means and not an end, the wings by which the eagle climbs, but not its soaring flight. They contribute to, but do not create, the force and felicity of style ; they economize energy and decrease friction, but do not constitute the prime mover in the mechanism of style. A man cannot write like Stevenson by sedulously studying the formal part of style any more than he can compose music like Mozart by learning the tone and time-value of notes and their harmonious coincidence in chords, or paint like Turner by mastering the combinations of colours and the niceties of perspective. There are "some beauties yet no precepts can declare" and "nameless graces which no methods teach," and these originate subjectively from something to which personality and thought both subscribe, something which technique merely sharpens to the point of artistic effectiveness. Technique can turn a rough stone into a sparkling gem, but its rules of literary expression, derived inductively from the practice of great writers, are always of individual rather than invariable application, are constantly converted by genius into false or fallen idols, and are further conditioned by the ever-present necessity of exploiting the sweet uses of diversity. Herbert Spencer's generalization about economizing the reader's attention is in some respects the most satisfying precept of composition yet enunciated, but it takes only indirect account of the reader's pleasure and none at all of the writer's feelings. Surely the effect on the reader cannot be the true criterion of style, surely there is a duty towards oneself as well as a duty towards others, surely submergence of self is not good style in every kind of writing any more than it is good form in every circumstance of life.

Technique in writing is concerned primarily with words, with their choice as units, their arrangements as sentences, their combination as paragraphs, chapters and books. Though the point is reminiscent of the old problem about the precedence in time of chickens and eggs, we are told by poets like Shelley that speech created thought, while philosophers like Hobbes say that words are merely the conventional tokens of thought like the counters used in card games to represent money. As a matter of probability, the earliest words were ejaculations expressive of bodily wants and sensations, such words being aptly similar in sound to the corresponding desires and feelings. As this process continued, the words became less rationally suggestive and more arbitrarily associative, new words were more symbolic than emblematic, while the meaning of the old ones was extended, modified and even completely changed. The result is that, in modern languages, the archetypal ideas underlying most words are unknown or forgotten, and the words used have become the paper money of the mind without intrinsic meaning as media of intellectual exchange. It is here that philologists and phonologists discover their utility and teach ordinary men new ideas out of old words, leaving poets and philosophers to create new words to express fine shades of fresh meaning. Yet, when all has been said, meaning remains nothing without words just as words are nothing without meaning. Provided their limitations are not overlooked, provided they are kept in their places as servants should be, words cannot be disparaged or disregarded in the manner of those champions of brevity, the learned professors of Laputa. "The distemper of learning is," as Bacon put it, "when men study words and not matter," when words become mischievously momentous, when people listen not to what Ruskin said, but to how he said it. It is also true, however, that prose is, in Coleridge's phrase, "words in their best order," while Swift's definition of style as "proper words in proper places" is quite adequate from the purely technical standpoint. But what are these "proper words" in prose?

Lessing advised his sister to "write as you speak and you will then write well." His object was to cure German prose of elephantiasis in its sentences, but his advice is still repeated to young writers who are told, on the added authority of

Wordsworth, to shape their ardent ideas in a conversational mould by using "the language really used by men." This advice is certainly a salutary check on youthful exuberance because, like the beginner on a bicycle who fails to get over the ground through keeping his eye on the front wheel instead of on the road ahead, the inexperienced writer loses sight of the end of his art by paying too much attention to one of its means and seeking, like the Archbishop of Granada, "a literary reputation for a sublime and elegant style." Still, though words are common to all modes of communicating connected thought, the words used in writing must differ from those used in speaking for the same reason as ceremony differs from custom in most human affairs. At bottom, the convention which made a Roman citizen wear a toga on certain occasions, and which now forbids flannels at a levee, is the same as that which pranks writing in the comparatively imposing garb necessary to the impression that something out of the common is afoot. Writing in the literary sense is the art of the few, speaking is the business of the many, and the forms that fit the one do not suit the other. Writing in the language of everyday intercourse discourages circumlocution and encourages concrete expression, but for the rest current speech is inaccurate in syntax, unmindful of etymology, disfigured by slang, unlubricated by rhythm, and diluted with weary overworked phrases essential to instant comprehension. The tone of cultured conversation suits an essayist like Hazlitt, but only the tone not the words, for Hazlitt himself says in his *Characteristics* that "to expect an author to talk as he writes is ridiculous." It is at least as ridiculous to expect him to write as he talks, writing like a monologue being just as unreal as talking like a book.

Another form of the same argument is that writing should be as free from self-consciousness as speech, that a writer who knows his subject, and what he wants to say, has as little choice of language as Tobias Hobson's customers had of horses. But this is opposed to the teaching both of experience and of writers like Ben Jonson who have told us to "seek the best and be not glad of the forward conceits, or first words, that offer themselves to us." Samuel Butler professed carelessness over his style, but added that "a man may, and ought to, take a great deal of pains to write clearly, tersely and euphemistically." This ingenuous inconsistency is as entertaining as Lord Morley's remark that he had very little faith in rules of style, though he had an unbounded faith in the virtue of cultivating direct and precise expression. We know that Ruskin ascribed his command of language to the constant habit of choosing his vital words carefully, and that Rudyard Kipling used to dredge the dictionary for words. We know also that Stevenson modelled his sentences in clay before he cut them in marble, that Pater brought forth the unique word with much mental travail, and that Flaubert was even more meticulous, almost morbidly meticulous, spending days and weeks over a single page. Remembering those thoughts "which into words no virtue can digest," one is inclined to doubt whether anything really good or great has ever been written with a running pen. Yet there is the word of Nietzsche that sometimes "everything seems to present itself as the readiest, the correctest and the simplest means of expression," when, as another writer puts it, "beauty and truth may come together and find the exactly right word in the flash of a moment." We may believe therefore that a writer of genius does occasionally experience a twinkle of inspired consciousness, one of those pregnant glimpses that Ulysses caught of Minerva, when the infinite becomes for an instant finite, when the interpreter of God to man sees without straining, hears without hearkening, and takes without asking. But, like the gipsy's art, "it needs heaven-sent moments for this skill," and the writer more often finds himself in the position of Cassim in the robbers' cave saying "barley" and every other grain in the vain attempt to recall "sesame." Second thoughts are the best in writing as in living, and a clever journalist has proved in his *Literary Recreations* that "many of the words and phrases which might seem most inspired or inevitable were, in fact, second thoughts."

Hazlitt supplied another answer to our question about "proper words" when he wrote that "the proper force of words lies, not in the words themselves, but in their application," this cloistered correspondence between application and association, between form and spirit, between sound and sense, being the complementary secret to Matthew Arnold's having something to say. It links meaning and melody to something beyond both, and discovers imaginative similitudes where reason only recognises differences. It chooses the long word; the Latin word, even the inelegant word, used significantly and suggestively; it refuses the short word, the Saxon word, even the sweet-sounding word without suggestion or significance. There is necessarily a certain distance between the writer and the reader, and appropriate diction flashes the writer's message to his reader's mind and imagination along a double wire of plain and implied meaning. It also vivifies and visualises the writer's thought into reality, and adds beauty as interest to the gifts conferred by reflection and feeling. But success is not easy, and the preordained *mot propre* is too often a delusion and a snare. "Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend," and the hyper-Latinisms of Sir Thomas Browne, the archaisms which Lamb wrote for antiquity, the imperial-purple patches of Carlyle, are "graces which a master-hand alone can reach." For ordinary wayfarers the safest part of the literary road lies neither to right nor to left, but along the middle, that *via media* which adhering to good usage, and avoiding both the rocks of tired tradition and the ditches of daring neologism, conveys pertinent ideas euphoniously, fits meaning without being superfluous, satisfies the understanding without neglecting the emotions, and appeals to the æsthetic sense without being unintelligible. The margin for error is, however, small and ill-defined, and few men can be "omniverbivorous" like the Autocrat of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Asked what he mixed his colours with, the painter Opie replied : " With brains, Sir." And so it is with words in writing for, though "man's use or defiance of the dictionary depends for its justification on nothing but his success," that success is only to be won by constant contact with the best, by cultivated consciousness of verbal impressions, by a laborious process of training during which the intellect and taste are taught to select felicitously and surprisingly those inevitable words that vibrate with life and meaning.

Having found the proper word, its proper place must next be discovered, that place in the pattern which is most apropos to the general design. As the proper word is a mixed matter of meaning and imagery, so is the proper place a mixed matter of meaning and melody, the common object being to convey thought and feeling with intelligible force and fine artistic effect. Apart from pedestrian considerations of syntax, this proper place is determined by emphasis and rhythm, emphasis being effective presentation by position, by the use of repetition and contrast, of parallelism, inversion, antithesis and climax, while rhythm is effective presentation by sound, alliteration and assonance artfully aiding that elemental appeal of measured movement and undulating forte and piano which facilitates mental effort as much as it lightens manual labour. Rhythm was suggested by the beating of the heart, by the natural alternations of stress and pause that prevent exhaustion. It was imposed by the physical limitations of the lungs, but necessity has become the mother of artistic beauty. Prose rhythm does not move always on the same feet and should be as unobtrusive as a good accompaniment, but cadence will not come if one takes care of the sense only and leaves the sounds to take care of themselves. Well-tuned words and music-laden phrases are more important in poetry perhaps, but even in "the other harmony of prose" a style's prosperity lies in the ear of him that reads it. Sound may be the echo, sense the authentic voice, yet it is always advisable to read aloud and listen to what one has written even if nothing higher is attained than

Bentham's "pronounciability" or that " evasion of cacophony " which preoccupied De Quincey.

Technical skill, beautiful expression, harmonious and modulated composition, has a value of its own, apart from the thought and feeling it conveys. If it is original, it adds a new joy to life by creating a taste for itself, the danger being that language thus tends to become a cult with a ritual of form without meaning. The proper aim of literary craftsmanship is the *curiosa felicitas* of Petronius, for technique is only one part of style, and should not receive nor attract more attention than a constituent part deserves. Someone has said that the style of Sainte-Beuve's letters is superior to that of his essays because he had no time to spoil it, and the later work of Henry James shows how the problems of presentation may delight unduly. Toilet trickery can be artistic, but a meretricious display of cosmetics is degrading and repellent. The perfect style should be like the perfect girl of the Chinese sage, "another grain of powder would make her too pale, another touch of rouge would make her too red." All sacrifice of substance to show is inartistic, but substance should be shown to the best artistic advantage, remembering always that unity is the crowning glory of art, and that unity in writing comes from the writer, guided but not governed by the rules applicable to his medium and theme.

Prose style is thus a synthesis of three elements joined for true felicity like Meredith's blood, brain and spirit. It is not, as is water, a chemical compound of elements in fixed proportions with properties of its own; it is rather a plastic amalgam in which the ingredients are mingled in varying quantities while retaining their own qualities. Thus perspicuity is a quality of the thought element, austerity of the personal element, an[illegible] propriety of the technical element, sincerity being a[illegible] common to all three. And what is sincerity in wri[illegible] deliberate humbug obviously, nor even the un[illegible] that distinguished Mr. Facing-both-ways "[illegible] preaches one thing, and sincerely does anothe[illegible] thought, feeling and form, an honest sharing of the opinions expressed and a modest accommodation of subject to capacity, no posing in describing experiences, no assuming of unfelt emotions, no going a mile out of one's way to hook in a fine word. Novelty is the writer's will-o'-the-wisp, beckoning alluringly under modern competitive conditions, and sincerity is the only light that will guide him among the sloughs of affectation and *ad captandum* vulgarity. Yet sincerity is only a quality and cannot create good style if thought is trivial, feeling feeble, or craftsmanship defective. All the conscientious ploughing in the world will not produce a crop out of sand, and if he wishes to escape the fate of Gil Blas, who was given credit for speaking what he thought, but was nevertheless dismissed because he had not thought anything deserving of speech, the writer must not only write what he thinks or feels, but must also think or feel something worth writing about, and must besides write about it in a manner worth writing. The old distinction between accidental qualities and inherent essentials is often overlooked in this connection. Thus, many of us confidently classify or label a particular style, and think we are showing considerable critical acumen, when all that we really mean is that the literature in which it is embodied or exhibited excels in or lacks certain qualities peculiar to one or other of the essential ingredients of all style. The epithet "rhetorical" implies, for instance, the use of elaborate and superfluous ornament to captivate the senses and divert the understanding, but it is also the hall-mark of a differentiating essential, of sincere and intense feeling roused to appropriate declamation. Even as a quality, however, employing artifice is not necessarily the same as being artificial, and hetoric only becomes bad art when the lucid is lost in the s. As William Watson says, "truly the worst literary is that of unliterariness," for every writer must be a deliberate stylish if he "love not matter limpid " if he takes any pride in his art, if he tries to leasure by its practice. A man is impelled to adorn what he admires, but adornment in writing varies wit the object it has in view. For this ideal of style is too coldly intellec enough to come home to men's business osoms. Persuasive urbanity is very well, but convincing downrightness suits certain circumstances better. "The reverence of unshodden feet" is then discarded and Parson Yorick's want of discretion in words becomes artistically appropriate, hitting is more effective than hinting, and strong feeling finds strong expression without offending good taste. "Every species of composition," says De Quincey, "is to be tried by its own laws," each has, what Sainte-Beuve calls, its *ecueil particulier* as well, and it is not sound criticism to impeach a *jeu d'esprit* on the charge that it fails to conform to the canons applicable to a *chef d'œuvre*. Yet an essay on dreams and a treatise on indigestion may both be literature and display art in suitable degrees and qualities. Similarly, the style of every writer should be judged on its own merits taking into account the subject, the individual, the aim and the art, and so the simple styles of Bunyan, Swift and Defoe on the one hand, and the gaudy styles of Gibbon, Pater and Ruskin on the other, will each be found to have its own special timbre. There is thus no absolute criterion of style any more than there is such a criterion of truth and beauty, the only criterion being that applicable by those who have a sense of good style and can recognise it in any guise, classical or romantic, imaginative or matter of fact. Style is the resultant of three forces—intellect, personality and craftsmanship—working in communion and ending in union. The head, the heart, and the hand each has its own tone, while their common chord is a triad which should be harmonious, but rarely is, the diapason being broken because one of the tones is more fundamental or characteristic. The writer's responses to internal and external stimuli vary with the nature and distribution of his gifts and acquisitions, and are so resolved into qualities of style, the sources of which are mainly mental, spiritual or physical. The innumerable unsatisfying definitions of style make one chary of attempting another, and definition is really superfluous if one has grasped and can apply the idea of a thing, that generalized conception of its absolute essentials as distinguished from the relative qualities of its particular instances. The idea of prose style, as conveyed in this essay, may perhaps be put clearly and concisely enough to focus comprehension on. It is essentially and immutably manner, not a mere intellectual gesture or literary accent, not an inexplicable and incommunicable fragrance peculiar to the finer flowers of literature, but the whole manner in which ideas are conceived and brought into the world as written words, manner of thinking, manner of feeling, and manner of expression, good style being sincerely appropriate manner, appropriate to the subject, appropriate to the writer, appropriate to the occasion, and appropriate to the object or end in view.[1]

LIONEL B. BURROWS

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[1] An amplification of a previous article on the same subject by the author, published in the *Calcutta Review* for May, 1922.—*Ed., C. R.*

EDUCATION FOR PEACE

Since the World War, the idea of furthering the cause of World Peace has received considerable attention from various quarters. Among other things, the promoters of the League of Nations claim that the League came into existence, to further the ideal of "eternal peace" which was so nobly and consistently advocated by the great philosopher Kant in "Towards Perpetual Peace" which was issued in 1795.

Lately various Peace Societies of the world have awarded prizes to many distinguished men for their contributions to the cause of World Peace. The selection of Dr. Stresseman, M. Briand and Sir Austin Chamberlain, as the recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, for the work done by them in bringing about the conclusion of the Locarno Pact, has received world-wide approval. The Locarno Pact, however, did not solve all the problems of international distrust and rivalry, but it has, nevertheless, proven afresh that with real will to peace among the statesmen of the world solutions of difficult international problems can be attained without appeal to arms and by arbitration. This idea is not a new one, for this has been practised in all ages on various occasions whenever statesmen deliberately decided to avoid war.

The Locarno Pact is merely a regional one affecting as it does only a section of western Europe; it does not solve the difficulties in other quarters. Thus the Polish representatives in the League of Nations are demanding a new pact which will have a far wider scope resembling the Locarno Pact, and the Dutch Foreign Minister, supported by the representatives of many small nations, has put forward a resolution in the League Assembly, to revive the General Security Pact of 1924 which was discarded by the League of Nations, due to the opposition of Great Powers, especially Great Britain. It is rather a very good omen of the time that Dr. Stresseman, on behalf of the great German nation, has advocated in his recent speech in the League Assembly that the German Government should do all that is possible to promote economic stabilization of the world, security for all nations and disarmament. These incidents should give courage to all workers for the cause of World Peace, although they might have been disappointed at the failure of the Anglo-American-Japanese Naval Disarmament Conference, and Lord Robert Cecil's frank statement accusing the British Government of not supporting the ideal of disarmament and the League of Nations in practice.

The most heartening thing that should inspire all who are working for the cause of World Peace is the advocacy of the need of "outlawing war" by such persons as M. Briand, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University, as well as Senator Borah and numerous other persons of less prominence, but no less integrity.

M. Briand has indicated that a treaty, outlawing war between the United States and France, would not only be most welcome, but it would be the most important thing in the history of international relations and peace movements. This idea has received considerable support and cordial reception among many people of the United States, although some of the politicians have pronounced concealed disapproval. President Butler, with his outstanding position of one of the greatest intellectual leaders of the world, has not only approved of the position taken by M. Briand and other statesmen, but has been in recent years exerting untiring efforts for the cause of World Peace by outlawing war among all the civilized peoples of the world. It is to be hoped that in 1928 by the time of the 150th anniversary of the Franco-American Alliance, which played the most significant part in bringing about the independence of the United States, France and America will be able to set a noble example to the rest of the world that these two great peoples, wishing nothing but peace, *can outlaw war*, by agreeing to arbitrate all issues that may arise in future in their dealings, because they are not afraid to submit to Justice.

Outlawing war would mean ending a most barbarous practice among the civilized nations—the most far-reaching revolution in human society; and none should expect that this will be accomplished in a very short time and without great effort. To bring about a change in practice it is imperative that there should be decided and effective change in ideal. President Butler is not a visionary; but he is an idealist, philosopher, great educator, and statesman of vision, who realizes that a lasting change in human affairs can only come through education. Thus he has undertaken to educate world opinion to the ideal of World Peace by outlawing war. He has been engaged in this work of promoting world peace for many years, by spreading the idea of international conciliation and co-operation; but his recent visits to various countries of Europe and his addresses to the most distinguished audiences of various lands can well be characterised as a New Mission for World Peace.

Among the educators of the world, there are many who may be thinking along the same lines as President Butler; and it may be confidently hoped that every Head of great centres of learning in all countries and every responsible educator will support Dr. Butler in his efforts to create an "international mind" championing the "will to peace" and in favour of outlawing war.

TARAKNATH DAS

GS 1453

LIGHT IN DARKNESS

I

To men be I insane or cheat
For love of Thee, my Love!
Dispraise of men how sweet I feel
All warmth of praise above.
Dispraise gives vision of truth within—
The love-flame burning there;
Praise but robs me of myself,
By word of men made sore.
The child in fear to mother flies;
From praise to Thee I fly,
How sweet it is, O Mother mine,
On Thy breast to live and die.
If for my vileness Thee men praise
That Thou canst save even me,
A joy unseen on heart descends
To rise as praise of Thee!

II

" If things of time and things beyond
Are taken as truly two,
Thy suff'rings then shall know no end
But grow as ever grew.
Make them one and thou shalt see
In time Eternity,
And pain will teach that joy to prize
—The joy whose name is great surprise,"

III

I stand a beggar at gate of grace
O turn me not unfed away
I know deserve I not Thy grace
To witness Love's unlov'd love sway.

IV

Thy joy, O Love, I forsake,
Thirsting for Thy power;
Palsied muke me in and out
A prisoner in Thy bower!
Without Thee life is naught but woe,
And with Thee I am joyous glow.

V

If I forget Thee midst life's din
Forget me not, tho' black my sin!

VI

By word of mouth I worship Thee
My heart is far away.
I thank Thee e'en for gift of words
Word, mind, soul own Thy sway.
I and all I take as mine
All—all shall ever be
As naught—as nothing, O Love supreme
Away, O Lord, from Thee.
Thou art I am, Thou ever shalt be
If Thou to naught reducest me!

VII

Thou art what good I find,
  Thou art what ill I call ;
Faith shows as one, beyond—
  The One she shows as all.

VIII

Of Thee forgetful ever I, Love,
  My treason knows no bound,
May I see Thy light, O Love
  In gloom of life profound!
For moments I Thy presence feel
And yearn for life's that joyous seal.
In midst of all my struggle and strife
The true light Thou in darkest life.

MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJI

A STRAY THOUGHT

A BOUQUET.

On my table is a bouquet. I fancy I am an Ottoman prince or a Mogul tyrant indulging in revelry within the cool shade of a harem, full of enchanting ladies. The fairest damsels have been purchased for my pleasure. I take deep breaths and the fine perfume insinuates itself into my heart. I can clutch them to my bosom—dare any of them protest? Ah no! they are mine, absolutely mine. They dare not shrink from my coarse touch. A smile plays upon their tender lips. I hold them in my hand. They are feathery light. I recline on the sofa. In the midst of my revelry a feeling of satiety slowly creeps in and makes me pensive. How many tender stems have been robbed of their fair flowers! Perhaps an entire garden has been made desolate.

I place the bouquet on my table and look at its beauty composedly. There is still that dewy freshness upon the flowers. The petals are still bright and supple, soft and sweet, delicate and delightful. They are absorbed in their own happiness. A halo of purity plays round them. I wonder at my own transformation. The beastly madness is scared away and a feeling of devotion makes tears of joy trickle down my cheeks. The scene of the erstwhile harem vanishes and I find myself in the presence of a holy spirit so long concealed under a fairy cloak. My erring mind confesses its guilt and the Spirit out of his Supreme Divineness blesses my soul. Since then I have learnt that innocent beauty is another name of Divinity.

Rash Ranjan Basu

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY
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HISTORICAL STUDIES

Example is better than precept, and I wish I had the ability to provide, as your President did last year, an address containing original research. If time had permitted I would have attempted at least some collation and personal interpretation of my reading. Time pressed, so I have fallen back on a general discussion of the benefits of historical studies. The subject should interest this association, especially those members who have recently chosen history for study at the University. Only a minority will become professional teachers of history so it is just as well that I should discuss the subject from an unprofessional point of view. That is my own point of view because, though I studied History at two universities and have read it more or less continuously all my life, I have not for many years taught or read it systematically.

Some of you may have chosen history as a short cut to a degree, a key to the door of services and professions. Most of you, I hope, looked further and tried to weigh the *pros* and *cons* of your choice. Those who did may be interested to hear what, in my opinion, they are likely to gain, and what they cannot expect to gain, from their historical studies. The views I express are personal, and, though I shall for brevity state them somewhat dogmatically, I claim no authority for them. I shall deal first with the limitations of historical studies.

Any of you who hope to find out Truth (with a capital T) will, I think, be disappointed with History. From the days when Socrates and his eager young friends disputed for days "concerning Virtue, and what it is," to those of the modern undergraduates who, absorbed in similar inquiries, still "Tire the Sun with talking and send him down the sky." Pilate's question "What is Truth?" has been a will-o'-the-wisp to young students. Those who feel its lure irresistible should choose natural science, philosophy or theology, for there they are more likely to find some satisfaction. History, it has been well said, "is a purely relative study. It seeks, not the ultimate, but the immediate causes and results of human action." The quest for ultimate causes is a noble one, and it is not only the young who feel drawn to it. It often returns later in life. If I had to choose a library to take for two years to prison or a desert island those books would be mainly theological, though history has been my life study. History trains the human intellect but does not satisfy its deepest needs.

If the search for ultimate causes is in all ages an intellectual hunger which historical studies will not feed, there is another search, still more attractive in this age, on which most historical students must turn their backs. Why has Oxford instituted a Modern Greats School? Why are so many American Universities offering general courses which emphasize the inter-relation of all human knowledge? Why this growing tendency to synthesis of studies? I think the answer is to be found in what has been called the modern literature of despair. Biologists prate of racial deterioration, psychologists of evil crowd impulses, publicists tell us that democracy is played out and that administration has become too complicated for human capacity, economists deplore a civilization dehumanized by machinery, some historians pretend that we are following a cycle towards decadence, and moralists point to general apostacy from standards necessary for stable civilization. All these gloomy forebodings have been popularized by novelists and journalists until most of us feel the prospect black. But there is also a modern literature of hope based on the possibility of effective social control. For that, it seems, we must mobilize nationally and internationally all the world's present knowledge, scientific, educational, economic, political and ethical. For such a mobilization of specialists we require leaders,

" ring-masters with just enough of the alloy of mountebankery" to touch the imagination of the masses (*vide* articles on Outlook for Western Civilization by G. Frank, reprinted in *Calcutta Review*, April, 1926); these leaders will need also to be generally acquainted with all human knowledge. All this may well be true. If so, the national and international leaders of to-morrow should be taking general courses, and history graduates will not get much of a look in. That may or may not be a serious objection to specializing in history ; but it is certainly true that an increasing number of students now feel attracted to synthetic courses, and that those who specialize in history are sure to feel some disappointment later at the importance of certain fields of knowledge about which they are ignorant.

I fancy that many Burmese undergraduates now aspire to become professional politicians and it may be that some have chosen historical studies with political careers in view. If they become serious students they are likely to be disappointed. A labour politician who could speak fluently on any subject once went for two years to Ruskin College. After that period of study he could no longer speak fluently on any subject because he knew too much and had lost his old certainty and conviction. The men who lead crowds, and get things done are generally men of narrow views and intense convictions. Historical studies train a man to see many sides to all questions and that often causes failure in public life. Conscientious and thorough historical studies will make you more reasonable and enlightened politicians, but I doubt if they will make you more successful politicians. In spite of this warning I do not wish to dissuade future politicians from historical studies. What they may lose in personal success they will gain in personal merit. They may be less successful politicians, but they will certainly be better citizens.

Let us consider next what is to be gained by historical studies. Students of this college will, I hope, acquire what has been called *The Academic Spirit.*

The best students in any university worthy of the name acquire this spirit, which has been defined as follows:

> "The essence of the best academic spirit is a willingness to face facts, to discard cherished theories when fuller evidence makes them no longer tenable, to suspend judgment upon matters upon which certainty is unattainable, to welcome criticisms and to hear difference of opinion with tolerance. Few of the undergraduates who have spent three years in a university are scholars, and fewer still, of course, are qualified to make any addition to knowledge themselves. But, in so far as they have taken advantage of their opportunities, they ought to have acquired a standard of thoroughness, to have become accustomed to reading books in a spirit of enquiring criticism, not of mere acquiescence and to have obtained some idea of the foundations upon which knowledge reposes and the methods by which it is advanced, they ought to be able to weigh evidence, follow and criticise an argument, to put their own value on authorities, and to prefer sober truth to pretentious superficiality."—*English Adult Education Committee's Report, 1919.*

University men acquire and retain this spirit in varying degrees. I shall mention it again later when discussing judgment. In some cases an excess of it leads to paralysis of action and this charge used often to be brought against men who were supposed to be typical products of my own university, Oxford. Yet few will deny that we need more of that spirit in the world to-day. No subject is more academic, in the best sense of the word, than history. In studying history we are constantly faced with problems, and the historian's method of dealing with problems is the fairest method of dealing with the problems of life. An advocate selects the facts he needs but the historian collects all the relevant facts he can find. The best historians often leave judgment on these facts to their readers. The university student's task is first to master thoroughly all the relevant facts he can collect, and then to form from them a judgment on the problem before him, which is also a question of fact. If he tries to save time by accepting other people's conclusions without mastering the facts on which they are based, he is losing the most valuable part of his training.

A sound historical training gives constant practice in forming judgments and should, therefore, prove the best possible training for the affairs of life. It is true that the university student judges only questions of fact, whereas the man of the world has to decide also questions of action ; but both should reach their conclusions by the same processes.

Let us consider further the *training of judgment* for it is the most valuable thing you will get from your historical studies, and your best safeguard against an excessively academic outlook. Judgment translated into action is the first requisite for men of affairs, especially business men. It is less necessary for teachers, hence the traditional type of professor, a child in the affairs of the world. No bore is more intolerable than the learned bore whose mind retains an infinite store of information which he is incapable of using except to retail. A judicial temperament and judicial capacity come from long training best acquired in the university of life. Nevertheless a teaching university provides useful preliminary training. Students are often impatient at having to spend time on remote periods of history and problems that have comparatively little connection with modern life. Nevertheless remote problems which it is easy to consider dispassionately give more valuable mental training than those more closely connected with our own prejudices. The young historical student is not likely to acquire capacity for dispassionate judgment if he neglects preliminary training in ancient and medieval history. Burke observed very acutely that "men are wise with but little reflection, and good with little self-denial, in the business of all times save their own." It is therefore prudent to begin on what is easiest, and train our judgments to work dispassionately before attempting to use them on modern problems.

I once read an essay by an able Indian student on Shepstone's annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. He had read a great deal about the period and must have known something of the tangled condition of affairs which led to that momentous event. None could have offered to a dispassionate student a better opportunity for exercising his historical judgment. This student was so full of nationalist and anti-Imperial zeal (honourable, no doubt, but requiring restraint in a historian) that he did not deign to reproduce the knowledge he had acquired but confined his essay to a vigorous defence of the rights of small nations suffering from imperial oppression. Those who have taught ancient history to university students know the danger of their carrying modern political prejudices and standards of judgment even into such studies. We acquire new knowledge by association with old knowledge, so there is great temptation to such an easy method of approach; but the harder way, to acquire laboriously a sufficient knowledge of the period in question and use imagination and sympathy in applying that knowledge, is the only historical method.

A historical judgment means an impartial judgment and for this imagination is no less necessary than knowledge of facts. Study of a period should enable the student to translate himself into the past and recreate the atmosphere in which men lived and struggled then. Take sides, if your judgment compels, but not until you have considered all essential facts; above all suppress none. After some experience as an examiner I think I would advise you to take sides for that will help you to write vigorously; but the best way for the historian or examinee to take sides in an ancient controversy is to take both sides in turn, and so bring back to life the feelings and arguments of all the protagonists.

The historian should beware of exercising his judgment beyond questions of fact. Moral judgments, though interesting, should generally be suppressed. Ernest Lavisse, one of the greatest teachers of history, used to repeat with impassioned emphasis to generation after generation of students at the Sorbonne; "I do not judge, I do not praise, I do not blame, I verify and record facts." That did not mean that he abstained from using his judgment but that he confined it to facts, their causes and results, and refused to label actions right or wrong. Behind his judgments of fact lay exhaustive study of the psychology, environment and ideals of the actors; he entered into their very souls. Though a free thinker he lectured for years with exemplary tenderness and sympathy on those champions of faith and predestination, the Jesuits and Jansenists, whose differences disturbed Seventeenth Century France. I have been one of the students who thronged his lecture theatre, and he impressed on me for life his views on the responsibilities and limitations of historical judgment.

We cannot judge facts without studying motives and it is here we are most often tempted to waste our time over prejudiced moralizing. The danger constantly occurs when we are studying the development of religious ideas, and their consequences. To this day few Englishmen are capable of unbiassed judgment on the characters of Knox and Laud. Few men have earned severer judgment, or more indiscriminate praise. That is because both were of the unacademic type to which I have recently referred, saw clearly what they wanted and got things done regardless of consequences. Historical students, at any rate those of English or Scotch nationality, will be wise to leave praise or blame of Knox and Laud to polemical writers and be content to understand their motives and how each managed to preserve and give its present form to the Church of his respective nation.

Students without strong religious sympathies risk another danger, that of regarding the clashes of deep convictions as petty squabbles. In such cases nothing but study and an effort of imagination will save them from mistaken judgment on questions of vital historical importance. Such efforts of imagination are specially needed by Europeans studying Indian or Burmese history, and by Burmans or Indians studying European history.

To sum up what I have said on judgment: Training of judgment is the chief benefit to be derived from historical studies. The historical student should aim at an unprejudiced, impartial judgment based on thorough, sympathetic and imaginative study of people and their actions. His judgments should be confined to facts, their causes, and consequences. Moral judgments are best avoided.

Next in value I would place the training historical students get in formulating and testing *generalizations.*

All higher studies proceed by a process of ascertaining facts and systematizing them into concepts. In the exact sciences these concepts are natural laws, in the inexact science of history they are always more or less erroneous, and exemplify the proverb that the exception proves the rule. They are none the less valuable for they stimulate the imagination, aid the memory, and systematize knowledge. A historical comparison helps us to remember two facts at once: A historical generalization enables us to remember a large number of facts at once and is a strong stimulus to the acquisition of new facts. That is why a historical generalization is so often set for discussion in examinations. Students should formulate their own generalizations, but I fear that they get most of them second hand from text-books and lectures. Even so they are very useful if carefully tested and used for the acquisition and systematization of further knowledge. The value of a historical generalization depends on the amount of material which can be produced in illustration. Of principles and illustrations it has been well said that "each without the other appeals to the memory alone. United, they form the training of a man; divided, they resemble the meaningless chatter of a parrot." Though I am talking about history, there is, I fear, too little history in this address. You may, therefore, welcome a few historical generalizations as illustrations here. All are worth careful study, each would furnish materials for several lectures. Some are old generalizations which have not stood the test of time; others will suggest many exceptions as well as illustrations :

"Burma is geographically, racially and linguistically a unit."

" Burmans have always been a democratic race free from any caste system."

" The Burmese Kings were absolute monarchs."

" The history of European expansion is the history of struggles for a hinterland."

" Wars are followed by loss of civil liberties."

" Material prosperity produces political lethargy."

" In Lancastrian England Constitutional progress had outrun administration."

" The War of American Independence destroyed Whig ascendency in England."

On the ebullitions of mob fervour in 18th Century England :

" Feeling vaguely aggrieved and powerless to control the Government, the people at intervals seized the nearest catchword and raged against it."

" Reformation England was seething with economic unrest."

" Money lenders have controlled Europe since the 16th century."

" Cabinet Government was possible in the 18th century because England was a deferential country."

You will meet in your reading more subtle and pregnant historical generalizations than most of those I have just mentioned. I hope you will formulate others for yourselves. Those of you who undertake research work later will find this the hardest part of your work. Weakness in generalization is the fault of most historical theses. Too many research students are content to collect material laboriously without attempting to systematize and apply the facts they have acquired. They leave that to others partly because they have been allowed to undertake historical research with insufficient general knowledge and experience of historical method, and partly because they lack the flash of genius needed to illuminate the significance of their own labours, and so fail to formulate those general conclusions without which their work is incomplete and lacks distinction.

This suggests the next advantage you will get from your studies, *a training in historical method.* Some of you will get personal experience of methods of historical research, and you are all fortunate, for students of so young a university, in the amount of research work going on before you. The Government epigraphist every year deciphers and translates inscriptions, which throw light on the obscure subject of Burmese social and economic history. Many new sittans and other palm leaf manuscripts are deciphered yearly, and there are hundreds waiting for investigation. Ma Mya Sein during the last three years dealt with a large number, and produced a thesis on the myo-thu-gyi-ship which has thrown new light on the Burmese social system. Professor Pe Maung Tin, Mr. Furnival, Mr. J. A. Stuart and other members of the Burma Research Society are working on this mass of material and from time to time publish the result of their researches. Mr. Aspinall, recently on the teaching staff of this college, and still a lecturer in this University, has recently published a book containing the result of his research on an important period of English History. Professor Luce has for some years been collecting material for Burmese history from Chinese sources, and your College Library already contains more Chinese books than a historian could investigate and annotate in a life-time. Professor Hall has made the early relations between England and Burma his special study, and brings to it enthusiasm, laborious industry, special training, and an exceptional gift for lucid exposition. You are fortunate in having a chief who sets you so inspiring an example. Nothing could be more stimulating to a young historical student than the popular lectures, open to the public, at which Professor Hall from time to time summarizes the result of his recent inquiries. I wish I had experienced such an incentive when reading history as an undergraduate. You will nearly all devote some attention to the history of Burma, Published work on Burmese history is still so imperfect and conjectural that to study it at all to-day cannot fail to afford some insight into methods of historical research. As regards examples of historical research, and fields of historical research for those who are drawn to it, you students are certainly fortunate.

Yet, when all is said and done, the young historical student deals entirely with second-hand material, and can get full value out of his historical training without going further. Many a keen student, who cannot make history his profession, regrets that he has to go out into the world and earn his living without having done any original research, and without any prospect of leisure for it. That regret sometimes lasts through life but I doubt if there is often much justification for it. The specialist in research chooses a life of self-abnegation even as regards his own realm of knowledge; and this is still more true if he starts specializing too soon. He must choose knowledge rather than life, like Browning's Grammarian, and have some of his faith in knowledge and contempt of time :

> "Others mistrust, and say 'But time escapes.
> Live now or never.'
> He said 'What's time ? Leave now for dogs or apes,
> Man has Forever."

That is noble, but few of us, especially when young, are tempered for such abnegation.

There is much to be said for confining your historical studies to published writings; and, though this may be heresy in a university, I will go further and claim that there is some advantage in confining your studies to standard authors. The gain lies in the stimulus to be derived from good writing, in the increased amount of knowledge you can assimilate, the broader and more varied interests you acquire, and the number of important subjects on which you can exercise your historical judgment. The all-important thing is to observe historical method in all your studies, for their chief use is to train the mind in method through given material. Perhaps the most valuable course in History which this University provides is one taken by students reading for the Honours B.A. They read a mass of documents and general history connected with a fairly short but momentous period of South African history. The period and country in question are sufficiently remote for dispassionate study, all their material is printed and so can be rapidly assimilated, and so they get not only ample opportunities for exercising their historical judgment, but a sound practical training in historical method. Students are already taking this course as preparation for business life and they are wise. After such a course a man should be able to collect facts, weigh their respective value, and present them in an orderly and convincing manner towards the construction of an argument. What better training could be given to a clerk, secretary, judge, lawyer, administrator or man of business?

I have mentioned the benefit to be derived from reading good authors and it is certainly one of the advantages of historical reading that it brings you into touch with great literature. It is superficial, for instance, to study the Elizabethan period of English history without reading Elizabethan literature, or to examine the effect of the French Revolution on England without listening to England's voices of revolt, Coleridge, Keats, Byron and that "last and greatest voice," Wordsworth's which survived so long into a later and less troubled era. Yet some professional historians and many students have been so foolish.

Though certain historical writers of importance have written without charm or distinction it is fortunate that most of them have written clearly and many have written nobly. The English reading public owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. G. R. Trevelyan who has recently become Regius Professor of History at Cambridge. He has not only written history himself with lucidity and charm but he uttered a warning to his fellow historians at a time when it was needed. You will find the essay in a volume called *Recreations of a Historian*, first published in 1913. He observed that Gibbon, Macaulay, Motley, Prescott, Grote, Froude, Carlyle and Seeley were widely read by the preceding generation, but that the present generation considered history dull and seldom read it. I think these observations were true. As a boy I have found volumes of those old historians along with the Bible in many a small inn, but they were not often read then. A very great Headmaster, Howson of Holt, is reported to have said "Biography, biography! Why, isn't that nearly as dull as history?" I have worked under Howson and believe that story is true. Trevelyan analyzed the causes of the change and pleaded for better historical writing. When Oxford University began to teach history an old don protested because "every gentleman knows history." The effect of making history a university subject in the eighties and nineties was to produce too many professional historians who wrote without intellectual passion or literary charm. They were so anxious to prove their subject a science that they forgot that it is not an exact science and needs emotional interpretation. They devoted their best energies to accumulation of material and neglected the duty of lucid interpretation. They prated of the "Verdict of History," though no such verdict can be final. They had little difficulty, for they were laborious in research, in upsetting earlier verdicts, but time has proved that they had little justification in claiming finality for their own.. They stigmatized the great historians, whom "every gentleman" used to read, as unscientific, but they supplied nothing readable to replace them. Consequently, the man in the street accepted his dismissal, and few people except specialists read history at all.

Trevelyan's essay, which was widely discussed, had some effect, and the great war probably had more. At any rate the next fourteen years have produced far better vintages. Publishers have given us a number of books in history which have been widely read because they had something new to say and were written with distinction and charm. Some were written by scholarly specialists like Trevelyan himself, the earlier Belloc, and Ramsay Muir. Some by propagandists like the later Belloc, the two Chestertons and H. G. Wells. Mr. Lytton Strachey, a master of English, has studied the Victorian period as meticulously as any specialist and invented a new method of interpreting it. All the above modern writers on history, and many more, are worth reading as literature. Those who regret that circumstances have prevented them from specializing in history have this compensation that they can read all the history any man can reasonably desire, and yet read no bad writing. The specialist still suffers from the amount of important matter published in undigested, crude, and unattractive form. So, too, occasionally does the university student. My advice to the students before me is to read good authors with appreciation of style as well as matter, not to neglect standard authors because some of their theories have been refuted, and to cultivate sedulously the art of writing with lucidity. This will increase your chances of success in examinations, and in life, and, what is more important will bring much pure aesthetic pleasure into your lives. There is no thrill better than the thrill which comes from generous appreciation of a fine thought perfectly expressed, and to write what adequately expresses one's thoughts gives special satisfaction.

Let us consider last what moral edification may be obtained from historical studies. Misguided school teachers have too often encouraged moral judgments of historical persons and actions. I have, for instance, heard whole lessons spent on discussing whether the Declaration of Independence, the Execution of Charles I, and the Expulsion of the Rump were right or wrong. As we have already observed such inquiries violate the essential spirit of history. I may remark in passing that a common type of essay subject which asks what justification certain actors had for certain actions should be taken as an invitation to examine motives and circumstances and not as an invitation for moral judgment, we should get moral inspiration from studying the motives and actions of great and good men, but labelling actions right or wrong is morally as well as historically an objectionable practice.

There is danger also in using history to teach the type of patriotism which emphasizes a nation's military achievements, conquests and claims to racial superiority rather than its contributions towards human civilization and progress. Germany has been, and Italy is now, the worst offender in this respect, but the United States and all great European nations have erred in the same way. English children in our best schools still get much clearer and more detailed instruction on the Seven Years' War than on the abolition of slavery, their country's most glorious achievement.

In spite of these dangers history is more fruitful in moral edification than any other academic study. It cannot fail to impress on the serious student the continuity of all human action and the essential unity of all mankind. Such impressions will be a safeguard against irresponsible behaviour and racial intolerance. Many people need a clearer vision of the common needs and common achievements of humanity, and the study of history will supply that need.

The growth of internationalism through the ages deserves special study. Ever since the age of the renaissance and geographical discovery the idea of ending war by international agreement has been the aspiration of the salt of the earth throughout four centuries. The ideals of the League of Nations are not new. Witness in the 16th century Henry IV's Grand Design, what Grotius taught in the seventeenth century while the Thirty Years' War was raging, Penn's Essay Towards Peace, and the Abbe St. Pierre's Project of Eternal Peace in the eighteenth century ; witness in the nineteenth century, the age of steamers, railways, and telegrams, the growth of International Law, the Hague Conference and Tribunal, how many wars have been prevented by arbitration on boundaries, navigation, and fisheries, and how often international co-operation has aided social legislation and the development of Science and Medicine. Yet we must not make the common mistake of measuring the progress of Universal Brotherhood by the halting progress of International Law. All successful law systems rest not only on the consent of those who benefit but on their ability to make their will prevail. The will for peace and brotherhood has been continuously frustrated by faulty political institutions. The collective morality of mankind lags sadly behind its individual morality. The problem of the day in international, national, and local public life is how to translate into collective action the individual good-will of the majority. We all know how reasonable men are when we meet them personally but how hard it is to get any reform executed. Nineteenth century complacency with regard to political institutions has vanished even in England. All over the world men feel the need for better machinery for collective action, international, national, provincial, and local. Hence, the importance of thoroughly understanding the League of Nations and other plans for international action, national and provincial constitutions, and systems of local self-government. Study of constitutional history is the best introduction and a strong incentive to such inquiries, and it should, therefore, be of absorbing interest to university students to-day. Yet how few students when they read about the English Municipal Act of 1835 realize half of the personal interest it should have for them, and how few text-books give it adequate treatment.

The study of political institutions is liable to leave an impression of hopeless frustration and has made some people pessimists. Yet historical studies should on the whole create a healthy optimism. They have left me with a passionate belief not only in the unity of mankind but also in human progress. If it is right for old men like myself to dream dreams, it is right for young men, like you, to see visions. Every right-thinking young man desires to leave the world better for his stay in it and the study of history should do much to stimulate that impulse. The story of capitalism, of its grip on European social and political life for four centuries, is an ugly story. So is the story of how official Christianity abandoned its early insistence on social morality and came to condone and encourage oppression of the weak by the strong. But the story of the fight against the evils of the capitalist and industrial system is a glorious story. It began in England and continues there and in India to-day. The growth of ideals of social service and of machinery for social service is a significant chapter of modern history, all the more interesting to our generation because the best of it will be written after we are dead. I hope you will study it from its somewhat obscure beginnings in eighteenth century England to its recent developments in Europe, India and Burma. The work of the Servants of India, the Social Service League, the Ramkrishna Mission, is historically linked not only with India's past, but with the work of Francis Place, Robert Owen, William Lovett and Lord Shaftesbury. The connection is a historical fact of which both Indians and Englishmen are proud. History will teach you what you owe both to the past and to the future, and, unless you are temperamentally cynical or soured by circumstances, will make your ideal nothing less than that which John Addington Symonds set forth in a famous hymn which I once heard sung by over 1,000 persons brought together from all parts of the earth by the common cause of Universal Brotherhood.

Usher Hall, July, 1925.

These things shall be, a loftier race
    Than e'er the world hath known shall rise
With flame of freedom in their souls,
    And light of knowledge in their eyes;

They shall be gentle, brave and strong
    To spill no drop of blood, but dare
All that may plant man's lordship firm
    On earth, and fire, and sea, and air.

Nation with nation, land with land,
    Unarmed shall live as comrades free;
In every heart and brain shall throb
    The pulse of one fraternity.

New arts shall bloom of loftier mould,
    And mightier music thrill the skies,
And every life shall be a song,
    When all the earth is paradise.

I thank you for the honour you have done me in inviting me to be President of your Association, and for giving me the privilege of addressing it. It is a great privilege and responsibility to address such a gathering of university students, for their future and the future of their country depend largely on how for three short years they use their opportunities. I wish I could have illustrated my points by more instances from Asiatic history but I could use only such knowledge as I possessed, and my historical training has been mainly through the medium of western material. Yours also will probably be largely through the same medium, for books on Eastern History, except that of India, are still few and defective. If any of you can contribute later to the material available for students of Burmese and Far Eastern History you will deserve well of your University and of your generation. Aim high at this or any other worthy mark, but do not let plans for to-morrow lead to neglect the duties of to-day. Students who take themselves too seriously are often too easily satisfied with their daily work. Your immediate aim must be to equip yourself for your life-work by taking full advantage of the sound historical training now offered in this University.[1]

J. P. BULKELEY

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[1] Presidential Address read in September, 1927, before the Rangoon University College Historical Association.

A FULL-MOON NIGHT

I love a glorious full-moon night;
The earth, the sky, the trees, the hills
Are flooded with its silv'ry light:
With what fantastic joy it fills
My heart. To walk with arms entwined,
My love and I, in phantom guise,
And one in soul and one in mind,
Would be to me a paradise;

But 'tis the light that wakes in me
Sad thoughts at best of one, who loved
The full moon light, the fairy she,
To me a lover true who proved.
She lay upon her bed in white,
A rav'shing beauty, young and gay,
Upon her blazed the full moon light,
Her life was fading fast away.

She pointed out to me the brook,
O'er which the moonbeam softly danced,
She asked me at the hills to look—
With ecstasy at me she glanced.
And on a moonlit night she took
My hand in hers and sweetly smiled,
She spake of love with such a look,
And flooded me with kisses wild.

I owned my love to her, she felt
So happy in her ebbing life,
My heart did break, my eyes did melt,
She thought she came to be my wife:
Upon that lovely full-moon night,
From mortal coil her soul was free;
I hear her voice in soft moonlight,
Her fairy form in moonbeam see.

C. C. MUKERJI

ON MODERNISING SPINOZA

II

Now, to come to a closer grip with the details of Professor Alexander's procedure in dealing with the solvent of Time as brought to bear on the study of Spinoza, it must, at the outset, be admitted to the credit of Professor Alexander that he has in this monograph on Spinoza, worked out, with his characteristic originality and subtlety, a plea for a re-interpretation of Spinoza which, if not always convincing, is wonderfully stimulating and suggestive. Here, as elsewhere, he brings to the execution of his task that wonted ease, and grace of style that mark him out as a consummate artist—a past master in 'the artistry of truth.' By reason of its sheer artistic finish and stylistic beauty, it is destined to rank as one of the romances of modern philosophy. This is surely high praise, and praise justly due to the author. But it is here exactly, as we venture to think, that he shares, with many others, the faults of his greatness. One who has followed out rather closely his arguments in the 'Abstract' on 'Space-Time,'[1] or his famous Gifford Lectures (1916-18), or, even this brochure in question, will hardly fail to notice that their author has not infrequently lapsed into 'word-painting' or making 'imagery and metaphor do the business of reasoning and logic. Like Bergson, whom he compliments for 'taking time seriously,' he is a great visualiser. Passages might be quoted from his other works,—but we can substantiate this point of criticism from the present work. Take, *e.g.*, the passage 'the stuff of reality is not stagnant, its soul's wings are never furled, and in virtue of this unceasing movement it strikes out fresh complexes of movements, created things' (p. 42) or even the passage 'sharing in the nisus of the universe, caught as we are in the wheels of that being, which arising out of the chaos of Space-Time evolves levels of beings with their conatus, but always retains the unused chaos which allows of the emergence of new levels' (p. 77); and on closer scrutiny the mode of reasoning as exhibited herein will be found to be more captivating than convincing.

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[1] Read on July 5th, 1918, before the Aristotelian Society.

(1) In the first place, the passages just quoted—which may be said to adumbrate roughly Professor Alexander's metaphysical position—are typical Bergsonian in tone and conception, and thus open to the same criticisms more or less so often urged against Bergson. They display the same fondness for visual imagery, the same passion for novelty and the same fascination for a cosmic evolution. Now the fundamental consequence of the substitution of Time for thought in the Spinozistic attributes, would be the view of 'ultimate reality'—'reality in its barest character'—as 'Space-Time' or motion itself'[1] 'the stuff out of which by various distributions all things arise.'[2] The last clause is simply a variant of the language employed in the 'Abstract' (already referred to) in outlining the hypothesis 'that Space-Time is the stuff out of which all existents are made:' 'Existents are complexes of Space-Time, that is, of Motion; they are, as it were, crystals within the matrix, or eddies within this vast whirlpool. As Time goes on, higher and higher complexes of the spatio-temporal stuff emerge with qualities, the scale of such qualities, *e.g.*, materiality, colour, life, mind, whether it begins with materiality or at a simpler stage, being itself unending.'[3] Even on making due allowances for imagery and figurative expressions employed in this story of Cosmo-genesis as told by Professor Alexander (and as might be justly attributed to M. Bergson), one would detect what Professor Perry has not inaptly phrased—the twin errors of 'pseudo-simplicity' and 'indefinite potentiality' in their construction of ultimate reality, and of its relation to existing things. Further, it is difficult to see how

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[1] S. & T. P. 36.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 70.

[3] Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1917-18, pp. 417-8.

'reality in its barest character' or 'ultimate reality' can be a 'stuff,' not to speak of pure motion, with which he proceeds to equate it. One is perfectly at a loss to realise what exactly Professor Alexander is driving at by this newly coined term 'stuff.' When we try to categorise or liken it to the traditional notions of 'reality in its barest character,' we are simply baffled in our endeavour to encompass its nature. We can surely understand when we are told that 'we are such stuff as dreams are made of' but we are certainly baffled when we are bidden to realise—unless it be by way of a poetic license—that 'Space-Time or Motion itself' is 'the stuff out of which by various distributions all things (including ourselves) arise.' At first sight one wonders if it is not the ancient Phoenix of Hyle reborn from its ashes, or the 'matter,' of a much later age, resurrected and etherealised. But the very ground underneath this assumption is cut away, when we remember that neither of these had 'motion' as one of its attributes, far less be synonymous therewith. Instead of explaining how exactly pure motion can strike out 'fresh complexes of movements, created things,'—and this is the very crux of the situation he has created by his novel thesis—Professor Alexander seems to be only dogmatising on the point that it does so, and thus committing, what we may not, unjustly, ascribe to him, a fallacy of verbalism. In all fairness to him, we must of course admit that he has at one place in his gloss on Spinoza offered an explanation of this point by way of comparing this 'Space-Time' 'to the space which in the Platonic *Timaeus* is that which receives definite character through the ingression (I borrow the word from Mr. Whitehead) of the Forms or Ideas.'[1] But, as he carefully points out, his Space-Time is a distinct advance on the Platonic space which is 'purely spatial, and contains intrinsically no time.'[2] By such incorporation of time into the notion of 'ultimate reality' Professor Alexander persuades himself that he has solved the outstanding difficulties of Spinozism. This innovation and advance he signalises by the studied avoidance of the Spinozistic term 'substance' and substituting all through the term 'stuff' in its place. One of the reasons, as he tells us, of speaking 'of the ultimate reality of motion not as substance but as stuff' is that by so doing we can avoid the standing 'contrast of the Spinozistic Substance and its modes'[1] on which so much ink has been hitherto spilled unnecessarily. Further, as he thinks, 'in this way the danger is avoided which besets Spinoza's doctrine, the danger that the modes or things should be engulfed in an ultimate being which purports to be the positive ground of its modes, but always is on the point of slipping into bare indefiniteness.'[2] As a further consequence of thus regarding things as 'modes of the stuff which is Space-Time'[3] is that 'their relation to their ground is no longer that of the properties of a triangle to the triangle, but rather that of the two triangles which compose an oblong to the oblong. They are involved in the oblong.'[4] Finally, 'directly Time has become an attribute of the ultimate reality,'[5] the order in the sequence of the modes from God's nature on which order, according to Spinoza, their degree of perfection depends, "ceases to be merely a logical one (as in Spinoza), and becomes temporal. The grades of moral perfection are no longer a 'static' series of forms, but a hierarchy produced in the order of time."[6]

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[1] S. & T., p. 37.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 39.

(2) Now, as a result of this gloss, the Spinozistic Substance undergoes a tran-substantiation, admittedly, too catholic and radical to retain its original designation, and to justify the substitution of the other term 'Stuff' in characterising 'the ultimate Reality.' But what's in a name?—one may very pertinently enquire. Does the so-called 'Stuff' charged with

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 37.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 40.
[3] *Ibid*, pp. 41-42.
[4] *Ibid*, p, 42.
[5] *Ibid*, p, 44.
[6] *Ibid*, pp. 44-45.

'time-fulness or restlessness'[1] fare any better than the traditional 'Substance' in obviating the standing difficulties of the Spinozistic system? If it does, we can, of course, see into the *raison d'être* of the proposed gloss on Spinoza; otherwise, there is conceivably no point in the substitution in question. On this point it is instuctive to note how Professor Whitehead (from whom Professor Alexander has in the book at least borrowed and quoted with approval more than once) has responded to the task of re-interpreting and modernising the 'Substance' of Spinoza in strict keeping with the requirements of 'Science and the Modern World'—which is the very title of the book that has broached the problem. "In the analogy with Spinoza," as he puts it himself[2] "his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes," and proceeds to elaborate the 'analogy' further, thus[3]: "The general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. There is nothing with which to compare it: it is Spinoza's one infinite substance." Evidently Professor Whitehead, for whose way of thinking Professor Alexander has an avowed sympathy and admiration, does not find the Spinozistic Substance unsuited to the exigencies of their kindred characterisation of ultimate reality. Probably the main consideration which leads Professor Alexander to speak 'of the ultimate reality of motion, not as substance but as stuff' based on 'the vital contrast' of 'the infinite or *a priori* stuff of the Universe' and the empirical things or substances which are parts or modes of it, is the deep concern he shows for the Kantian criticism 'that the categories of finite things are not applicable to the ground of finite things.' Unfortunately, he does not stop to enquire whether on a consistent application of the same principle of criticism, 'the infinite or *a priori* stuff of the Universe' can be suffered to hold the ground. Particularly the physical analogy of 'involving' he uses in this context—Space-Time as the stuff involving things as its modes—evidently makes a transcendent use of a category, which has its meaning and exemplification in a more limited sphere. The decision in favour of this '*a priori* stuff' was further precipitated by what may, not unfairly, be called, a prejudging of the metaphysical issues of the theory of relativity, and a deliberate departure from the physical theory it is meant to be. Whether such advance in respect of a theory 'on which discussion has yet to do its work'[1] was well advised or not is another matter; but it was probably suggested to him and justified on the authority of 'one pronounced supporter of the relativity theory'[2] who 'maintains that when it is said that Space-Time is wrinkled or warped in the presence of matter—this means that matter is the very wrinkle in Space-Time.'[3] But is this piece of argument quite sound and acceptable? Does it not amount to saying *totidem verbis* that because matter appears in a particular relation, *therefore* that exclusive relation constitutes the very essence of matter or that matter is to be defined thereby - a specious argument comparing not unfavourably with the Berkeleyan thesis of idealism which, as Professor Perry justly observed, is guilty of the fallacies of 'exclusive particularity' and 'definition by initial predication.'

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 42.

[2] Science and the Modern World, p. 99.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 248.

(3) However, in choosing to call ultimate reality—even reality in its barest character—'stuff and not substance,' Professor Alexander has, as we shall presently see, taken a retrograde step, and, instead of making towards Reality, seems to have been led by a circuitous path, perilously near the 'lion's den' with *nulla vestigia retrorsum* which he thought he had avoided with the magic discovery of Time. But through the

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[1] S. and T. P., 39.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 40.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 40.

studied rejection of Substance, he has failed to substantiate the pledge, and has ended by definitely subscribing to one of the two irreconcilable characteristics of Substance between which Spinoza alternated throughout his philosophical career. It is the conception of the absolute 'totality of all things....... The mere togetherness of things,' the 'stuff of which they are pieces, the material out of which they are made.'[1] Such a togetherness, or 'stuff' or material whatever else it is, is not, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, entitled to the name of Reality. Although there is a close parallelism between the two in respect of philosophical approach and conclusion, Professor Lloyd Morgan here markedly differs from Professor Alexander, as he holds, truly enough, that "Substantial to all the substantial go-togetherness which suffices for naturalistic treatment, is the planful Activity in and through which its stuff has been and is held together."[2] In regarding Space and Time as the two attributes of ultimate reality of Space-Time which 'through its inherent character of timefulness or restlessness gives rise to created things that constitute in their totality the *facies totius universi*, Professor Alexander seems to have been influenced to a considerable degree by Kuno Fischer's construction of Spinozistic attributes as real 'potencies' or 'powers' inherent in the substance which on its part radiates its creative energy along those lines. Now of the two extant alternative interpretations of the nature of the Spinozistic 'attributes,' this one is, as we know, fundamentally at variance with the whole drift of Spinoza's metaphysics, as well as fatal to the notion of Ground and Consequent which is the very nerve of Spinoza's great constructive attempt. Admittedly, Professor Alexander as engaged in writing a gloss upon Spinoza has sufficient excuse for not abiding by the letter of Spinoza's system, and, as such, can justly claim a wider latitude than the mere literalist commentator who is naturally hide-bound in his task of faithful exegesis. But, then, even a gloss of Spinoza which fails to safeguard this notion of Ground and Consequent, one of the main-springs of his thought, forfeits thereby the right to associate the name of Spinoza with anything that is left behind. It will be verily like throwing away the babe along with the bath. Professor Alexander, however, is too well-versed in Spinozism to lapse into such error. He does, indeed, retain this notion, and apparently assigns to it central importance so far as he characterises ultimate reality or Space-Time as 'infinite and self-contained and the ground of all finite modes.'[1] But as we shall presently see, he proceeds to modify and square it, with what consistency we shall also enquire, with a very different notion, and thus stultifies his original position. 'By insisting that bodies are intrinsically complexes of motion,'[2] being only the 'modes' of the ultimate or *a priori* reality from which they derive,'[3] Professor Alexander evidently imperils his allegiance to the notion of Ground, and, collaterally, to his favourite metaphysical creed 'that there is only one matrix from which all qualities arise.' This is indeed a point of crucial importance and the very crux of the whole procedure in question. Much the same criticisms can be urged against Professor Alexander as against Spinoza; and here, at least, we discover that the so-called panacea of Time is no better than a prophylactic, affording a relief for the time being. Apparently in doctrinal, and, perhaps, temperamental sympathy with Spinoza's pantheism which imports 'in the truer sense that all things are in God and are modifications of Him,'[4] he goes on to add that 'there is and can be but one being which is entirely self-dependent, needing no other being for its explanation'[5] and rounds up the discussion by representing it 'not as an aggregate of things, not even as a whole of parts in the sense in which you and I who are organic are wholes of parts without being mere aggregates, but as a unitary being from which all its so-called parts draw their nature and in the end their existence.'[1] Whether following this line of thought, we are, in our search after a unity higher than what we find in ourselves, not likely to defeat our own ends, we cannot undertake to answer here; but one cannot help being reminded of a forceful suggestion made by the late Mr. Bradley in another reference that "the man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks."[2] The passage just quoted from Professor Alexander is strongly reminiscent of the confusion between essence and existence, into which Spinoza was not infrequently betrayed in spinning out his rather long-drawn geometrical demonstrations. Wrestling like Spinoza, with two fundamentally disparate notions of ultimate reality as 'ground of all finite modes' and as 'the stuff of which they are parts or modes' or 'pieces,' or rather trying to represent these two disparate notions as at bottom reconcilable—doubtless, by the solvent of Time which, as omnipotent, hath cleft a channel for the water-flood, and a 'way for the lightning of the thunder' and can achieve what, under ordinary circumstances, would be deemed impossible—Professor Alexander seems to have been driven to a hopeless *impasse*. So long as we choose to abide by the notion of Ground in this reference, and develop it with the vertical consistency with which Spinoza does it, we must necessarily end in an abstract supreme essence—'the Intense Inane'—that 'always is on the point of slipping into bare indefiniteness.' Evidently from such a logical universal, there is no possibility of advance into a world of particulars. Accordingly what Professor Alexander does is to follow up this notion of Ground up to a certain extent and, then apprised of the impending deadlock, tries to retrieve the situation by so far modifying the notion as to make it in the end indistinguishable from that of physical totality. Probably he could foresee that without the notion of Ground and Consequent one could not enter into Spinozism, and with it one could not remain within it. With his rejection of the Spinozistic construction of the case, we can have no quarrel; but surely it is incumbent upon one who thus dissociates himself, to sustain his position of opposition, and not play fast and loose with the notion in question or bring it up in a secondary way by the back-door, as it were, having once dismissed it at the very threshold of his entrance into the system. In justice to Professor Alexander, it must be admitted of course that he had offered an altogether new interpretation upon the notion before he admitted it into his gloss; but, our contention is that he has not infrequently lapsed into ordinary and technical sense of the term which he had begun by repudiating at the start. The best course for him, we venture to think, would have been to steer clear altogether of the slippery term on which many a writer on Spinoza have stumbled. However, as it is, we find that not having studiously kept to the restriction imposed on it by himself, he has erred, of course, in the honoured company of Spinoza, in setting forth the relation between essence and existence. The extract last quoted is typical of the deplorable confusion which such indiscriminate use is likely to engender. Granted that there is 'a unitary being from which all its so-called parts,' *viz.*, the finite modes or empirical things 'draw their nature,' it by no means follows that they should draw their 'existence' as well. Perhaps conscious of the enormity of the transition from nature or essence to existence, he seems to have tried to minimise it by the incorporation of the qualifying phrase 'in the end.' But is it not of the nature of a baffling addition, hardly adequate to meet the exigencies of the situation? When in further explication of his notion of 'the ground of all finite modes'[1] he goes on to say that it 'comprehends them all,' his gloss thrives upon the happy

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 37.

[2] Emergent Evolution, p. 209.

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[1] S. and T., p. 37.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 35.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 31.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 25.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 25.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 25.

[2] Appearance and Reality, p. 449.

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[1] S. & T., p. 37.

ambiguity of the term 'comprehension' which is not, however, devoid of a logical bearing. But he breaks through the last film of ambiguity when he proceeds further down to construe this relation of 'comprehension' as one of 'composition' or 'involving ' the relation, to quote his own words, 'of the two triangles which compose an oblong to the 'oblong.' With what semblance of justice and consistency, Professor Alexander can still continue to speak of the infinite, self-contained ground of empirical things, we do not pretend to enquire. The nature or essence of things is, we can readily allow, somehow comprehended or contained in the supreme essence or the so-called 'unitary being,' but that does not necessarily include the existence of any particular mode or thing—which it would seem to do on the construction of the relation that has been just offered. Here he has completely thrown overboard the well-nigh universally accepted signification of the term "Ground," or if he still continues to use the term in this regard, he must be using it in an unheard-of sense. What further lends support to our contention is his candid confession that 'once Time is regarded as an attribute of ultimate reality, the contrast of the Spinozistic Substance and its modes, falls away.'[1] He is here, apparently, complimenting himself on the result of his experiment with Time, *viz.*, the removal of the contrast on which alone, be it remembered, the continued use of the term 'Ground ' depends. When such vital issues are staked on the maintenance of ' Ground ' in any philosophical dissertation worth the name, one cannot with perfect impunity minimise the force of this contrast or tamper with it in any other way.

(4) Further, we ask, is not this final sense of 'comprehension' as buttressed by this telling example, indicative of a relapse into a ' lower pantheism ' with its inevitable bondage to a purely spatial category from which Professor Alexander was apparently commissioned to redeem Spinozism ? No one is more thoroughly convinced of the sheer irrelevance of spatial

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 39.

metaphors in such context—the unmistakable evidence of the inherent geometricism of our intellect,—as Bergson would say. At this critical point all the resources of timefulness do not avail, and Professor Alexander's metaphysical predilections stand unmasked. On the extinction of that much-needed 'contrast,' the alleged unitary being in its ambition to be the positive ground of all finite modes, and, not merely a negative logical *prius*, defeats itself, and ends by forfeiting the very principle which alone can make it a self-contained systematic unity of differentiated particulars. It becomes, in the end, as Professor Pringle-Pattison puts it so happily[1] "the pellmell of empirical occurrence over again in which the sum-total of phenomena is indiscriminately housed," and consequently "the unity reached is the unity of a mere collection and everything remains just as it was before." Such a doctrine of immanence or pantheism, in spite of its claim to a 'truer' and presumably acceptable sense, recoils upon crude Naturalism, 'untroubled by a spark.' Wave the magic wand of Time, as you may, such a brute collection or mere togetherness of attributes does not answer to the principle of unity which is designed to comprehend all—there being no principle of comprehension at all here. Thus circumstanced, Professor Alexander's 'Space-Time,' or 'Motion,' is open to much the same criticism as has been urged with the force of an epigram against Spinoza's Substance that 'because it includes all, it includes nothing at all.'

(5) Such an unmitigated Naturalism, acknowledged or otherwise, is not, however, the last word of his theory of the world-ground, as it was not also Spinoza's. We are reserved for more surprises when he proceeds, in strict keeping with the method of Naturalism, to invest the 'skeleton universe' of Space-Time with flesh and blood until in all literalness of philosophic truth 'the conscious stone to beauty grew'—'the stone' which, in his own words 'knows its surroundings in the same way as we know ours, 'for in so far as my mind or the stone

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[1] The Idea of God, p. 219.

is affected by other things, it knows them.'[1] It is doubtful whether such a simple, romantic, and metaphorical extension of the meaning of the term 'knowledge' would be sanctioned by established usage and sober philosophy that is uninspired by a 'natural piety' which binds 'each to each' all the different levels of stratified existence—from the primary modes which are 'bare differentiations of Space-time' right up to the 'mind of man—with that link of all-pervasive element of Time which finally evolves the character of mentality. Whether we begin at the bottom with bare differentiations of Space-Time and work steadily upwards 'humouring our propensity to construe things on the pattern of what is most familiar to us, our own selves,' the result is the same; 'on either method we realise the same truth that all the world and everything in it are constructed on the same plan, which betrays itself most plainly in our thinking bodies.'[2] Granted that philosophical explanation, like charity, begins at home, what philosophic justification is there for thus 'humouring our propensity' into the extravagances or irrelevancies of anthropomorphism, interpreting the world at large, as Schopenhauer suggested, *macranthropos*? It is this very 'propensity' rather than 'rationality' that is the inspirer, *e.g.*, of Fechner's 'world-soul' and such-like hybrid constructions. Whatever the merit or reasonableness of the procedure, Professor Alexander is convinced that his professed Basic Naturalism does not contradict the superstructure that has been raised on it ; that starting from this basis in Space-Time we can, in other words, attain to a nodal or hierarchical *Weltanschauung*, which exhibits in the world a systematic structure, scale of values, or degrees of perfection or reality. Indeed, as Professor Alexander gave out (in a lecture entitled 'Naturalism and Value,' and delivered under the auspices of the British Institute of Philosophy)[3] that he had been 'irritated' by idealistic philosophers, like Professor Pringle-Pattison, into taking up the gauntlet against what he thought to be an ill-conceived challenge of the latter as expressed, *e.g.*, in his Gifford Lectures, that 'the vindication of human values could only become effective and convincing when accompanied by the demonstration that the conclusions of Naturalism rest on a misinterpretation of the character of the scientific theories on which it founds that Naturalism, in short, in spite of its claims to exclusive reality, is no more than the substantiation of an abstraction or of a fragment that can exist only as an element in a larger whole.'[1] With regard to Professor Alexander's polemics as elaborated in the lecture by way of controverting this thesis, well might Professor Pringle-Pattison urge (what he did in another reference), *viz.*, that 'one has the hopeless kind of feeling, which so often oppresses us in philosophical controversy—a sense of despair at seeing the one party accumulating proofs, and re-iterating assertions, of what it has never occurred to the other to deny.'[2] Indeed, as it would also appear to a disinterested third that much of Professor Alexander's defence arguments are gratuitous or even unnecessary ; for, with a good deal of this Professor Pringle-Pattison would go with enthusiastic assent, and has, in fact, himself, emphasised, from the side of what he calls the higher naturalism, 'man's rootedness in nature' under the title of 'man as organic to the world.' This is not the place to attempt a comparative valuation of their acceptance of naturalism, but a crucial difference between the two comes into prominent relief as we compare their respective attitude towards philosophical method and explanation as well as the question of historical origin and time-sequence as brought to bear on the problem of Emergent Evolution. There is, however, a complete parting of the ways, so far as Professor Pringle-Pattison urges, with pointed emphasis, that 'all ultimate or philosophical explanation, must look to the end,'[3] 'the question of historical origin' being 'strictly indifferent to philosophy' against what may be accurately described, on the authority of Professor Lloyd Morgan, as the 'retrospective outlook towards antecedent conditions.'[4] This is exactly the point on which Professor Alexander differs markedly from Spinoza, and claims to have marked a distinct advance on him so far the hierarchical order which, according to Spinoza, is not a temporal, but a logical one,' becomes in his system, on the admission of Time as 'an attribute of the ultimate reality,' 'not merely a logical one but 'temporal'—'a hierarchy produced in the order of time.' One should not wonder if this claim were contested on this ground at least that not a shred of justification had been brought forward in support of the prodigious assumption involved herein: One could, however, allow that the temporal or the historical viewpoint might have its justification in the realm of the special sciences, *e.g.*, biology, as a regulative or heuristic principle merely,—serving perhaps to lead to the discovery of new facts,—but one is surely justified in calling for the credentials when it is translated into a wider context, and accepted *eo ipso* without any regard for proportion or relevance, as a constitutive principle of the structure of entire Reality. On such vital issues, Professor Alexander leaves us with a mere *ipse dixit* which, however, does not mend matters. Further, in thus trying to square the 'logical' with the 'temporal'—and that shirking the *onus probandi* that can hardly be evaded—he may not unjustly be accused of running with the hare, and hunting with the hound.

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[1] S. & T., p. 49.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 49.

[3] On March 15, 1927, at the Royal Society of Arts.

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[1] Idea of God, pp. 208-9.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 272.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 107.

(6) The incidental discussion by Professor Alexander of the much-debated relation between Mind and Body and the nature of Mind and its operations as conceived by Spinoza, calls for a detailed examination. Herein Professor Alexander does not seem to have departed in a very considerable degree from the original doctrine of Spinoza, and that for obvious reasons. For, it is but common knowledge that nowhere has Spinoza been so glaringly betrayed, by the misleading analogy of the mind as united to the body, into a psychical atomism, hardly

distinguishable from a crude naturalism, which, by pulverising the human mind into atomic constituents or regarding it as the sum of its constitutive ideas, destroys that very synthetic unity and centrality of reference that make up the very *differentia* of mind. Professor Alexander does well to comment, with his characteristic lucidity, on the cryptic utterances of Spinoza that 'the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body' (Prop. 23, Part II) or that the mind has the body for its object or *ideatum*,' and thus helps to differentiate the psycho-physical from the strictly epistemological issues of the cognitive situation, mystified all the more by the habitually ambiguous construction of the words 'idea' and 'object' in Spinoza. For example, he clearly points out 'that when Spinoza says that a mode of thought my idea has for its *ideatum* a condition of my body, he does not say that I perceive that condition of body. The body is expressed (objectively, he says, subjectively, we should say) as the idea, but what I perceive is the 'tree,' whose existence is implied in my bodily condition, because that condition varies with the perceived object.''[1] Evidently the principle on which he proceeds thus to interpret Spinoza and to accept the rather paradoxical consequential position 'that the idea which I have of the table informs me rather of the state of my body than of the table,' is the relation of 'identity of essence' between the brain-processes and their accompanying thought-processes. As a question of exegesis, Professor Alexander's interpretation is undoubtedly the most cogent and faithful one; but in thus identifying himself with this supposedly invulnerable rendering of the problem, he has been, in his gloss on Spinoza as well as in his *magnum opus*, landed in grave difficulties. These crucial difficulties in the rendering of the cognitive situation could have been, to a great extent, alleviated, if not avoided altogether, by accepting the principle of unrestricted 'concomitance,' and not mere correlation, which has been so fruitfully applied by Professor Lloyd Morgan in a similar gloss upon, and advance beyond Spinoza. It is not meant, however, that the latter principle has not its own besetting dangers; but it evades some of the patent difficulties into which the other is thrown. In the first place, the inherited naturalism of this position has its indubitable influence on Mind. Professor Alexander's theory of the individual mind is presented more or less as a reacting essence, and sensory presentations as 'the result of such reaction' or as a mere registering machine or recorder of the bodily changes; or, to use his own words, 'it is as if we had a clock which not only showed the time but was the time it showed.'[1] One need not be at pains to refute a theory of Mind, so very crude and out-of-date.

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[1] S. & T., pp. 52-3.

(7) The next in importance is his view of knowing, of the cognitive relation, consequential upon such a view of mind. The description of the knowledge-relation as 'the mere togetherness of terms,' the mental term being only unique and not the relation itself, seems on the very face of it an undue simplification of the matter. True it is, that he has offered a well-nigh scientific and logical definition so far as he holds,[2] that 'the cognitive relation proper is the compresence between the physical object and another thing, when that thing has the property of consciousness.' Now, in spite of all its claims to a logical definition, an unkind critic may discern in it a covert *petitio principii*, not very much unlike the explanation of *virtus dormitiva* in the classic caricature of Moliere. Many of the so-called Neo-Vitalists of the present day derive the plausibility of their theory from this specious mode of reasoning in trying to account for the emergence of life at a certain stage of physio-chemical collocation. However, as it is, Professor Alexander is convinced that 'in so far as my mind or the stone is affected by other things, it knows them.'[3] But does it tell the whole story of the cognitive relation? If it

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 47.

[2] Pro. of the Artist. Soc., 'Basis of Realism,' pp. 31-2.

[3] S. & T., p. 49.

does,— as it needs must of a relation which, on his own showing is 'the *whole* situation into which its terms enter, in virtue of that relation,'—then is it not a mere travesty of the whole situation of knowing? Is it not a truism and commonplace in Psychology that our mind is 'compresent with' or 'affected by' a variety of things without being, in strictness of language, cognisant of them? Whether the dilution of the term 'knowing' as has been assiduously carried out here, so as to make it applicable to the case of 'stone' with no loss of meaning is a crucial question, and must give us pause to think. Those who find it a hard thing to swallow it have no other alternative than to part company from Prof. Alexander. But with all deference to his critical acumen, it might be pointed out that it is he who in his own noteworthy distinction between 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' has furnished the best reputation of himself, or at least put us on the way to refuting him by showing that the so-called relation of compresence must attain to a specific character in virtue of the constituent terms which again, are *ipso facto* specified by entering into relation, before it can with any semblance of justification pass for knowing.

(8) Then, in the next place, we have to examine some interesting developments of this theory of 'mind as merely minding' standing over against 'all that is minded' or 'the non-mental'—developments that are, as he thinks, in perfect accord with the standpoint of Realism professed by him. On closer inspection this supposedly realistic view of mind comes perilously near 'the radical empiricism' embedded in the challenging dictum that 'the passing thought is the only thinker.' No one has more effectively disposed of the claims of such a 'minding' to be entitled 'mind' than his fellow-worker in the same field, Professor Lloyd Morgan, who sums up his disapproval thus: "There is no differentiation in such minding. All the differentiation is in the non-mental colours as minded. The mind just apprehends for 'tis its nature to do so.... To regard percipient mind as blankly apprehending is—to paraphrase

Mr. Alexander's saying with regard to time—not to take *seriously* the evolution of mind as substance.''[1] In so construing the nature of mind, Prof. Alexander, like many others, has been doubtless under the spell of the seductive 'eye-metaphor,' or 'the mirror' theory of the universe which has justly been criticised by Lotze under the caption of a 'barren rehearsal' of a finished reality. Professing, as he does, a kind of evolutionary naturalism, Prof. Alexander can hardly afford to forget that mind, even at the perceptual level, is a participator 'in the evolution of our richly-coloured world.''[2]

(9) Lastly, in working out, on strictly realistic lines, his view of the non-mental, of 'things' and 'objects' of 'appearances' and 'images,' 'sensation' and 'perception'—which he has simply suggested in this gloss on Spinoza but elaborated elsewhere—his misreading of the whole cognitive relation appears in limelight. The description of real 'appearances' as 'partial revelations' of things is one that can readily be understood and assented to; but this perfectly harmless proposition is at once turned into a dangerous epistemological heresy, as Prof. Alexander proceeds to define a 'thing' as a 'synthesis of appearances.' This mistake of regarding 'appearances' as existents—so very common, yet none the less pernicious, in modern epistemological literature—is probably in Prof. Alexander's case, the offshoot of the Proton Pseudos, the initial confusion between 'essence' and 'existence,' as observed in an earlier reference. Prof. Alexander developes the position further in his replies to Prof. Stout's criticism that from 'sensa' to 'external existents' there is, after all, no passage. But Prof. Alexander cuts the Gordian knot by saying that no 'passage' is at all needed here, for the 'sensum' itself is non-mental or the external existent. The problem, therefore, is not how we go beyond the sensum into a world of external things, but how we advance from the sensum to the fully developed notion of a

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[1] Emergent Evolution, pp. 232-3.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 233.

thing. Prof. Alexander thinks that a right solution of the problem is possible only when one can grasp the truth that the sensum is *not* mere sense-quality, and that it presupposes intuition which is admittedly a lower grade of experience than sensation. Sensum 'green' for example, is, according to him, not 'greenness' but 'a patch of green,' that is, a 'bit of space-time' which has the quality 'greenness,' green being an object situate in that even-patch. Instead of following him out in his realistic procedure of denuding the mind of all its attributes, and carrying them over to the object we can summarily note that a thing becomes for him in the long run a synthesis of 'sensa' *and* 'percepta' *and* 'images'—these last having, in his opinion, physical existence independent of mind. This is surely Realism with a vengeance!

(10) Now, to revert to his Space-Time. One is sure to stumble on the view of Reality as 'Space-time or Motion itself' which is the 'infinite or *a priori* stuff of the Universe' and 'the empirical things or substances which are parts of modes of it,' or as he thinks, Spinoza himself would say 'but complexes of motion and made of the stuff which the ultimate or *a priori* reality is.' Was not this very notion of 'Motion itself' disposed of by Leibnitz who in a letter to Arnauld contended that 'motion *per se* is merely relative and cannot determine its subject.' Granted his concept of 'motion,' Prof. Alexander does not, it is presumed, hold with Spinoza that the quantity of motion in the universe is constant. In this regard, however, Prof. Alexander is manifestly influenced by the Bergsonian creed that there are no things, there are only actions or that 'movement does not imply something that moves.' True it is that Prof. Alexander tries in his Gifford Lectures to improve upon the Bergsonian presentation of the case, and represent space-time as constituted of 'pure motions of which point-instants are the limiting cases.' But if, as on Prof. Alexander's own showing, philosophy is the empirical study of the non-empirical or *a priori*, how can it with any

show of consistency claim 'for philosophy' a studied 'inversion' of the *ordo naturae* or *ordo et connexio rerum* which, alone, our experience can vouch for. Space-time, as 'anterior to material things' is, for aught we know, something recondite and trans-empirical. No greater *volte face* could hardly be conceived on the part of a philosophic thinker, who begins by swearing his allegiance to the method of the special sciences. The enormity of the parallel inversion is, however, the less striking in M. Bergson's case, because of his declared policy of antagonising the method of philosophy to that of the sciences. Nevertheless both seem to have slipped into the fallacy of explaining *obscurum per obscurius*. To the unsophisticated mind nothing is more obvious and incontestable than the patent fact that it is things that move; and no amount of hypercritical argumentation can render a flagrant Hysteron Proteron plausible. Against this specious mode of reasoning, one may in all propriety urge the polemic preferred by Diogenes of Sinope against Plato. "When Plato spoke of 'tableness' and 'cupness', Diogenes the cynic said 'O Plato, I see a 'table' and a 'cup', to be sure, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness.'" Going the whole hog, our author may, of course, retort with a Platonic emphasis "You do not, because you lack the eye for it." But this, he evidently cannot in strict fidelity to his own persuasion in philosophy. Truly speaking, Prof. Alexander has not been able to substantiate the pledge he had initially held forth He does not, indeed, as a professed realist begin from "the One above," "the Absolute in idealistic systems" but as we might say from One below, from 'Space-Time,' which, as he tells us, is 'the experiential Absolute' taking the place of the orthodox Absolute. But in thus trying to get behind the standpoint of thorough-bred Realism which makes it a point to start from where we are, he has exposed his own modified monistic realism—which is but an inverted or masked absolutism—to the same methodological difficulty as has been the very crux of idealistic Absolutism.

(11) While thus criticising Prof. Alexander's view of Space-Time or Motion, we are not, however, unmindful of the significant contribution he has made in the much-needed introduction of time into the Spinozistic rendering of Motion. There is hardly any student of Spinoza who has not stumbled upon the somewhat easy deduction of motion from extension. Motion and rest, as infinite modes of Extension, may conceivably depend upon 'Extension,' but motion and rest can by no stretch of imagination, be conceived as *following from* Extension. Truly, as Prof. Alexander comments here, 'Spinoza could pass so easily from extension to motion because motion was conceived as it were statically;' and no one else has demonstrated more convincingly that 'nothing seems so obvious to us as the proposition that motion takes time and is unintelligible without it.[1]

(12) Then, again, despite his formal protestation as to the perfect mutuality of Space and Time—and herein Prof. Alexander claims to have scored an advance on M. Bergson—there can be left no room for doubt as to his studied partiality for Time. This is clearly in evidence not only in his Gifford Lectures but in the abstract itself which starts with the initial contention 'that Space and Time imply each other mutually,' [2] that 'Time makes Space a continuum by securing its divisibility, and Space makes Time a continuum by securing the connection of its parts,[3] and that 'Time is thus intrinsically spatial and Space temporal,' [4] but proceeds later to develop, without the slightest suspicion of inconsistency with his thesis of mutuality, the doctrine thus: "Space must be regarded as generated in Time, or if the expression be preferred, *by* Time since Time is the source of movement. It may be

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[1] S. & T., p. 34.

[2] Pro. Artist. Soc., 1917-18, p. 411.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 411.

[4] *Ibid*, pp. 411-2.

imaged as the trail of Time, so long as it is remembered that there could be no Time without a Space in which its trail is left. We cannot, without inepitude, say that Time is the trail of Space, but only that Time, as it moves from past through present to future, is the occupation of a stretch of Space.[5] There could be no more revealing confession as to the real state of things. Time is no longer a sleeping partner of the joint partnership, but appears in its proper rôle as the efficient 'Agent.' Thus the breach in the *entente cordiale* that is already in sight, becomes much more pronounced in "Spinoza and Time.'

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

IN NUBIBUS

Come Love,
Let us once, riding on fancy's wings
Soar into ether blue.
And there hear God's whispers from above,
See star-maids playing hide and seek
In the hollows of floating clouds.
Then in that blissful moment
Dear Love,
Let us from that Pisgah-height
Look below on life and love.

"DEW DROPS"

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[5] *Ibid*, p. 414.

SOME MORE EARLY INDIAN VISITORS TO ENGLAND

Since the publication of two articles in the October issue of 1924 and the January issue of 1925 in this magazine by the present writer on the "Early Indian Visitors to England," new facts have been discovered about more visitors who came to England and visited other European countries during the days of the East India Company. There may be still others whose travels have not yet been recorded.

Sir Evan Cotton, in his article on *The Journals of Archibald Swinton,*[1] refers to a Munshy who accompanied Swinton to England in 1766, at the request of Vizier Monyr al Dowlah, who "insisted on paying Rs. 2,000 towards his charges." The Munshy later on visited Oxford with Swinton and assisted Sir William Jones "with his Indian and Persian manuscripts." He afterwards went to Edinburgh and stayed at the house of Captain Swinton's father.

One of the most interesting accounts of these visitors to England was that of a Muhammadan adventurer named Mirza Abu Taleb Khan. He travelled extensively in Asia, Africa, and Europe during the years 1799 to 1803. While in England he created quite a sensation in high circles, and left his mark as a man of great personality.[2]

In the *Calcutta Christian Observer* for August, 1834, we find an account of an Indian just returned from England which runs as follows :

"By the Triumph which arrived on the 28th of June, Samuldass Dessabhaee, a Dessaee of Neriad, in Guzerat, who proceeded to England *vid* Bourdeaux, has returned to this country. He is still in Bombay, and has been visited by several of our countrymen, who were anxious to see a Hindoo who had braved the prejudices of caste, and the perils of the sea, and to hear from his own lips, in what manner he lived in England; how he liked the country and its people.... ...''

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[1] *See* Vol. VIII, pp. 28-29, Report of *Indian Historical Records Commission, 1925.*

[2] The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan......, translated by Charles Stewart, London, 1810.

There is a reference to a Young Rajaram, who visited England with Rajah Rammohan Roy in the London *Record* for October 3, 1836. It states:

''The Rajah Ram Roy, son of the celebrated Rajah Rammohan Roy, Ambassador from the King of Delhi, who died in this country in 1833, arrived on Sunday last from Lord Lynedoch's on a visit to the Rev. A. R. Kenney, of Lichfield, and has been introduced to some of the leading families in that city. The Rajah professes the Church of England religion, and speaks the English language remarkably well.''

The Rev. Lal Behari Dey mentioned in his book, ''Recollections of Alexander Duff'' (*see* p. 160), that Ananda Chandra Majumdar and Dwarka Nath Bose, two converts of Dr. Duff, visited England between 1835 and 1840.

In 1869 the Nawab Nazim of Murshidabad went to England, where he was well received by Queen Victoria and afterwards during a visit to France by Napoleon III. He stayed for some years in Europe.[1]

HARIHAR DAS

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[1] *See* pp. 176-7, of Sanyal's *Reminiscences and Anecdotes*; also p. 243 of *Twelve Men of Bengal* by F. B. Bradley-Birt.

JUVENILE CRIME

The Young Criminal.

I have heard it said that criminals, like poets, "are born not made." Such a statement is true only in as much as it refers to a distinct type, but for the average juvenile delinquent, crime is an adventure, an uncommon and unpleasant experience and one, in most instances, to which he is driven through ignorance, force of circumstances or economic stress.

Juvenile criminals may be roughly divided into three classes or sections. The accidental or first offender, the recividist or potential criminal and the confirmed or habitual type.

Of these three sections, the accidental or first offender is the most important from a reformative standpoint. This is the boy or girl, who, if taken in hand early, is most successfully weaned from a career of crime and brought up to an honourable, decent livelihood. In most instances it is the economic factor that is the principal cause of the first offence. I take a typical instance. A young Anglo-Indian lad was recently convicted for cheating. An enquiry into his antecedents revealed the following facts. The boy, who had been liberally educated, came from a poor but respectable family. The father had recently died and, as is usual in such cases where the struggle for respectability means a hand-to-mouth existence, a living up to and beyond their slender resources, he left his family practically destitute. The mother, totally unfit for such a task, struggled on for a time. Friends and relations assisted with that wonderful whole-hearted generosity, so typical of the poor, till broken in body and spirit, she collapsed and had to be removed to hospital. Then, on the eldest boy, a lad of 15, fell the onerous task of supporting his dying mother and seven little brothers and sisters. Before his fall, let us consider for a while the game struggle put up by this manly little fellow. From early morning till late at night, with a few hard biscuits in his pocket, he tramped the streets in search of employment. His youth and inexperience were dead against him, but still he struggled on. Odd jobs came his way, kind-hearted employers, unable to help him in any other manner offered monetary assistance, but "there were seven mouths to feed and mother was dying" and all he got was hopelessly inadequate. And so the days slipped into weeks and the weeks into months, and gradually, imperceptibly at first, that fine spirit began to waver ; hope died and slowly came that black despair, the awfulness of which only those who have struggled and struggled in vain, realise.

Degradation came slowly. It is doubtful if the boy realised himself that he was sinking. As his hopes of finding employment faded, the ease with which he secured assistance from kind-hearted people struck him, and soon he learnt that it was easier to beg his bread than earn it. Thereafter we find him, no longer seeking employment, but hanging round street corners, before large restaurants and shops, cringing and whining for a few coppers. No man can beg and keep his self-respect and this boy sank lower and lower till came the final act that closed the drama.

Instances of this type could be multiplied, *ad nauseum*, but such a typical instance is all that is needed to show the absolute, imperative necessity there is of providing, in every large city in India, those up-to-date methods of dealing with juvenile crime which at present exists in every civilised country in the world. But we will consider reformative methods later—to return to the lad in question—as a type.

Let us suppose the Judge, taking a humane view of the matter, warns and releases the culprit.

What happens. The shock of arrest and probable imprisonment steadies him for a time, but in what way does it improve existing conditions? The lad returns to his old life, his old associates and the same economic conditions. His clash with the "powers that be" has not improved his condition in any way, it has alas! only added an additional obstacle in the way of employment.

But what is its effect on the lad himself. The first is, I am inclined to believe, a salutary one. He is probably thankful at having got off so lightly and makes a pious resolution to amend his ways. But can he?

Considering that his position is the same this pious resolution after a time takes a more sinister form. From an honest desire to amend his ways the boy makes an equally firm resolution to be *more careful* in future.

There now starts between him and the police a game of hide and seek. Every artifice, every device to hoodwink and deceive the authorities, is brought into play. For a time he is successful and encouraged by this success he extends his activities to petty thefts, pick-pocketing and the like, till once again he makes his appearance in a Police Court.

There now follows a short or deterrent sentence of from 3 to 6 months and the boy goes to jail. Thus is the first stage left behind. The boy has now entered the second grade; he has become a potential criminal.

The short or deterrent sentence is a farce. It is impossible for the jail authorities, with the present inadequate means at hand, to bring any reformatory influence to bear on the boy during this short period, while it serves as an introductory period for the lad, during which he makes the acquaintance of elder boys, more advanced in crime than himself and from them receives his first lessons in a criminal career.

It is the short sentence that is the making of the recividist, and the recividist is the first stage of the habitual criminal or confirmed old offender.

Before dealing with the question of reformatory methods employed in Borstal Institutions and Reformatory Schools, let us consider the wider field of juvenile crime in its initial stage. This will bring us to the subject of Probation Officers.

Probation Officers.

"Many years ago, a Boston shoemaker, named John Augustus, interested in the welfare of the fallen, and impressed with the belief that many whose feet had slipped could be reclaimed better outside than inside the prison walls, arranged with the courts to have certain persons, who were arrested for crimes, put upon probation under his care. He became bound for their appearance at court, should they be so ordered, and, as a surety, had the right to surrender the principal when he chose. There was no authority for this, except the discretion always vested in the courts ; but its operation and results were such that the judges of the Boston Courts continued to exercise it for several years, during which time hundreds of persons were taken upon probation by him, and generally with good results.

Later on, his labours having ceased, they were taken up by Mr. Rufus W. Cook (familiarly known in Boston as "Uncle Cook"), for many recent years the chaplain of Boston Jail. Many hundreds of persons were taken on probation in the same way by him : a large proportion of them returning to good lives. A similar method of dealing with children convicted of crimes has long been in practice in Massachusetts. In 1878, a law was passed authorizing the appointment of a "probation-officer" by the Mayor of Boston, subject to the approval of the Board of Alderman. So valuable was the work deemed to be, that the Legislature of 1880, with hardly a dissenting vote in either branch, extended the provisions of the statute so that a probation officer could be appointed in each city and town."

The above extract is taken from the Reports on the Seventh Annual Conference of Charities and Corrections (Clueland, 1830) and serves to illustrate the humble source from which this splendid system originated.

Let us now return to the typical case I have dealt with previously, and see how this system would have influenced the career of the youth in question. The duties of a probation officer are as follows :

The Clerk of the Court notifies the proper probation officer of each case of a first offender; he then has to make every posble investigation into the circumstances of the culprit, and the causes of motives of his offence. He is present at the trial, and reports the results of his inquiries, and the Court, if it find the accused guilty, thereupon considers whether he is a fit subject for probation, and, if he is, determines the period during which it shall be enforced, the probation officer becoming "his bondsman to save him from prison." If he think it desirable, the probation officer may, before the expiration of the time appointed by the Court, apply for an extension; wives have been known to show their appreciation of this restraining influence by begging probation officers to do so on their husbands' behalf. The probationer must write once a month to the officer, visit him or receive visits, notify him immediately of any change of address, and "diligently pursue some lawful employment." If he fail to fulfil his engagements, and prove unfit for freedom, the probation officer surrenders him to the Court, which then condemns him on surer grounds than if probation had not been tried. This is the American method, and its application and probable success in the case in point is obvious.

Germany, always ahead in matters of penal reform, differs considerably in her methods of supervision and the care of juvenile offenders. The German system is this:—A Court of Guardianship (Vormundschaftsgericht) formed of local officials hears the case as stated by the parents, legal representative of the child, parish council, clergyman, and schoolmaster. The governors of gaols in which juveniles are serving terms of imprisonment must consult with the other officials, including the chaplain, doctor, and schoolmaster, as to whether their cases should go before this Court; and if they do, it must be arranged that committal to an institution or to the supervision of a probation officer should be simultaneous with release. If the Court of Guardianship decides that a boy or girl is to come under the operation of the law, another local official has to report on the personal history and circumstances, and express an opinion as to whether the child should be committed to the care of a family or of an institution. When he is committed to his own or another family, a Fursorger, or guardian, must be appointed, whose duties practically correspond with those of the American probation officer, but who differs from him in having a quite informal and unofficial, though not less esteemed, position. A clergyman, schoolmaster, member of a philanthropic society, or any suitable person residing conveniently near, is simply asked to look after a boy who requires supervision, and, either directly or after a period in an institution or prison, has been placed in a family, apprenticed, or provided with work. Such lads are always, if possible, sent to the country: The Fursorger's appointment is a post of honour, necessary expenses being refunded by the authorities. He must watch over the conduct, upbringing, and treatment of his ward, must visit him and assure himself that all is in order, that church and, if he be a child, school are regularly attended, and the terms of the contract conscientiously fulfilled by the head of the family with which he lives. If the lad is apprenticed or at work he must see that his services are suitably rewarded, and that a portion of his earnings is placed in a savings bank. Twice a year he must make a report to the officials. His responsiblity continues until his ward attains his majority; but when the possibility of renewed trouble seems excluded, the child may be released from guardianship at an earlier date. If his release is conditional the Fursorger must however, if practicable, continue to exercise surveillance. The system, as compared with that usual in America, seems to possess the advantage of establishing a closer relationship between the probation officer and his protege, as a Fursorger has, as a rule, only one ward to whom to devote his attention, and the connection may continue for several years, three being the normal minimum, *i.e.*, from eighteen to twenty-one. In practice, however, it is probable that the expert probation officer, who traces the case from the beginning and is thoroughly experienced in the work, giving his whole energies to it, has more insight, sympathy and understanding for the lads with whom he deals than a man whose main interests may lie in quite other directions.

In Holland, Belgium, France and Switzerland we find Societies de Patronage, *i.e.*, authorised private bodies who assume the functions of probation officers on behalf of youths who are brought before the Courts or discharged from Reformatories. The surveillance exercised by members of these societies sometimes continues for several years. We have no such institutions in India at present, but as I write, I am conscious of the fact that such excellent philanthropic societies, that at present exist in Calcutta, such as the Rotary Club, Toc H, and The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, could do excellent work in this connection.

This leads naturally to the question of the appointment of probation officers.

Every man and woman who has the welfare of India at heart, who is sincerely and genuinely anxious to help those whose feet have strayed from the path of rectitude, is eligible to become a probation officer. The position is an onerous one, the duties entail many hours of self-sacrifice and of unprofitable labour, but the ideal is always there, to serve and serve disinterestedly for the uplift of humanity,—" greater love hath no man than this."

AUGUSTUS SOMERVILLE

W. B. YEATS

II

SECOND STAGE OR SECOND PERIOD.

It is to be noted that from 1887 to 1890 the Yeats family lived in London [1] and the poet enjoyed the fellowship of men like Ernest Dowson,[2] Lionel Johnson,[3] Arthur Symons and others, association with whom, to a great extent, modified his art. He refers to some of his lost friends in the poem written "In Memory of Major Robert Gregory" published in 1919. His intense homesickness while he was an exile in London is expressed in his letters of the time in which he speaks of "this hateful London" and yearns for "any breath of Ireland." Once he writes, "It is pleasant to think this letter will go out of this horrid London and get to the fields. I wish I could fold myself up and go in it. My life is altogether ink and paper. I have woven about me a web of thoughts. I wish to break through it and see the world again." And so on.

By 1892, when the lyrics in the "Countess Cathleen" volume appeared before the public, Yeats was marked out at once as a great poet above the controversies of coteries. The now famous representative piece "The Lake Isle of Innisfree" was there, though included later on in "The Rose" volume of 1893, dedicated to Lionel Johnson. Two stanzas of this poem were sent along with one of the letters from London referred to above showing how intensely he was feeling the oppressiveness of city-life. No apology is necessary for quoting the piece in full—

"I will arise and go now, and go to Innisfree,
And a small cabin build there, of clay and wattles made;
Nine beanrows will I have there, a hive for the honey bee,
And live alone in the bee-loud glade.

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[1] *Vide* "Plays": Notes, p. 418.

[2] *Cf.* "The Grey Rock."

[3] *Cf.* "In Memory of Major Robert Gregory," stanza 3.

And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow,
Dropping from the veils of the morning to where the cricket sings;
There midnight's all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
And evening full of the linnets' wings.

I will arise and go now, for always night and day
I hear lake water lapping with low sounds by the shore;
While I stand on the road-way, or on the pavements grey,
I hear it in the deep heart's core."

This island is less poetically called the Rat Island and it is in Lough Gill Lake in the Sligo country with the Rosses to the N. W. for which Yeats has exactly done what Wordsworth has done for Somersetshire, Cumberland and Westmoreland, Tennyson for Lincolnshire and the Isle of Wight, Cowper for Olney or Thomas Hardy for Wessex.

Nature Poetry.

The reposeful dreamy atmosphere of the whole enchanting woodland scenery with its pastoral charm, deep quiet, green vegetation, rocks, sand, the distant sea, the bee-loud glade is here reproduced with the unerring instinct of a true poet-artist who knows how to capture in simple delineation scrupulously free from all embellishment the very soul of Nature's secluded and silent places. It is something more than a picture of external scenery interpenetrated as it is with an entrancing subdued emotional rapture which vitalizes all ecstatic lyrics. We shall have more of such exquisitely beautiful emotion-haunted artistic pieces in "The Wind[1] among the Reeds" in which the highest art of Yeats culminates in this second period of his life by 1899. But I must first dwell for a moment on the extraordinary advance in *poetic art* indicated by Yeats's poetry of love which forms the central theme of his lyrics of this phase of his life. Love is to all true poets the very fountain-head of inspiration and the highest of all emotions. One is tempted to make a comparative survey of the conception and treatment of love by poets of different ages and countries but my limits of space and time are inexorable and I must therefore confine myself to a very rapid survey of Yeats's work alone.

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[1] *Cf.* "The Song of Wandering Aengus," "He bids his Beloved be at Peace," "He gives his Beloved certain Rhymes," "To his heart, Bidding it have no fear," "He wishes his Beloved were dead."

Love Poetry.

In his love poetry Yeats reveals all the qualities of a truly great art—tenderness, nobility, dignity, simplicity, chasteness, ardour, sincerity all are there. What is more, a flame of spiritual rapture burns intensely through his greater and maturer lyrics of love comparable to some extent with Shelley's or Patmore's love poetry yet different by reason of their distinctly individual note. Rossetti's is a feverish erotic passion by the side of love in Yeats. In Yeats's love poetry all earthly element is consumed in the pure flame of sacred rapture without being etherealised into an impassioned yet abstract idealism so characteristic of Shelley's divine ardour—the desire of the moth for the star, the devotion to something afar. Leonardo da Vinci says, " the hope and desire of returning home to one's former state, is like the moth's desire for the light ; and the man, who with constant longing awaits each new month and year, deeming that the things he longs for are ever too late in coming, does not perceive that he is longing for his own destruction." This may partially apply to Shelley but not to Yeats. The desire is there in his poetry but it is chastened and he fully recognises that peace is the culmination of our development, for, says he (in " The Phases of the Moon")—

> " Under the phrenzy of the fourteenth moon
> The soul begins to tremble into stillness."

"Rosa Alchemica," Part IV, contains a remarkable passage on love represented by the figure of Eros with a veiled face flitting among dancers " like a dream within a dream, like a shadow of shadow " and Yeats knows him *by an understanding born from a deeper fountain than thought,* as also that " the face was veiled because no man or woman from the beginning of the world has ever known what love is, or looked into his eyes, for

Eros alone of divinities is altogether a spirit, and hides in passions not of his essence if he would commune with a mortal heart. So that if a man love nobly he knows love through infinite[1] pity, unspeakable trust, unending sympathy; and if ignobly through vehement jealousy, sudden hatred, and unappeasable desire; but unveiled love he never knows.''

This surely is something more than the Platonic idealism that etherealises the Shelleyan Ideal of Love, or, at any rate something different, though both the poets are decidedly mystic. The Shelleyan conception is more abstract ; Yeats is true to the kindred points of heaven and home but he is so in his own individual way—a way easily distinguishable from that of contemporary realists in poetry as much as that of poets of the Romantic Revival like Wordsworth (not to speak of later Wordsworthians).

It may be noted by the way that Yeats himself explains how his Ideal of Beauty differs from that of Shelley and Spenser and we also see how he differs from these English Platonist poets in respect of his Ideal of Love, bearing in mind at the same time that these two ideals form eventually *a single* **Idea** of which Truth, Beauty, Love (and Goodness to which Plato gives the highest place as manifestation of the Absolute) are mere facets. Yeats is more mystic than idealistic and though it be indeed difficult, if not impossible (as Emerson thinks), to be original *inspite of Plato,* it may, perhaps, be conceded that the Celts in very remote ages had visions of their own (having little to do with the Greek philosopher) suggesting an affinity with Oriental mysticism of which the influence is distinctly visible in this most poetic spokesman of the modern Celtic movement in Ireland. Oriental mysticism, we know, had its share in influencing the poetry of the Provençal Troubadours and their followers in Britain. One is tempted to connect Yeats with Hindu India through the intermediate and very valuable agency of Troubadour poetry. But a discussion of that will take me far afield into a debatable land of controversial criticism which I must resolutely eschew on this occasion.

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[1] *Cf.* " Proud Costello's love for Una, MacDermot's daughter " (page 383 of Early Poems and Stories) ; " The Twisting of the Rope " (*ibid*, pp. 413-423).

It will be convenient, I suppose, to consider, in connection with Yeats's conception of love, the important question of the conflict between realism and idealism in art and the resulting *art principle* of a symbolist so far as this question is treated of in his poetry. I have here to refer in particular to the poem " Ego Dominus Tuus " and may note also that this piece bears witness to his attempt to write a poetical dialogue in which we find an example "of the finding or not finding of (what he has called) the Antithetical Self." Now, this poem is in the form of a dialogue between a man who represents realism and a woman who is a symbolist to whom art is but a *vision* of reality. Dante and Keats are interpreted by the symbolist in this light and we are told that it is *heart* unsatisfied that makes luxuriant song and not lovers of life (*i.e.*, of *action*) nor men who find on earth easy happiness—

" Those men that in their writings are most wise owe nothing but their blind, stupefied hearts."

To the realist's contention that Dante, the chief imagination of Christendom, *found himself* to such an extent that he has made his hollow face perfectly *plain* to the mind's eye, the symbolist replies by asking

"And did he find himself
Or was the hunger that had made it hollow
A hunger for the apple on the bough
Most out of reach ?"

We may compare Forgael's words in " The Shadowy Waters " :—" For it is love that I am seeking for, but of a beautiful unheard of kind that is not in the world."

This principle has its important bearing on Yeats's conception of love too. I shall make it clear from the poem " Solomon and the Witch." Here we have the idea of the world coming to an end the moment the gap that divides the ideal from the real disappears thus destroying the despair resulting from the difference between the *lover's* imagined image of his beloved and the real image he actually finds, when all uncertainties and cruelties by which during the period of love-making a lover becomes tested, cease at the bride-bed (which, however, brings despair through the gulf separating the ideal and the real). I may refer also to the highly mystic poem "An Image from a Past Life" which is an image of the woman's heart smitten through beyond all likelihood or reason;—she says to her beloved

> "A sweetheart from another life floats there
> As though she had been forced to linger
> From vague distress
> Or arrogant loveliness,
> Merely to loosen out a tress
> Among the starry eddies of her hair
> Upon the paleness of a finger."

In "The Double Vision of Michael Robartes" we have—

> "Although I saw it all in the mind's eye
> There can be nothing solider till I die,"

and in "Towards Break of Day" we learn that it is a heavenly law that

> "Nothing that we love over-much
> Is ponderable to our touch."

Occasionally he sounds a passing note which apparently runs counter to his settled conviction regarding love and makes, for instance, "all those that love sad" or sings "of that monstrous thing, returned and yet unrequited love" (*cf* "Presences"). We may refer in this connection to the short piece "To a Young Girl" and also, perhaps, to "Solomon to Sheba" in the latter of which we read—

> "There's not a thing but love can make
> The world a narrow pound."

But the essence of his love poetry is to be sought for elsewhere, as for instance, in Hanrahan's Song meant to hearten Oona (page 418 of Early Poems and Stories)—

> "O Death's old bony finger
> Will never find us there
> In the high hollow townland
> Where love's to give and spare."

And when the injured young man whose hand Oona had refused in the evening's dance, preferring that of the bard Hanrahan, cried out in his spleen and unbelief: "Where is that country he is singing about ? Mind yourself, Oona, it is a long way off" and another added "It is not to the country of the Young you will be going," Hanrahan satisfied her questioning looks by singing more loudly : "It is very near us that country is, it is on every side." The ideal, if it is not merely a misleading dream, is indeed always close to us because at every moment it is in the process of being realized.

Closely connected with his poetry of love and his ideal of Beauty is the kindred theme of ideal womanhood. All romantic poets, more or less, reproduce something of the respect for womanhood so characteristic of the age of chivalry, inspite of what Tennyson has to say in his *Princess* against the false note of that type of woman-worship (*cf*. the romantic story of Amadis, son of Perion, King of Gaul, and Oriana, daughter of Lisuarte, King of Great Britain). There are several poems on this theme, such as, "On Woman," "Her Praise," "His Phoenix," "A Thought from Propertius" and finally "Broken Dreams." His ideal of womanhood, so far as self-effacing fidelity under the most trying ordeal for a woman goes, is represented by Dectora (in "the Shadowy Waters") who with womanly instinct surmises, when Forgael accuses himself of having deceived her, that "some other woman has a claim on him" but being told "Oh, no!" very firmly asserts—

> "And if there is,
> If there be half a hundred more, what matter?
> I'll never give another thought to it,"

Later on she observes

"Do you not know
How great a wrong it is to let one's thought
Wander a moment when one is in love?"

Similarly in the poem "The Two Kings" we have the figure of an ideally faithful woman in Edain (once in a previous existence the wife of the Gaelic Pluto, Mider) who when the god argues with her about the transitoriness of her earthly happiness as the wife (now) of Eochaid, King of Tara in Ireland, stoutly refuses to leave Eochaid and go back to Mider, saying

"What can they know of love that do not know
She builds her nest upon a narrow ledge
Above a windy precipice."

Even then the passionate god making another appeal to her in vain seized her in his arms but was instantly thrust away by the noble woman who finally said to the defeated deity—

"Never will I believe there is any change
Can blot out of my memory this life
Sweetened by death, but if I could believe
That were a double hunger in my lips
For what is doubly brief."

The experiences of love—ranging from the highest to the most carnal—have served for the foundation of a philosophy of life from the days of Plato down to our own. There is a good deal to be said on the *Symposium* or the *Vita Nuova* regarding the theory of love of two outstanding figures of Hellenic and Mediæval culture respectively, but I must strictly restrain myself on the present occasion out of regard for my limits.

Infinity of desires :.

I may be permitted, I trust, to connect with the important idea of love's limitlessness, what amounts to the laying down by Yeats of another art-principle (in "The Tables of the Law") that "the beautiful arts were sent into the world to overthrow nations, and finally life herself, by sowing everywhere unlimited desires, like torches thrown into a burning city." This somewhat paradoxical idea, we are told, acquired the force of almost a belief with the reawakening[1] of imaginative life in Ireland. It is dramatically ascribed to Aherne (about whom and Michael Robartes *vide* Notes, pages 362, 363 of "Later Poems," 1924 edn.) who is described very suggestively as "the supreme type of our race, which, when it has risen above, or is sunken below, the formalisms of half-education and the rationalisms of conventional affirmation and denial, turns away from practicable desires and intuitions towards desires so unbounded that no human vessel can contain them * *."

In "Rosa Alchemica," Part IV, we read of the petals of the great rose in mosaic falling through the air and shaping themselves into living beings of extraordinary beauty and then beginning to dance—every mortal foot dancing by the white foot of an immortal—"and in the troubled eyes that looked into untroubled shadowy eyes, I saw the brightness of *uttermost desire* * *." (Italics are *mine*.)

There is a mystic touch in these passages, no doubt, but we have to remember what is so nicely urged in the Introduction to "The Oxford Book of English Mystical Verse"—"And now it appears that the fortunes of mysticism are mending. It has emerged from the morass of apathy which characterized the 18th and the greater part of the 19th century; it is reawakening to the value of its own peculiar treasure of thought and word: on all sides there are signs that it is on the verge of entering into a kingdom of such breadth and fertility as it has perhaps never known. It is as though the world were undergoing a spiritual revitalization, spurring it on to experience—even through destruction and death—a further measure of Reality and Truth."

In the "Shadowy Waters" Aibric argues with Forgael against his dream of an "unheard-of passion"—"some strange love the world knows nothing of"—which to the former's practical mind is "all folly." Forgael's reply is worth quoting in full. Says he:—

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[1] *Vide* page 278 of *Calcutta Review* for February (1st instalment) for this groping for new light.

"But he that gets their" (*i.e.*, of the beautiful women of the world whom other men generally love)

"love after the fashion
Loves in brief longing and deceiving hope
And bodily tenderness, and finds that even
The bed of love, that in the imagination
Had seemed to be the giver of all peace,
Is no more than a wine-cup in the tasting,
And as soon finished.

* * *

It's not a dream,
But the reality that makes our passion
As a lamp shadow—no,—no lamp, the sun.
What the world's million lips are thirsting for,
Must be substantial somewhere."

The other side of the case is, however, presented even in this mystic drama of love in two passages—*viz.*,

(1) *Forgael to Dectora*—

"There is not one among you that made love
By any other means, you call it passion,
Consideration, generosity;
But it was all deceit, and flattery
To win a woman in her own despite,
For love is war, and there is hatred in it" etc.

(2) *Dectora to Forgael*—

"I would that there was nothing in the world
But my beloved—that night and day had perish'd,
And all that is and all that is to be,
And all that is not the meeting of our lips."

Dectora under the influence of Aibric who proposes to safely take her back to her home leaving the crazy Forgael to his fate for one moment wavers and with a woman's instinct requests Forgael to carry her to some familiar place now that in having one another, she thinks, they have everything that life can give. But her final decision is to go on for ever with Forgael after having cut asunder the rope that held her to the world. Love's fruition, as here conceived, is thus represented—

"The world drifts away,
And I am left alone with my beloved
Who cannot put me from his sight for ever,
We are alone for ever, and I laugh—

* * *

Bend lower, that I may cover you with my hair,
For we will gaze upon this world no longer."

To this Forgael's response is—

"Beloved, having dragged the net (*i.e.* of this Fate) about us,
And knitted mesh to mesh, we grow immortal."

In "Deirdre," the heroine addressing the strange musicians says, when she and her lover Naisi are betrayed into the hands of King Conchubar,

"Oh, singing women, set it down in a book,
That love is all we need, even though it is
But the last drops we gather up like this."

And the musicians then sing the following beautiful love-lyric—

"Love is an immoderate thing
And can never be content,
Till it dip an ageing wing,
Where some laughing element
Leaps and Time's old lanthorn dims.
What's the merit in love-play,
In the tumult of the limbs
That dies out before 'tis day,

Heart on heart, or mouth on mouth
All that mingling of our breath
When love longing is but drouth—
For the things come after death?"

Let us go into some further details to show the development of love in his poetry.

In the "Usheen" poem of 1888 love is an alluring snare. The high-born lady who is to the hero a veritable Circe is a pleasant woman

"But like a sunset were her lips
A stormy sunset on doomed ships,"

And Usheen confesses to St. Patrick—

"O Patrick, by your brazen bell.
There is no limb of mine but fell
Into a desperate gulf of love."

Phases of love.

In the early lyrics lovers are described as "Wandering ever with woven hands, murmuring softly lip to lip" and love "grows like a meteor of the burning heart." The poet sings in these of the pity of love with tenderness, of the sorrow of love without bitterness, though mortal love is shown as incapable of appeasing the heart's ecstatic longing. The sense of love's transitoriness is embodied in "A Memory of Youth" and there is the resulting discontent or despondency. "The Rose of the World" speaks of beauty passing like a dream and of how Troy passed away in one funeral gleam "for red lips with all their mournful pride." "Beauty grown sad with eternity" and how

"Danger no refuge holds, and war no peace,
For him who hears love sing and never cease"

are both referred to in the "Rose of Battle" (a highly mystical poem).

"Ephemera" occurring in the 1889 volume of lyrics called "Crossways" is remarkable for its brooding tenderness and a subdued autumnal sadness born of old memories ending in a heartening note of solace. The poem must be quoted in full specially for its high suggestiveness of Nature as an enveloping medium of human emotion and as a sensuo-sympathetic symbol.

"Your eyes that once were never weary of mine
Are bowed in sorrow under pendulous lids.
Because our love is waning."

And then she :—

"Although our love is waning, let us stand
By the lone border of the lake once more,
Together in that hour of gentleness
When the poor tired child, passion, falls asleep.
How far away the stars seen, and how far
Is our first kiss, and ah, how old my heart!"

"Pensive they paced along the faded leaves,
While slowly he whose hand held hers replied:
'Passion has often worn our wandering hearts.'
The woods were round them, and the yellow leaves
Fell like faint meteors in the gloom, and once
A rabbit old and lame limped down the path ;
Autumn was over him: and now they stood
On the lone border of the lake once more:
Turning, he saw that she had thrust dead leaves
Gathered in silence, dewy as her eyes,
In bosom and hair."
"Ah, do not mourn" he said
'That we are tired, for other loves await us ;
Hate on and love thro' unrepining hours,
Before us lies eternity ; our souls
Are love, and a continual farewell."

"A cradle song" keeps eternally embalmed in its perfect simplicity and absolute sincerity the tenderness[1] of a mother's love for her child while she is affectionately crooning a lullaby over her sleeping child snugly nestled in the cradle.

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[1] *Cf.* stanza 12 of "Moll Magee."

> " The angels are stooping
> Above your bed ;
> They weary of trooping
> With the whimpering dead
> * * *
> I sigh that kiss you
> For I must own
> That I shall miss you
> When you have grown."

The last two lines are unsurpassable in their suggestiveness as an echo of all the world's maternal hearts trembling with a queer feeling of which the validity comes straight from the stronger logic of passion than that of the intellect.

> " We heve given the world our passion,
> " Wc have naught for death but toys"

in "Upon a Dying Lady" makes passion all in all,[1] yet the raw passion of mere sensuous love has little appeal for Yeats who playfully condemns it in a poem "Never[2] give all the Heart," which very skilfully recaptures the humorous abandon of the 17th century writers of Cavalier love lyrics. There is another such *light* lyric "O do not love too long" in the same volume entitled "The Seven Woods" (published in 1903).

I quote only one stanza—

> " Sweet heart, do not love too long:
> I loved long and long
> And grew to be out of fashion
> Like an old song."

"The Young Man's Song" (in the Green Helmet etc. series, 1912) on the mystery and eternity of love, is, after all, suggestive of a half-humorous treatment of the theme, the transition to which mood from that represented by the two lighter pieces just noticed is marked by "To a Young Girl" (*vide* "Wild Swans at Coole"). These are moments of emotional relaxation from love's intensity and the poet's fancy is then out for holiday-making. It is refreshing, however, to note that while employing this lighter vein in his love-poetry, Yeats is singularly free from the disgusting habit of indulging in elaborate conceits—there is no such thing in Yeats, even though in one poem there is mention of Donne with a qualified appreciation, as a *carte du pays de Tendre,* though his travels are rather extensive in the realm of Aphrodite. His passionate sincerity and simplicity saves him equally from sentimentalism and what is sensual. Though resembling Shelley much, Yeats does not idealize what others will call a guilty passion and there is no poem on love pre-nuptial however romantic his treatment of this all important poetic theme may be. In "The Two Kings" we have, no doubt, Ardan's passion for his brother King Eochaid's wife, Edain, but that, we must remember, is due to the craft of Mider who put that passion in Ardan. In "Hanrahan's Vision" various types and classes of lovers are seen to pass by before that bard's eye, *viz.*, first, those that had the greatest name and fame such as Deirdre and Grania who cared not for physical charm—"The blossom of the man or woman that brings grief and not peace"—but for "the beauty that is as lasting as the night and the stars; then, those not put in songs by the poets "because they sought only to triumph one over the other to prove their strength and beauty"; next, "the women with shadow-bodies who desired neither to triumph nor to love but only to be loved, and there is no blood in their hearts or in their bodies until it flows through them from a kiss, and their life is but for a moment. All these are unhappy." "The Seven Woods" volume, I should remind you, marks an important transition stage in Yeats which we may assign to the year 1903 when this second period of his poetic development had come to a close. I must turn back, therefore, to the richest wealth of poetic beauty embodied in what constitutes Yeats's best work of the second stage contained in "The Wind among the Reeds" (published 1899). There are more love poems in this series. than in any other—19 out of the 37 pieces in it being avowedly on one or other aspect of love. We shall have to rest content with one or two samples.

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[1] *Cf.* " He wishes his beloved were dead "

[2] *Cf.* " Down by the Sallee Gardens."

In this volume Yeats's art makes a great advance[1] and he invents a new type of imagery as the drapery of sincere, earnest, dignified, elevated and *spiritualised emotion.* The intensity[2] of poetic passion that is here is of a heavenly order. It should be noted also that now begins a new mode of treatment that is decidedly Yeatsian—a symbolic treatment full of highly mystic hints. Just as in the case of Patmore we note a parallel development in passing from "The Angel in the House" to "The Unknown Eros."

Even in the earlier (1893) volume of poems, "The Rose" there is a reference to 'love's bitter mystery'' in "Who goes with Fergus?"

Love poetry deepens now into the poetry of ecstatic spiritual longing, free from the pollutions of earthliness and mortality, from the vanities of the world and the morbid sentiments of sickly lovers. The keynote is struck in two lines of "The Hosting of the Sidhe"—

> " And Niamh calling 'Away, come away:
> Empty your heart of its mortal dream.' "

The poet in Yeats here pre-eminently stands before us as the herald of a renaissance—the harbinger of a new light of inspiration destined to make for peace and harmony by healing the world's accumulated wrongs. A premonitory note was sounded earlier in the "Countess Cathleen" where we heard Aleel crying out—

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[1] *Cf.* " The Lover asks forgiveness because of his many moods" for its Shakespearian note.

[2] *Cf.* " He tells of a Valley full of Lovers," " A Poet to his Beloved."

"Let Him that made mankind, the angels and devils
And death and plenty mend what he has made,
For when we labour in vain and eye still sees
Heart breaks in vain ;"

Or, Cathleen herself telling her foster-mother Oona

"O mother tell me
How I may mend the times, how staunch this wound
That bleeds in the earth."

In "The Poet gives his Beloved certain Rhymes" we have

"I bade my heart build these poor rhymes
It worked at them, day out, day in,
Building a sorrowful loveliness
Out of the battles of old times."

The seer's calm conviction thus embodied brings straight to our hearts with a compelling force the assurance of a regenerated world even in a message of love. No longer is love closely associated with pity and melancholy as in "Proud Costello" (a prose piece in 'The Secret Rose' volume of 1897) where we have—"And while they (Costello the lover and MacDermot's daughter Una) danced there came over them the weariness with the world, the melancholy, the pity one for the other, which is ths exultation of love."

The poet's vision of a new earth and a new heaven shines clearer in "The Lover tells of the Rose in his Heart" which is decidedly a typical love poem of the new order. The first stanza of this poem alone will suffice for our purpose.

"All things uncomely and broken, all things worn out and old,
The cry of a child by the road-way, the creak of a lumbering cart,
The heavy steps of a ploughman, splashing the wintry mould,
Are wronging your image that blossoms a rose in the
deeps of my heart."

Similarly we have in "He remembers forgotten Beauty"—

"When my arms wrap you round I press
My heart upon the loveliness
That has long faded from the world,"

and in "He gives his Beloved certain Rhymes"—

"You need but lift a pearl-pale hand,
And bind up your long hair and sigh ;
And all men's hearts must burn and beat ;
And candle-like foam on the dim sand,
And stars climbing the dew-dropping sky,
Live but to light your passing feet."

Dante's *Beatrice* embodying "idealization of love as the Divine Wisdom," it has been rightly observed, fails to be "a fit philosophy for men in general" by forgetting to "pay respect not only to the soul but to the senses, not only to the imagination but to the body of man." Yeats satisfies both the higher and the more common demand.

The underlying idea of Yeats in such poems is not merely one of ardent appreciation of beauty and love where they already exist in Nature and Man but of so refashioning the world of actualities that all types of ugliness, aesthetic as well as ethical, may for ever disappear from the face of the earth till we, the depressed and sorrow-laden children of God full of deep anguish of the soul, may once more be restored to the pristine glory of the golden age of beauty, love, innocence, goodness, peace and joy. Thus is wafted into our wounded hearts a melodious breath of soul-entrancing song, at once pensively sad and joyous and full of the sweetest music of life's harmony. Like the poet's own Driscoll in "The Host of the Air" we hear—

"A piper piping away
And never was piping so sad
And never was piping so gay."

Sad, because of what was and is, but gay with the message of what is yet to be. Yes ; sad and gay, for, as we all realise in the deeper depth of our own hearts, verily joy and grief are actually the warp and woof of the fabric of human existence (*cf*. Dedication to a Book of Stories).

For intense all-absorbing love in a woman's heart wistfully yearning for pure union, which alone is blessedness, we turn next to " The Heart of the Woman " so simple, sincere, chaste and beautiful.

" O what to me the little room
That was brimmed up with prayer and rest ;
He bade me out into the gloom
And my breast lies upon his breast.

O what to me my mother's care
The house where I was safe and warm ;
The shadowy blossom of my hair
Will hide us from the bitter storm.

O hiding hair and dewy eyes,
I am no more with life and death,
My heart upon his warm heart lies
My breath is mixed into his breath ! "

A woman's heart has seldom been probed with better skill or more unerring sureness of a poet's sympathetic imagination unfolding the completeness of satisfaction to the heart and soul through self-effacing love. Another phase of the same emotion that finds fruition in soul's repose is more beautifully recorded in " He bids His Beloved be at Peace " which shows the all-sufficing quality of genuine and true love—which is at once " blessedness and love."

" O vanity of Sleep, Hope, Dream, endless Desire,
The Horses of Disaster plunge in the heavy clay;
Beloved, let your eyes half close, and your heart beat
Over my heart, and your hair fall over my breast,
Drowning love's lonely hour in deep twilight of rest,
And hiding their tossing manes and their tumultuous feet."

One cannot go on quoting endlessly. So I shall barely refer to the piece "He remembers forgotten Beauty" which records the lonely mysteries of love and beauty blended into a rich harmony that eternally haunts and broods over life.

There is delineation of another kind of love that seeks but never finds full fruition in limited time but does so only in eternity. We behold such a vision in the lines ("He tells of the Perfect Beauty"):—

> "O cloud-pale eye-lids, dream-dimmed eyes,
> The poets labouring all their days
> To build a perfect beauty in rhyme
> Are overthrown by a woman's gaze
> And by the unlabouring brood of the skies;
> And therefore my heart will bow, until God burn time,
> Before the unlabouring stars and you."

And again,

> "I wander by the edge
> Of this desolate lake
> Where wind cries in the sedge:
> Until the axle break
> That keeps the stars in their round,
> And hands hurl in the deep
> The framers of East and West,
> And the girdle of light is unbound,
> Your breast will not lie by the breast
> Of your beloved in sleep."

In this connection we may compare also "The Travail of Passion" which records how our hearts can eternally endure all trials and sufferings "when an immortal passion breathes in mortal clay;" "The Poet pleads with the Elemental Powers" which are invoked to encircle the woman loved and sing her into peace with their harmonious choir" so that "a gentle silence wrought with music flow whither her footsteps go;" but finally, the following 8 lines of exquisite verse recording the homage of a heart that finds fulfilment and bliss by offering on the sacred altar of exalted love love's utter selflessness as by a pious worshipper in a holy shrine in a devotional mood—

"Had I the heaven's embroidered cloths,
Enwrought with golden and silver light,
The blue and the dim and the dark cloths
Of night and light and the half light,
I would spread the cloths under your feet:
But I, being poor, have only my dreams;
I have spread my dreams under your feet;
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams."

The Ideal of Love.

Even in the earlier volume of "The Rose" (1893) we come across significant hints regarding the ideal of love in such pieces as "When you are old" of which the last three lines run thus—

"* * * how love fled
And paced upon the mountains overhead
And hid his face amid a crowd of stars."

In "Who goes with Fergus?" the hero's appeal is—

"Young man, lift up your russet brow,
And lift your tender eyelids, maid,
And brood on hopes and fears no more.
And no more turn aside and brood
Upon Love's bitter mystery."

One question may, however, arise in respect of Yeats's conception of love *idealised.* I have sometimes been troubled by the suspicion that Yeats must have at one time been largely influenced by the ideal of love prevalent among the Troubadours of the 12th century, particularly of Provençe who later on became indoctrinated with the Oriental mysticism of the Albigenses. The topic is too large for anything like a discussion in my short paper but it deserves some consideration. This conjecture, if correct, may, to some extent, account for his difference with Shelley's treatment of ideal love or even that of Browning as far as that ideal is illustrated, say, by his "Rudel to the Lady of Tripoli."

In summing up this aspect of his poetry I shall simply add that the lyrics of the period from 1890 to 1900 which, according to my own appreciation of poetry, form the best years of Yeats, productive of the richest and most representative pieces so characteristic of his lyrical genius, stand unsurpassed in their originality, emotional intensity, artistic technique, sweet melody and beautiful imagery. This is to some extent a matter of personal preferences. I recall my younger days when the irresistible charm of this new poetry filled me with intoxicating joy and I distinctly remember the zest with which in those days we turned from the heady wine of Swinburne's sensuous music which had once carried us almost off our feet by its resistless rush and impetuous volume of cloying sweetness to the refreshing and soothing sonorousness of Yeats's poetry.

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION

Since the introduction of the Morley-Minto-Reforms in 1909, the question of communal representation through separate electorates has become the most prominent subject of discussion in political India. It has been discussed threadbare in the press and on the platform as it is a problem of considerable importance for India's future progress. It is not proposed, however, to add anything very new but the writer as a scientific student of history wants merely to express his own feelings and his understanding of the situation. The discussion should necessarily be dispassionate and free from all sentiments. Any contribution, however small, to this vital problem that now confronts India might be of some service towards its solution, and it is the duty of every right-thinking man or woman who loves India and desires her political and economic uplift to contribute his or her best to the solution of this grave problem at this momentous juncture of India's need to draw up a constitution on the principle of the right of self-determination. She has been challenged by many Britishers to prepare a constitution acceptable to all sections, but the problem of communal representation consequent on the question of safeguarding the interests of minorities has so long stood in the way of the challenge being taken up successfully.

Let us examine what communal representation means. It is a system that permits representation on public bodies on the basis of different communities. Seats in the legislatures and a few other public bodies are distributed mainly on the population basis among the different communities in India. The system recognises the right of every community to be represented by its own men usually on the strength of its numbers. Communal representation, specially the system of communal electorates that now obtains in India, has always been a handicap to the pursuit of common policies by our legislators, since members are elected by their co-religionists on different tickets.

Let us next examine what necessitates communal representation in India. It owed its origin in India to the insistence of the Indian Mahomedans. Distrust among the two major communities—Hindus and Mussalmans—of India led to the acceptance of communal representation with separate electorates. A Moslem does not somehow feel himself quite safe in being represented by a Hindu and it is possible that a Hindu may not like to be represented by a Moslem. Each community seems to feel that its interests are more or less antagonistic to those of the other and they therefore must be looked after by its own people. Each of these two communities seems to believe that its wants and interests are peculiar to itself and can be best represented by its own members. But the Hindu community has been always against the system and it is the Moslem community that has always stood by and fought for it. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the reasons that specially led them to stick to this demand

Mahomedans form about one fourth of the total population of the whole of British India and except in Bengal and the Punjab they are in a hopeless minority in the provinces. They, therefore, believe that if communal representation is abolished they may possibly be kept out of the public bodies, since the number of Hindu electors in all the provinces, except two, is in an overwhelming majority. Mahomedans believe that Hindus in general are not very friendly to them and that public officers and legislators will possibly support the cause of their own co-religionists when any conflict of interests arises between the two communities. Unfortunately this belief has been hardened by sharp and sudden outbursts of communal leaders on both sides. The last communal riots all over India and their remnants that are yet affording precious food to a section of the Indian press have greately added to the panic. In these circumstances if Moslems or Hindus refuse to be convinced of fair treatment for each by the other they cannot be blamed.

Now a great task lies before the country. Leaders of both the communities will have to find out a formula which will automatically establish mutual goodwill in the two communities. The first step, as has already been decided upon by responsible Moslem leaders and accepted by the Congress and the Calcutta Moslem League, should be the formation of joint electorates with necessary reservations as provided by the Madras session of the Congress for safeguarding the interests of minorities. This point will be discussed elsewhere in detail.

Unfortunately for India, communalism has been so long gaining ground over nationalism. Nationalism and communalism are two contradictory ideas and cannot both co-exist. The growth of communalism has been fostered, among other things, by the communal electorates. If India is to be or become a nation, communal or any other sectarian sentiment must be subordinated to national feeling, and to achieve this the present system of 'electorates' must go. Nationalism demands a common consciousness of rights and wrongs, a sense of unity, community of interests and sentiments, and a fusion of thoughts and ideas. Does India satisfy these indispensable conditions? Do her internal conditions entitle her to be called a nation in the true sense of the term? Many may be shocked to hear this from an Indian, but plain speaking may still be of some good. Let our leaders realise the situation and rise to the occasion to meet it. If German, Spanish and French nationalities could be developed not from a "common *stem*," but from "*heterogenous* race elements," why should India fail? Community of religion is no essential mark of a nation and it nowhere exists in the same degree as it exists in India.

Nationalism demands the energy of the people to be spent for the good of the nation, while communalism creates a communal outlook, however detrimental that outlook may be to the nation as a whole. The existence of different communities, as is evidenced by the history of other countries, cannot really stand in the way of creating a nationalist outlook. What is the difference between a Hindu and a Mahomedan in the matter of worship except that the former goes to the temple while the latter to the mosque? Why should we magnify for political ends man's particular religious faith without taking him fundamentally to be a citizen or a child of the same soil? Except in the matter of religion and allied social customs all Indians are essentially one and can work, if they will, in concert. They inhabit the same land and any disaster affects them equally. Foreign bullets and bayonets and batons, for instance, do not discriminate between the Hindu and the Mahomedan. Religion is a thing more or less personal and too sacred to be allowed to be dragged into the field of politics and made a butt of controversy. "Blind faith in religious tenets," must not be allowed to get the upper hand and disturb the peace of the country. In the words of Sir P. C. Ray

> "It is pure idolatry on the part of the Moslems when they object to music before mosques even in times when no prayer is going on, while it is mad intolerance on the part of the Hindus when they object to cow-killing by Moslems, while they revel in the sight of goats and buffaloes being slaughtered with pomp and ceremony."

One could only wish that every community had thoroughly realised the significance of the above observation, for then vagaries of religious zealots would automatically disappear. The religious fanaticism exhibited by both the communities in their "zid" for preventing cow-killing or music before mosques is an intolerable absurdity; and the riots originating from them simply remind one of that barbarous age when law, reason and sanctity of human life had no respect. In the name of religion the rioters, better, those so-called leaders who were responsible for exciting the mobs, have really disgraced religion and themselves as men.

One word to those fellow Moslems who would be satisfied with nothing short of communal representation along with communal electorate. Communal electorate along with communal representation is inconsistent with the idea of nationalism or *Swaraj* in any democratic country. If they say that India is not fit for Swaraj at present or that the Moslem community is not prepared to have it now one can understand them all right. But to demand immediate Swaraj and at the same time to insist on communal electorate is to accept both Moses and Frown.

The argument they advance is that under a joint electorate even with the reservation of seats, "a successful Mussalman candidate may in some cases come in as the nominee of a Hindu majority of voters and as long as the communal consciousness or bias persists he may not be a true representative of the community to which he belongs." But this may be answered by saying that the same supposition will of course apply to the other community or communities in constituencies where Mahomedan voters may be in a majority. But this is apprehending too much without sufficient reason. This is only a negative way of looking into the question without enquiring into the merits of a system of joint electorates which may outweigh any possible evils arising out of it. The communal form of franchise, even as Sir Abdur Rahim admits, "accentuates to some extent the tendency to exaggerate the communal aspect of many questions." Another argument though not clearly brought out seems to be that even in constituencies having a majority, or at least an equal number of Moslem voters as the other community has, Hindus who are richer, more educated and influential than Moslems will carry their Moslem nominees through the elections by influencing even Moslem voters. This position is not very tenable and even if it be true to some extent, it does not matter, and any such sectional interest must be sacrificed for the greater boon of nationalism.

Whatever may be the case, the Parliament of any country is not an association of delegates of different nations with different and hostile interests, but an association composed of the representatives of the same nation gathered together for the furtherance of national interests and aims. Communal interest has to be subordinated to national interest in cases where they conflict, and if the whole nation gains by a measure at the sacrifice of the interests of a section of either community or of a particular constituency, then the representatives belonging to that section or constituency which is thus adversely affected must have to support such a cause from a national standpoint. This is true political philosophy and any country desiring democratic institutions must cultivate such a spirit and must be prepared to sacrifice sectarian interests for the benefit of the nation as a whole. It may, however, be pointed out here that the best interests of a community are not incompatible with national interests, for communities are integral parts of the nation as a whole.

Granting for the sake of argument that some Moslem candidates who may be the nominees of a large section of Moslem voters, fail in a few cases to get into public bodies, even then the sacrifice of communal electorate (if it is a sacrifice at all) is worth making for the larger cause—the attainment of Indian Swaraj. Through such a form of franchise let not India be further exposed to the ridicule of the outside world. Separate electorates, experience shows, have failed to create a national outlook and if they have achieved anything, have only intensified communal consciousness.

A few words now about communal leaders. Communal leaders there are in both the communities. But there is a good deal of difference in their ultimate aims. Hindu communal leaders, almost without exception, genuinely feel for their community and whatever they preach or do, their ultimate aim is to further the interests of their community. And one would only wish their patriotism were not limited within the bounds of their own community. But the activities and all loud talks of some of the Moslem communal leaders, speaking on behalf of the community, have a different tendency. Their ultimate aim seems to be personal interests which they best serve by talking in the name of the community. One cannot imagine a worse principle than this which has helped to degenerate public life in Bengal. The Moslem community in Bengal is mostly illiterate and is unable to see through the weaknesses of its leaders. These communal leaders pose to be the friends of the illiterate Moslem masses and are only serving the interests of themselves and their dependents. They become inconsistent in their public policies to any extent and even sacrifice their community if such a change of front pays them, as is evidenced by the luke-warm attitude of some and passionate, though short-lived, enthusiasm of others in the matter of the 'Kulkati firing' where nineteen Moslems were shot dead. Examples showing their inconsistencies might be multiplied, but they are not necessary.

Are these the ideals on which the future Moslem community will be built ? Are these the ideals from which the present and the future generations will draw their inspiration ? Leaders whose leadership means the exploitation of the ignorance of the masses are leaders only so long as the communal electorate is there. Their importance will be considerably diminished the moment the separate electorates cease to exist. It is more to the interest of these few people to move heaven and earth, 'go from Bengal to Lahore' to retain the present system in its entirety. One can appreciate those communalists and even praise them, though reluctantly, who want nothing but the good of their community. One can only say that they are mistaken and might be convinced of the efficacy of a change. But it is futile to try to convert the former class for reasons already stated and they unfortunately hold the ground for the time being not only in Bengal, but also in several other important centres of India.

Now, the Moslems must realise that mere concessions granted to any community cannot ultimately solve the problems of the community. A community cannot thrive on concessions alone. To rise to a position of eminence it must learn to stand on its own legs. This can be achieved by the spread of education among the masses and by developing public spirit for the service of the people in general. They must know that it is against the very tradition of the British people to allow them these concessions for ever. So the Moslems have to be prepared in time for the inevitable re-adjustment of power and responsibility in a progressive India.

One word also to the Hindus. Have they really acted so long in a manner calculated to inspire love and confidence in the Moslems ? Is there not a substantial section which always looks upon Mahomedans with an amount of contempt and hatred ? "It is an open secret," writes Sir P. C. Ray, "that the educated Hindus have always looked down upon the Mussalmans, whom they consider to be their inferiors. This feeling of contempt is very much resented by the Mahomedan *intelligentsia.* The educated Hindus generally treat the learned professions and the higher services under the Government to be their monopoly and any attempt by the Mussalmans to enter these departments is regarded as an infringement of their vested rights. It is one of the chief causes of the estrangement between the two communities." Hindus must now realise that unless this outlook towards Mussalmans is radically changed, no amount of pact or oratory will solve the problem of Hindu-Moslem unity, so essential for winning *Swaraj* in this down-trodden country. He must be a born lunatic who believes that Indian independence can be achieved by any one community alone.

Let the Hindus and Mussalmans speak out their minds sincerely and try to come to an understanding. Let both the communities place all their cards on the table and fight out the issue. No patched-up agreement for unity between the two communities will stand the stress and strain of time. This is on time for vacillation. Every action must be straightforward and honest. Sir P. C. Ray reminds us that "causes of antagonism are small and few, but how wide is the field of co-operation and mutual help." There are many wants and grievances in the country which, says Sir Profulla, "can only be tackled by the joint efforts of both the communities."

What then is to be our next step? Having regard to the opinion held by the entire Moslem community and specially the present atmosphere of mutual distrust and communal consciousness, the present system of representation cannot be altogether overhauled, although one might wish the relation between the two communities was such as to allow the abolition of the entire system at once. Reservation of seats as alternative to separate electorates seems to be the best practical course under the circumstances. It is possible that this will place the relation of the two communities on a more friendly basis. It may be said that communal leaders would not have the heart to rouse the mob as they did in the days of the last riot, if they only knew that their chance of entering any public body or rising to public eminence did not depend solely on the support and sympathy of their co-religionists alone. A few lines from the Congress Presidential Address of Dr. Ansari may be quoted in this connection. He says :

> "The one great cause of friction so far has been separate electorate. If the success of a candidate at elections depends entirely on the votes of his co-religionists, the tendency to exaggerate and accentuate points of communal friction and division in order to catch votes is inevitable. The resolution of the All India Congress Committee on May 16, 1927, while making the fullest possible allowance for the fear of minorities regarding adequate protection, by reservation of seats, presents fresh opportunities for the development of a spirit of friendliness and mutual confidence, the best augury for a united India."

In constitutional matters sudden and wholesale changes are politically inexpedient and are often attended with disastrous results, specially when it is attained against the decided opinion of a certain influential section. So let us begin with the joint electorates giving minor communities adequate protection with a view to alley their 'reasonable' suspicion. Let this be a temporary arrangement to continue for a number of years when, it may be confidently hoped, the communal outlook will be replaced by a national one and the spirit of hostility and distrust will be replaced by bonds of friendship between the two communities. Then, communal representation may safely be abolished without any opposition whatsoever. When most of the differences between the two communities have ceased, it will be a matter of indifference to the masses in general whether Ram goes to the council or Rahim fails provided both can equally represent their common views. But a complete overhauling of the present system at once, however lofty the ideal might be, under the existing strained feelings between the two communities, will be a potential danger which is not worth risking at this time as the whole structure may come down as a house of cards before the experiment has time to work itself out and reap any lasting results. With the introduction of joint electorates by which the Hindu and Moslem candidates will be thrown open to the sense of justice and fair play of people of both the communities, the promotion of nationalism is sure to become the ideal of our leaders and of the people in general, and sectarian interests are bound to become a secondary concern.

Nationalism has been so much emphasised in this paper that one may feel impelled to ask : 'What is the goal of nationalism?' People may differ on this point and as to its exact purpose and ends. But on some fundamental principles we can all agree. The aim of nationalism is to develop political power and promote social progress in the country of our birth or adoption. Its aim is the perfection of national life after security, liberty and justice have been well-established in the country. Its aim should be, as that of the State also, to maintain national independence and to work for the general welfare of the people.

KAZI MAHABBAT ALI

THE INLAND BILLS OF EXCHANGE

Financing of Inland Trade.

Sufficient attention was not drawn to the internal bills o exchange or inland trade bills till the year 1920 and the Indian banks never cared to finance internal trade largely by means of discounting trade bills. It is indeed true that Hundies were used to a limited extent in this direction. But, broadly speaking, the system of cash credits was adopted in preference to trade bills. The advance is made on demand promissory notes signed by two or more persons unconnected with each other in general partnership with collateral security when necessary. The bulk of our mercantile business is transacted on this cash credit basis or "running overdraft" basis as bankers put it. An export merchant who wished to secure banking accommodation to help him in the export of raw material would approach the banker and secure 20 or 25 lakhs as the maximum for the overdraft for a specified period. The actual accommodation however depends on the varying needs of his business. This affords him cheaper finance than any other method. He usually takes notes or rupees from the bank and purchases the product from the cultivator direct or through an intermediary and no bill is drawn on him or his intermediary by the cultivator. He sends the material out of the country and draws on the foreigner. This export bill is bought by the exchange bank and the proceeds would enable the merchant to pay the loan to the domestic bank.

What happened in 1920 and after.

The analogy of the Federal Reserve Board appealed strongly to the Babington Smith Committee which recommended the issuing of seasonal currency against export bills.[1] When the

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[1] See Mr. M. M. S. Gubbay's Oral Evidence before the Hilton-Young Commission. Vol. V, p. 110.

Paper Currency Act of 1920 was passed the difficulties of basing the seasonal expansion of currency up to five crores of rupees on export bills were realised and in their place the internal bills of exchange or *hundies* were recommended as suitable cover.[1] Detailed regulations were issued on 16th February, 1922 to this effect. The rate of interest at which this seasonal currency was made available to the Imperial Bank was fixed at 8 per cent. The experience gained in this matter during the two busy seasons of 1922-23 and 1923-24 pointed out the necessity of raising this limit from five to twelve crores of rupees. The loans were also made available to the Imperial Bank as soon as the Bank rate rose to six per cent. and the whole amount was made available at a predetermined schedule of bank rates. But during the busy season of 1923-24 in addition to this expansion notes had to be issued by adding the British Treasury Bills to the extent of 12 crores in the Paper Currency Reserve. In September, 1924 it was announced that Treasury bills would be used as the basis for expansion of the P.C.R. and a change was also made in the issuing of loans to the Imperial Bank. Four crores were made available at six per cent. and the remainder at seven per cent. The Government also undertook to reimburse the Imperial Bank the amount of loss sustained by it in "creating" bills to the necessary limit.

It is indeed disappointing to find that although self-liquidating bills of exchange were recognised as the basis for seasonal currency and due provision was made for it no attempt was made to popularise these bills of exchange. The Imperial Bank had really to "manufacture" bills out of cash credits granted to the merchants and as a heavy stamp duty had to be paid on these bills the bank had to consent to bear this duty and although the Government came to the rescue of the bank in this connection neither the Government nor the Imperial Bank undertook any measures to increase the volume of internal trade bills of exchange. The paucity of bills and the absence of an active discount market were realised by the advocates of the Central Bank of Issue but these preferred to run the risk of prematurity in starting this Central Bank. Although there is no other method so successful as the starting of a Central Bank for the improvement of the discount market still other attempts must be made to popularise the drawing of trade bills.

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[1] For a succinct summary of provisions for seasonal expansion of currency, see the Memorandum of Mr. H. Denning submitted to the Hilton-Young Comn., Vol. II, Appendix 3, pp. 19, 20.

Recommendations of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

The Bengal Chamber of Commerce in its memorandum drawn in September, 1924 drew attention to the necessity of increasing the bills of exchange and suggested that the stamp duty should be reduced and the Government should willingly accept bills on stores purchased locally so that these would become popular instruments available for discount in the money market. Some of the more successful and large-scale manufacturing firms like the Tata Sons and Co., already adopted by this time the practice of drawing on the wholesale merchants and these were freely discounted by the Banks in the Calcutta Money Market. However the financing of crop movements from the up-country to the port centres or the centres of trade was not done by the internal bills of exchange and unless this is done freely bills would not increase and an open discount market cannot be created in this country as in the case of the economically developed Western countries.

Advantages of multiplying these trade bills.

The Central Bank's business is admittedly to finance the commercial banks by rediscounting their bills or, if open market operations are allowed, the buying of such bills of first class character is its legitimate function. To facilitate the free and successful functioning of the Central Bank these bills have to be created and a money market dealing with these bills has to be developed. Secondly the ordinary banks stand to gain much by discounting these self-liquidating genuine trade bills. One great difficulty in the matter of branch extension by these joint-stock banks is the non-availability of such liquid instruments as these short-term trade bills. If enough scope exists for discounting such bills the banks would not feel it difficult to embark on a policy of branch extension in the interior. The general public would stand to gain by stabilised money rates. Thirdly it is admitted by all that the system of providing currency on the security of bills of exchange tends to make it automatic and due expansion and contraction takes place as fresh currency is issued against bills and as these mature there is automatic contraction of the same. It is in the interests of sound currency then that these internal bills of exchange should be developed. Fourthly, it must be remembered that the Imperial Bank is becoming more and more censorious in the matter of the Hundies. It is of opinion that *hundies* are becoming "very risky documents." One of the Governors of the Imperial Bank[1] is of opinion that "*hundi* brokers generally are not of a reliable character and they have the knack of disappearing in a monetary crisis. Any Bank which wishes to discount largely these *hundies* should take security from these brokers which should be confiscated if any loss arises out of these transactions. Endorsees of these *hundies* must also be of a solvent character." All these precautions are essential to check kiteflying by men of doubtful standing in the money market. Finally the creation of an open discount market has to be faced and when self-liquidating bills can be converted into gold the holding of such bills by foreign banks might be brought about. Continental Banks are freely purchasing bank bills in the London Money Market and they do not buy even British Treasury Bills for they are precluded from buying bills unless they have two names.[1] Similarly foreign banks might care to hold our bank acceptances if we succeed in maintaining a free gold market and levy no practical hindrances in the matter of the export of gold from the country. Lastly the habit of drawing bills has to be encouraged and if the indigenous bankers are assured of rediscounting facilities at the hands of the Jointstock banks and the Imperial Bank they would perform the original discounting of these bills and the cultivator can secure cash from the indigenous banker. These can act as the discount houses in this country. The indigenous banker would collect the proceeds of the trade bill from the drawee merchant who has already accepted it. He would have to be rewarded for this service and if his monetary compensation is higher than the cost of securing a cash credit from a banker and moving rupees or notes into the interior this method of financing internal trade by means of drawing bills would never become an established fact.

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[1] See Sir D. E. Wacha, Written Evidence before the Hilton-Young Commission—Vol. II, p. 389.

Other Suggestions.

Now that my suggestion for a standardised inland bill of exchange drawn up in vernacular is accepted [2] it remains for the local Government to consider the reduction of the heavy stamp duty which has been suggested by the Hilton-Young[3] Commission and approved by the Government of India. As it is a matter for the provincial Governments to decide it would take certain time to accomplish this needed change. To defeat the intentions of the law bills are drawn as Darsani or sight bills for these need not have to pay such heavy duty as the usance bill. There is always the implied understanding that the bill would be renewed. As the present tax,[4] which bills other than demand bills would have to pay ranges from 3 *as.* to Rs. 27 up to Rs. 30,000 and subject to Rs. 5 for additional Rs. 10,000 or part thereof in excess of Rs. 30,000, is nearly two times heavier than the tax prevailing in the United Kingdom, there is every reason for prompt reduction of this "Nuisance Tax" if the resources of the local Governments do not permit a complete abolition of the same. Barring the two provinces which have shown a deficit other provinces can hope to point out the way in this important direction.

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[1] See S. E. Thomas, " Principles and Arithmetic of Foreign Exchange"—3rd edn., pp. 96-99.

[2] See Rau, " Present-Day Banking in India," 2nd Edition, p. 110.

[3] See para, 116 of the H. Y. Commission's Report.

[4] See Article 13 of 1st Schedule of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the amendment of 1910.

A change in the law is also needed. The existing law with reference to the practice of the bills of exchange or *hundies* needs distinct change in favour of the banks. A negotiable instrument if originally drawn as a bearer instrument [1] must always continue to be so and should not lose its bearer character by any restriction or reservation by reason of subsequent specific endorsements.

Permission should also be granted to put in not only the adhesive stamp on the bill but a postage stamp. This would bring in difficulties in the matter of allocating the stamp revenue between the Postal Department and the Provincial Governments.[2] Some remedy should however be devised to overcome the administrative difficulty and allow the people to put a postage stamp on the bills. In America during the war time there was a stamp duty levied on the cheques and bills but they were understood to create a good lot of "nuisance" [3] so that these "nuisance taxes" were the first to be abolished as soon as peace was restored.

Much capital has been made out of the illiteracy of the people. It is indeed true that a large number of our people cannot read and write. In Egypt the illiterate people kept deposit accounts with banks though they had no idea of how to write their own names.[1] It is confidence that is essential in this vital matter. Lacking this there would be no free mobility for capital or any other use cannot be made of banking instruments if our joint-stock banks fail to conduct conservative banking business.

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[1] See 27 Bombay L. R. 34 (1925) where it is held that a *hundi* drawn in favour of the payee or bearer and endorsed by the payee to a third person was considered to be no longer a bearer *hundi*. The Associated Chambers of Commerce have been trying their best to amend the law in favour of the banks.

[2] See the Report of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, 1926, p. 291.

[3] See the evidence of the American Witnesses before the Hilton-Young Commission, Vol. V, p. 314.

Even if the legend on the bill is drawn up in vernacular in a standardised form it would not work miracles in the matter of making these instruments popular ones. A legitimate campaign for the free use of these bills must be undertaken in this country. Merchants should be granted preferential terms by the sellers of commodities and the wholesale merchants should grant preferential rates to retailers who are willing to accept such bills in lieu of obtaining credit on open accounts. Commercial banks should be granting preferential rates to merchants who finance themselves by discounting bills than to those who borrow on overdraft or by one-name promissory notes. The Central Bank itself would have to grant preferential discount and rediscount rates on trade acceptances.[2] In order to promote the custom of drawing bills some Central Banks are empowered in their charters to charge higher rates on advances than on discounts. The charters of the Central Banks of Austria Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the National Bank of Bulgaria prescribe that if the banks' loans exceed the total of the bills held the rate charged for advances is to be raised to one and half times the discount rate.[3] No such provision was enrolled in the Bank Charter of the Reserve Bank. The Imperial Bank would stand to gain if it freely rediscounts these trade bills, for these would be of use to it for rediscounting at the hands of the Controller of Currency. The limit of 12 crores is meaningless and should not be insisted upon. So long as genuine bills are offered by the Imperial

[1] See F. T. Rowlatt's Oral Evidence before the Babington Smith Committee.

[2] Similar measures were advocated by the Kemmerer-Vissering Commission. See Report on the Reversion to the Gold Standard in South Africa, para. 49 (2).

[3] See C. H. Kisch and W. A. Elkin, " Central Banks," pp. 133 and 134.

Bank there is no reason for this limitation. This is not indeed so ideal a monetary reform as the one of a Bank of Issue considering the bills of exchange as part of its fiduciary currency, but in the absence of the best the next best would have to be resorted to to ameliorate the situation. There should be a vigorous campaign conducted by all parties, the Government, the Imperial Bank, the joint-stock banks, the shroffs and the co-operative purchase and sale societies to create these bills. By moral influence as well as pecuniary inducement efforts must be made to increase the bills of exchange. It would create a healthy and desirable development in Indian monetary progress.

Dangers to be guarded against.

There is always the danger of a Micawber drawing bills for his house-hold expenses on the fond hope that something would turn up to save him in the long run. It is the duty of the indigenous banker to see that such abuse of bills is not made. such accommodation bills should be eschewed altogether and knowing the nature of the parties and their business it would not be difficult for the indigenous banker to know the bona-fides of the transaction. Anticipatory bills are freely drawn and discounted by banks in America but there is a very grave danger with regard to these kinds of bills. As our agriculture is subject to pests, diseases of crops, and storms it might so happen that it would be as foolish as counting chickens before they are actually hatched. The practice of renewal of maturing bills should be frowned upon and the indigenous banker or the original discounting body should be aware of the fact that too frequent or continuous and indiscriminate renewals mean a departure from the strict principles of banking and might involve them in pecuniary loss in the long run. The period for which bills would run might undoubtedly be longer, for agricultural trading in the interior, devoid of proper facilities in the matter of conveyance facilities, requires longer time than in any other industry. With such suitable safeguards as are outlined here the discounting of inland trade bills should be freely done and so long as bills up to a certain limit are discounted by the banks there is no reason to suppose that the solvency of the banks would be threatened.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

THE OFFERING

Yet when I sit in joy's embrace,
And when the dawn doth kiss my lids,
And when the wind in sportive race
My sleepy soul "awaken" bids;
'Tis then I think it were but sin
To live in lands of such delights,
Alone such smiles of nature win,
And climb alone ecstatic heights;
To feel the pulse of throbbing earth
Vibrate in every single vein;
To feel the joys of merry mirth
Tingle in my youthful brain;
'Tis then I feel afflictions throng
And choke my little heart with pain,
And just one sacrificial song
I offer thus at Sorrow's fane.

BYRAM K. TALOOKDAR

Reviews

A History of Hindu Political Theories (from the earliest times to the end of the Seventeenth Century A.D.)—By U. N. Ghoshal, M.A., Ph.D., Oxford University Press, 1927, second edition, pp. 257, price Rs. 8.

We welcome the second edition of this handy little volume on Hindu Political Theories. It deals with an exceptionally difficult subject, and it cannot reasonably be expected that everything that the author has said on a number of highly controversial questions should be unanimously accepted. When the first edition was reviewed in these pages, some of these controversial points were critically discussed. Dr. Ghoshal has extended the scope of his enquiry in the present edition, and briefly alluded to the contribution of the Marathas and Sikhs to political speculation in India. He refers to the famous *Dasabodha* of Samartha Ramdas but does not mention two Marathi works on polity. Malhar Ram Rao Chitnis's *Rajniti* was based mainly, if not wholly, on old Sanskrit works, but Ramchandra Pant Amatya's little treatise was certainly a valuable manual that did not fail to take note of existing conditions. In other words, he was the official exponent of Shivaji's views on the functions and mechanism of the state. The *Raj Vyavahar Kosh* also might be used with profit, for although it was strictly speaking nothing but a dictionary, yet it treated mainly with political terms, and it is likely to throw some light on the actual practice, if not the theories, of the Maratha statesmen. The chief feature of Dr. Ghoshal's work is its sobriety and simple exposition. We have no doubt that it will be very useful to students of Comparative Politics and Ancient Indian History.

HISTORICUS

Communism *vs.* Individualism in Land: an Italian Theory. The Italian land-economist Ciasca's *Il Problema della terra* (The Problem of Land) is fortified with a preface by Professor Prato (Milan, 1921, 320 pages, Fratelli Treves Co.). The standpoint of these two authors is directly opposite to that of recent tendencies in land-legislation and land-theory.

According to Prato the French system promotes the stability of social equilibrium as contrasted with the Russian excesses of to-day (of which the first symptoms could be seen in 1905). Direct proprietorship in France leads to progress in agriculture and economic life, whereas the Russian conditions constitute but the prelude to a catastrophe and rebarbarization. Italy is oscillating between the two systems. Speaking of recent Italian developments he says that there was sequestration by Government during the war-period. The *decrets* and schemes of laws (Vissocchi, Micheli, Falcioni) aim at (*i*) transformation of the *Latifondi* (large estates or Zamindari), (*ii*) intensification of cultivation, and (*iii*) reduction of the price of bread. The recent tendencies indicate an absence of confidence in the capability of individuals to make the best use of private property and point to the " coercive intervention " of the state as a more efficacious mode in the creation of wealth. They thus embody the principle of despotism as anticipated by Tocqueville, to which " *la violence est legitime.*" The " economico-social problems " are being sought to be solved, says Prato, " exclusively by politico-juridical " means.

But what are the lessons of economic history? asks Prato. In Curis' *Storia del latifondo italico* (History of Italian Land-ownership) we find that absolute individual property was the rule in Pre-Imperial times. The *diritto dominicale*, which meant territorial overlordship, concentrated possessions, as well as stability and *garanzia* assured to cultivators, was the rule in the Imperial period. The modification of the above system was synchronous with " *burocrazia*, fiscalism, monopolio, *Statc ipertrofico.*" And along with it began the degeneration of agriculture.

The principle of " *collettivizzazione parziale delle terre*" was synchronous with the downfall of the Roman world according to the late Professor Pareto. The " *uniformita* " or " *legge storica*," *i.e.*, the historic law, that according to Prato can be deduced from ancient Roman experience, says that individual proprietorship is conducive to rational and intensive production.

Prato then discusses the conclusions of the studies in village communities (Seebohm, Maine, Landau, Meitzen). He finds that collective property bears the impress of the " common slavery " of the group, and at best indicates a form of " pastoral economy." It can rise up to the archaic system of coercive and inelastic equality. The " enclosures " of the Renaissance constitute but the expression of a " social necessity " consisting in the withdrawal of lands from the promiscuous wastage under the conditions of " ruinous cultivation." The advantages assured to the peasants during periods of depopulation and chronic agrarian crisis (*cf.* the third and fourth centuries under the Empire and the fourteenth and seventeenth in Europe) are strictly " contractual " phenomena intended to induce the labourers to stay on the land and do not indicate any abstract philosophical sympathy with a communistic system.

In Prato's analysis, economic opinion also has been anti-collectivist. For example, in the eighteenth century the abolition of archaic "communism" was held to be indispensable in the interest of "technical progress." Increased production and individual proprietorship were considered to be intimately associated. The Napoleonic civil legislation, assuring as it did proprietorship but abolishing general privileges, has promoted agricultural progress in the nineteenth century. Proudhon (1848) also admires the "mutuality" consisting in the spontaneous associations of small and free farmers as opposed to the "communal centralization" of property.

Ciasca examines the state "providence" that has been instituted in the poorest parts of Italy. He points out the inefficiency and stupidity of the methods of empirical intervention, for example, as manifest in deforestation which is really ruinous. The experiments of agrarian legislation are disappointing on the whole. The varied forms of compulsory control can show at best but negative results. On the other hand, progress is due almost exclusively to private initiative. After such precedents, to invoke the state is absurd.

The real problem, according to Ciasca, is not whether the present movements arise "out of old laws" by way of "direct derivation," nor whether they reappear today under the stimulus of "similar operating forces." He would rather advise theorists and legislators to investigate to what different phases of technical and economic evolution, to what different needs and circumstances these two types, *viz.*, individualism and collectivism, correspond. The chief problem consists in studying what forces and motives have led to the disappearance of patriarchal and communistic residues of the land-economy with the advent of industrial civilization. The object should be to ascertain whether the perpetuation of this industrial civilization is reconciliable with a return to the "froglodytic forms" re-established by violence and superimposed by law.

Ciasca quotes Professor Mortara on the significance of land in Italy's present-day economic system. Land is considered to be the most essential element in Italy's productive capacity, according to this authority. It is the chief source from which to recuperate the passive side in the Italian balance of accounts, says Mortara. The exports of agricultural produce are large and may grow. As the source of exportable wealth like hemp, oil, fruits, kitchen garden products, cheese, eggs, poultry, wool, land's place in national economy is very high.

That being so, an increase in the productive capacity of land should be the chief concern of legislation and patriotism. But, asks Ciasca, is it likely to be promoted by revolutionary communistic schemes?

State interference in land can only lead to its systematic destruction. It implies an arbitrary regime of requisition and government prices and compels the cultivators to adopt less remunerative methods of cultivation. For instance, it prohibits the alleged " luxury " of cultivating non-food vegetables (*e.g.*, textiles) and orders all fields to be given over to foodstuffs, although by selling hemp, hay, etc., the cultivators can get more wheat from abroad than by producing it at home. It likewise forbids the exportation of cheese, olive oil, etc., and compels their sale at home at very low prices, and interrupts the judicious specialization in farming (as in Sardinia).

Finally, it offers a subsidy to idleness. Rice fields have been reduced from 140,000 hectares to 100,000. The Visocchi, Falcioni and Micheli *decrets* to regulate the transfer of land to cultivators have led to malcultivation,

The farmers of Emilia and Ferrara, guilty of introducing improved methods in cultivation, have been dispossessed on the charge of negligence in cultivation although they were forbidden by Government to sow and thrash. And peasants have been allowed to occupy lands in Cremona and destroy the tools and implements without hindrance from the Carabinieri.

The authors furnish a strong plea for existing conditions and offer a stout resistance to the inroads of Soviet Russia's ideology.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

India by Air, by the Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, with an introduction by Lady Maud Hoare, pp. 156, Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1927, price s. 6-6.

Sir Samuel and Lady Hoare made a flying visit to India last year. Their object was not to seek pleasure, but Sir Samuel as a responsible minister wanted to ascertain for himself the possibilities of a regular air service between India and England. His experiments proved successful, and he presents in this interesting little volume his experiences of this wonderful journey. It might be imagined that a voyage by the air, however adventurous, was bound to prove monotonous. For the passenger has little chance of observing the varied landscape and the natural charms of the countries over which he speedily passes. Sir Samuel, however, assures his readers that there is nothing to beat an air journey in interest, excitement and pleasure. The wardrobe is bound to be limited but at every halting place the passenger can expect all modern comforts. He has a unique opportunity of having a bird's eye view of all the interesting places on his way. Even the desert has its charms, and it is by no means so monotonous and uniform in its general aspects as is commonly supposed. Sir Samuel spent only a few days in India and he cannot be expected to speak on anything but Viceregal parties. He paid a visit to the frontiers where he met an old Afridi chief. He observes—"The chief's benignant smile may have expressed the present friendliness of his people—I say the present friendliness of his people, for no one would be so bold as to guarantee the permanence of Afridi affection." It would be interesting to learn what the old Afridi gentleman thought of the smile of his English visitor and the permanence of English affection. Sir Samuel was lavishly entertained by the Maharaja of Bikanir who is, according to the author, well-known for his extensive hospitality. Here again one feels tempted to enquire whether Sir Samuel had any leisure to enquire about the economic condition of the peasants of Bikanir who have to find money for the lavish hospitality of the Maharaja. For it is these very people for whose good the British are supposed to be labouring in this unhealthy country. The value of the book has been increased by many beautiful photographs taken from the air.

S. N. SEN

Ourselves

DATES OF DIFFERENT EXAMINATIONS.

Engineering—

The next I.E. and B.E. Examinations will commence on Monday, the 9th July, 1928.

Law—

The following dates have been fixed for the next Law Examinations :

Preliminary—Tuesday, the 3rd July, 1928, and following days.
Intermediate—Monday, the 9th July, 1928, and following days.
Final—Monday, the 16th July, 1928, and following days.

M.A. and M.Sc.—

The M.A. and M.Sc. Examinations for 1928 will commence on the 1st of August next.

* * *

RESULTS OF LAW EXAMINATIONS, JANUARY, 1928.

Preliminary—

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 1,180 of whom 460 passed, 550 failed, one was expelled and 169 were absent. Of the successful candidates, 11 were placed in Class I.

Intermediate—

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 667 of whom 421 passed, 140 failed and 106 were absent. Of the successful candidates 37 were placed in Class I.

Final—

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 759 of whom 310 passed, 203 failed and 246 were absent. Of the successful candidates 24 were placed in Class I.

SASANKA MOHAN SEN

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THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

MAY, 1928

UNIVERSITIES AND POLITICS

The subject which you have allowed me to take for this address[1] is difficult—difficult and many-sided. While preparing what I am about to say for your consideration, I tried to keep in mind the different circumstances of universities in various countries, both at the present time and in past times. The connexion between universities and political ideas or controversies is at this moment by no means alike all over the world; nor has it been the same, in the case of the more ancient universities, at all periods of their history. Therefore, a comparison of the circumstances in which the main groups of universities are now placed may throw some light on the question which we are about to consider. And it is also possible to get some guidance from looking at the matter in historical perspective. But our knowledge of the historical side of the question is still incomplete. For example, we know comparatively little about the earlier history of the ancient universities of India, and what Dr. Cooke recently called "the awakening of our historical conscience" leads me to suspect that we may sometime arrive at a clearer understanding than we now possess of the political atmosphere of the European universities during the earlier and during the closing parts of the Middle Ages.

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[1] Address delivered by Sir Michael Sadler, K.C.S.I., at the Annual Meeting of the Indian Students' Union and Hostel.

The attitude of universities towards politics is necessarily affected by their administrative relation to government. Some universities, like those of Italy, France, and Russia, are intimately dependent on the central administration of the State. Others are dependent on a State Government like those of the unified German Republic since the war, or like the State Universities in the Federal Republic of the United States. All of these are, by the nature of their being and their financial dependence, necessarily sensitive to the tone of political feeling dominant in the State authority from which they draw an indispensable part of their support. At the other end of the scale are universities which derive no part of their revenue from State subsidy and are wholly free from State influence in the planning of their courses of study and in the choice of their teachers. Such are Harvard and Yale, Princeton and Columbia, in the United States; such was the Free University of Brussels in which the great geographer Elisée Reclus took a leading part, and (if we accord to it the status of a university) such is the Shantiniketan founded by Dr. Rabindranath Tagore at Bolpur in Bengal. Intermediate between these two opposite types are two others, both British: one of these intermediate categories is represented by Oxford and Cambridge, each mainly supported by endowments supplemented by fees but now also subsidized by the central government, and each subjected at intervals to investigation and remodelling by Commissions which Parliament appoints and clothes with statutory powers. The second intermediate type is represented by the modern English universities which, though deriving about one-third of their income and most of their buildings from gifts, fees and endowments, are dependent of the remainining two-thirds of their income on grants from local authorities within their area and from subsidies voted by Parliament and assigned by a committee appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The more remote a university from control by the State, the less likely are its members to be restricted in the expression of their political views. But it is by no means the case that the State always encourages, still less is it true that it always requires, a university maintained by public money to give active support to the policy of the government by voice or pen. A government may bear the cost of maintaining the university, not in order to get a political advocate, but because it regards learning and higher education as indispensable to national welfare and because national conditions in that particular case make it (or at some earlier times have made it) convenient or necessary to maintain the university directly from State funds. But no government would take it kindly if a university, maintained from funds under the direct control of the government, opposed the policy of the government on any crucial question. And if the government were struggling, or conceived itself to be struggling, against heavy attacks which threatened its existence, it would be more than human if it did not look to the university whose expenses it defrays to give to it its moral and intellectual support. The classic example is the case of the German universities during the thirty years before the war. The Prussian Government was justly proud of the scientific eminence of the universities which it maintained. In those parts of the field of learning and investigation which had no direct bearing on the political aims of the State, the Government gave (and felt great satisfaction in giving) complete intellectual freedom to the professors whom it had appointed. But, on matters of moment in political science it welcomed professorial support; it looked coldly on professors whose political opinions it distrusted; and it took steps through the Department of Higher Education to prevent the appointment of candidates who were thought likely to be critics or opponents of its policy.

Universities which receive no money from government and are free from government control have in theory the greatest liberty of expression on political questions. But it does not follow that they make use of that liberty or that they have any wish to use it, in opposing the government. Harvard and Yale, Princeton and Columbia, have not been political opponents of the Government of the United States. Nor does independence from government subsidy or from administrative supervision by government necessarily secure at all times a university from government interference. In times of acute civil tension a government by the law of its being is bound to defend itself against any enemies, intellectual enemies included, who challenge seriously its right to govern. But it has been found by experience, especially in France, that fussy interference with university teaching is not an effective weapon in the armoury of government. Governments in these days rarely take a university professor by the throat and say "pay me what thou owest." Forbearance has been found the best form of conduct. And this is to our general comfort and, on the whole, to the public good.

The present case of the universities of the intermediate type in regard to controversial politics is especially interesting. The modern English universities have risen swiftly to a position of intellectual influence. It is true that University College, London, King's College, London, and Owens' College, Manchester, have, for more than three-quarters of a century, been eminent in things of the mind. But I can remember when it seemed a profanation to think of a university at Birmingham. Mr. Chamberlain's courage showed itself in his determination to make his beloved city the seat of a modern university. When it was proposed that the Yorkshire College should apply to the Victoria University, a federal institution of which the earlier members were Owens' College, Manchester, and University College, Liverpool, there were many people in Leeds who thought that it would be insufferably presumptuous on their part to ask that the august word "university" should be attached to their town. But I find that in Oxford to-day the great modern universities are profoundly respected and that all traces of their being treated like parvenus have been obliterated by the finger of time. Nevertheless, they are still young. There are people still living who remember Manchester before Owens' College was founded—many more who can remember the contemptuous rejection by the Government of the day of the proposal that Owens' College should receive a University Charter. Liverpool was still not a university when the Prince of Wales was born. Without being in any way precarious, the position of the modern universities in England does call for tactful avoidance of local unpopularity. A penny rate is not easily got, but indignation might jeopardize it. There are still vestiges in English life of party prejudice. A retired public servant wrote angrily to us the other day because the committee of the Oxford Luncheon Club, a representative but not a political society, had invited Mr. Pethick-Lawrence to tell it the hard and bitter truth about the Surtax. If, in a narrowly-contested parliamentary election in a local constituency some of the professors of a modern university developed striking powers of propaganda, a good many ratepayers would say that they were not going to be taxed for that kind of thing. I can remember a sagacious Yorkshireman saying that nobody could prevent a member of the university staff from writing to the newspapers about anything he liked, but that if he wrote about controversial questions in politics or religion he ought to date his letters from his private house and not from the university. But I have said enough to show that there are reasons for circumspection on the part of those whose work lies in the modern English universities.

With the two ancient English universities which form the other group in the intermediate type, the case is different. No one suspects Cambridge of being unanimously Liberal because Mr. J. M. Keynes is chairman of the directors of *The Nation.* No one imagines that Oxford would poll a unanimous vote in support of the Conservative Government because its two representatives in Parliament are Lord Hugh Cecil and Sir Charles Oman. It is not only that the two ancient universities are big and therefore, being broad-bottomed, can carry a mixed crew, but that a truce of God has been called in the political conflict which used to rage in both of them. Oxford and Cambridge in their present form and temper are the outcome of the Liberal movement of the last century (I use the words "liberal movement" in its continental and not in its narrower, English party sense). Stamped upon them is the impress of John Stuart Mill's belief in the value of discussion and of progress through the candid utterance of varied opinion. For this reason the ancient universities are, at the present time, the protectors of professorial liberty in all English universities in regard to controversial matters of politics.

If, therefore, any person were to say that all universities should keep clear of politics, I would ask them whether they do not think that Oxford is strengthened by the presence of Professor Gilbert Murray, of the Master of Balliol, and of Mr. G. D. H. Cole. And whether in an earlier generation it was not good for Oxford to be the scene of the varied political activities of Professor A. V. Dicey, Arnold Toynbee, and Henry Scott Holland. Whether it is not good for Columbia University to have such varied spokesmen on public affairs as Professor John Dewey and President Nicholas Murray Butler. Whether, finally, the brave voice and unfaltering courage of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee were not worth considerably more than a crore of rupees to the University of Calcutta.

The view which I would submit for your consideration is that all universities should encourage an open-minded study of the fundamental principles of politics, but should, as institutions, be allowed to keep themselves free from entanglements with momentarily raging political controversies. Further, I would suggest that, if a university is strong enough to stand the battering waves of stupid misunderstanding, it should be generous in allowing individual members of its society to express, in speech and writing, their sincere convictions on controversial subjects, relying on their good sense, and on their sense of obligation to the corporate society of which they are members, to restrain them from unworthy partisanship and from impropriety in self-expression. Thirdly, I would add that, even in great emergencies when strong conviction feels that silence would be cowardly, activity in political affairs should be kept strictly subordinate to the full discharge of the other duties which in a learned society devolve both upon the old and the young.

Upon the old and the young. These words remind us that every university consists of two parts—the senior and the younger generation.

Having spent the most part of a long life in three universities, I am drawn by experience to say that in the academic world some of us who are old are apt to forget how old we are, and that some of those who are young do not always realize how young. Nearly fifty years ago, when I was head of the School House at Rugby, I felt the weight of my responsibility as seriously as if I were Viceroy of India ; when I pored over Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian speeches, spread out on one of the old brown oak tables in the School House Hall, I had less misgiving about right and wrong in British Foreign Policy than I have since been troubled with. Once when I was an undergraduate at Trinity, Professor Robinson Ellis, a Latin scholar whose fame stood high in every university of the world, took me for a walk round the University Parks. Naively, but with conviction, I told him that those of us who went to the Union thought that Curzon would some day be Foreign Secretary and that E. T. Cook knew more about the tangle of English Local Government than any man except Mr. Goschen himself. Robinson Ellis sighed, and said, " Sadler, I take little account of *under*graduate reputations."

In words not devoid of irony, John Henry Newman said that " A university is a place to fit men of the world for the world." But he was not ironical when he wrote that " The practical end of a university course is training good members for society."[1] Many a young man has tried his wings in politics during his undergraduate days ; a few while still at college have impressed experienced statesmen by their promise as parliamentary or platform speakers and by their good judgment in dealing with political topics ; far more, through political discussions at the university, have first come to close grips with the reality of public affairs. "Man," says Aristotle in a famous passage in the first book of the *Politics*, "Man is by nature a political animal." No university is vigorous unless the active minds of its young and older members are thinking about fundamental things —God, Freedom, and Duty to one's neighbour. To muffle conviction about these things stunts the mind. One's courage shrinks if one shirks fundamental issues.

I have quoted Aristotle in support of my argument, but some of my hearers may feel that I have no right to call in aid the words of one who, if I understand him aright, was a thorough-going advocate of putting all education, including what we now call university education, under State control.[2]

But you will remember that Hellas intellectually was a congeries of relatively small states and that Aristotle had in view the circumstances of a city state. He is careful to point out how different in scope, method and tendency were the educational systems of the constituent state-members of the mental and, one might almost say, cultural, confederacy of the Greek-speaking world. Viewing Hellas as a whole, therefore, we may justly say that in effect it had (as we moderns have) a variety of university disciplines, compensating one another's defects by their several merits, just as in pre-war Germany the University of Marburg had a tone and outlook different from those of the University of Berlin, and just as London,

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[1] J. H. Newman, *The Idea of a University* (1852), pp. 77 and 232.

[2] In W. L. Newman's *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1887), Vol. III, pp. 39-46, there is a good summary of Aristotle's scheme of education, and the general index at the end of Vol. IV of the same work (s. v. Education) is a useful guide,

Cambridge, and Oxford differ from one another, though all are organs of English higher education. What Aristotle would recommend is that each university should have a specific tone and a thought-out purpose, governing not only its courses of study but the pre-suppositions of its educational life. Yet he takes it for granted that, in its institutions for the training of the young, Hellas as a whole will have diversity of type, and that each great unit in the consortium will, as in the modern world, be adjusted to the needs of the community which it was designed to serve.

Maladjustment to the needs of their time and country is hurtful to the well-being of universities and, in some cases, has been the cause of fatal décline. One is apt to think of universities as immune from death. But history shows that among them the rate of mortality is rather high. Of the universities founded in Europe during the last eight centuries, nearly one-third, I think, have perished. Except in periods of unusual quietude or in the torpor of decay, universities are not, as we sometimes think them to be, haunts of ancient peace. If we look back upon their history we see them tossed at their moorings by great waves of controversy in religion or in politics, and the storms have been worst when religion and politics have been in explosive combination. In our time, indeed, most universities are remote from political or religious controversy. Their chief intellectual activity now lies in the domains of history, of the comparative investigation of custom and belief, and in the physical and biological sciences. But what lies ahead? Before our eyes, applied science is causing economic change. Economic problems loom larger in politics. But they touch at many sensitive points the lives of men. They involve ethical questions, questions of responsibility in employment, new contacts between races, our assessment of the value of what we may enjoy in life. There are signs that these questions may touch the quiet of universities. By the law of their being, universities have one foot in the past and one foot in the future. Within their walls meet minds which are mature and minds which are promising and eager but still immature. To blend these two is to help in stabilizing society. But at times of rapid change in social or intellectual outlook, courses of academic training are in danger of getting out of date. Old ways of thought may become obsolete, not by reason of inherent defects but through subtle changes in the mental appetite of the young. At these times, conservatism which is rightly cautious may be over-tenacious of tradition. Into this mistake fell the English universities at the Renaissance, the University of Paris in the time of Descartes, some of the German universities after the Thirty Years' War. Again, it is a perilous time when a new culture and the power of large-scale industry impinge upon the venerable studies of an antique civilization. And whenever the spirit of Nationalism has gripped the imagination of the most eager-minded part of the community, universities, because one of their functions is to stabilize society, are wise, I think, in not withholding sympathy with what is fair and feasible in national aspirations.

To sum up : Politics play so great a part in life that places of education which prepare young men and women for life cannot be isolated from politics. Every university has always been the scene of political discussion. The hardest questions of belief and duty both in religion and in politics cannot be evaded by old or young in any centre of sound learning, Political philosophy and its applications have been inseparable from university training from the days of Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle to those of Treitschke, Henry Sidgwick, and Woodrow Wilson. To think and talk about politics during undergraduate days has for centuries been part of the training of those destined to lead in the public affairs of their country.

But the first duty of a university and of all those who work in it is to get at the truth. To hear both sides, to be candid and fair-minded, to shun (except in debate) the spirit of party, are primary obligations on those who teach and learn in it. But if the conditions of life in a country are unhealthy, political talk may become feverish and unbalanced. In such circumstances, university teachers and students are under especial obligation to set an example of steadiness in judgment and, if after patient thought conscience constrains them, of courage in standing up for what at the moment may be the unpopular side.

MICHAEL SADLER

AWAKE, MY SOUL AWAKE

See! the crimson dawn-lights fly
Across the freshen'd morning sky,
And I hear the birdlings cry,
Awake! my soul, awake!

Live in glory through these days
Treading kindly on life's ways
That dear God may give his praise,
To thee, my soul, to thee!

And, when from out the great Beyond
Comes the Call, my soul respond!
It draws thee from thy earthly bond
To rest, my soul, to rest!

LELAND J. BERRY

THE DESERT SPEAKS

The Eastern desert spoke, pointing to a littered
waste of sand :
"Here stood Babylon and Nineveh,
Thebes and Samarkand ;
The jackals prowl through ruins
Where once their beauty mocked the world !
Where is their glory now, and all their lust?
Their songs are mute, their singers turned to dust !
Where are all the joys they knew?
Their course is run; the old gives place to new."
The Western desert spoke, pointing to a littered
waste of sand :
"Here men will come, and cities rise,
And on this barren ground will stand
The miracles of brick and stone !
A new race comes from out the sea,
To graft its blood and bone
On my broad waiting breast ;
And cycles hence, an unborn race
Will speak of cities vanished from this self-same
place ! "

Lily S. Anderson

W. B. YEATS

III

Poetry of Moods.

Yeats's treatment of love brings me to dwell for a moment on an important question of poetic art. Yeats as a true lyrist practically asserts the supremacy of a *single mood* of concentrated but refined passion or of intense emotion on the strength of a deep poetic faith that such moods are destined to live for ever. The range in his poetry of these *moods* is quite extensive and their depth at times remarkably profound. The poet's heart thus unburdens itself in a large variety of ways in perfectly spontaneous and impassioned outbursts of significant self-revelation. The highest mark is reached when passion is deepened, chastened and elevated into a tranquil spiritual resignation leading to the peace of the soul or to religious adoration. Then, oftener than not, the poet's utterance becomes charged with a mystic* meaning and his treatment becomes symbolic.

We have to bear in mind that *mood* is of the very essence of that emotional quality of our life which it is the function of poetry to restore to humanity whenever man loses it in the fret and fury of life's maddening pursuits or even in the scientist's absorption in the intellectual investigation of fragmentary truth or discovery of a law and in the philosopher's logical thinking. Mood arrests our too quick-paced straight march to the goal of our utilitarian existence and gives us a moment's needful halt in which we get the leisure to recapture a glimpse (be it transient) of lost beauty or to lose ourselves in enjoymeut pure and simple, if not disinterested. "As the guiding principle of practical thinking," rightly observes a philosophical critic, "is some interest, so that only what is pertinent to that interest is selected by the attention...so in poetic thinking the guiding principle is often a mood or a quality of sentiment."

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* *Cf* "A Friend's Illness".

Thus in one poem called "The Moods" in his "Wind among the Reeds" (1899) we read—

"Time drops in decay
Like a candle burnt out
And the mountains and woods
Have their day, have their day;
What one in the rout
Of the fire-born moods
Has fallen away?"

Elsewhere we have—

"O sweet everlasting Voices, be still;
Go to the guards of the heavenly fold
And bid them wander obeying your will
Flame under flame, till Time be no more."

Better still—

"The wrong of unshapely things is a wrong too great to be told,
I hunger to build them anew and sit on a green knoll apart
With the earth and the sky and the water, remade, like a casket of gold
For my dreams of your image that blossoms a rose in the deeps of my heart."

Here we have the soul's [1] hunger for pure and perfect beauty. In another poem a romantic quest of the ideal of the vanished glory of the innocent earth's infancy ends in a spiritual vision of God. This is entitled characteristically "Into the Twilight":

"Outworn heart, in a time outworn,
Come clear of the nets of wrong and right;
Laugh, heart, again in the grey twilight,
Sigh, heart, again in the dew of the morn.

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[1] *Cf.* "To the Rose upon the Rood of Time," lines 9-12.

Your mother Eire is always young,
Dew ever shining and twilight grey;
Though hope fall from you and love decay,
Burning in fires of a slanderous tongue.

Come, heart, where hill is heaped upon hill:
For there the mystical brotherhood
Of sun and moon and hollow and wood
And river and stream work out their will;
And God stands winding His lonely horn,
And time and the world are ever in flight;
And love is less kind than the grey twilight,
And hope is less dear than the dew of the morn."

The whole poem in its exquisite music palpitates with the pure passion of the sudden recovery of vanished joy vibrating at the magic touch of undying hope.

The matchless grace of only 6 lines of exquisite poetry in "He Reproves the Curlew" challenges comparsion with Wordsworth's "Cuckoo" in which the haunting mystery of that bird's familiar music, we know, brings to the elder bard "a tale of visionary hours." But Wordsworth's dreamy reminiscence is pale by the side of the ruddy passion with which Yeats's short piece is flushed into energetic vitality. Let us quote the lines—

" O, Curlew, cry no more in the air,
Or only to the water in the West;
Because your crying brings to my mind
Passion—dimmed eyes and long heavy hair
That was shaken out over my breast:
There is enough evil in the crying of wind."

Distinction with other lyrists.

But I must stop somewhere however difficult it may be to abruptly curb oneself. The writer of a short paper on a long subject labours under a serious disadvantage and I must pull myself up mercilessly. Let me finish this aspect of Yeats with a reference to a well-known artistic principle which differentiates Yeats as a lyrist of such moods.

Melody and Rhythm.

In the case of poetry of this exceptional class we have to remember that the aesthetic appeal to the reader is produced by the captivating charm of the poet's extraordinary command over the indefinable resource of melodious rhythm. In "Rosa Alchemica," Part IV, we are told that "rhythm is the wheel of Eternity on which alone the transient and accidental could be broken and the spirit set free."

"In all the beauty" (of medieval portraits and engravings) "whether it was a beauty of religion, of love, or of some fantastical vision of mountain and wood, was the beauty achieved by *temperaments which seek always an absolute emotion*, and which have their most continual, though not most perfect, expression in the legends and vigils and *music* of the Celtic peoples" (Italics mine).

Music, we remember, plays an important part in the legends of the Fenians and we read in a story that Manannán, son of the Celtic Poseidon and Lord of the Celtic Paradise, gave King Cormac, the Magnificent, a magic branch of silver bearing golden apples which being shaken made such sweet music that the wounded, the sick, and the sorrowful forgot their pains and were lulled into deep sleep.

The Fiddler of Dooney says—

"When I play on my fiddle in Dooney,
Folk dance like a wave of the sea;
My cousin is priest in Kilvarnet,
My brother in Mocharabinee.

I passed my brother and cousin:
They read in their books of prayer;
I read in my book of songs
I bought at the Sligo fair."[1]

This fiddler is sure that St. Peter will sooner admit him into heaven than the other two, for, "the good are always the merry, save by an evil chance."

When Edain (*i.e.*, Etain) came from Midher's hill to the tower of young Aengus she

> "Wove seven strings,
> Sweet with all music, out of his long hair,
> Because her hands had been made wild by love."

Quite recently this very important feature of spontaneous poetry has come to the forefront through the valuable publications by the Oxford University Press (1925-1926) of anthologies of Negro Workaday and Folk Songs supplemented by Messrs. Chapman and Hall's collections of American Negro "Spirituals" (1926-1927) or "Sorrow-Songs." These songs are simply wonderful for their soul-entrancing rhythm and melody. The high-pressure life of a Continent largely given to Dollar-worship is tempered with the ravishing sweetness of these really artistic natural songs of which the music comes straight from man's unsophisticated heart with its irresistible appeal to hearts considerably deadened to this primitive appeal by commerce, industrialism, machine-governed civilisation, and economic competition, on top of which comes to-day very ironically a staggering budget provision for huge armament! Melody thus seems to come as a saviour of competition-ridden society preserving from decadence and degeneration the vast population of a vastly wealthy New World. Booker T. Washington appropriately observes—

> "There is in the plantation songs (*i.e.* spirituals) a pathos and a beauty that appeals to a wide range of tastes, and their harmony makes abiding impressions upon persons of the highest culture."

The shepherd in "The Sad Shepherd" says—

> "I thought of rhyme alone,
> For rhyme can beat a measure out of trouble
> And make the daylight sweet once more."

It is needless to multiply by quotations these remarkably significant instances of Yeats's persistent emphasis on two things, *viz.*, (1) the supreme importance of love as a poetic theme and (2) the value of music, rhythm, time, song. Yeats's lyrics, like those of Burns, are wonderful and very effective in their song-quality. Having just now no authority before me to enable me to ascertain what was precisely the nature or extent of the influence of Troubadour poetry on Yeats, if any, I can only go so far as to lay stress on the fact that to Troubadours in general, but specially to those of Spain under Arab supremacy, only *one life* did count at all and that the life of love and song and music. It is not without significance that as an artist Yeats too seems to care for no other life, whatever his interests may be as an Irish patriot or a student of, if not adept in, alchemy, theosophy, Indian philosophy or Christian mysticism and his sympathies with symbolism, to all of which I have drawn or shall draw your attention. There is another evidence in support of this supposition which is rendered thereby more probable. The structural FORM of some of Yeats's poems reminds me of the Provençal "*tenso*" (*i.e.*, *tension* or contention in verse) which the Troubadours performed in the shape of a song of which one part "*answered*" another (just as Miriam in the Old Testament *answered* the women with timbrels and dances). With this is connected the French "*débat*". The dialogue-form used in many Troubadour compositions on love, chivalry, religious dogma or ethical problems is often reproduced by Yeats who more or less adheres also to the *tenso* rhyme-arrangement in such poems as "Michael Robartes and the Dancer." I refer to "An Image from a Past Life," "Phases of the Moon," "Ego Dominus Tuus" and "The Sad Shepherd" for their dialogue-form which can easily be differentiated from "The Wanderings of Usheen" which inspite of the interlocutor in St. Patrick is essentially a narrative poem, or "Anashuya and Vijaya" which is frankly a miniature dramatic piece. The form of "Fergus and the Druid" is also dramatic, for, there is no "contention" here, the queries of the Druid serving merely the purpose of giving liveliness to the story of Fergus which, if put in the shape of a continuous narrative, would surely lose much of its vividness and persuasive force. Not so, I contend, is the case with the poems I have cited as instances of *dialogue poems* written in the manner of the Troubadours, though the modern reproduction of the older form does not exactly represent the peculiarities of the *tenso*. "The Saint and the Hunchback" marks the transition in *form* from "Fergus and the Druid" to "Phases of the Moon."

Will it, in this connection, be too fanciful to speak of another (circumstantial) evidence furnished by Yeats's use of the word "embroideries" in "A Coat" ("Responsibilities," 1914) with which, he tells us, he "covered his song," reminiscent as it is of the favourite type of Arabian Song called "*maouchah*" full of fantastic rhymes justifying the name which means "embroidery"? This *maouchah* has its counterpart in short Troubadour lyrics noted only for their elaborate dainty rhymes.

Something of the irresistible charm that we relish in Yeats resides, we know, also in Swinburne's exquisite melody. Now, the suggestive power of the subtle art of music unconsciously induces in appreciative readers of true poetry a mood akin to that of the poet when he actually composes under the stress of a powerful emotion. The mood may not deliberately be made itself the subject-matter of the poem concerned. The Arion-Dolphin myth of antiquity is not without its significant application to the point I am now discussing about the emotional appeal of (Yeats's) musical verse. May not this also be one of the reasons why hymns (which according to St. Augustine's "cum cantico" suggest worship of God with songs, requiring, as Bede holds, *metre*) are recognised from early times by the Church as appropriate to liturgy, possibly in imitation of Hellenic forms of worship of Zeus, Hermes, Dionysius and Apollo ? In Hesiod's *Theogonia* the poet is the Muses' follower whose chief function is to *sing* the glories of the Olympic gods and goddesses as also those of semi-divine men.

Even when a melody-induced mood is not the theme of a poem, the reader's imagination co-operating in harmony with the poet's under the incantation of such melody realizes in a mysterious way that the harmonious sound of the words uttered in their proper rhythmic movement makes the entire composition vital with a living energy full of emotional warmth and glow. The rhythmic verse-beat conveys a delicate, dim, sensuous pleasure lulling for the moment the too wide-awake intellect to sleep so that it may successfully play on the cultured sensibility of the heart like the soft motion of a gentle breeze playing on the attuned strings of an Æolian harp. I am quite confident that all true lovers of pure poetry to whom, be it remembered, poetry, in the first instance, is *more an art than a philosophy of life* and as such must be enjoyed and appreciated in an appropriate spirit, will be charmed by the compelling power of the sheer beauty of Yeats's entrancing music—of the melodious sweetness of sound apart from the sense. Yeats in this respect challenges comparison with Spenser, Shelley, Rossetti, Swinburne, Poe and Arthur Symons.

Now Yeats himself rightly observes at one place that " all poets, even all delighted readers of poetry, speak certain kinds of poetry to distinct and simple tunes, though the speaker may be deaf to ordinary music " (Collected Works, Vol. III). To this I have only to add that in his poetry the tune, with rare exceptions, coincides with the sense in a perfect manner. Aleel's song in " Countess Cathleen " (Act I) is highly suggestive in this connection. He sings—

> " Impetuous heart, be still, be still ;
> Your sorrowful love may never be told ;
> Cover it up with a lonely tune. "

This characteristic of Yeats brings his poetic art as far as practicable under modern conditions close to the antique art of the Greek rhapsodists, to that of the lyric poets of the school of Sappho in the 7th century B.C. or of Pindar in the 5th, though the parallelism must not be pushed too far. We have to remember that even the best lyrics of our day (except songs expressly written for being *sung* instead of being *read* or recited), rarely merits the name of musical[1] as distinguished from literary poetry. That well-known art of Troubadour poesy is practically a dead art with little chance of being revived; and lyrics now appeal to our heart not so much by their music as the thought, sentiment, emotion or feeling they are primarily intended to record on which the attention of the reader as well as of the poet becomes mainly concentrated. Yet *mutatis mutandis* Yeats naturally and spontaneously clothes his sentiment or feeling in highly melodious verse and the point demands special notice. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to dwell at some length on this feature of his best poetry and to make an attempt to distinguish his craftsmanship from that of other modern lyricists while not forgetting his affinity with Shelley or Swinburne.

I hope by now I have succeeded in making it clear that Yeats is remarkably rich in poetic felicities in his treatment of the longing of a restless soul ever eager in the quest of a divine beauty and a heavenly love or of a serene repose that can be realised alone in a world or a life more perfect than the fragmentary mental life we daily live or the worse one of maddening futile activities. That is why he often depicts with rare exquisiteness of touch the flitting *mood* laden with[2] sad or pensive memories—memories which are the ghosts of the ever-vanishing present or of the long-buried past. Thus even every sight and sound of Nature speaks to his delicate soul of what is to him "the fluttering sadness of earth."

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[1] Tennyson's lyric "The splendour falls on castle walls" (in *Princess*, Bk. IV), for instance, is such by virtue of its superb music, as also Christina Rossetti's "Dream-love."

[2] *Cf.* "When you are Old" (1893).

His nature poetry is seldom purely descriptive. It proceeds from a subjective and mystical conception and is enveloped in a romantic dreamy atmosphere of twilight. An attempt was successfully made by him to shake off this mood and the result was the series of later poems called "The Wild Swans at Coole" belonging to the last stage of his poetic career and published in 1919.

POET OF MOODS.

In "Rosa Alchemica" is elaborately set forth the contents of the book on alchemy mentioned there which expounded the whole principle of spiritual alchemy—which was "the gradual distillation of the contents of the soul"— and declared the independent reality of our thoughts. So, "if you imagine the semblance of a living being, it is at once possessed by a wandering soul." "All minds are continually giving birth to such beings and sending them forth to work health or disease, joy or madness." "The divine powers would only appear in beautiful shapes, which are but, as it were, shapes trembling out of existence, folding up into timeless ecstasy, drifting with half-shut eyes, into sleepy stillness. The bodiless souls who descended into these forms were *what men called moods*; and worked all great changes in the world. ** In this way all great events were accomplished." (Italics are mine.)

In this passage we have a very indirect and somewhat vague assertion about the transcendental quality of the imagination. At all events, it serves to show how and why Yeats as an idealist assigned great importance to *moods*, which, according to my estimate, form the staple of his best poetry. I have elsewhere attempted to establish by quotations from Yeats that he was a great believer in the potency of a single supreme **moment** of emotional intensity or passion, or of ecstasy or trance. One may make this the theme of an essay or a brief thesis on Yeats, for, among others, it explains his theory of poetic inspiration, doctrine of intuitive *vision*[1] (which he carefully distinguishes from dream) his extraordinary imaginative quality, his ideality, his symbolic treatment of sights and sounds, the source of his exquisite imagery and of his ravishing rhythm and cadence, his abiding sense of joy and repose alike, the austere classic beauty of his mature work and all the deep mystery with which he, as a poet-seer, beholds all the universe to be completely enveloped, till the exalted *moods* unfold to him as to us, through his poetic vision and his great art, the intimate and eternal connection between the passing shows and phenomenal changes and God. Thus to things material his *moods* give the shape and colour of the spiritual and to all discord the note of harmony. The baffling burden of the mystery is then lightened, not as in Wordsworth's case, by reflective meditation or contemplative communion with Nature but by the depth and intensity of *feeling* as in Shelley (*cf.* "Prometheus Unbound"). This will give an enduring vitality to his art as it clearly marks his individuality and originality.

Criticism makes much of the poet's habit of writing "with the eye upon the subject." I may claim, after all, that I have succeeded in a single paper in explaining and illustrating, that Yeats more than satisfies that condition as an artist. Besides, the eye that he fixes upon his varied themes is not merely the physical eye that notes minutely what lies on the surface of reality by means of a rare power of alert observation alone. He is, when he chooses to be so, as exact as the most exacting of our latter-day so-called realists but he does not stop there. He is endowed with a double vision—one that sees with others whatever appeals to the senses and the other that penetrates through the outer shell into the inner kernel and reveals to the less fortunate world that which eternally abides, and his is always the artist's beauty-way of revelation which, however, as Keats has once for all proclaimed with his mighty voice, is not opposed to the truth-way. His yearning[1] for ideal beauty is a part of his intense sense of temporary separation from God and true Life with which he hankers to be eternally united. His quest is the mystic's quest of a Joy which is the deepest peace that knows no change even in the midst of this universe of incessant changes. The pathos of the whole world of failures, partial successes, fragmentary realisation of transitoriness, sorrow, disease, decay, and death and the weariness that all these cause are dissolved in his deep sense of the felicity of Joy in which all these disturbing elements at last find their fruition and significance. We know that Wordsworth, too, saw Joy immanental everywhere—" joy in the widest commonalty spread " as is suggested by the Northampton peasant poet John Clare (1793-1864) in his " The Woodcutter's Night-song "—just as Shelley saw the immanence of Love, Keats of Beauty, and Browning of Energy (शक्ति). The idea of immanence, be it Wordsworths' "something far more deeply interfused," Shelley's "one spirits' plastic stress," Goethe's Earth-spirit " weaving God's eternal vesture at the loom of Time," or what is beheld by Browning's Paracelsus in his dying vision, stood sharply opposed to the 18th century Deist's mechanical idea of God's relation with the created world, having been made the common property of all great poets once for all by German romantic philosophy. It also explains in part the common currency of Pantheism in most of the poets of the 19th century and accounts for the reverent love of the commonplace in some of them who invested it with a soul of divinity. The commonplaces of Irish peasant life, for instance, and of the superstitious and traditional beliefs of Irish fisherfolk are well-nigh a kind of lure to the poetic imagination of Yeats. So far as immanence is concerned, the mystic, however, almost reverses the pantheist's process in his individual way of realising it by not so much seeing God's presence in all things as by completely immersing (and sometimes dissolving) all distinct individualised existences in one pervasive God-presence and there seeing all things **in God** outside which nothing in the universe can live, move and have its being. According to the mystics this God-vision comes to intellects quickened—made particularly sensitive to its ineffable touch—by the solvent of intense burning love—or better, by the rushing tide of love inundating the entire personality of man so as to obliterate all demarcations and barriers, all definite contours, of individuality in an all-embracing soul-existence. This spiritual consciousness is induced by tranced moments of ecstatic vision, by deep insight, effulgent illumination undazzled by excess of light, or by emotional exaltation. It is in rare moments of supreme value that the Finite succeeds not merely in having an occasional glimpse of the Infinite (as is indicated in Shelley's *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty*) but in thoroughly grasping the Infinite as *at once* Truth, Beauty, Love and, finally, Joy as these are *seen* by God Himself.

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[1] *Cf.* E. Brontë's "Speak, God of Vision" and "Often rebuked, yet always back returning," specially ll. 3-4, 7-8 and last two lines and Christina Rossetti's "Dream-love."

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[1] *Cf.* D. G. Rossetti's Sonnet " Sibylla Palmifera."

Thus even a poet like Browning, who is the least mystical in his mysticism which he ever modifies by the inevitable stress laid on all his poetic utterances of a clear **ethical** note (of constant upward endeavour made by a powerfully active **will**), has been interpreted by a very competent critic as one to whom "God was present, sharing **their joy**, in all the vitalities of the world, from the uncouth play of the volcano to the heaven-and-earth transfiguring mind of man." In a way, this too is pantheism in disguise or in the guise of mysticism with its unmistakable emphasis on the **joy element** though the same critic contends, I know, that "this God of manifold joys was sharply detached from Browning's universe ; he was a sensitive and sympathetic spectator, not a pervading spirit. * * * "The mystic's dream of seeing all things in God, the Hegelian thesis of a divine mind realising itself in and through the human, found no lodgment in a consciousness of mosaic-like clearness dominated by the image of an incisively individual and indivisible self."

This authoritative verdict of a great critic makes me a little diffident in urging that in my view this peculiar variety of (radically reconstructed) mysticism—well-nigh re-shaped out of all recognition by the new form given to it—makes ethical endeavour interfere too much with emotional fervour and suffusiveness, creating as if it were a strange amalgam consisting of two well-defined Indian religious disciplines poetically re-interpreted for a modern imaginative presentation, *viz.*, (1) the imperative ethical note of Buddhistic culture and (2) the sweeping emotional intoxication of *Vaisnava* ardours. Perhaps he will rashly venture too far who, as a critic of Yeats, will suggest that Yeats too seems to have in some measure inoculated the Celtic Movement in literature with something akin to this verus. I simply throw out with extreme hesitation a critical hint for worthier persons to work my suggestion out (if it is worth anything) or refute it outright by a more thorough analysis of all Yeats's utterances than my present limits permit. If mine be a surmise ridiculously wild or extravagant I can only crave the generous indulgence of more competent interpreters of this Irish mystic poet. I offer my humble suggestion at all because it appears to me to be one of many possible ways of explaining the apparently abrupt change detected in the last phase of Yeats's development which drove back the former cabalist, occultist, theosophist so definitely into the Christian fold, connection with which even in the earlier stages of his life was surely never severed but allowed somewhat to be slackened and loose.

The iron does sink into his heart, if not his soul, yet it is not allowed to inflict a wound for which there is no healing. He is melancholy at times and his verse is sorrow-laden and his heart is anguished but he soon passes on to exaltation divine, and ultimately, he finds for us permanent solace through spiritual resignation and absolute surrender to divine dispensation—to the law of Love and loving sacrifice which fulfils instead of destroying the older law of "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not."

My point is that in Yeats and in his poetry there is thus to be discovered a steady and gradual growth—a systematic development, stage by stage, leading from tentative juvenile efforts in which "*embroideries*" are so prominent to artistic perfection combined with ecstatic or mystic vision which entitles Yeats to the glory of a prophet-poet, at least of modern Ireland.

Note of Melancholy.

In connection with my brief remarks on Yeats's first longer poem "The Wanderings of Usheen" I have just mentioned that even then (1885-1889) the poet was subject to a romantic melancholy which was his own. In the later poem "The Wild Swans at Coole" (the title piece to the series of poems under that name published in 1919), stanza 3 records his sadness due to the contrast between the present and the past of his own life much in the way in which (not Shelley or Keats but) Wordsworth refers in his "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality" to a similar change. His "Lines Written in Dejection" seems to me to differ significantly from Coleridge's "Dejection—an Ode" or Shelley's similar lines written at Naples, for though Yeats knows

"The holy centaurs of the hills are vanished
I have nothing but the embittered sun,"

he does not complain but on the contrary resolves

"And now that I come to fifty years
I must endure the timid sun."

"The Green Helmet" poems of 1912 contain a number of pieces overcharged with a temporary sadness. Let me quote a few verses from here and there.

"And I grew weary of the sun
Until my thoughts cleared up again."

"But, dear, cling close to me ; since you were gone
My barren thoughts have chilled me to the bone !"

"And I that have not your faith, how shall I know
That in the blinding light beyond the grave
We'll find so good a thing as that we have lost?"

"The fascination of what's difficult
Had dried up the sap out of my veins and rent
Spontaneous joy and natural content
Out of my heart."

"Wine comes in at the mouth
And love comes in at the eye;
That's all we shall know for truth
Before we grow old and die.
I lift the glass to my mouth,
I look at you, and I sigh."

We may match these with an extract from "The Wild Swans at Coole" (1919) :—

"I have looked upon those brilliant creatures
And now my heart is sore,
All's changed since I, hearing at twilight,
The first time on this shore,
The bell-beat of their wings above my head,
Trod with a lighter tread."

This too is Yeats's *poetry of mood*—only the mood is one of temporary depression due to loss of faith sustained by a wearied soul. He speaks in such a mood almost like Shelley and Keats of the contrast between man and nature to bring out the lurking pathos of human life which is subject to change—particularly to the benumbing power of time, of old age. The prose piece "Red Hanrahan's Curse" contains that poet's "curse upon old age and upon the old men"—old age which like the wind comes and blows away the blossom of youth and of the beautiful people of the world.[1] The pathos of the coldness of heart that old age brings with it is well expressed in "A Song"

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[1] Contrast Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra" and R. W. Dixon's (1833-1900) "Ode on Advancing Age."

(in "The Wild Swans at Coole"). Yet Yeats soon shakes off this mood, conquers sadness born of the consciousness of this change till the balance of the soul is once more restored. He is found next to "praise the winters gone" and the recognition of the fact follows that

" Wisdom is a butterfly
And not a gloomy bird of prey."

Forthwith the stern subdued beauty of mature age finds its due meed of the poet's praise in "Peace" where we read of

" Such a delicate high head,
All that sternness amid charm,
All that sweetness amid strength."

Similarly another short verse runs—

" Though all the lying days of my youth
I swayed my leaves and flowers in the sun,
Now I may wither into the truth."

In his latest published volume[1] of poems, mostly written between 1923 and 1927 and published in 1928, called " The Tower," we come across in " Sailing to Byzantium " (composed, 1927) which, we are told, in the opening line "is no country for old man" and where it is further said that

" An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
For every tatter in its mortal dress,"

the beautiful thought embodied in the third stanza which runs

" O sages standing in God's holy fire
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,

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[1] All references to "The Tower" are necessarily fresh additions to the Paper read before the Poetry Society in September, 1927, when this new publication had not yet reached the writer.

Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,
And be the singing masters of my soul.
Consume my heart away; sick with desire
And fastened to a dying animal
It knows not what it is ; and gather me
Into the artifice of eternity."

With the recovery of this mental equipoise, however, grows a strange distrust of mere knowledge as we find recorded in "The Sad Shepherd," "Lines Written in Dejection" and "The Down." In short, mysticism deepens with a growing sense of perfection and peace. Like Wordsworth he finds ample compensation in his own type of a philosophic mind for all the loss sustained with the passing away of youth's glorious visions, of those days of "immense despair, unfathomed love—every eternal *mood*" (*cf.* "Our Lady of the Hills"—Italics mine). I do not find anything like pessimism in Yeats whose trials and sufferings for his country's degradation were not less crushing than those of Shelley or Byron or whose disapppointment at the failure of people around him to appreciate Irish art and Ireland's poetry and myth, the beauties of her scenery or of her once pure and simple life and faith less depressing than that of Ruskin. There is, however, in his satirical and humorous pieces, comparatively negligible, an occasional touch of cynicism which sometimes threatens to be hard but the balance thus temporarily distributed is quickly set right.

I have yet to take into consideration this note of sadness in his poetry and rightly interpret its significance and meaning.

So far as the pervasive note of pensive sadness is concerned, it brings to him for ever a message of a beauty fading that fills the heart with an autumnal reverie and he stands before us as

"A man of songs
Alone in the hushed passion of romance."

His appealing address "To the Rose upon the Rood of Time"—

"'Red Rose, proud Rose, sad Rose of all my days!
Come near me, while I sing the ancient ways:

* * *

Come near, that no more blinded by man's fate,
I find under the boughs of love and hate,
In all poor foolish things that live a day
Eternal beauty wandering on her way'"—

goes straight to the responsive hearts of all his readers by the sheer force of its downright sincerity.

It must not, however, be inferred even from the poet's insistence on this pensive sadness that his outlook on life is permanently overclouded with romantic gloom or that his poetry enervates more than it chastens, braces and ennobles the human heart. There is not, nay, cannot be, any real pessimism in a poet like Yeats who in his early stage had absolute confidence in the human heart and in the last period became noted for his reliance on God. Though one notices in him something of the Troubadour spirit, of an opposition to the church in its externalities which he shared with the 12th-13th century Christian mystics like the Abbesses St. Hildegard (1098-1179) and Elizabeth of Hungary (1207-1231) and Abbot Joachim (1145-1202), his faith in God remained ever unshaken and his "pathway," finally chosen with determination, led him from the immortals of the ancient belief of Ireland and from the Order of the Alchemical Rose to chapels where he lost himself among the prayers and the sorrows of the multitude" repeating an ancient prayer of poor, suffering Gaelic men and women of yore—

"Seven paters seven times,
Send Mary by her Son,
Send Bridget by her Mantle
Send God by His strength.'"

There is an abundant stress emphatically laid on the underlying idea that this entire **mood of longing** means essentially nothing but the soul's hankering for release from thraldom to sense which is achieved by its union with an abiding spiritual unity behind all transient diversity, with a permanence at the core of all impermanence, with an eternal life far beyond the power of "Time, Space, Chance, Change and Fate." There he discovers the "land of heart's desire"—the land that is too good to be a burden on the heart. In that poetic drama "The Land of Heart's Desire" (1894) a mysterious child-voice thus addresses the soul of the young woman Mary (the wife of Shawn) significantly—

"You shall go with me newly-married bride
And gaze upon a merrier multitude (*i.e.*, fairies)
Where Beauty has no ebb, decay no flood,
But joy is wisdom, Time an endless song,
I kiss you and the world begins to fade."

In his "Ideas of Good and Evil" (1903), Yeats tells us—"We love nothing but the perfect and our dreams make all things perfect that we may love them." Here is verily the triumph of the spirit over the flesh that is so weak in all of us.

I should add here that with this significant note of the poet's undying faith in perfection we step into the third stage of his poetry, beginning, roughly speaking, with the birth of the new century. At any rate the year 1903 may be accepted as a sure land-mark. From that date Yeats's poetry is distinctly charged with a message of heart-easing joy and of slow-reviving hope.

THIRD STAGE OR THIRD PERIOD.

The direct transition from the second stage is marked by the comparatively unimportant volume "The Seven Woods" (pub.

1904) preceded, the year before, by two beautiful narrative (long) poems, *viz.*, "The Old Age of Queen Maeve" showing the difference between now and then and the love story of "Bailie and Aillinn" whom the Master of Love, the Gaelic Eros Aengus, caused to die of broken heart by telling each an invented story of the other's death so that he might make them happy in his own land among the dead. The title piece of "The Seven Woods" speaks of the poet's having left behind "unavailing outcries and the old bitterness" and of his "contentedness" even though there lingers a clinging to the old beauty of Ireland.

To this period belong all later works of Yeats including the revised version of "The Shadowy Waters" (1906), "From the Green Helmet and other Poems" (1912), "Responsibilities" (1914), "Nine Poems" (1918), "The Wild Swans at Coole" (1919), " Michael Robartes and the Dancer " (1921) and " The Tower " (1928). We can easily afford to dismiss the Green Helmet poems which to my mind are not representative of the poet's great art. Nay, I venture to say that they are feeble in sense, obscure, full of mannerism and lacking in free play of emotion and in lyrical beauty.

In "The Responsibilities" (1914) the style altogether freed now from "embroideries" referred to in the poem " A coat " which I have already quoted is, I must say, a bit rugged and hard but Yeats now becomes remarkable for lucidity. That I consider to be a great advance in art. There is another important change and we cry out with the poet in the gladness of heart and soul "O heart, the winds have shaken," for, indeed, they now finally cease to be

"Desolate winds that cry over the wandering sea
Desolate winds that hover in the flaming West."

With this new poetry of Yeats the reader's imagination veers round to the grey East touched at last with streaks of new light heralding the glorious break of a new dawn.

Idealism, Optimism.

There is now a supremacy of idealism [1] but it ceases to be dreamy reverie and has for its solid foundation a sure basis of a robust [2] optimism without which life even as it is reflected in art misses its true meaning and value. We also come across a highly ethical note which gives the lie to that cheap criticism which so comfortably disposes of in its stupid self-complaisance such great masters of poetry as Poe, Blake, Shelley and Yeats, as if they are nothing more than mere visionary dreamers. Psycho-analysis practically proposes to class all idealistic dreamers with neurotics—only it charitably distinguishes the former by adding that "the literary man generally saves himself from neurosis by putting his dream into artistic shape," as if art, after all, is a safety valve. "One dreams on," we are told, "till he is rescued from going mad by a physcian's help, if possible; the other partly cures himself by self-expression, and at the same time gives the world a piece of art or literature, which consoles many, because they too have either had or witnessed similar troubles, or consider themselves possible victims to such sorrows." So, even the readers or appreciators of art productions are not altogether spared by psycho-analysis!

Now, this is scientific analysis with a vengeance. All sciences in their infancy or even in the hey-day of youth are a bit over-confident and must shoot beyond the mark till Time, the suprème mender of all extremisms, steadies the audacious, if not over-hasty, youth into sobriety. To-day the craze is for psycho-analytic interpretation of all literature and particularly of poetry and of poets, and the craze must, we know, be left to run its natural course as experienced physicians leave certain fevers to do. We need not be alarmed at this "modern" *furor*, far less should we refuse to give psycho-analytic *literary*

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[1] *Cf.* Introductory verses to "Responsibilities," "Ego Dominus Tuus," "His Phoenix," "Broken Dreams."

[2] *Cf.* "Pandeen."

criticism a full scope or a patient hearing. Nay, we do gratefully accept here and there some of its verdicts but not all its theories and are certainly ready to have guidance from it to serve as a corrective to over-emotional, super-romantic, too individualistic (*i.e.*, egoistic) or merely impressionistic critical attitude. This may not satisfy the over-zealous scientist but may, we trust, appeal successfully to sober sense. I have just pointed out that though the range of Yeats's love poetry is extensive he is nowhere what psycho-analysis calls[1] an "*exhibitionist*" unless, of course, his extraordinary curiosity and remarkable desire for knowledge, specially of a somewhat esoteric type as evidenced by his keenness for occultism, for the *cabala*, for psychical research and the like,[2] be interpreted as an instance of the *sublimation* of exhibitionistic traits. Gautier seems to have some influence on Yeats's art and his symbolism and we cannot omit to notice that Gautier's exquisite artistic craftsmanship is ascribed by psycho-analysis to this exhibitionism. Vision[3] cannot altogether desert artists, though Browning's Don Juan tells us that "a poet never dreams, we prose folk always do," lest our world should grow too poor and drab, but it now makes our poet—

> "Talk of the embattled flaming multitude
> Who rise, wing above wing, flame above flame
> And, like a storm, cry the Ineffable Name."

Let us next listen to Yeats consoling himself and us by saying—

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[1] *Vide* page 95, *Calcutta Review*, for April, 1928.

[2] *Vide* "Auto-biographies and Reveries, etc.," Sec. XXV ; "The Trembling of the Veil," Sec. XII relating to 1887-91, pp. 181-187 and "Hodos Chameliontes," Sec. I, pp. 313-339, 456-460 (1897-98).

[3] For a full description of a seer girl's waking trance which enabled her to see fairies dancing to a tune and the poet's own trance (which is explained as a "suspension of the will in which the imagination moved of itself") *vide* "Regina Pigmeorum Veni" in "The Celtic Twilight." Reference to his own dream-like reverie is significantly made also in "Rosa Alchemica," Part II. I shall have to dwell at some length on this question of vision later on while speaking of symbolism.

"Dear heart, make a soft cradle of old tales,
And songs, and music : wherefore should you sadden
For wrongs you cannot hinder ? The great God
Sailing condemns the lost: be mirthful: He
Bids you be merry and old age be wise."

The Wisdom of Mirth.

This is wise resignation, this is surrender of the over-active spirit to the blessedness of peace. Let us sometimes have the courage to acknowledge that old age too hath its victories as great as those of earnest youth. Let us unite our sober and serene voice with that of the mature poet and in the meekness of spirit say—

"We who still labour by the cromlec on the shore
The grey cairn on the hill, when day sinks drowned in dew,
Being weary of the world's empires, bow down to you,
Master of the still stars and of the flaming door."

Mystic-Symbolic.

Now the poet's vision is spiritualised and he beholds the flaming door of heaven opened wide to receive the weary and worn soul. He is soaring to higher heights and diving into deeper depths of man's consciousness. His note becomes now distinctly mystic and his art frankly symbolic. We may refer in this connection to the prose essay "Rosa Alchemica, Part II," specially the utterances of Michael Robartes addressed to his friend Yeats. I cannot quote them here in full but must point out the very suggestive and strange experience of Yeats while under the mysterious influence of Michael Robartes as to how he felt his whole self (memories, hopes, thoughts and will) melting away and himself next passing beyond the mysterious forms full of unearthly beauty, after having in the meantime endured strange moods, melancholy with the weight of many worlds, "into that Death which is Beauty herself, and into that Loneliness which all the multitudes desire without ceasing." Finally, Yeats, who had at first remonstrated and refused to be initiated into the mysteries of *Eleusis* as opposed to those of *Calvery*, yields and unconditionally surrenders himself to Michael's guidance. We must remember, however, that Yeats ultimately outgrew this stage and found peace and happiness in the Christian fold. He beautifully puts the idea at the end of his "Rosa Alchemica" as to how the mastery of the indefinite world of these esoteric studies is not altogether gone and how he presses the rosary to his heart saying—

> "He whose name is Legion is at our doors deceiving our intellects with subtlety and flattering our hearts with beauty, and we have no trust but in Thee;"

and then

> "the war that rages within me at other times is still, and I am at peace."

How strange is the close parallelism between this cry of the Irish poet's innermost heart and that of St. Augustine in his famous *Confessions* (Chapter X)!

His appreciation of symbolic art is indicated by the following extract from "The Tables of the Law":—

> "The certitude of a fierce or gracious fervour in the enraptured faces of the angels of Francesca" (the 15th century painter of the Umbrian school remarkable for tenderness of colour and beauty of expression in his frescoes at Borgo San Sepolcro and in Arezzo); "and in the august faces of the sibyls of Michael Angelo" (1475-1564) well-known for his Christian Platonism); "and the incertitude, as of soul's trembling between the excitement of the spirit and the excitement of the flesh, in wavering faces from frescoes in the churches of Siena" (executed mostly in the 14th century and noted specially for imaginative force and technical skill); "and in the faces like thin flames, imagined by the modern symbolists and pre-Raphaelites, had often made that long "grey, dim, empty, echoing passage" (leading to Aherne's private chapel) "*become to my eyes a vestibule of eternity.*" (Italics and the portions in parenthesis, mine).

In the "Cap and Bells" (1899) in his own way our poet had already complained however indirectly of the world's[1] indifference and apathy to the inspiring urge of poetic visions just as Shelley had done before him in his passionate lyrical cry. Yeats in his quieter and characteristic symbolic way suggests that the young queen would not listen to the wisdom of the jester but on the contrary—

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[1] *Cf.* The complaint of Seanchan in the drama of "The King's Threshold."

"She drew in the heavy casement
And pushed the latches down."

But the earnest soul cannot be thus baffled; for,

"It had grown wise-tongued by thinking
It had grown sweet-tongued by dreaming,"

and so,

"In a red and quivering garment
It sang to her through the door."

This is the mystic's way and with him the blind,[1] the so-called insane, the professional jester, the man, superficially viewed, senile and decrepit with age—these are, after all, often the chosen vessels of God through whom His divine wisdom pours itself into the empty souls of the busy world. (*Cf.* such plays as "The Hour Glass" " On Baile's Strand" which have in this respect much in common with the symbolic dramas of Maeterlinck and of Rabindranath).

The poet's deep faith in perfection which is the fountain-head of noble optimism is intimately connected with his keen pursuit of the Ideal in the real, showing clearly his affinity with Shelley. (*Cf.* "The Tables of the Law.")

In the song of Wandering Aengus who in Celtic myth is the God of youth, beauty, poetry and ecstasy, we read how a little silver trout, caught by the hero in a stream, suddenly and mysteriously changed itself into a glimmering girl

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[1] *Cf* "Helen's Eye" in "The Celtic Twilight." "I think Raftery (the blind poet) was altogether blind," said an old man to Yeats, "but those that are blind have a way of seeing things, and have the power to know more, and feel more, and to do more, and to guess more than those that have their sight, and a certain wit and a certain wisdom is given to them." Maeterlinck's *Les Aveugles* (1890) and the grandfather in *The Intruder* are like Plato's cavern man groping in exile with his back towards the light yet " those who see least see most."

> "With apple blossom in her hair
> Who called me by my name and ran.
> And faded through the brightening air."

At once begins in consequence an eternal quest of the Ideal in the hero's firm and passionate resolve

> "Though I am old with wandering
> Thro' hollow lands and hilly lands,
> I will find out where she has gone,
> And kiss her lips and take her hands ;
> And walk among long dappled grass,
> And pluck till time and times are done
> The silver apples of the moon,
> The golden apples of the sun."

This is really the key-note to the poetry of Yeats and it appears so early as 1889 even in his "Wanderings of Usheen," the renowned poet-hero of the Fenian cycle of Irish mediæval legend, commonly known as Ossian, where the hero is full of sighing because he has detected in the faces of men and women the intense longing of sacred desires—"the immortal desire of immortals." In "The Tables of the Law" we read that "the angels who have hearts of the Divine Ecstasy, and bodies of the Divine Intellect, need nothing but a thirst for the immortal element, in hope, in desire, in dreams."

I am afraid I have detained you too long. It will be seen that I have practically shut out most of the poet's dramas and also that I have dwelt at greater length on the second stage of his poetic career. In that period we have his best poetry *considered as poetry* and his best craftsmanship, though naturally the final period shows deepening of thought into something more profound. His art, however, suffers and he grows more idealistic, mystic and symbolic.

(*To be continued*)

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

IS FREUD A PSYCHOLOGIST ?

To ask whether Freud is a psychologist would at first blush, seem a presumptuous if not ludicrous question. One might as well ask whether Darwin was a biologist or Kant a philosopher. A little analysis, however, will readily alter the perspective.

Before the advent of psychoanalysis, there were two kinds of psychology, that of the common man and that of the scientist; a psychology of the street and a psychology of the laboratory. Popular psychology was immersed in the daily preoccupations of men and women; it dealt with personalities, characters, dispositions. It classed some as intelligent, others as stupid; some as mean, others as kind; some as gifted, others as commonplace. It spoke of talents, geniuses, leaders of men, keen observers, born naturalists or inventors. It loved to dwell on the ineradicable psychological traits of nations. Also, it always dealt with the whole man, the whole woman. Its syntheses were realistic and pragmatic, its analyses allowed for no exceptions or inaccuracies. Its conclusions, generally, were categorical, sweeping and dogmatic.

Popular psychologizing was raised to an exalted status by the realistic novelists and dramatists. Men like Chekov, Balzac, Maupassant, Tolstoi, Shakespeare and Moliére, Ibsen and Dostoyevski, Galsworthy or Maugham, used the psychology of the street, of the common man; but whereas the average person employed in his operations pick and shovel, hammer and saw, these great seers of the human psyche wielded refined surgical instruments, the painter's brush, the sculptor's thumb. They saw further and more clearly, expressed their insight with greater precision and refinement. Also, they discerned much that lay hidden from the common eye. Still, all in all, their conclusions were comprehensible to the lay reader. They belonged to his universe of discourse. They dealt with living men and women of flesh and blood, with aptitudes and inaptitudes, passions, characters and personalities.

Scientific psychology belonged to an altogether different domain. Whether in abstract analytical procedure or on the graphs of the laboratory, it dealt with the human psyche not as a whole but in parts. It dismembered familiar realities into fragments of abstraction which bore no resemblance at all to the things of the flesh and the spirit in which the common man was interested. Sensations, perceptions, sensory illusions, after images, memories, associations, habits, two-dimensional or three-dimensional vision, cutaneous sensitivity to pain, heat or cold, blind spots, semi-circular canals, functions of the sympathetic nervous system and innumerable other topics, were as uninteresting to the layman as they were incomprehensible to him. Just as grammar which is of the very essence of language always seemed stupid and dry except to grammarians, so scientific psychology, though full of problems and adventure to the initiated, brought to the average man nothing but vague formulæ and high-sounding propositions. Technically accurate they may well be, he thought, but also empty and useless.

All this changed with the advent of the New Psychology, in the form of behaviourism and psychoanalysis. However different in technique and perspective, these two systems had this in common: they dealt with the whole man, their concern was with the humanity familiar to ordinary humans. Therein lies the secret of the extraordinary popularity of these two phases of the new psychology. For once scientific psychology had come down to earth, and as such it was welcomed. Behaviourism in its modern form took its inception in the animal laboratories of the Russian Pavlov; it was picked up in America by the dynamic John B. Watson, whose personal initiative and ability are largely responsible for the present vogue of psychological behaviourism. The behaviourist, building on the foundations laid by such experimentalists as Fechner, Weber and Wundt in Germany, or Cattell, Titchener and Stanley Hall in the United

States, refused to accept as data anything but objectively observable and measurable phenomena. He was less interested in the psychological process as such than in the organism, human or otherwise, in which the process took place. The behaviourist's province was animated organisms in functions, and he attempted to reduce our knowledge of such functions to a form comparable to the findings of the exact and natural sciences. In the introspective psychology of old, behaviourism saw its principal enemy and the great menace to a scientific psychology. Grudgingly, the behaviourist admitted that a psyche, a mind, did exist; but for scientific purposes it was available only in so far as its operations were observable under controlled conditions, recorded in objective form and measured with exactitude.

It is here that the behaviourist joined hands with the psychoanalyst. Psychoanalysis was born in the seances of the hypnotist and the clinic of the psychiatrist. Freud, a Viennese physician who had turned his attention to psychic disorders, found the then prevalent system of hypnotic treatment inadequate in various directions. He substituted for it a procedure in which the patient, instead of being reduced to a will-less tool of the physician, was on the contrary urged to permit his mind to function freely, unencumbered even by the checks of habitual criticism and selection. This so-called method of free association, to which dream analysis was subsequently added, became the operative tool of the psychoanalyst.

As mentioned before, the psychoanalyst was at one with the behaviourist in his distrust of the conscious psyche. In introspection psychoanalysis and behaviourism found their common foe. But having thus met in friendly compact, they presently parted company, never to meet again. The behaviourist stepped outside the psyche, as it were—the good old-fashioned psyche of the common man and the analytical psychologist—and devoted his attention to muscular responses which could be graphically recorded, measured and reduced to figures. The psychoanalyst, on the other hand, dug deeper into the psychic soil to discover there another psyche, the Unconscious, the operations of which had heretofore been unknown to the layman and scientist alike.

The psychological system of the psychoanalyst, meaning primarily Freud, may be reduced in its principal features to the following propositions :

The conscious psyche represents but a surface phenomenon of psychic life. It is but a fragmentary and distorted replica of the unconscious psyche which operates with great coherence and consistency, subject to as rigid laws of causal determination as are the events of the material universe. Nothing is accidental in the psychic domain. Its apparent incoherence or freedom are merely due to our ignorance of the deeper-lying connections. Once these are understood, the mystery and casualness of psychic life vanish and it begins to assume the form of a well-ordered and strictly deterministic system.

The unconscious itself is populated by psychic urges, originally conscious, which come into conflict with certain attitudes, taboos and regulations brought by civilization and imparted to the individual in education. In the ensuing test of strength the original urges lose out, to be forthwith repressed into the unconscious. They do not, however, cease to exist. On the contrary, they remain active and dynamic and continue to influence the life and reactions of the individual.. In this they are most successful just because their very existence remains unknown to the person who harbours them. These unconscious processes display a marked resistance to being once more pulled into the domain of the conscious psyche, this resistance being the greater the more thorough-going the preceding repression.

Analysis has disclosed, moreover, that the repressed urges of the unconscious are mostly or wholly sexual in nature. In this connection Freud introduced a conception of sex wider and more fundamental than that current before his day. The essence of sexuality to him was not in the sexual act and the ensuing conception and subsequent procreation, but in the sexual urge itself, the sexual excitation. This extension of the concept of sex made it possible for Freud to cover by the term not only the phenomena of the normal bi-sexual life, but also of the so-called perversities, such as homosexuality, sadism, masochism, and fetichism. A further extension, finally, embraced also the sexual phenomena of childhood, nay of infancy. Thus the infant, heretofore regarded as an asexual creature, a symbol of angel-like innocence, stood revealed as not only sexed but "polymorphous perverse," in so far as it combined homosexual, sadistic, masochistic, and other tendencies.

When this early sexual period is left behind, there comes a more or less extended period of amnesia or forgetting during which the sex urges and experiences of early childhood are largely repressed. When the child emerges from this condition, during or somewhat preceding puberty, its sexual orientation has become different. It is no longer perverse nor polymorphous. From now on, it is dominated by the Oedipus Complex, which consists in a positive fixation toward the parent of the opposite sex and an ambivalent attitude toward the parent of the same sex, an attitude which combines a positive and a negative element. Thus, to put it briefly and inaccurately, the boy loves the mother and both hates and loves the father ; whereas the girl loves the father and hates and loves the mother. The Oedipus Complex, in normal instances, is resolved after adolescence, the boy often substituting his sister or sisters for the mother before his love or libido becomes attached to other women, while the girl passes *viâ* brothers to other men.

If all goes well with the psyche of the individual, " normal " sexual life begins at this point. In cases of difficulties, however, into which we need not enter here, conflicts arise, the nature of which or even their very existence may for long remain unknown to the person in question, as at least one of the conflicting elements remains in the unconscious. Then we say that a person is afflicted with a complex and the time is ripe to consult a psychoanalyst, with whose assistance the conflicting elements in the unconscious are raised into consciousness, blind spots of memory are illumined, the complex, if all goes well, is resolved, and the patient is cured, temporarily or permanently.

In addition to the method of free association, the psychoanalyst uses in his technique still another method, that of dream analysis. Dreams, so teaches Freud, are not as simple as they seem, nor as chaotic, nor as meaningless. Dream life, like that of the waking hours, proceeds in two levels: the dream of actual sleeping experience, which is the manifest content of the dream, and the dream thought or work, the dream's latent content. The significant part of the dream lies in the latter process. The repressed elements of the unconscious, which during waking hours are prevented by resistance from reaching consciousness, succeed in doing so after the control elements in the psyche have been weakened during sleep. It is then that the wishes or urges present in waking life, but hidden from consciousness, appear in the manifest content of the dream in the form of wish fulfilments and in a setting largely made up of experiences of the preceding day. They do not, however, appear in their pristine form—the resistance is too great even then—but in a disguise. They take the form of symbols which constitute a large part of the manifest content of the dream. In order to interpret the dream, therefore, it is necessary to understand the language of symbols. In the interpretation of symbols considerable differences of opinion exist between psychoanalysts. Some hold that certain things or events always appear in the form of certain fixed symbols, while others grant symbols greater leeway.

It now becomes clear how dream analysis can assist the psychoanalyst in his therapeutic technique. It helps him and the patient to pull the veil from certain elements of the unconscious, which are held back so powerfully by resistance as not to appear in the consciousness during waking hours, even though the patient is willing to co-operate with the analyst in permitting these elements to make their appearance. Moreover, an avenue of approach is thus opened to the hidden wishes of the patient which often lie at the root of his disorder. All these things are likely to make their appearance in the dream life of the patient because during the period of analysis it is just these matters that concern him and torture him.

Not satisfied to trace neuroses to repressed sexuality, Freud and other psychoanalysts believe that certain positive and outstanding elements of psychic life, such as extraordinary creativeness in art, music, religion, or any other form of imaginative activity, also represent sexual repressions of childhood, sublimated in such cases in a positive and productive direction.

Such, in brief, are the main tenets of the Freudian psychology.

This being so, one may well ask, how can the status of a psychologist be denied to Freud? Has he not raised psychology from a state of vagueness and conjecture to that of definiteness and positive knowledge? Has he not illumined heretofore unknown or misunderstood elements of the psyche? Has he not originated a psychological technique by means of which men and women, otherwise hopelessly lost, may be returned to the joys and activities of normal existence? Finally—and, from the standpoint of the layman, most important of all—has he not, first among professional psychologists, turned his attention to living humanity, to the men and women of actual life, rather than lose himself in elaborate but unilluminating analyses and meaningless abstractions?

Yes, all this may be so. To a large extent it is. And yet, in senses more than one, Freud is not, strictly speaking, a psychologist. Both what he does and what he does not do support this contention. The failings and exaggerations of his system, moreover, are largely due to the absence of the comprehensive view of an all-around psychologist. Freudian mechanisms do exist and perhaps operate as he describes. For the purposes of this article, in fact, we may assume that these mechanisms are strictly true to reality and that their operations are just as represented by Freud. But at this point two questions arise. Is it justifiable to transfer the mechanisms which explain neuroses to the psyche of the normal individual? To a degree, no doubt it is. It is quite in line with modern psychiatry generally as well as with latter-day criminology, medicine, and, in fact, biology, not to draw too sharp a line between the normal and abnormal, between health and disease. Nevertheless, just as in medicine it is understood that whenever there is disease, certain pathogenic factors, toxins, disease germs, are present in unusual number or under exceptionally favourable conditions for their multiplication and growth; just as in criminology it must be assumed that certain anti-social trends or animalistic tendencies hold excessive sway, when there is crime; so in the domain of the neuroses the mechanisms which engender them must be assumed to be in more emphatic control of psychic life in a neurotic than they are in a normal individual. To put it differently: the psyche behaves the more true to Freudian pattern the more truly a neurotic an individual is.

In committing this error Freud has strayed after the fashion of many psychiatrists and of physicians generally who are naturally tempted to look at the individual from the angle of pathology with which they are especially familiar, a temptation not easily nor frequently resisted.

One of the reasons why Freud could so readily have been led into this error is the fact—a crucial one from our standpoint—that much of what belongs to the domain of psychology has never concerned Freud. Sensations, perceptions, the mechanisms of vision or the other sensory organs, including illusions, such things as after-images, or even the processes of memory or association, the psychic mechanisms of learning, the nature of creativeness, the analysis, finally, of such traits of character as kindness, meanness, temper, magnanimity, courage—none of these topics, nor many others of the well-nigh interminable list of factors that make up the life of the psyche, have ever formed part of Freud's subject-matter, have ever figured in his mental laboratory. If a pre-Freudian psychologist had written a book leaving out these topics, we might have asked with some surprise: "Where are the remaining chapters? Are they coming in another volume?" Surely we should have been justified in expecting some treatment of topics which form so essential a part of psychology. In the case of Freud, what he has given has proved so exciting and astounding that little attention has been paid to what he has neglected. And it is this neglect which raises the doubt as to his status as a true psychologist.

What Freud has really done is to discover a number of highly important mechanisms, some new, others but imperfectly understood, which function in a typical way in the neurotic psyche. Prompted by the common enough desire to generalize his findings, thus giving them greater universality, he proceeded to apply his mechanisms to the normal psyche. In this he was to a degree justified, as we have noticed before. But he was so concerned with his own mechanisms as to be blinded to the fact that, on the general map of psychic life, they, after all, constitute but a small corner, however significant they may prove to be on occasion.

Another aspect of Freud's system which justifies our contention, reflecting as it does upon his status as a psychologist, is the undue simplification which he introduces into his interpretation of the psyche. However important sex may be, the reduction of psychology or any part of it to sexology can surely not be undertaken without specific proof being provided that the urges of sex do indeed constitute not only part and parcel of certain psychic phenomena but their exclusive source and root. It is not for those, moreover, who dispute Freud's position to furnish evidence, for such is amply provided by ordinary human experience. The proof must be given by him who claims that the plurality of experience is at bottom but a unity, and that this unity is sex. There may be common elements between the religious and aesthetic functions and the sexual ones, but it does not follow therefrom that genetically or ontogenetically the religious sense or the sense of beauty are derivatives of the sex urge. Nor is it sufficient to make such an assumption plausible. That, indeed, is easy enough, for what is simple is in itself plausible as well as attractive. If such an assumption is to be accepted as true, it is to be demonstrated. This has never been done, nor even attempted.

In Freud's treatment of sex life itself, moreover, there is a similar tendency toward excessive simplification. Paradoxically enough, Freud does not seem to give due weight to the so-called normal heterosexual tendency of most men and women past adolescence. To him this tendency is but the last phase in the evolution of sex in the individual, beginning with the early sex gropings of the infant and normally ending with post-adolescent heterosexuality. Now, it is not at all clear that this is actually so. As is well known, the sex organs of man, male and female, reach their maturity just preceding or during adolescence. At the very same period, certain psychic mutations take place in the organism of a boy, and especially of a girl, which are popularly characterized by the phrases, "He has become a man," "She has become a woman." Now is it not more feasible to assume that these psychological tendencies are as congenital as the physical changes an accompaniment of which they are, but that both are timed to appear not at birth nor in infancy or childhood, but at the period roughly described as puberty? Take, for example, milk teeth and second teeth. There is nothing in the milk teeth which would make one suspect that second teeth are to appear there, and obviously enough the second teeth are not an evolution of the milk teeth. Both the milk teeth and the second teeth are congenital, but the first are timed to appear earlier in life, the second considerably later.

Here then we have once more a simplification without proof, which reminds one of the mode of procedure in the theoretical natural sciences, like physics, or chemistry, where conceptual simplification is justified whenever it can be achieved in such a way as to render our conceptual universe in the particular domain more simple and coherent. Psychologists, like historians, have at length learned to resist this tendency toward simplification, for they are confronted with the human reality, every element of which clings to its independent right to existence, and will not be submerged for the sake of a comprehensive unifying formula, however intellectually attractive.

So here it seems Freud once more functions not as a psychologist.

Freud's concept of the unconscious, finally, and that of its relation to the conscious, are subject to the same stricture.

First, Freud over-emphasizes the unconscious psyche at the expense of the psyche of awareness. We need not quarrel with the concept of the unconscious as such. It is most helpful in our thinking about psychic life, nor is it even particularly new. The ungodly fear, moreover which some psychologists and philosophers have of it, may have reasons of its own (Freudian or otherwise). But to have grasped the significance of the unconscious and to have applied it to an interpretation and elucidation of the conscious is one thing ; to explain away the conscious is another. In his zeal to explain the conscious psyche and reduce it to some sort of order, Freud has spirited it away. The only way to understand the conscious psyche, it would seem, is to follow the guide-posts it provides to the unconscious, and there understanding will be found. Now this is obviously a highly artificial and unrealistic procedure. The conscious may be all wrong, it may be nothing but illusion, but it has one undeniable characteristic : *it is*. This Freud seems to forget. The conscious psyche, after all, constitutes a reality. It may not be *the* reality, but it is a reality : the reality of the life of awareness. If there are in it contradictions, incomprehensibilities, tensions, illusions, such is psychic reality, experience, life. We are fully justified to attempt an interpretation of this conscious psyche in terms of something that lies beyond it, but this is only one way of approaching it. The other way—

and it is a way which preserves its autonomy, the autonomy of life as consciously lived—is to remain in the level of the conscious psyche and do with it what we can, for better or for worse. A psychologist who sacrifices the psyche of experience to a psyche of conjecture—psychic, if you please, but conjectural—is, after all, a psychologist who has strayed from his primary subject-matter.

The psychic nature of the unconscious itself, finally, is of a somewhat dubious kind. We are, to be sure, reminded frequently enough by Freud and others that the unconscious is psychic ; also, that it must be assumed to be such in order not to impinge upon the autonomy of the psychic level : psychological explanations must be in psychic terms. The unconscious is but a subterranean extension of the conscious. The conscious and the unconscious are a continuum. So far, so good. But, on analysis, the unconscious—Freud's submerged psyche—does not operate like a psyche at all. It is most orderly, coherent and deterministic, while the psyche is casual, chaotic and somewhat disjointed. The unconscious knows no conflicts, no contradictions, the very traits which characterize the conscious psyche. If we try to classify the unconscious, not in accordance with the baptism given it by the psychoanalyst, but rather in accordance with its nature, derived from the same source, we find it to behave much more like blind organic substance, if not like that other substance—equally blind, and not even organic—which, at bottom, is the substance of the cosmos. It is, therefore, not wholly accidental that Jung, Freud's renegade disciple, in an attempt to widen the concept of the unconscious still further, has given it a form which lacks even the external signs of the psychic discernible, perhaps, in the unconscious of Freud. Jung's unconscious may still be organic, but it is certainly no longer psychic, not so far, at least, as one can gather from any use made of it in Jung's system.

Freud's psychologism thus seems to be but a mechanism in disguise. The unconscious, which is the dynamic and operative principle of the Freudian system, even though it be called psychic, functions as if it were part of the inanimate cosmos. When we remember how commonly physicians are mechanists, and that the same has, until quite recently, been true of psychiatrists, this last characteristic of the Freudian ideology receives its historical setting and interpretation.

Freud was a physician, trained in his formative years in the techniques and concepts of the physiological laboratory. When his attention was attracted to psychic disorders, he attacked them with the preconceptions of a natural scientist endowed with a constructive and speculative intellect. He soon found himself on the track of a number of significant mechanisms, which he proceeded to use not only as postulates in his therapeutic technique, but also as corner-stones for a new psychological philosophy. This philosophy, now fully developed and forming a closed system, proves, on analysis, to be simplicist, mechanical, and deterministic. It thus possesses all the characteristics of the speculative constructs of theoretical physics. Freud may call it psychological, but it differs in all fundamentals from the nature of the psychic as known to us in the reality of conscious experience.

In this way, the unpsychological background and presuppositions of Freud's system may be seen to account both for what he has given and for what he has left out. What he has left out he omitted because of deficient interest in much that should be the concern of the psychologist; and what he has given he has conceptualized in a form bearing the earmarks, not of psychology, but of physics, not of mind, but of mechanism. In this sense, then, we must conclude, Freud is not, strictly speaking, a psychologist.[1]

ALEXANDER GOLDENWEISER

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[1] *The Reflex*, New York City, January, 1928.

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AN ALLEGORY

She lay in the golden haze of sunny Spring-time; dreamily, drowsily watching the apple-blossoms shower around her like blushing snow-flakes, falling on the soft, green grass where she nestled lovingly. The blood purled deliciously through her veins; she stretched her limbs in the warm, glad light and watched two white butterflies chase each other among the flowers; they intertwined wings as though eager for embraces.

In the blue fields of heaven two delicate cloudlets, like larger butterflies, flew together. A pair of turtledoves cooed above her, and all things sang of love. Love, love, love,—the song stole into her mind and hummed a musical drone like bees among the lilac blooms; her senses reeled in ecstatic joy, and a blissful sleep took possession of her.

Suddenly, she was singing and dancing her merry way through fields of flowers beside a wimpling rill, happy in the exuberance of youth and sunshine. Across the streamlet a boyish, roguish face smiled into hers; they looked into each others' eyes and loved, even as the birds and butterflies mate.

They clasped hands over the gleaming water and danced on, singing together, and lips could cling across the silver thread when not content with clasping hands; but as they pressed the ferns and violets down, and pushed the rose-blossoming vines apart to form a pathway through the perfume, the brooklet grew a brook; no longer could lips reach, but fingers interlocked. A faint chill passed over their hearts, and their songs grew softer and dancing footsteps lagged.

Then the brook widened into a stream and hands were severed too; only hearts touched, only eyes embraced, and a sob crept into their song.

Then the stream flowed on, a river; and far apart, the lovers could only gaze and long for the streamlet once again.

The song quivered and died on the air; their feet grew weary, and fain would they have retraced their steps; but the roses had turned to thorns, the violets were dead, the pebbles cut their feet, and, alas, there was no going back!

They looked behind them, and the garden of flowers had vanished; the pathway was obscured, and only memory remained. The twilight shadows came and purple clouds hid the brightness of the sun. No longer could they look into each others' faces; they could only cry, "Love! Love!" across the noisy water.

Then night and darkness came upon them; like the wings of some giant bird of prey; it hovered over them, and the voice of the girl's lover grew silent, or was lost in the river's rush. It flowed on, dark and sullen; the path grew steep and rough, and she fell often; bruising her face and cutting her tender hands on the rocks. Her feet were tired and her heart ached and cried in anguish.

"Oh, why did I not cross the streamlet to my Love, and abide with him among the flowers!"

She was athirst, and stooped over the river's bank to cool her fevered lips. A vivid flash of lightning lit up the heaven and earth, and painted on the river, she saw the ghost of herself. Youth had vanished, and she had grown pale and hollow-eyed. A tempest was brewing, and she was all alone, alone! Oh God, to find the pathway back! But she knew there was no going back to the past; relentless Fate drives us ever onward. Again the lightning's lurid sheet spread across the darkened clouds, and she saw that her feet had wandered into a valley, cold and dark and dread. She wrung her hands and cried out to God to help her; and suddenly, upon the pinnacle of a mountain, a light gleamed, like unto a light from a tower, over a seething sea, and her heart leaped up:

"There is the garden of youth and love," she cried, as she tottered on, her eyes never leaving the beacon.

But pitfalls were plentiful, and the way was long. Then, at last, she reached the mountain, and began to climb; her bleeding hands clinging to rocks and boughs as she slowly went upward, upward. The way was so long; the night was so dark, and her soul seemed to bear a burden on its back. But the light shone steadfastly above her, and she knew that she should find her lover there.

The river in the valley roared and rolled, lashed by the tempest; the wanton wind used her roughly; but she clung to the rocks and climbed, higher and higher. It seemed hours, days, months, and years passed whilst she toiled up the mountain side. At last she reached the pinnacle, and behold, the light she had striven to attain, was the light of a star, still so far, so far away!

She stood in darkness and desolation, alone and in despair; the rough pathway now led down, down, into fathoms of darkness; and she could not hope ever to penetrate its desolation. She must still seek to go upward and reach the star; for she knew that only there could she find her lost Love, her sunshine and her flowers. There had been a wall with a gate around that lost garden; Faith was the key to unlock it; the star must be the key-hole through which the light shone and there was the garden of Heaven!

But how could she penetrate that pathless waste of infinite space? Her feet were useless as a bird's save for earth; her hands were helpless; but, suddenly, a thrill of joy permeated her being, and her soul trembled with bliss; for it realised that the burden it had borne so long was fledgling wings, that now were plumed for flight! Wings! Beautiful wings, with which to cleave a way through the fathomless blue ether, and reach the starry gate of the garden where her Love awaited her. She stretched her pinions out, and soared up, and up, leaving the darkness and cold far beneath her, and, as she flew higher and higher, she cried aloud in her joy!

"O Love, I will meet you once more!"...

A burning kiss was pressed on her lips, and lo, the face of her Beloved lay against her own, and the apple-blossoms floated down through the golden haze, bearing perfumes of Spring-time again.

"Tell me, when does love cease?" she asked; and the voice of her Beloved answered her:

"*Love never ceaseth. Love is like God, from everlasting to everlasting. Love is eternal!*"

Teresa Strickland

THE TEMPEST.

AS I shut my weary eyes I behold
The ravages of a gale—trees torn apart;
But what is a gale, or lightning and hail
Before the tempest in my heart?

NEXT I see a wreck on shore,
Bodies floating—Death's dire toll;
But what is a storm or thunder's roar
Before the tempest in my soul?

Byram K. Talookdar

EGOTISM

Egotism is the practice of talking about oneself, an all too frequent use of 'I' and 'me.' Most of us are wise in our own conceit. Egotism is thus a general weakness. When anything that is not exactly good becomes widely prevalent it often passes for a virtue, and even the few who at first stand outside its influence are gradually drawn in and induced to 'toe the line.'

Although everybody is, more or less, addicted to egotism you will always come across people who take a special delight in inveighing against it and look exceedingly self-righteous. The curious fact is that in doing this they generally forget the whole world but themselves. Such persons are prone to egotism and as they least know it themselves, are comical to a degree.

With the vast majority of mankind number one exercises a compelling spell. Each carries his 'kit-bag' of self-conceit. There is not any very great harm in this so long as self-conceit does not become absolute selfishness. Self-importance is only a weakness ; active selfishness is nearly a crime.

Egotism in its venial form takes various shapes. Quite a large number of us adore ourselves honestly and openly. From this spring some of the most fascinating and perplexing facts of life such as shyness, slyness, individuality and anger. Life would, of course, lose most of its charm if 'I' and its manifold adjuncts are struck off the roll. It should be a beautiful disaster if all attain what sages name conquest of self.

Taking life as it is we find that shyness is almost a virtue, at least, a winsome weakness. Shyness torments its possessor and delights the onlooker. The shy are the beloved. The shy are the sought. The coy maiden is the attractive maiden. If a girl is lost to shyness she is lost also to charm, that most elusive thing which we cannot fully see or fully escape seeing.

You think such a girl plain, not quite coming up to your cherished notions about the fair sex.

What is the origin of shyness? It is difficult to say what, if it is not egotism. Shyness is surely one of egotism's many lovely off-shoots. Some gifted souls simply vanish in the ether of self-adoration the moment they start thinking about themselves. Shyness is really egotism exaggerated to the point of humility. This old earth of hard pebbles and sharp thistles is, to every one's joy, draped in the evergreen of sweet shyness. Indeed, everybody ought to be shy in some measure. Most great men of history were: It is always pleasant to see the human soul struggling in the soft, strong meshes of shyness.

In some respects slyness is allied to shyness. Slyness is born on the wrong side of the blanket of egotism. Slyness is shyness turned upside down. The sly always see without being seen. They esteem others slightly, but themselves as incomparable. The faults of others are to them indisputable proof of their own perfection. Whatever they do not do, these secret people always do two things, namely, praising themselves and prying furtively into the secrets of others.

But even slyness has its place in society. It provides harmless entertainment. Few things are more pleasing than to study the sly. Their hiding places invite exploration. Their stealthiness is half concealed in a wrapper of romance. Look at the tortoise. How it watches the world when none are about. How deftly does it withdraw when it knows that you are by. The tortoise is a very egotist, and what is true of the tortoise is equally true of the sly.

The sly ones seldom meet one another. And an event occurs if they do. An error in their calculations might bring the sly Tom face to face with the sly Dick once in a long while. Then a fierce struggle ensues and, like sparks of fire, they presently fly in opposite directions. In this case 'diamond cut diamond' is all wrong.

Now from the greenroom comes *individuality*. Individuality is the principal character in the play. Individuality! thy name is egotism. Its very appearance on the stage brings down the house. One had, therefore, best write about it seriously.

Mistaken notions have settled upon the term individuality. It is, however, clear that there is no individuality without egotism. Indeed, egotism in flower is individuality. In very many cases the bud seldom opens. There must be real effort, active aspiration on the part of the bud to blossom. A man without individuality is like a jelly-fish, although too much of it makes one somewhat of a 'character.' Everyone must attain to a measure of individuality to be anyone at all. If you do not have it you should be lost in the throng and stress of life. Also in the absence of individuality most of the amenities of life will go. Progress will stop. The higher yearnings will slumber. Gentle wayfarer along life's pebbly paths and arboured walks, do not let yourself be cut off from individuality, for in shine and shower, in mirth and melancholy, it will stand you in excellent stead, and your strength will be as the strength of ten.

Lastly comes anger. The angry man is easy to understand. He is a fanatic in the faith of egotism. He will permit none to cross his path. He will have the pride of place for his, 'I' at all hazards. He will try to shake the earth with his tread, to frighten the heavens with his looks. His opponents must fly in terror. This is 'I' in eruption.

Consider for a while what the results would be if egotism never bursts into anger. Then there would be no quarrels, no brawls and no battles. Humanity will be deprived of its wild flutterings, and drop into a dreaming passivity. This little ball, on which we are so many tiny specks making twice as much noise as our size, is indeed kept continually in motion by the electric power-station bearing the little name 'I.'

N. K. VENKATESWARAN

ON MODERNISING SPINOZA

III

Reviewing as a whole his procedure in the gloss on Spinoza, it will not be unfair to conclude, therefore, that the situation does not at all improve on the introduction of Time into the system nor are its outstanding difficulties solved thereby. On the contrary the Spinozistic *Weltanschauung*, which hinges on the geometrical method that views the world *sub specie æternitatis*, stands out, as already observed, in bald antagonism to the proposed method of viewing the world *sub specie temporis*. Now, the all-important question that crops up here is : whether after expunging the geometrical or the mathematical method from Spinozism, we have any the least justification for associating the honoured name of Spinoza with any superstructure that may be raised on it. If ' the Ethics,' as it has been so happily described, be ' the strange book in which the soul of poetry is clothed in the body of geometry,' the continued survival and functioning of the disembodied soul of Spinozism, become matters on which ' psychical research ' has yet to press its seal of authority. To Mr. Bertrand Russell, at least, than whom there has been no more ardent advocate of the ' Scientific Method in Philosophy,' it is the aspect of timelessness, enshrined in the heart of mathematical truths, and productive of that ' austere beauty of mathematics ' like that of sculpture, so ably grasped, and exalted by Spinoza as the standard of perfection that has commended itself. In his strictures on Evolutionism with its shibboleth of ' progress,' he goes back to Spinoza and by way of reinforcing his own arguments cites with approval the well-known proposition LXII of Ethics, Bk. IV, which runs thus : " In so far as the mind conceives a thing according to the dictate of reason, it will be equally affected whether the idea is that of a future, past, or present thing." Accordingly, this specific attempt to improve upon Spinoza by importing time into it, would be, in his opinion, tantamount to a mutilation of the very soul of Spinozism, if not of the substance thereof,—which it avowedly is. On the general problem of Time in a philosophical reference, Mr. Bertrand Russell is equally emphatic. What Prof. Alexander—'by whose writings' on the subject of Realism Mr. Russell, as a realist, thinks to 'have profited greatly'[1]—welcomes as the tendency 'to take time seriously' and therewith the idea of 'evolution' leading to a 'hierarchy produced in the order of time,' Mr. Russell would unambiguously condemn as 'ethically inspired metaphysics' with its characteristic 'slavery to time' and would insist that "both in thought and feeling, even though time be real, to realise the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom."[2] Furthermore, Prof. Alexander has not been able to substantiate the pledge that 'Time displaces Thought in the Spinozistic scheme' so far as he has been constantly appealing, in a tacit and recondite way, of course, to Thought in his evolutionary scheme, beginning from bare Space-Time of which 'the time element becomes' at a late stage of evolution 'mind, or rather the character of mentality.' The logical and the temporal, all along jostling with each other, come out here in the baldest antagonism;—and it is the logician in him that runs the whole show, while the evolutionary naturalist retires to the background only to be exposed and condemned eventually. Indeed, it is by a sheer *tour de force* that Prof. Alexander has been here trying, and that clearly in vain, to make Time do the work of Thought, and, in fact, his very language embodying this forced construction in the startling paradox that 'Time is the mind of Space' unmistakably betrays him. Nor is this procedure calculated to do justice to the notion of 'evolution' with which Prof. Alexander is evidently in 'bitter earnest.' As it is, the evolution of mind or

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[1] Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, p. 125.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 22.

'mentality' in his scheme appears more or less like the emergence of something that has been surreptitiously smuggled in, or in more familiar language, like drawing out of a ballot-box what has been already put into it. That is why Prof. Lloyd Morgan has justly taken exception to this procedure in words that bear quotation: "If we take evolution—that is, the progressive advance of natural events,—*seriously* (as Professor Alexander might say), we must not 'posit' the human mind at the advanced stage of development with which the logician, quite properly for his purpose, starts as somewhere already in existence[1].

It may, however, be profitable to enquire whether the realms of 'ethics' and 'religion' fare better under the somewhat anarchical *regime* of Time along with its faithful consort, Emergent Evolution. At first sight it appears strange how in a universe reduced to its lowest terms—the bare differentiations of Space-Time—there can conceivably be any room for conservation of the values of life, the ethical and the religious in particular, as it has been found to be the case in Spinozism, which has placed under a perpetual ban the much-maligned human or 'modal' point of view. An ethical metaphysics may be bad, but a geometric or cosmo-centric ethics is a contradiction in terms. In defence of Spinoza it might be argued, however, that there are two voices in Spinoza, and that Spinoza who is clearly greater than his method,—on which he seemed to have pinned his faith,—so far redeems ethics from the domination of the geometric method that the last word of his philosophy seems to be the direct negation of the first and the prevailing note. Besides, as it has been condoned by Dr. Duff in his interesting work on Spinoza, Spinoza, although born in an age in which the prestige of the Geometrical method was universally acknowledged, employed it, without being enslaved thereby,—as an academic, 'convincing mode of statement' rather than as 'more cogent kind of proof.' It is further borne out by the fact that there is no trace of it in his earlier and later works. In the light of the author's limited purpose the contention may have a plausibility of its own; but, as we reckon that Spinoza's abiding interest was metaphysical, we feel convinced that Spinoza's employment of the Geometrical method is not, in view of his central interest, a matter of methodological expediency, or historical accident merely, but is the direct off-shoot, and logical outcome of his metaphysics. However, as it is, Professor Alexander is convinced that the Spinozistic 'Supreme Being lacks the human note '[1] and, here as elsewhere, directly 'Time is introduced into the ultimate reality as an essential ingredient, the conception of God and of the religious passion is altered at once'[2] and eventually 'the gap which we find in Spinoza between the speculative conception of God ' and 'the religious demand that God should be an object of worship,' is filled when Time is acknowledged to be of the very life of ultimate reality.[3] To the unsophisticated mind the very mention of time as an operative agency in the context of 'religious passion' 'worship' and "God" may justly appear to be highly inappropriate and irrelevant. Nowhere are the artificiality and unnaturalness of the procedure, by which Time has been pitchforked into this gloss of Spinoza, more markedly realised than in this reference. Although the chapter on 'Religion in Spinoza and the Intellectual Love of God' opens with a profoundly stimulating curiosity as to 'the consequence for the conceptions of religion and God of recognising Time to be an attribute' we keep our alert eyes open, all in vain, to catch the faintest trail of Time throughout the remnant of that section. Until we pass on to the next chapter, we do not discover any 'important consequence' whatever of the introduction of time, and thus the proleptic use of time in an earlier context stands without a justification.

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[1] Life, Mind and Spirit, p. 224.

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[1] S. & T. p. 69.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 69.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 78.

(1) This is, however, a minor point. The main theme of this chapter is the direct inversion of the relation between 'God' and religious emotion or 'the intellectual love of God' as conceived by Spinoza. Spinoza, it is contended, has tried to conceive the religious emotion or passion as 'a symptom' rather than 'intrinsically,' whereas the logic of religion presupposes the substantive existence of the religious emotion which, as 'the master-light of all our seeing' lights up the reaches of the unknown, and leads finally to an intellectual discernment or justification of the object of such emotion or passion. In other words, Professor Alexander is here contending, against Spinoza, for the priority of the religious emotion to its proper object as being a specific case of the general law governing the relation of an emotion to its object. Herein he is, evidently, in sympathy with the modernist attempt to shift the centre of gravity from the obiect of religious emotion to the emotion itself which is supposed to stand in an adjectival relation to the former, and to concentrate on the psychology of religion—the 'that' rather than the 'what' of the religious emotion. Now, in view of Spinoza's theory of the oneness of Will and Understanding together with all its implications, the propriety of this contention is seriously to be called into question.

(2) Secondly, the psychologist as hidebound by the data he manipulates is necessarily precluded from saying anything authoritatively with regard to the nature of God or the object of religious worship. Hegel's arraignment of 'feeling' on the ground of its inadequacy for religious consciousness, although somewhat reactionary, has its own relative justification. Summarily, whether the religious emotion is all of a piece with the other emotions, or to be placed in a class apart as acquiring a new dimension of value, and thus differing *toto cælo* from the rest, is a matter on which discussion has yet to do its work—on which psychology of religion, at least, has not the final say. Lastly, while admitting that the intellectual and the emotional

factor must inseparably blend in the religious consciousness, one is not bound to make the precedence of the one the law absolute—the one exclusive approach to religion; in Martineau's words, 'nor does it matter to their indissoluble union which of the two you put into the prior place; whether you trust first the instinct of intuitive reverence, and see the reality of God emerge as its postulate; or whether, having intellectually judged that He is there, you surrender yourself to the awe and love of that infinite presence.'[1]

(3) Whether this psychological or empirical approach to religion is the only possible one or whether Professor Alexander's exposition of the Spinozistic 'intellectual love of God' is fair or not, we shall not here stop to enquire. We shall only allow ourselves to observe that his criticism of 'the intellectual love of God' as failing 'of being religious as it wants the special flavour of worship'[2] is hardly compatible with his full and frank confession that in Spinoza "the intellectual recognition of the object of a passion is itself something practical."[3] Rightly construed, the Spinozistic intellectual love of God' is *ipso facto* a religious passion that culminates in worship, and not merely 'an intellectual passion' that 'wants the specific flavour of devotion.'[4] It may be one of the alternative constructions to which Spinoza's utterances on the point lend themselves, but it is hardly fair—and that for a Spinozistic scholar of his eminence—to tie Spinoza down to one definite construction, and then convict him of misrepresenting the religious issue. As for Spinoza himself, there is scarcely any hard-and-fast line of demarcation between emotion and its corresponding object, much less in the case of religious emotion. He would resist all attempts at artificial analysis that has been, in modern times, brought to bear on the 'intellectual love of God'; it is not merely *love* or *intellectual love* but intellectual love *of God*—an emotion differing by that very fact from the entire

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[1] Martineau's Study of Religion, Vol. I, p. 3.

[2] S. & T., p. 66. [3] *Ibid*, p. 65. [4] *Ibid*, p. 69.

gamut of emotions and, therefore, necessitating a differential treatment. It is, in the words of William James, 'a total reaction' upon experience, a reflection of the whole man, an integral state of mind, rich in all the intellectual, emotional and volitional responses constitutive thereof.

Now, one of the besetting dangers of concentrating on the psychology of religion comes out prominently in Professor Alexander's presentation of 'God' or rather 'his divinity.' In strict keeping with his professed empirical standpoint in Philosophy, Professor Alexander offers us consistently enough, not God but Deity 'as the next higher empirical quality than mind' and Religion 'as faith in deity.' Deity is not indeed spirit, 'but something which mere spirit subserves,'[1] and though as deity God is beyond good and evil, his deity is on the side of goodness.'[2] The ultimate reality of Space-Time cannot be 'as such identified with God,' but his divinity is 'contained within it'[3] and must be traced back, not in the Spinozistic 'conatus' but further down the scale of creation to a 'nisus'—which is 'the impulse of the world towards new levels of existence,' deity being 'the characteristic quality of the next higher level of existence prophesied by the nisus of the universe which has created mind and the finite beings endowed with it.'[4] Not the effort to persevere in one's own being, but the constant effort of every form of existence by virtue of the primal 'timefulness' or 'restlessness' inherent therein, that there emerge in time, levels upon levels, in an ascending hierarchy. The convert *petitio principii* stands unmasked here: why is this unceasing emergent evolution?—because there is a *nisus* towards development? Further, it appears nothing short of a miracle that this original 'restlessness,' or 'nisus'—vaguer than the 'conatus' or the blind irrational will or impulse—should have with unerring precision threaded its way through the intricate mazes of materiality, vitality and mentality, and been in travail with deity. Not a shred of evidence whatsoever, so far as we can see, has been produced to show why God should be represented 'as the *whole* universe possessing deity' or why the nisus 'towards deity should be along one specific line (of advance) rather than all possible lines of advance. Nevertheless, we are assured that God 'is the world as a *whole* with its nisus towards deity'[1] and that his body is the whole universe, his mind is 'infinite deity'[2] or, as he puts it more clearly, 'God as actually possessing deity does not exist, but is an ideal, is always becoming, but God as the whole universe tending towards deity does exist.' In spite of Professor Alexander's protestation that in his system 'God is immanent in nature, is pantheistic, in respect of his body, but in respect of his divinity transcends us, though still remaining within nature, and is theistic,'[3] one is inevitably reminded of its undeniable affinity with the text of shallow pantheism embodied in the two well-known lines of Pope's Essay on Man:

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[1] Space, Time and Deity, Vol. II, p. 249.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 413.

[3] S. & T., p. 70.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 75,

> "All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
> Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

One cannot, however, help admiring the ingenious way in which Professor Alexander seeks to bring about an Eirenicon to the age-long problem of Transcendence *versus* Immanence by way of a refined or attenuated anthropomorphism. But the compromise, desirable as it is, has been, as we shall presently see, too dearly purchased.

In the first place, the question that suggests itself at the very outset is: why is it 'the *whole* universe' or 'the world' as a *whole*, and not a part of it, as in the case of every other emergent quality, that makes for deity. No *prima facie* case has been, so far as can be seen, made out for this differential

[1] *Ibid*, p. 75.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 76.

[3] *Ibid*, p.

treatment of deity. Perhaps under the stress of criticism he came to realise later the mis-understanding it was likely to engender, and hastened to retract the statement in question thus: 'God's deity, that which is characteristic of him, is lodged only in a part of the world,[1] 'belonging not to the world as a whole, but to a portion of it.'[2]

Secondly, starting from the presupposition that 'the religious passion which we find in ourselves cries out for an object which intellect then sets itself the task of describing in intellectual terms,'[3] it is no wonder that Professor Alexander religiously accepts—with a literalness that is appalling—that God 'is always becoming,' and that 'in religious experience the vague future quality of deity is felt, not in its quality, for that cannot be known, but as giving a flavour to the experience of the whole world which it does not possess as merely an object of sense or thought.'[4] Quite apart from the question of its adequacy or otherwise for the purpose of religious worship, such a concept of God illustrates the characteristic fallacy of a radical 'progressivism' or moralism, which invariably ends by making religion of morality.[5] It is not meant, however, that there is any intrinsic incompatibility or antagonism between the two but the moral ideal cannot *eo ipso* become the object of religious worship. The moral life is admittedly a life of endless becoming, 'something ever more about to be' and the religious life is, too, in a sense, ever-progressive, but that does not, in the least, justify the proposition that the object of religious veneration or worship should develop *pari passu* or be always becoming. Here the argument is clearly guilty of a vicious psychologism. If, however, Professor Alexander elects to abide by the 'exclusive moralism' or what Hegel called 'the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte,' can he consistently provide for that

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[1] *Ibid*, pp. 75-77. [2] *Ibid*, p. 76. [3] *Ibid*, p. 78.

[4] Space, Time and Deity, Vol. II, pp. 379-80.

[5] In his Gifford Lectures, Vol. II, Prof. Alexander does indeed delimit the scope of the two, but then his presentation of the case of religion cannot obviate the criticism urged here.

'feeling of our oneness with God' which "the healthy, religious mind 'shares' with 'Spinoza's Mysticism'"?[1] Is not the moral life, which is committed to the pursuit after the infinite ideal, condemned to something like the fate of Tantallus—perpetually progressing towards, but never reaching the goal? Whether this notion of 'infinite progress' can be logically sustained or not is another matter: but those who prate of a perpetual progress shut out the very possibility of that 'fathering response,'[2] which the religious mind always craves for. 'In my Father's house there are many mansions'—is a saying pregnant with deep philosophic import, and suggestive of the secret of the religious life.

Thirdly, just as it cannot be pretended that Space-Time as the ultimate reality can be the object of religious worship, so also a God that is an ideal, is always becoming. Even if we grant that 'God as actually possessing deity does not exist' we fail to understand why He should be 'always becoming' or emerging in time. Again, is not this very notion of a God that is 'ideal, always becoming,' one that was anathematized by Martineau so eloquently in the 'Introduction' to his 'Study of Religion.' As he therein put it with prophetic pertinence, 'Amid all the sickly talk about "ideals" which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, and not its personal surrender to immediate communion with an Infinite Perfection, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine, and broken by the passing wind ...The very gate of entrance to (religion), is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls: short of this there is *no object* given you.'[3] As for Prof. Alexander, there can be, and need be, 'no object' given; it is the 'quality' of Deity that can cater to the demands of the religious experience, and afford a permanent satisfaction and saturation to the religious devotee. That it obviously cannot is evident from his bringing up in a secondary way that 'God' which 'as the whole universe tending towards deity, does exist,' and is thus the God of religious consciousness. Now, is it in an instrumental relation that this God 'that does exist' stands to the God that 'does not exist' but is an ideal 'with a cloud of unknowing' on its face? If 'we must needs love the highest' and worship it, is the function of the God 'as tending towards deity' something transitional and preparatory so far as it subserves the purpose of the admittedly higher God 'as actually possessing deity,' just as, in the Religion of Humanity, the function of orthodox Monotheism is 'to direct provisionally the evolution of our best feelings under the regency of God during the long minority of Humanity?' So far as we can see it is God 'as the whole universe' that goes about tabernacling among its human worshippers, and appropriating all the homage that is due to the highest during the perpetual minority of a God 'that is always becoming.' Thus circumstanced, it is difficult to see how the true object of worship differs from George Meredith's "Mother Nature" or the religious emotion or passion from a vague 'cosmic emotion' or even a 'Natural piety.' But the accredited exponent of 'natural piety' would rather be a conservatist 'suckled in a creed outworn' than worship with the modernist at the altar of the God 'that is always becoming.' Worship of such a God may justly arrogate to itself the title of 'a free man's worship' which prides upon worshipping 'at the shrine that his own hands have built,'[1] the man-made God 'all-powerful and all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be,'[2] but it is the worship not of a free man, in the strict sense of the term, but of 'a weary but unyielding Atlas,'[3] enchained to the bed-rock of naturalism or mechanism, and hunting after ethical harmony and religious peace, after the manner of Lange in his 'flight to the ideal' or the free creation of a spiritual home (*Heimath der Geister*). Far from being the worship of a man, spiritually free, such a gospel of 'unyielding despair' is a melancholy mimicry of what man has, during the ages past, understood by religion and religious worship. The bifurcation in God's being, whereby Professor Alexander has sought to substantiate the religious attitude, may be brilliant, but leaves us unsatisfied so far as it fails to do justice to the basic truth about religious worship that there can be no worship of ideal as ideal, nor worship of the actual as such, quite apart from the consideration of its worth. In other words, immanence is truly conceived when it is conceived as the immanence of values; and here the idealistic leanings of Professor Alexander will, on closer inspection, be found to be strangely at variance with his ingrained Naturalism. An Idealistic Naturalism is a curious amalgam whose antipathic elements are sooner or later destined to break asunder. Similarly, in respect of the relation between the human individual and God, he is always alternating between what he calls 'mysticism of the sound variety' and 'dangerous mysticism.' How he can, in strict consistency with his peculiar notion of God, make good, as against Spinoza, the point 'that God's need of us is no less than our need of him,'[1] it is more than we can pretend to say. Howsoever refined and sublimated, his deity is at bottom, the *nisus* and the true object of his worship is this nisus raised to the power of infinity. This form of worship can be described, with no loss of meaning, only by substituting 'nisus' in Mr. Fredric Harrison's travesty of the Agnostics' worship of the Unknowable thus: "O (nisus) love us, help us, make us one with thee. In such a reference the talk of a 'fathering response' or of 'God's need of us' sounds absurd, if not preposterous. In thus constantly harking back to Space-Time with the 'nisus' embedded therein, the religious passion, too, is diluted down to a vague 'cosmic emotion' or 'natural piety' bereft of what Professor Alexander happily calls 'the specific flavour of worship.'

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[1] S. & T., p. 68.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 68.

[3] Study of Religion, Vol. I, p. 13.

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[1] Russell, 'Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays,' p. 57.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 49.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 57.

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[1] S. V. T, p. 68.

Summarily speaking, this enterprising venture, on Professor Alexander's part, to deduce a God from a godless world *ab initio*, is not very much unlike its Spinozistic prototype—the attempt to deduce the world from the indeterminate substance. No excuse can be made out on the ground that God is not deduced, but that God emerges. As in the other case, the world has been brought *ab extra*, and engrafted upon the substance, so too here. There is, in both cases, no organic connection between God and the world. Pile up your 'emergents' as you may, the deity never blossoms upon 'the virgin soil' of Space-Time. Accordingly, Professor Alexander's dialectic is but the Spinozistic dialectic turned upside down. In trying to avert the proverbial 'lion's den,' the inevitable pitfall of that 'dangerous form of mysticism' 'in which the worshipper is lost in the adoration of God,'[1] Professor Alexander has, it is feared, 'tumbled into a godless deep,' fondly hoping therein to save, as the healthy religious mind would, 'the individual from absorption by securing his independent entry, into the relation of dependence upon God, and to seek 'in God the fulfilment of the human being and not absorption.''[2]

Against this universal levelling down of man and God, this systematic naturalising of the specific human character of religious worship together with all its edifying implications, what we venture to suggest has nowhere been expressed with greater force and persuasiveness, than in the following lines of Browning's 'Rabbi Ben Ezra':

> "Look not thou down but up!
> To uses of a cup......
> Thou, heaven's consummate cup, what need'st thou with
> earth's wheel."

(*Concluded.*)

SAROJKUMAR DAS

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 67.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 68.

SOME MORAL HOLIDAYS[1]

Recent advances in Psychology have brought out two facts that are worth more than a passing notice. The first is that much of overt human conduct springs from the hidden soil of the unconscious and is inexplicable without an adequate knowledge of that source of origin. That unconscious, again, is largely constituted by anti-social thoughts and feelings repressed out of consciousness by the need of mutual adjustment without which people cannot hold together as members of the same society. The second is that the psychology of a group is different from the psychology of an individual and that it is risky to predict from the behaviour of an individual in his ordinary setting how he would behave in quite a different environment or in relation to a different social group. Without an adequate understanding of these two factors, *viz.*, the individual equipment of unconscious tendencies to thought and action and the variable response that different social groups call forth from the same individual or from the same collection of individuals, it would not be possible to explain adequately how lapses occur in moral life or a sense of morality develops in unexpected quarters. It must be remembered that the moral response is always to other persons and has no meaning apart from the group to which it is made. The sense of beauty may be called forth by inanimate nature and the sense of truth may arise in connection with individual experiences; even the religious sense may find in the non-human world sufficient materials to justify itself. But there is no sense of morality except in reference to a society of individuals, so much so, that it is doubtful whether suicide would be immoral but for its effect upon the society to which the individual belongs. Our conscience is a very accurate barometer of the pressure of the social sense, and indicates very faithfully the degree of our valuation of the opinion of any particular social group. The sense of obligation decreases in proportion to the diminishing degree of intimacy and the increasing extent of the social components. Regarding intimacy, nothing is so patent as the fact that the family, the clan, the community, the society, the nation and humanity at large claim our moral allegiance in progressively decreasing amounts. We are more solicitious to be at peace with our immediate environment than with one more remote, and are more particular about the effect of our conduct on the minds of our kinsmen and our neighbours than on those of distant people with whom our social dealings are intermittent or intangible. Moral delinquency has a tendency to inflate itself as soon as the pressure of social opinion is relaxed, and hence we are more prone to immoralities in distant lands and in the midst of strangers than in the heart of our own society. Running away from society in order to pursue unhampered a career of vice or illegal and immoral enjoyment is one of the most frequent devices in reality and fiction, for it requires a good deal of brass and courage to tread the evil path in one's wonted society.

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[1] Dacca University Popular Lecture, 1928.

Instances of the effect of intimacy of relation on moral conduct are quite plentiful. Robbers have their own code of morality but that is reserved for fellow robbers. The consideration we show to our kinsmen, fellow members of the same party or the same nationality, we are not often prepared to extend to others. A cheat does not necessarily deceive his family and a despot may be a good father and a good husband. A moral character that would have justified the hounding of a man out of European society develops very easily in the lives of many Europeans in the East,—in tea-gardens and plantations and isolated stations where the society which the individual values does not exist and where power facilitates a fall. War-babies and Eurasians owe their origin equally to power backed by license in places where the social opinion, instead of hindering, helps the commission of vice. For the same reason, in a city where there are more crowds than communities and where population confers, paradoxically enough, a kind of privacy which is difficult to obtain in a small place, temptations to immorality are correspondingly greater.

There are many irregularities of conduct, again, which we would hesitate to indulge in as individuals but not as parties, communities or races. Even most reasonable persons may be guilty of irrational and violent behaviour as members of a mob-gathering, and friends belonging to different parties may fail to understand and respect each other on the floor of a parliament where members talk not as individuals but as exponents of party politics. The religious toleration we show in our private discussions we abandon in communal deliberations and, in times of accentuated communal jealousies, we are prepared to connive at the misdeeds of the blackguards of our own community,—nay, even to lend them our moral and financial support and to snatch them away from the hands of justice by a deliberately iniquitous verdict as jurors even though we have been sworn to honest conviction and impartial justice. How often do we lend our support to unworthy causes and withhold it from worthy ones, not because we have any doubt about their true nature, but because we have temporarily put our conscience in the custody of our party-leaders whose fiat we have agreed to obey implicitly even against our own personal conviction? By signing a party pledge or accepting office we may deliberately go into a moral hibernation and vote at the dictation of our conscience-keepers, sometimes backing up our conduct by a complacent rationalisation that there is more virtue in collective or official action than in individual opinion but at other times even without that pretext.

Think again of the ideal of freedom, equality and fraternity among all men and its application to practical politics. How exclusive are we, in the matter, of others, specially those whom we consider to be inferior? The Hindus are not the only people to suffer from a caste-system. The capitalists and the labourers, the aristocrats and the plebeians in modern societies, tend to form exclusive groups with hostile interests and partial codes of morality, mindful of their peers and regardless of their opponents. Our sympathies and antipathies closely follow the alignments of social grouping except when self-interest demands that we should combine against a common foe and present a united front. But so dangerous is class-organisation and so sapping is it of national strength that driving a wedge between parties with conflicting interests has always figured as a category of supreme diplomacy from very ancient times in Sanskrit literature and dominant aliens have always found it conveient to resort to a policy of ' divide and rule' to keep subject races disunited among themselves and have depended for its success upon the psychology of social, religious and ethnic groups.

The weakening of the moral bond takes place in proportion as the two parties to a moral relation cease to be definitely ascertainable. The strongest moral tie is between two definite individuals. If the second term of the moral obligation ceases to be definitely ascertainable or becomes identified not with a single individual but with a group or when both the terms consist of groups, the code of morality may undergo such a change for the worse that what would be regarded as immoral in private life or private relation ceases to give trouble to the conscience. Just consider how matters of international diplomacy are conducted. The standard of truthfulness and respect for other people's person and property you normally demand in the relations of individuals, you never expect the political states to follow in their international dealings. Spying, secret preparation for war, fomenting internal trouble and allowing one's secret agents connected therewith to pay even the extreme penalty of the law when detected, every ambitious nation would regard as a perfectly legitimate statecraft and would not hesitate a moment to disown, when accused, in order to keep up an appearance of international amity. The killing of one person by another would be the heinous offence of murder but organised international murder would be called war which is less offensive in the eyes of the world. Forcible, unjust seizure of personal property would amount to robbery, but similar international brigandage would be conquest which the world is ready to view more leniently.

The conscience of the world is even more accommodating when one of the parties is outside the pale of the comity of nations. When uncivilised Africa is treated as a *res nullius* by the European races and divided among themselves without reference to the natives of the soil, when the islands of the Eastern Archipelago or the Polynesian Islands become the property of the first comers from Europe, when the lands of coloured races are apportioned as so many mandated territories or zones of influence of the white races, the world's conscience does not insist on a strict comparison with what might have been the feelings of the inhabitants had the countries belonged to Europe and even the right of a national plebiscite had been denied to their inhabitants. It is not because of international morality but because of international jealousy that the small states of Europe have escaped absorption by one or other of the great Powers, although it may also be that international immorality, like personal immodesty, becomes ashamed to show itself in its nudity only in the presence of one's peers. In far-off lands this international shame disappears, and so in the history of nations the colonies have often changed hands, for the pressure of Europe's public opinion is less felt when the hand of aggression plays havoc outside the restricted zone of obligatory considerateness. Religious mission and trade, both inoffensive in themselves and in some aspects beneficial to a less developed country, have almost invariably been followed by the national cupidity of strong Powers and led to unjust exploitation of that country's resources and ultimately to political subjugation, and yet the process may be so gradual that the line of demarcation between benevolence and injustice may be imperceptibly crossed and the pleas of civilisation and better government may provide the necessary rationalisation to the strong nation for political and economic aggrandisement. But international and national immorality is so obvious a phenomenon that it hardly needs any elaborate treatment: it is taken for granted that we cannot behave as morally as nations as we do as individuals. We may sign an agreement for armament limitation and yet go ahead with the secret strengthening of both the army and the navy in personal equipment and scientific device and wriggle out of our promises on some plea or other, when caught in the act of stealing this silent march on the other trustful signatories to that international covenant.

So much for the morality of groups in their mutual relation. Now observe the behaviour of an individual in relation to a group, whether that group be the state or a public utility company or a corporation or an institution or a joint-stock company. A variety of causes combine to make men less moral in relation to a group than in relation to single individuals; but the most frequent ones are resentment against authority, financial jealousy, invisible relationship, possibility of evading detection and a spirit of bravado. Obedience to authority is not an inborn characteristic and, even when acquired, is often coupled with a spirit of revolt. Hence the most loyal citizen takes moral leave when he does not find how by that conduct he can do any wrong either to the government or to any individual. Evasion of the law is practised more or less even by the most law-abiding on occasions, and by some systematically, without the least moral scruple. How many motorists can conscientiously declare that they have never exceeded the speed-limit fixed by law and did not rationalise their action by the thought that no harm to any individual was likely in the locality or that pressure of circumstances prompted that haste? Similarly, a cyclist will never feel any scruple in travelling without light after nightfall. The less obvious the moral significance the greater is the chance of breaking the law. Thus the breach of the Income Tax Law is notorious. There is delight if a sum escapes detection and deliberate mis-statement is the rule rather than the exception. Very few barristers, attorneys, doctors or traders will make an accurate return of all their incomes and will take all steps to evade just assessment. People never take kindly to direct taxation of this type and cannot be made to see the justice of this kind of blackmail upon their hard-earned income. To the same category belong poll tax, immigration charges, admission to enclosures and all such direct payments. There is always a tendency to resent such levies and to evade them on every convenient occasion, especially if exemption is given by the law itself in some cases. I know of eminent educationists who did not feel the least scruple in smuggling books and instruments out of a country without paying customs duty and of Englishmen who sent tea and cigar from India to friends at home through mere acquaintances who were instructed to unpack the case before landing to put on it an appearance of personal use during voyage and thus to evade the law. Similar evasions of the law relating to customs take place through the post-office. I know of cases where dutiable goods like silk scarfs and trinkets have been sent to and received from foreign countries without payment of any customs duty by otherwise conscientious persons of either sex. After the price of a thing has been paid, it is always galling to make additional cash payment in respect thereof, especially when the usual freight or postage has also been paid for transit. As compared with this fraudulent practice, a false declaration of value in order to avoid a portion of the duty is regarded by private senders and the trade in general as less offensive, for the moral sense of mankind refuses to acknowledge the "all or none" principle in fraudulent conduct and grades immorality with the extent of cheating practised. The same mentality is at work as in submitting false income tax returns : in both cases it is to minimise the rigour of a necessary personal evil of which no tangible benefit seems to accrue to the individual concerned. Similar attempts to cheat are not unknown to post-offices. In addition to under-valuation of goods and remittances for purposes of insurance and customs duty, the misuse of the book-post is a familiar phenomenon. A few lines of communication that should under the law go by the letter post will often accompany printed matters without the writer feeling any sense of moral or legal guilt. Similarly, many contraband goods will be sent otherwise than as provided by the law for their transit. The man whose pocket is touched refuses to recognise that in cheating the government he is indirectly inviting on himself some other kind of taxation, for the government of the country must be maintained at all costs and if a government is not particularly solvent it will necessarily resort to fresh taxation to make up the deficit caused by cheating. He consoles himself with the thought that in that case the amount would be distributed over all. Every one thinks that his amount is too small to affect the government and very few look upon the State (especially when they are subject to an alien or despotic government) as the embodiment of their own highest social self which they ought to maintain at the cost of personal convenience or individual gain. No wonder that when no direct cheating is involved the sense of legality makes feebler protest still. Treasure troves, especially of ancient coins which the Government generally reserves to itself by law in the interests of historical research, are secreted away unless promptly brought to the notice of the department concerned; and so also portable archaeological finds if they can command a sale in the open market or by secret negotiation. The Curator of the Ajanta Caves told me that some beautiful specimens of fresco-painting had been secretly removed by foreign tourists, sometimes probably out of aesthetic curiosity but at other times out of the more sordid motive of gain, and then sold to museums of their own country. They simply took a moral holiday in the presence of works of art and in their case no question of identification with the government could possibly arise. The fact is that the impersonal character of the government affects the sense of moral or even legal obligation and cheating the government is seldom regarded as a heinous offence. Death duties and escheats would have brought a handsome revenue to many governments had all people felt scruples in hiding the real value of an estate or the fact that the deceased left no legal heir.

Even those who are more intimately connected with the government have their own ways of taking moral holidays. Using one's public position for private ends is not an infrequent occurrence. The system of billeting soldiers on private citizens is no longer practised in normal times, but some executive and police officers still expect to be provided with free or cheap ration and labour while on tour. While officials use official cars on private errands, constables have a temperamental weakness for free rides on tramcars and hackney carriages. Indulging in lucrative speculations after getting possession of information in one's official capacity is not very widespread, but utilising materials and documents acquired by virtue of one's official post for the purpose of writing books or contributing articles that bring profit to one's private pocket seldom hurts the conscience. The beauty of the situation may be enhanced by employing labour at the cost of the government, consuming government stationery and using government postage stamps. To utilise the services of a typist, maintained at government cost, for private jobs is a common failing of officials and so also the use of government materials and stamps in many cases. Personal stinginess and a sense of official prestige may combine to bring about this failing, and the knowledge that waste and abuse are rampant in almost all departments of the government may bring about a complacent attitude. Personal abuse of official position may however suffer a transformation into connivance at other people's paying proper homage and respect to one's post and in this way the system of receiving presents (whether in coins or in kind) comes into being and the path to bribery and corruption is gradually prepared. The demand of a commission for accepting a tender or placing an order or passing a bill is very seldom unknown to the agent as illegal, but an occasional present would be connived at as a token of social goodwill, which unfortunately it is very often not.

A peculiar type of impropriety develops in touring officers. Some heads of departments have peculiar propensities for creating occasions for travel and display a knack of leaving matters unfinished to justify a second tour in the near future. Members of legislative bodies have been known to return to their stations in order to be able to draw more than one travelling allowance even though there was absolutely no urgency about their return. Increasing the mileage is not an unknown failing, and where luggage expenses are also paid, overcharging is sometimes practised. Not satisfied with their normal savings on legitimate travel, many are known to travel by a lower class while charging for the higher and to rationalise their couduct by the reflections that the government would have spent the amount on them in any case had they travelled by the class to which they are entitled, and that the savings only compensated them for their personal discomfort in travelling by the lower class. That in fixing the class the government intended to keep up the prestige of its officers is a consideration that never enters into their head. When a false declaration about the class by which they actually travelled or the expenses they actually incurred is also signed, then the whole thing becomes a consciously motivated case of perjury and cheating.

That the indefinite character of the personality has something to do with these cases of fraud can be easily brought home if we refer to certain improper attitudes towards corporations and public utility companies. A want of civic sense and an ignorance of the rules of hygiene would account for the irresponsible way in which epidemic diseases are spread by infected persons or their attendants, but something more is at the root of our evasion of legitimate dues. It is notoriously difficult to collect municipal taxes on professions and vehicles, and limited companies are the worst sufferers from the personal dishonesty of their directors and their clients. Religious and public trusts suffer the same fate. Cheating that does not aim at tangible personalities evades the strict vigilance of social morality which would not brook the violation of individual rights. Public utility companies have the same complaint to make regarding the morality of their customers. While loud outcries are made if the supply of gas, water or electricity becomes temporarily defective or the meter records abnormally high, the customers generally keep quiet if the meter stops recording or reads abnormally low. As a matter of fact, on the first contingency, the consumption is forced to get some reading at least lest the defect in the meter should be noticed and remedied. Perhaps the conscience of such persons would have pricked had they been offered through mistake more than their money's worth of articles or more than the change due to them by any vendor (and there are people who welcome such mistakes as windfalls) ; but a defect in any automatic machine is to them something different from a mistake in human calculation and they do not feel bound to suspect the accuracy of readings or take steps to remove the suspicion unless it touches their pocket. The defence of this particular immortality may take any form. Thus the defect in the meter may be looked upon as a heaven-sent compensation for some unsuspected (and unverified) leakage in the past or for some imaginary unsatisfactory service or the silence may be justified by taking up the position that the company charges higher rates than justifiable or makes huge profits or, when the concern is run by foreign capital, that it is no good filling the pockets of foreigners more than one can help.

Very interesting data can be collected from the conduct of passengers by railway and steamer. While travelling without a ticket would be set down to downright fraud, getting into a crowded conveyance to escape notice or to avoid payment by getting quickly down before the inspector can reach one through the crowd, would be resorted to with less scruple. While the more daring employees of the company would evade all payment, an outsider will not probably venture beyond travelling in a higher class than what he has paid for, especially when prestige demands a mode of travel which the pay does not warrant. Common British soldiers in India very frequently resort to this practice when separate accommodation in the lower class is not available. Misuses of railway permits for travel without payment or on favoured rates are not rare and relatives appear from nowhere for the purpose of claiming concessions in travelling rates. Far more frequent and widespread than the abuse of "passes" is that of season tickets. A person travelling with a season ticket belonging to another justifies himself by the reflection that as two persons are not travelling simultaneously the carrying agency suffers no actual loss, forgetting however that that consideration is not enough to justify any personal evasion of legitimate fares. Generally, the largeness of the number of such ticket-holders makes identification difficult, and as cheating is not directed against any ascertainable individual (for instance, it may be a state-owned railway) conscience quietly goes to sleep. But while the timorous and the scrupulous would not stoop to such low practices, only the most fastidious moralist would hesitate to use the return half of a ticket, originally taken out by another person, simply because the words 'Not Transferable' happen to be printed on it. Not many can be made to see that the railway or steamer company meant to benefit the original purchaser and not to enable him to make a profit out of the return half of his ticket or to enable another to travel cheap or even free according to the condition of issue of the ticket concerned. The money spent on travel does not bring any tangible benefit in return except a change of place and hence there is always an unwillingness to pay the legitimate dues. The same disinclination to pay manifests itself in prolonging untruthfully, in the case of children, the age below which no fares are charged and the age above which full fares are levied. Children remain under-age much longer for purposes of travel than for most other things,—in fact, till their real age can no longer be hidden from anybody. When such is the attitude towards payment for personal locomotion, it is no wonder that the obligation to pay for excess luggage should be absolutely distasteful, especially to ladies whose outfit involves more bulk and weight. The effect is that handbags and attache cases attain the dimensions of suitcases, petty packages increase in number, unweighed and unpaid-for articles are smuggled into compartments and distributed among strangers having little luggage of their own, and, when all other resources fail, bribes are offered to railway officials to bring down the total weight or to pass the goods free.

But it is not only the public carriers that are defrauded by the general public. Many would not have the slightest scruple in getting into enclosures without payment for witnessing races, games, fights and shows of all kinds, especially when these take place in open spaces to which at other times the public have free access and in which the temporary structures are such as to facilitate easy and unobserved entrance at certain points. People are loth to pay for being amused or, in fact, for anything that does not bring any tangible return in kind ; and this is why men would enjoy a free ride or a free show or a radio entertainment without any right while they would not feel easy if goods are delivered free at their address and no payment for them is demanded or apprehended. A free pass to a theatrical or cinematographical show is so delightful because it enables one to avoid payment for mere amusement and at the same time obviates the necessity of taking a moral holiday by unlawful entry. The same is the case with free medical or legal advice or free reading of hand and horoscope : in all such cases there is an unconscious disinclination to pay for intangible benefits received and a conscious rationalisation that the person conferring the benefit is after all losing nothing in visible goods or chattels.

The differential moral attitude towards an indefinite assemblage of persons manifests itself also in relation to unknown and absent persons. Backbiting and passing adverse remarks against persons with whom one is not acquainted are really taking liberties with one's moral sense. Any ill-informed criticism, whether of books or of persons, and all hasty judgments on inadequate data would come within the scope of playing with one's conscience, and when the injured party is unable to defend itself the conduct becomes doubly reprehensible. That is why people are advised not to speak ill of the dead and criminals are accused in their own presence. There is a material check to irresponsible utterance when the party affected is able to refute ill-informed charges. One curious variety of this irresponsibility entrenches itself behind official immunity. On the floors of many assemblies, whose members are protected from prosecution by the privileges of those houses, many false or ill-informed statements are made against absent persons, and similar liberties are taken by counsels in a court of law. The temptation is greatest when it is known that such statements are likely to serve the purpose of the day by the catching of votes or the winning of a case.

That we become less moral where the signs of individual possession are absent is so well-known that it only requires mentioning. We shall probably think thrice before jumping into a field protected by a fence or hedge but we have less scruple in trespassing into open lands and even claim a right of way over them after the lapse of certain years, according to the law of the country, if no voice of protest is raised in the meantime. An absentee landlord, negligent of collecting taxes or asserting his rights, soon finds that his tenants have established the right of adverse possession against him. The same is the case with encroachment on the land of an absent owner by his neighbours. Roadside trees are treated by passers-by as nobody's property, and so also jungles where no sign of ownership is visible. Flowers, fruits, and fuel would be collected there without any sense of infringing the proprietory rights of any person. Even the disciples of a Messiah, as they were passing through the cornfields, plucked the ears of corn and did eat, rubbing them in their hands, but we are not told whether they took the permission of the owner; perhaps the triviality of the commodity made them oblivious of the fact that they too had an owner just as a young girl, when accused of bringing forth an illegitimate child, sought to defend herself by saying that it was too small to deserve social or legal consideration. When proprietorship becomes invisible, a thing practically becomes a *res nullius* and the first finder is sure to pick it up and claim it as his own. Purses and articles dropped in the streets or left in cars, carriages, trains and steamers very seldom find their way back to the owners' pockets and the less identifiable they are the less the chance of recovery. Very few would have the honesty to deposit the articles in some safe custody and advertise the finding so that the rightful owner may come forward to claim them back. While occasionally stray dogs or bundles of documents would be thus advertised, presumably because they are easily identifiable, a purse or a common article, like an umbrella, an overcoat, or a waterproof, would be quietly misappropriated because it is always possible to evade detection if the thing has no distinctiveness about it. In this matter thieves behave in exactly the same fashion, for they too leave behind such articles as are likely to lead to detection if disposed of by themselves. The misappropriation of lands belonging to savage races by the civilised nations of the world is only a large-scale picture of the same phenomenon. In their code of morality proprietorship means ownership of a civilised race and what does not conform to that definition is a *res nullius* which may be appropriated without any moral hesitation. The treatment of weak races by the strong ones and of coloured races by the whites comes pretty close to this predicament. The story of Alexander and the Robber is in point here : the extent of the misappropriation does not alter its moral character.

Enough has been said to show how the indefiniteness of the personality affected attenuates the moral attitude, whether that personality be a group or a single individual. But even when definite persons are affected, taking of a moral holiday is not unknown. Take, for instance, some cases of stealing which are overlaid with rationalisation for justification. One of the most famous hymns in Sanskrit owes its origin to a celestial being who lost the power of aerial locomotion as he came to steal flowers. In India while all theft has been viewed with disfavour the stealing of flowers for the worship of God is an ancient institution, as if the end justified the means in this particular case and in none other. Did not a great apostle of another religion say that he was not ashamed to lie to the glory of the Lord? The laudable character of the end is supposed to compensate for the sin of stealing or lying and to win merit in addition. This religious immorality has been at the root of much misery all the world over, for, in the name of religion, people have not shrunk from inflicting mental pain and bodily injury upon their fellow-men and done reprehensible acts under the mistaken notion that thereby they were serving God. Fanaticism, intolerance, religious persecution and forcible conversion are all mistaken forms of devotion and are sometimes positively immoral in spite of the honest conviction of the agents concerned that they are only serving the interests of true faith.

A practice closely akin to religious immorality is intellectual immorality. Of this there are many varieties. First of all, there is the crudest form which does not differ in any way from ordinary theft. It is the experience of many teachers and owners of books that at the time of periodical inspection they miss certain volumes because the persons to whom these had been lent had not the honesty to return them after use. This weakness about books is quite widespread even among highly educated people. The process starts generally with a genuine temporary need. Then interest or idleness delays the return; the delay produces a sense of shame or the hope that the loan has been forgotten; and afterwards a habit of possessing the book begets avarice. If constant reference to the book is needed and miserliness prevents purchase, the chance of returning the book is reduced to a vanishing point, especially when it is known that the owner has no very great need of the book in question. The rich man who does not use the books himself finds that his library is gradually thinning, and as he has no firsthand acquaintance with the volumes, he is unable to trace them to the various borrowers. The public libraries are better off in this that the regular system of issue always makes it possible to trace the books, but then they suffer in other ways. The absence of visible ownership makes men less careful of their books, and defacing and tearing pages out of them are more frequent. Removing pictures and interesting portions is a familiar experience of many libraries, while annotations, interjections, underlinings and such disfigurations are too frequent to deserve separate mention. The reading public take liberties with books as if these belong to them personally, and even the small respect that is shown to serious compositions is withheld from light literature and journals and these are treated with very little reference to their ownership. But while downright theft would be galling to many consciences, a large number of mediocre intellects never hesitate to plagiarise from the works of others and to pass off the compositions as their own. The lure of a catchy phrase is irresistible to some writers, while others are swayed by the more ignoble motive of shining in borrowed plumes. Raking up of old books and journals is an habitual occupation with some writers and extensive pilferings without acknowledgment are their only passports to recognition. The less the chance of detection the more bold the plagiarism; hence forgotten authors and foreign writers are mostly laid under contribution in this business. And while the writers are thus misappropriating other people's books and compositions, their publishers are lulling their own conscience to sleep by secretly printing a greater number of copies than are agreed upon and making profit out of the surplus copies without the knowledge of the authors. They are, however, better off morally than those who publish pirated editions so far as the book-selling world is concerned.

But it is doubtful whether the act of the publisher, though in accordance with a generally accepted moral code of the fraternity, is not something more serious than a mere moral holiday, for here the conscious motive to cheat is present. But there are other cases where the element of cheating is present and yet the acts are less unfavourably viewed by society. Take, for instance, the case of passing off counterfeit coins as genuine. Those who actually forge currency notes or counterfeit coins stand on a different footing, for they make a livelihood out of their illegal occupation. But even courts of law have failed to reach effectively those who manufacture ancient coins to dupe the antiquarians and charge fabulous prices for the same. On the same footing stand those who manufacture apocryphal manuscripts of literary masters or forgotten pictures of famous painters and waylay the unwary enthusiast. But the ordinary public are interested in the disposal of forged notes and false coins that they have been saddled with in the course of their financial transactions and it is here that they allow their conscience to go to sleep. The effect of receiving a false coin is analogous to the reception of a squib on one's body: the first impulse is to get rid of it immediately. Thus if such a coin be received at one shop and it be too late to change it for a genuine one, the tendency would be to pass it off in the course of marketing on the same day at another shop, as if the dishonesty of one can be visited on another because both are traders. But a different mentality creeps in if the coin is in one's possession for sometime. In such a case there is a greater sense of guilt attached to the fraudulent transaction ; but even then the affair may be regarded as more risky than immoral. These false coins gather in generous measure in the pockets of people who are unable to utter them for some reason or other—in the pockets of doctors and pleaders for it is not an etiquette with them to examine their fees and in those of court officials used to illegal gratification for they are afraid to utter them in the presence of their office masters for fear of being detected. Those who are afraid or punctillious about the disposal of such coins may entrust others with the work and thus save their coin and conscience at the same time. Generally the boys of the family manage to cheat with them petty hawkers or use them as gatefees in football matches where the rush prevents accurate examination of the coins. But adults may also buy for themselves a place in the Paradise of Fools by contributing them to church collections or relief funds.

Unfortunately, the law is in some cases in favour of the cheat. While a cheating of the type mentioned above will come within the clutches of the law, there are other types that escape them completely. Instances in point are adverse possession and time bar. After you have wrongfully kept the rightful owner out of possession in respect of a piece of land for a certain number of years, the law will confirm you in the possession of that ill-gotten right, however incontestable might be the proof adduced about the actual ownership. Similarly, if a hand-note is not redeemed within a certain period and you do not take steps to have it renewed, the debtor will throw the law about limitation in your face and escape payment of his legitimate dues. The law, in its desire to make men vigilant about their rights, has indirectly made provision for the taking of moral holidays, especially by those who feel themselves temporarily inconvenienced by the attempt to enforce rights against them. It is a rare phenomenon for bankrupts to repay their creditors after they have re-established their fortune ; they take a moral holiday with the reflection that as the court of law has once absolved them from the duty to pay, they are not bound to be just even after the recovery of their fortune. Similarly, minors are given the option to fulfil or not to fulfil certain obligations, entered into during their minority, after they attain majority. The same is the case with obligations which the law cannot enforce, *e.g.*, debts of honour, gambling debts, etc. Gambling itself is bad enough but it becomes doubly bad when it provides the additional opportunity of disowning monetary obligations. As a matter of fact, all transactions where the law is sought as a refuge for getting rid of undoubted obligations, whether it be a case of faulty execution of document or the expiry of time-limit or the plea of incompetency to enter into certain transactions or anything of such kind, are cases where leave is taken of conscience to achieve a selfish end. As an instance of cheating of an entirely different kind may be mentioned the practice of impersonation where one person passes himself off as another and does not feel himself any the worse morally, whether that be a student impersonating another at a roll-call or a voter recording the vote of another in favour of a party-candidate at an election. In such cases, the absence of a material benefit takes off the edge of the immorality practised; not so, however, if done for a consideration. Wasting office hours in gossip would scarcely be regarded as cheating the employer although it may be so in reality.

Cheating and lie are so closely related that it is sometimes difficult to separate them, the material difference being that in cheating there is an attempt to cause material loss through misrepresentation while the immediate object of lying is the misrepresentation itself by means of words that are known to be untrue. Now, while some lies are 'white' there are others that are quite 'black' and are used to induce people to do what they otherwise would not have done and therefore amount to cheating in a way. A loose classification of the lies that people use without thinking very much of their immorality may be made here. We have already mentioned lies made to the glory of God which some zealous protagonists of faith are not ashamed to resort to. This is the 'religious' lie. But while such lie is doubtfully justifiable there are others that are 'permissible.' A doctor is allowed to tell a lie to a patient about his health if the truth is likely to affect adversely the latter's condition. So also is the withholding of bad news, especially news of death, from persons who are likely to receive a severe shock by a too sudden breaking of the bad tidings. Censorship during the war is a permissible lie of this type, for the sudden breaking of bad news may cause a national panic and dislocate business. Such, again, is lying in jest which is not regarded as morally offensive at all. To nonpluss a fellow-man by a lie in jest is regarded as an intellectual occupation analogous to a mock-fight where all the conditions of struggle are present with the exception of the reality-factor. To outmanouvre one in wit has all the thrills of outmanouvring another in combat as the factors of feinting, dodging, etc., are present in both. This justifies the making of an April fool of another; but in some cases the joke may be pushed too far and cause practical mischief, when it ceases to be innocuous. Deceiving children is also largely practised without a thought of any moral significance. A bitter medicine would be administered with the prefatory remark that it tastes sweet and false excuses would be given by parents for leaving children behind at home. To stifle inquisitiveness in inconvenient matters false answers would be given, as, for example, the proverbial storks that bring the children. Mythical stories would be told to keep them quiet and to make them inhabit a world of make-believe where their imagination may have full scope for operation, and none would regard this as morally unjustifiable.

Practically in the same category would fall the lies of 'necessity' which have sometimes to be indulged in if a particular object is to be achieved. Thus the lies of 'exaggeration' are permissible not only to the trade to sell its goods, but also to official panegyrists in State documents and to compositions in honour of the dead. It would be foolish to regard an advertisement as a gospel truth. for it is generally known that one interested in certain commodities is bound to boom them to command a decent sale. 'Infallible remedies,' 'everlasting cure,' 'the best article of its kind in the market,' 'the paper with the largest circulation,' 'the best low-priced car,' 'the most up-to-date clinic,' 'the most fashionable hotel,' 'the cheapest shop,' 'the institution that provides the best instruction,' 'the biggest emporium in the East,' 'the most lucrative life-policy' and such other exaggerated descriptions are blazoned forth by interested parties, for without them the unwary and vacillating customers cannot be ensnared. The psychology of advertisement is a study in the art of catching attention and filching money out of the pockets of undecided customers, and the purpose is achieved as much by the use of exaggerated language as by the display of catching posters and pictures, both of which diverge more or less from the truth. 'Unshrinkable' woollen goods will shrink after all, 'permanent' curls will lose their wavy character in the long run, and hairs will not grow on bald pates in spite of the most emphatic assurances of the vendors concerned. But whatever be the actual worth of the goods, the sellers thereof are conceded the right to deceive by false pretences so long as it is kept within proper bounds. So also, in theatres, cinemas and circuses, 'positively the last night' may have a number of nights later than the last at the request of imaginary multitudes. The same right to use hyperbole is given to brokers and promoters of companies who promise extravagant returns upon investments. 'A few shares still available at par' is a modest lie as compared with issuing shares at a premium to give an appearance of extraordinary demand. An artificial speculation in the shares may also be set up in the market by the directors themselves enquiring after the shares of their own concern just as bids are raised in an auction by the seller's men mixing up in the general crowd and bidding for his articles at higher figures than those offered by bona fide purchasers. But the public, generally indulgent towards the seller, is rather stringent on those who compel people to sell their goods in execution of a mortgage and puts all sorts of obstacles in the way of a fraudulent underselling to the mortgagee so that the temptation to exchange a *jus in re aliena* for an outright ownership may not lead the powerful party to prevent a legitimate sale at a fair price.

But there are other species of lies which also are not seriously regarded. A number of lies is encouraged in matrimonial matters, for the unvarnished truth is unpalatable and people would rather have pleasant fictions than unacceptable truths. Matchmakers and marriage-brokers use this kind of 'compulsory' lies in order to pass off a boy or a girl. Exaggerating the good points in person, property, character, conduct and ancestry is a recognised method of discourse in matrimonial negotiations, and when the parties interested are themselves the actors in the negotiations, it is permitted to them to hide their weaknesses during courtship and to put forth only their good qualities. It is not expected of a man or a woman to tell the other party anything reprehensible about his or her own past life and a veil is therefore drawn over it as if life began anew at the matrimonial stage. In addition, the woman is permitted to invent fictions about her age according to the party chosen. This is why her age is seldom made public, even when known, lest her chances in marriage become minimised: up to a certain age time gallops with her so that she might claim the honours of a lady sooner than her age warrants, thereafter for some years her age and time run at an equal pace, and after she has passed a certain age time begins to move slower than her age and she stands at the same age for many years together. She is entitled to the use of all devices that human intelligence has discovered to hide the marks of time,—the crow's feet round her eyes, the wrinkles on her cheek and brow, the grey that begins to cap her frame, the drooping bust and the falling eye-sight. These are the compulsory lies that she must practise if she is to win and retain the affection of men, especially where the number of desirable mates is small and the competition keen. In quite a different field, but falling within the same class, are lies that subordinates have to use towards unreasonable masters. If you have a legitimate ground to absent yourself from office on an urgent business that cannot wait and your master will not recognise anything but the illness of yourself or your wife as a sufficient ground for taking leave, you are compelled to lie to that effect from sheer necessity. So your wife becomes conveniently ill when your father's *sradh* ceremony has to be performed or you have to negotiate your daughter's marriage or your ancestral property is being measured by the Settlement Officer. When that even is not enough you have no other alternative left but to feign illness yourself and adequate payment will get for you the indispensable medical certificate which cannot be ignored.

Official lies are so far remote from the ordinary life of people that they only require mention. Even when the whole world knows a particular event the official concerned may have no 'official' information of it and may postpone discussing it till it has been communicated through the official channels. War documents are notoriously unreliable and partisan in their character, and it is only after many years that the collation of conflicting documents suggests something approximating the truth. Papers conducted on different party lines have different versions and views of the same event. Diplomatic and official denials very often turn out to be temporary and truth is kept back so long as it is possible to do so in order to keep the people in good humour and self-confidence. Secret dealings with other nations, underhand methods of retaining and increasing power and prestige, and fabricating false opinion against an adversary are the normal equipment of an international diplomat, and very often official protection has to be given to him lest the clutches of law should reach him.

But all these are for the interest of the State. There are other lies, however, where the interest served is that of the individual ; and foremost among them stand what may be called 'economic' lies. A man may hide his income as well for fear of being robbed or approached for help as for gaining respect in society ; in the one case there will be undervaluing and in the other overvaluing of one's real income. So it has become one of the conventions of decent societies not to make enquiries about income, for they may in many cases lead to compulsory lies. Banks are expected to keep the financial position of their clients a strict secret, for on it depends their social prestige. But there is one place where all are interested in appearing poorer than they really are; that is the Income-tax Office. The imposition is resented and lies are resorted to in the interests of finance. The same psychology is at work in submitting false age-certificates in connection with employment, service examination and life insurance, for in all such cases age means money. The younger you are in age the longer you will enjoy an income from active service and the less you will have to pay as premium. You rectify the mistakes of your father, who is supposed to know better, by swearing false affidavits and you are as prepared to raise the age as to lower it as occasion demands. You thus raise the age to enter into contractual and matrimonial relations and lower it to get rid of obligations arising therefrom or to get concessions or to prolong personal benefit. And the doctor that certifies a false age or a sham sickness is looking to his own economic interest without any moral scruple. It is an open secret that the amount of fee paid has a marked influence upon the doctor and that when your case is officially referred to the Civil Surgeon you are still expected to pay the usual fees if you do not wish to have a certificate unsuitable for your purpose. 'General debility,' 'nervous breakdown,' 'insomnia' and such impalpable ailments are what you generallly suffer from if you have a leave of absence to take and are prepared to pay for it to the doctor whose certificate is indispensable for the purpose ; and rather than be transferred to an undesirable station you are willing to wink at your conscience and bribe the doctor and be none the worse morally in the eyes of the world.

Again, we have 'professional' lies which are incidental to the pursuit of a vocation. In a way the tradesman's lies are professional; but the best illustrations would be those of a pleader, attorney or barrister entrusted with a case. Although theoretically every member of the bar is expected to help in the administration of justice, the word 'justice' is usually understood to mean 'money's worth of legal help.' Hence even if it be known to the counsel that his client is the guilty party, he will not hesitate to hide that fact from the court and argue as if the latter is the wrongfully injured party. *Suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi* are the two main weapons in the hands of a clever advocate. His citations of cases are always one-sided, for he is not interested in throwing doubt upon his own particular standpoint, and so at the end the judge is presented with two sets of facts diametrically opposed to each other and left to guess at the probable truth. Similarly, the memories of witnesses follow curiously enough the alignments of the different parties citing them and it is only in very exceptional cases that they prove hostile and have to be discharged lest they should reveal the true state of things by inadvertence or premeditation. The Police will also try to defend its arrest of a person by extorting confession, and real culprits will, when assured of ultimate release with legal aid, retract confessions voluntarily made. The touts who extol the legal acumen of their principals can live only by this kind of lies just as brokers have to boom their concerns and election agents have to advertise their candidates.

Lastly, there are lies of 'convenience' which are regarded as the whitest of all lies and are most universally practised. There is in most minds an innate disinclination to disoblige others or to give out unpleasant truths. In such cases, in order to avoid wounding susceptibilities, palliative fictions or mild lies are resorted to by considerate people. Thus, if you are asked your opinion about the beauty of her ugly son by a mother or the taste of a nasty meal by your host or the architectural elegance of a badly designed house by a neighbour, you will feel embarrassed and very likely mutter out something by way of approbation because you do not wish to offend by candid remarks. The giving of testimonials to undeserving candidates should also be mentioned here, which is sometimes done by soft-hearted persons to oblige their proteges who often look upon this failing very favourably and call it kindness or generosity! The difficulty is that it is exactly those persons that have a vague suspicion that their articles are not first-rate that ask for opinion and they are the quickest to be despondent by any adverse comment. A novice in painting, poetising or singing needs words of encouragement when learning his craft and an unfavourable remark will probably kill all enthusiasm; so you have no mind to throw cold water on his ardour and you pat your conscience to sleep out of a feeling of considerateness for the budding artist. Want of moral courage may similarly keep you back from expressing your mind on acts of doubtful propriety done by powerful persons or official superiors. Similarly, in order to save yourself from uninteresting or troublesome situations, you may excuse yourself out of an invitation or engagement by a false plea. You may accept an invitation evasively, never intending to keep it, or you may decline it on the false ground of ill-health. You may excuse yourself out of an invitation which you know to be purely formal by a plea of previous engagement which does not exist in reality. To your creditors whose dues you cannot meet just now and to undesirable callers in general you are of course 'not at home' and your servants and children have standing instructions to announce that to certain specified persons. To unpunctual and bankrupt debtors you are always short of funds and you have to meet unforeseen calls for money from quarters which you cannot ignore whenever they ask for a loan. A note left by an undesirable person is always mislaid by your children or servants and when you yourself sign a receipt you are always so overwhelmed with work that you find no breathing time to reply. The article you do not wish to part with, you either do not possess or have lent or lost already. Your memory gets wonderfully short when you do not wish to keep an engagement or advance a loan or bear witness in an inconvenient case. You thus fulfil to the letter the ancient advice given by a Sanskrit text, "Speak the truth; speak the pleasant; but do not speak the unpleasant truth," and you do not feel any the worse morally for having done so.

But it is not always out of consideration that you lull your conscience to sleep. You are as ready to take leave of morality when you wish to be cruel. Ceremonial slaughter has figured as a part of the creed in many religions, and although it would be contended that cruelty to animals is not really immoral there is no doubt that the practice of cruelty in one field stiffens up your heart in another and that cruelty to men is only one step in advance of your cruelty towards the lower creation. A candid examination of the religious faiths of the world will show that savagery towards fellow-men is in exact proportion to that practised towards the brute creation, especially towards higher animal forms, and that non-injury to animals in religious creed is a safeguard against cruelty of all types. It is true that in the world as present constituted independent political existence is threatened without the practice of some cruelty and the Hindu and Buddhistic East with *ahimsa* as its foremost creed has paid dearly for forsaking the creed of violence when the aggressive West with its Semitic legacy of ceremonial cruelty professed its adherence to Peace but practised the cult of the Sword in its dealings with other creeds and other colours. But rapacity and violence are now recoiling upon the heads of those who practised them originally towards alien people, and the colossal scale in which the civilised West is engaging in war shows, if anything at all, that the conscience of the world is forced to go to sleep so that in the night of violence the savage instincts of man may go about their work without any protest from the better side of human nature. Nations are bound to take moral holidays so long as human nature is not radically transformed by the cessation of cruelty towards sentient beings and by the more effective preaching of peace by persons who have in their lives vindicated the possibility of a non-violent existence.

But let us abandon for the present this high politics in which the man in the street is not generally interested. In our everyday life we may still avoid wanton cruelty towards others, whether they be beasts or men. We can surely check the sadistic impulse of throwing a stone at the street dog or the perching bird and the unsocial habit of casting harsh and angry words at our fellow-men. We can avoid the still more refined cruelty of marrying without means to support a wife and of bringing children into being without being sure of maintaining them decently. We can avoid raising passions in a person of the opposite sex that we connot legitimately quell and can so train our sexual instinct that we do not become instruments for wrecking hearts and homes. In our unwarranted zeal for efficiency and in our proneness to favouritism we are so often tempted to sacrifice helpless subordinates or members of a different community that a constant pursuit of partisan aims results in the long run in denying justice to other societies and meting out cruelty to some individuals. We are very often tempted to import our private quarrels into our public dealings and corrupt the administration by partiality. I have seen very liberal people forsaking their wonted principles out of self-interest and also out of grudge towards a particular person generated in connection with quite a different matter. I have seen heads of institutions anti-canvassing subordinates whom they do not like but about whose efficiency there is not the slightest doubt. In all such cases the conscience has to be quieted, for otherwise wrong cannot be done without remorse. Some amount of rationalisation has very often to be done when the voice of conscience refuses to be absolutely silenced ; but persistent habit may even dispense with that.

The review of cases where conscience goes to sleep is by no means complete and an introspective mind of the worldly type will be able to detect itself practising one or other of the many forms which this immorality takes. Many are regarded as innocuous and some will think that life would be intolerable without taking occasional moral holidays. How many of us can live as if ever before our Great Taskmaster's eyes? These little immoralities are the protests which the civilised man makes against his social bondage just as he protests against social restrictions about sex in many disguised forms.[1] The juxtaposition of so many kinds gives it the appearance of 'a drain-inspector's report' and really all these are not practised by all persons at all times. But there is no doubt that civilised man is sometimes inclined to make moral picnics outside his urban limits and not feel the incoveniences of the outings. And he is more inclined to do so when ascertainable individuals are not near about, when he is under the domination of a strong instinct or when his personal interest is involved. If he is weak, let him be candid in his confession about a personal frailty; for while there is hope for one who knows that he is committing a wrong there is none for one who is ignorant about the true nature of his acts and persists in them under the impression that he is doing nothing wrongful.

H. D. BHATTACHARYYA

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[1] The reader is referred to the present writer's article on *The Ways of Sex* in the Indian Journal of Psychology, Vol. III, January and April, 1928.

A PILGRIMAGE TO THF EXCAVATION SITE AT PAHARPUR*

Paharpur or Hill-Town lies in the district of Rajshahi in the old Mandala (division) of the province of Paundravardhana which comprised the modern division of Rajshahi and its outlying parts.

The Paharpur mounds including a central one of great height (about 80 ft.) and lower mounds encircling it about the boundaries on the four sides, stand on a non-alluvial laterite soil which is a characteristic feature of the land of Varendra. The soil beyond the boundaries on the East is, however, alluvial and in some parts entirely sandy as may be noticed near the bathing ghat brought to light at a short distance from the South-East corner of the boundary mounds.



I. Main Mound.

The local tradition has it, that there was a river named 'Nur' flowing from the south to north. It may be yet premature to opine that there were large gates in the middle of each of the four sides of the surrounding wall but the excavation has disclosed the existence of an entrance from the north which presumably was the principal entrance. The northern entrance had a number of pillars in three rows the bases of which are existing even to the present day and the portion of the wall on the east and the west is still visible. Through the northern entrance there is a passage running from the north to south leading to a smaller pillared hall facing the central mound towards the south. Right in front of this structure there exists a hollow reservoir of water, circular in shape, which, it is doubted, might have been excavated in a subsequent age.

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* Read before the Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi, under the presidency of Mr. J. N. Ray, Divisional Commissioner, March, 1927.

Traces of step-like prolongations which have been described as large staircases on the north face of the main mound (in the report on Paharpur communicated by Sir John Marshall to the "Illustrated London News," 29th January, 1927) do not, however, exactly look like staircases but may rather be recessed structures set up to lend strength to the building. The absence of any frieze adorned with terra-cotta plaques on this side of the structure and the temple having a large gateway in the north may justly indicate a staircase on its north—but as long as there is no trace of steps or anything indicative of a flight of steps the idea of taking those structures to be large staircases seems to be a little hazardous.



II. North face of the Main Mound.

Above this recessed structure there is the remnant of a hall with corridors running round it. There are bases of four pillars still found deposited in the hall, the side walls of which are still standing to a considerable height. The two paleographic inscriptions and an image of Kuvera now taken to the Indian Museum are said to have been found here.

The unusual height of the central mound represents not merely a heap of local debris but it also indicates the existence of masonry structures of considerable height which lay long concealed therein. The whole structure in all likelihood was a terraced one. The ground plan of the structure as disclosed by the excavation has also been taken by Sir John Marshall as one resembling a huge Maltese-cross in design. But it is doubtful whether this theory can hold water. The mounds along the boundaries may in all likelihood be mounds over the boundary walls with rooms, cells on the inner sides. One cannot, however, be certain unless independent structures at different places in the enclosed compound are traced out.



III. Borders of the Main Structure decorated with terra-cotta-plaques.

In the main Shrine along the borders of the main structure there are dados decorated with terra-cotta plaques portraying animals almost of all principal descriptions, snakes, peacocks, antelopes, buffaloes, elephants, fish, human figures in various poses, musicians and other conventional designs. The modelling is mostly "realistic and vigorous" and speaks of "a high artistic standard" of sculpture in Bengal in ancient times.

The arrangement of these plaques clearly indicates a shuffling of the position of such plaques in later times. Some of them are turned upside down and have been laid on the Panel pell-mell without considering the natural or the original position of the plaques. Some of the flower designs have been stuck up in such a pendant headlong fashion that one is led to take them for a fruit design rather than a flower or flower buds.

IV. A Conventional Flower Design.

A realistic artist would not allow a fruit to be depicted in such a way as to militate against the ordinary principles of the law of gravitation.

A terra-cotta musician has been described as one striking a gong in the account communicated by Sir John Marshall to the "Illustrated London News" of 29th January, 1927, last, but on inspection I found the so-called gong looked more like a leather covered drum than a metallic gong attached to the body which could hardly give proper sound. Moreover, the short and the kilt worn by this terra-cotta figure do not correspond to the dress of a North Bengal peasant of the modern age. (*vide* figure, next page).

The characteristic features I could observe in these terracotta figures are that some of them look like Buddha in 'Bhumisparsa mudra' and in other attitudes too, but they are not many yet. The antelopes and some conventional lion heads with their forearms placed cross-wise are abundantly seen. The elephant motifs in the terra-cotta are splendid specimens of art.



V. A Terra-cotta Musician.

The excavation has led to significant discoveries. On the south, at a short distance from the main mound, the base of a chaitya-like circular area on a quadrangular platform has been discovered. Again below the present ground level the excavation has exposed some fine specimens of sculptures in stones mostly preserved in tact in their respective niches. They offer a study of a more speculative interest than before. Definite identification of some of these images could not be effected as yet. Most of these images seem to be Brahmanical images depicting scenes from Hindu mythology. Besides there are a number of standing amorous couples, dancing figures and Dwarapalas. In the amorous couples the male figure has been represented touching the bosom of the female figure as it is generally found in the representations of Uma-Maheswara.

In another niche there is a scene of some female figures and a child embracing the hip of one of them. By its side again there are two male figures and one of them is found to be carried on the back of a third one. On the other end is a figure of Siva with a couple of dwarfish figures by his side. Evidently the group represents a Saiva episode.

On the south there is an undoubted specimen of a four-armed Ganesa in a sitting posture.

Next there is a male figure with a garland-like object stretched between his hands.

The foot-wear of the same figure is an interesting study. The foot-wear is a near approach to a highboot but not exactly of a type similar to one usually worn by the Sun-God, and his attendant figures. One may be tempted to call it Aruna, the charioteer of Surya, on account of the foot-wear suggesting a possible connection with the Sun. A figure with the limbs fully represented can hardly be identified with 'Aruna' because mythologically he is 'Anuru' or one without the leg.

There is another highly interesting figure having four arms —two of which hold two small images on either side, the other two arms holding a hillock-like object.

There are seen figures of Kimpurusas having the face of a horse and a human body in some of the niches.

A fine specimen of sculpture is a female figure on a tortoise, a male attendant is found holding an umbrella over her head and a female attendant on the other side is seen holding a flower basket. Both of them are standing on crabs. This may very likely be a representation of Yamuna.

There is a figure of Balaram. The crown of the image has serpent hoods behind, the distinctive emblem of plough has been clearly represented.

A fine sculpture in stone probably depicting Indra with his elephant 'Airavat' has been found well-preserved in one of the niches on the east side of the main shrine.

There is an excellent specimen of a scene of a wrestling bout.

On the eastern and western side of the main temple there are some scenes from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. On the east are represented a figure, holding aloft three pieces of hillocks over the two arms and the head, and another figure kneeling down beside it. On the west again out of a number of figures, one male figure is found to be embracing a female one clasping round her buttock, and another figure is found to be in an archer's pose driving in a chariot. In the intervening space between the two, there is a figure in a devotional attitude.

In the niches facing north there are some interesting images. One has been found to be represented with a head-dress showing the top-knot bound in the middle with a cord —having 'akshamala' and 'puthi' or book-like thing held perpendicularly by the right hand. The body is rather corpulent.

Another figure having a crescent moon (Chandramauli) surmounting the head and Akshamala held by the right hand and the representation of two trees akin to plantain trees on either side of the image, may be taken to be a Siva.

Besides these, a number of such images have been discovered and are being exposed during the process of excavation. Correct identification and the explanation of all these images cannot however be definitely made now.

The 'Tri-Ratna' pillar inscription now in the Varendra Research Society's Museum which first of all gave a clue to the



VI. The Inscribed *Tri-Ratna* Pillar—Varendra Research Society Museum.

importance of the Paharpur mound, was discovered almost at the top of the low mound over the boundary near the South-west corner and it definitely speaks of the existence of a

Buddhistic establishment in Paharpur on or about the 11th Century A.D. For the Paleography of this ancient record ndicates an age not far ahead of the time of Mahomedan occupation.

The inscription runs as follows :—

> " *Oṃ Ratna-Traya Promodena*
> *Satvánám hitakánkshayá*
> *Sri Dasabalagarbheṇa*
> *Stambhoyam Karito varah.*"

"This excellent pillar was caused to be made by Sri Dasabalagarbha to please the three jewels, *viz.* (Dharma, Buddha and Samgha) for the good of all created being."

Now since the significant discovery of some of the distinctive Brahmanical images of Indra, Yamuna, Ganesa and Siva t has become exceedingly difficult to indulge in any speculation egarding the original nature of the worship for which the building was erected.

The topographical feature of the Paharpur mound and the existence of old historic places of interest, *viz.* :—Jagaddal Mahavihara—the seat of an old University, Amaree, probably a corrupted form of Ramavati, the capital city of Ram Pala of the Pala dynasty, and the inscribed Garuda pillar of Bhatta Gurava Misra, minister of king Narayana Pala—all lying strewn about almost in its vicinity, suggest that it was not an isolated tructure but one intimately connected with habitations of a ense population, if not also with a great city. The gigantic roportion suggested by the enormous height of the central mound naturally indicates celebrity, repeated repairs in the ast fairly indicate that the place was associated with holiness which long enjoyed veneration of generations. The institution must have grown up gradually round a sacred relic from an nitial humble beginning, which may lie encased in the now vailable remnants of the structures of a later age.

The terra-cotta plaques may be purely decorative or indicative of a particular cult. They however offer interesting and instructive materials for the study not only of Bengal Art before Mussalman conquest but also of Bengali life of the epoch in question. They should, therefore, demand a careful study. The brick plaques disclose unusual dimensions, some of them again bear a close resemblance to those plaques discovered at Biharail in the district of Rajshahi where an image of Buddha of the Saranath type belonging to the Gupta age has also been found. In it, the Varendra Research Society may justly claim to possess probably the oldest Buddha statue hitherto discovered in Bengal. Hence a close study should be made of the postures and features which though conventional are of great interest. Dress, ornaments and other signs of advanced affluent circumstances of the people are visible on all hands. In them one may find a clue to the state of civilization under which they were executed. Stone was no doubt rare in the land of Varendra as it had to be brought from a great distance with labour and cost, yet stone appears to have been used where it was necessary to give stability to the structure. Massive pillars to support heavy roofs and a large number of gargoyles to serve as passages of drainage. Sir John Marshall calls the structure as one which is unknown to Indian Archæology. In this alone Varendra deserves to be studied with greater attention.

As the excavation goes on, it is hoped that the efforts of the Archæological Department will bring to light many new materials which will greatly facilitate the study of the life and art of ancient Bengal.

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KSHITISHCHANDRA SARKAR

More Interesting Relics.[1]

The excavation in the last cold weather of 1927-28 has laid bare many more interesting relics. The most important relic unearthed this year is a copper plate inscription inscribed on both sides, dated according to Mr. K. N. Dikshit in 159 Gupta Era (*i.e.*, 478-79 A.D.). The inscription has a reference to Jainism and this find has probably made the monumental site at Paharpur more perplexing to scholars. "The inscription records the donation of land by a Brahmin couple for the maintenance of worship at the Vihara or religious establishment of the Nigrantha (Jaina) ascetics presided over by Guha Nandi at the Village of Vata-Gohali."[1]

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[1] It includes additional information on some interesting features of the ruins brought to light in the present year for which another pilgrimage had to be made to the site.

Numerous figures in terra-cotta and stone show Hindu and Buddhist connection and the present discovery of the copper plate suggests a trace of Jainism, too, in Paharpur. The existence of the Paundravardhania branch of the Jaina sect and the discovery of the image of the 16th Tirthankara Santinath at Mandoil in Rajshahi, now deposited in the Varendra Research Society's Museum, lend additional proof of an existence of traces of Jainism in the land of Varendra.

The spacious quadrangle appears to have an entrance on the north where gate-structures have been brought to light indicating an association with them of numerous cells. In some of these cells have been found small antiquities connected with the monastic life and some burnt clay seals with the name of the second Buddhist Pala King Sri Dharmapala Deva.

As this unique monument of the past exists in the heart of Varendra and as it appears to have been connected with all forms of religion once in vogue the place will take a long painstaking study and research work.[2]

K. C. S.

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[1] A brief account of the excavation at Paharpur by Mr. K N. Dikshit.

[2] Figures from *The Illustrated London News.*

THE NEW CONTENTS OF SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND NATIONHOOD

An analysis of ideas in the background of events, 1905-1927.

I.

Ideology : (1) Conquests of the bourgeois democracy in Asia, (2) Nationalities and minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, (3) Labour triumphant as a political force, (4) Criticism of democracy and socialism, (5) Progressive taxation, sur-taxes, capital levy, (6) Asia's revolt against Eur-America, (7) Intensive analysis of internal sovereignty, (8) Problems of representation, local, class, geographical (regional), occupational etc., (9) Centralization *vs.* decentralization of authority, (10) Local habitation of sovereignty, (11) Revival of autocracy and dictatorship, (12) Currency, credit and " central (reserve) banking " as influences in political thought.

SECTION 1.

From the Birth of Young Asia to the End of the Great War (1905-1918).

1905. Russo-Japanese War : A self-conscious Asia is born. The First Russian Revolution embodies itself in the establishment of the Duma.

1905. **Dufay** : *L'Impot progressif en France* (Progressive Tax in France). It is not only an economic role but a moralizing role as well that taxation has to play. It has to emancipate labour by removing excessive power from capitalists and rendering unto labour a social and economic power that it possesses very inadequately at the present moment. Taxation has the function of maintaining within a just limit the particular appropriation of the wealth produced at least indirectly by the labour of all.

1905-1915. **Giolitti** Ministry in Italy is a system of "dictatorial parliamentarism"; 30 million men are governed by 30 persons for the benefit of 300 thousand families. The Senate is a non-entity, the Chamber apathetic. Germany is taken to be the model and State-socialism the goal. Universal suffrage becomes law (*cf.* England, 1885).

1905-07. Indian National Congress: Sessions at Benares, Calcutta, and Surat. Presidents: **Gokhale, Naoroji, Rasbehari Ghose.** The New Party (Extremist) is founded by **Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, Lajpat Rai** and others. **Aurobindo Ghosh's** *Bande Mataram* (daily) is the chief organ. Planks of the new movement:—(1) Swaraj (Self-government on colonial lines), (2) Boycott of British goods, (3) Swadeshi (promotion of indigenous industries according to modern methods), (4) National education (emancipation of schools and colleges from Government control and establishment of general culture and technical institutions along national lines). The period marks the beginnings of the revolutionary movement among the intelligentsia. *N. B.* Minto-Morley Reforms, 1909.*

1906. Constitution is wrested from the Shah by Young Persia: The First Mejlis (Parliament.)

Persian Revolution.

Aug. 5, 1906: Constitution wrested from Muzaffaruddin Shah: The First Mejlis, June, 1908: Destruction of Mejlis by Muhammad Ali, July 13, 1900: Capture of Teheran: Expulsion of Muhammad Ali, (July 16): The Second Mejlis, July 1911: Ex-Shah's invasion, Dec., 1911. Abolition of Mejlis (Second) by the Cabinet for rejecting Russia's ultimatum *re* Shuster.

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* Sarkar: *The Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London 1912). The nature and form of sovereignty, nationality and democracy are dependent to a very great extent on the conjuncture of international circumstances. The problems of applied nationalism in every country, consist in the utilisation of the world-forces in its own interest. Foreign policy is an important and essential basis of freedom movements,

1906. The British Labour Party is established.

1907. **Figgis** (1866—) : *From Gerson to Grotius, Churches in the Modern State* (1913). Corporate personalities of churches and other associations, *e.g.*, family, club, union, college are inviolable. The state can recognize and guarantee the life of such societies, but it no more creates that life than it creates the invividual although it orders his birth to be registered. He initiates an appreciation of the medieval authority of the church and of its anti-statal position.

1908. **Seligman,** American : *Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice* (First edition 1884).

The general sentiment in many places is in favour of proportional taxation. But in almost every country the principle of progressive taxation has been introduced to some extent.

This is true not only in monarchies like those of continental Europe (1908) and Japan, but in democracies like those of America, Australia and Switzerland. One finds progressive income taxes in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Belgium as well as in Switzerland ; progressive rental taxes in France and Australia; progressive property taxes in Switzerland, Holland and Australia; and progressive inheritance taxes in France, Germany, England, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and elsewhere. Even in the United States, which is supposed to be *par excellence* the home of proportional taxation, there have been developed a progressive property tax, like the federalist house tax, and some decidedly progressive income taxes, both national and local; besides progressive income taxes, progressive inheritance taxes and progressive land taxes. According to Seligman the opponents of the progressive principle, like **Leroy-Beaulieu,** forget that it is the function of progressive taxation "not so much to obtain increased revenues as to apportion the burden more equably among the taxpayers." If the progressive tax is more just than the proportional tax, the fact that it would not yield a penny more revenue would itself constitute no valid objection. " It is erroneous to assume that progressive taxation necessarily implies socialism and confiscation. It is possible to repudiate the socialistic theory of taxation and yet at the same time to advocate progressive taxation—on purely economic grounds."

The simple fact of the gradual decrease of marginal utility does not necessarily lead to progressive taxation, nor on the other hand necessarily to proportional. From the equality of sacrifice doctrine it is not possible to deduce any mathematically exact scale of taxation.

A purely economic theory of taxation is as impossible as a purely economic theory of value. Equality of taxation counts an ethical problem in the same sense that the general law of value and price does, says Seligman. And he concludes as follows :— While it is highly probable that the ends of justice would be more nearly subserved by some approximation to a progressive scale, considerations of expediency as well as the uncertainty of the interrelations between various parts of the entire tax system should tend to render us cautious in advocating any general application of the principle.

1908. **Duguit** (1859—) : *Le Droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'Etat* (Social right, individual right and the transformation of the state) ; *L'Etat, le droit objectif, la loi positive* (The state, objective right, and positive law), 1901; *L'Etat, les Gouvernements et les agents* (The state, governors and agents) 1903, *Les transformations generales du droit prive* (General transformation of private law), 1912, *Les Transformations du droit public* (The transformations of public law, *i.e.*, the constitution), 1913. Social interdependence is a verified fact. It is based psychologically on the identity of interest as human beings. It is inevitable also because of division of labour. The weighing or valuation of our claims, rights, interests, duties and obligations must have reference to the extent to which they promote social interdependence. The goal in every instance is the "productive efficiency" of the social group. It is the function of law to further this efficiency. There is no such thing as absolute rights. If there be such a thing as *sovereignty* it must be limited by *law*. The groups and associations possess real authority or sovereignty each in its sphere.

1908. Nationalist activities of Young Egypt.

Egyptian nationalism : born 1871 to check the Khedive's autocracy and foreign intervention; Revolt of **Arabi Pasha**, 1882 ; British Occupation, 1882.

Egypt (1882-1914).

1892. Khedive Abbas Hilmi is discontented under the British regime but is compelled to oppose Turkey in Sinai.

1899. *Lawe*, Arabic newspaper, is started by Mustapha Kemal, the Egyptian nationalist.

1906-08. Nationalist unrest.

1906-11. Egyptians resent Britain's prevention of Turkey's soldiers passing through Egypt against Italian invasion of Tripoli.

1914. Hilmi is deposed while in Turkey during the Great War.

Egypt during the War.

1914. Deportation of patriotic agitators to Malta by Maxwell who replaces Kitchener. Nov., 2: War with Turkey; Dec., 17 : Egypt a British Protectorate : Hussain Sultan.

Feb., 1915. Turks at the Canal, British failures in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and Salonika hearten the Egyptians.

1916. Australasian and Indian troops defeat Turkey at the Isthmus.

1908. Constitution is "restored" in Turkey (*cf.*, "granted," 1876).

Turkish Revolution.

1. The origin is to be sought in the Reval journey of King Edward VII (May, 1908), and his advice *re*. the appointment of a Governor for Macedonia with the approval of the Powers. 2. The Constitution is proclaimed at Salonika, July 24, 1908 by **Enver Bey**. Abdul Hamid submits. 3. Counter-Revolution (Royalist) is subverted by Shefket Pasha, Abdul deposed.

Young Turk Leaders.

1. Major Niazi Bey leads the revolt at Resna (July, 1908). 2. Enver Bey proclaims the Constitution (July, 1908) at Salonika. 3. Ahmad Riza Bey, founder of "Union and Progress" with the slogan : "All in the Koran." 4. Shefket Pasha, Commander.

The New Turkey.

1. Abdul deposed, 1908.

2. Union and Progress Congress at Salonika, 1910: (i) "autonomy" is separation : "United Turkey" is the goal. (ii) Abolition of "capitulations." (iii) Bulgaria, the "fomenter of Macedonian discord," must be crushed.

3. Discontent in Syria, punitive wars in Albania (1910-1911).

4. Tripoli is surrendered to Italy, 1911.

5. The First Balkan War, October 18, 1912, under the leadership of Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Peace of London, December 16, 1912.

6. The Second Balkan War, 1913.

1909. Principles of taxation adopted by the British Labour Party : (1) Taxation should be in proportion to ability to pay and to the protection and benefit conferred on the individual by the state. (2) No taxation should be imposed which encroaches on the individual's means to satisfy his physical and primary needs. (3) Taxation should aim at securing the unearned increment of wealth for communal use. (4) Therefore taxation be levied on earned incomes and should aim deliberately at preventing the retention of great fortunes in private hands.

1911. **Hobhouse** (1864—) : *Social Evolution and Political Theory* opposes extremist eugenic propaganda directed against "social" (humanitarian) legislation, anthropologically indicates the progress achieved by states in passing from the kinship through the authoritarian to the citizenship stage, and discusses the imperfections of the citizenship-state of to-day : *viz.*, (1) economic inequalities, (2) dependencies, *e.g.*, India, (3) "nationalities" and minorities. He argues in favour of the socialistic control and state-intervention as embodied in life and thought since 1885 and believes that "liberty" is not an antithesis to "social control" but like it *one* of the conditions of "harmonious development."

Hobhouse's political philosophy is akin in a general manner to the philosophies of **Keynes** and **Pigou,** although they function in altogether different fields. It has its German allies in all state-socialists from Wagner to Spann, French allies in **Bourgeois, Bougle** and **Fouillee,** the "solidarists," and American allies in **Ward, Ross** and other champions of social control or "sociocracy." Naturally, it possesses no affiliations with the individualism of Spencer, Leroy-Beaulieu and Sumner. This socialism or social-progressivism or socialized liberalism has advanced very far from the halting state-interventionism of Mill and Green and is almost the exact antipodes of the positions maintained by Adam Smlth, Kant, Bentham and Say. And although on official war-footing with the "metaphysical theories" of Bosanquet and Hegel, Hobhouse is absolutely at one with them in the faith in the dignity of the state and the importance of its functions. The system can be challenged in contemporary thought by all those who do not believe in mutual aid and co-operation, in short, by the proletarianists and advocates of class-struggle (*cf.* **Russell,** 1918).

1911-12. Revolution and republic in China : **Sun** Yat-sen, General **Li** Yuan-hung, and **Liang** Chi-Chiaou the scholar are the leaders of the movement against the Manchus.

1913. The Federal Reserve Bank System is inaugurated in the U. S. A., the theory being in the main that of the German *Reichsbank* (1875).

1913. **Woodrow Wilson** (1856-1923) : *New Freedom*. One of the most alarming phenomena of the time is the degree to which government has become associated with business. By tyranny, as we now fight it, we mean control of the law, of legislation and adjudication by organisations which do not represent the people by means which are private and selfish. "Freemen need no guardian." But the government of the U. S. at present is a foster-child of the special interests. Legislation, as we nowadays conduct it, is not conducted in the open. The protective tariff has been taken advantage of by some men to destroy domestic competition, to combine all existing rivals within our free trade area. "What I am interested in is having the government more concerned about human rights than about property rights." Without the watchful interference, the resolute interference of the government there can be no fair play between individuals and such powerful institutions as the trusts. "Freedom to-day is something more than being let alone." Business we have got to untrammel, abolishing tariff favours and railroad discrimination and credit denials and all forms of unjust handicaps against the "little man." Industry we have got to humanize—not through the trusts—but through the direct action of law guaranteeing protection against dangers and compensation for injuries, guaranteeing sanitary conditions, proper hours, the right to organize.

1914. **Faguet** (1847-1916): " ......*et e'horreur des responsabilites* " (And the Horror of Responsibilities), sequel to *Le Culte de l'incompetence* (The Cult of Incompetence), 1911, *Le Socialisme en France* (Socialism in France), 1907. According to him the principle of democracy is the worship and cultivation of incompetence or inefficiency. The ideal advocated by him is an " aristocratic people and a people-loving aristocracy." His *En lisant Nietzsche* (Reading **Nietzsche**) and *Pour qu'on lise Platon* (Why Plato is read) indicate his anti-democratic affiliations. The philosophy of this disparagement of democracy is perhaps best to be seen in his *Le Liberalisme* which presents a criticism, item by item, of the two " declarations " of the " rights of man " issued by the French people in 1789 and 1793. He begins his thesis by casting ridicule on Rousseau's dictum that " man is born free but is everywhere in chains " and replacing it by his own postulate, namely, that " man is born in society, and, as such, is born slave." To him, therefore, "despotism is the natural form of human societies." There are no rights of man, says he, but there is a society, and this society has all the rights. The state is an evil but a necessary evil, a smaller evil designed by man as a remedy against larger evils, namely, the dangers of human combativeness. But an evil it is by all means. It is a fetter to the individual. The state should try to function in the most circumscribed sphere in order that it may perpetrate the least injury upon the individual. Its proper functions are police, justice and defence. Everything else is considered by him to be but the pretension not the function of the state.

1914-18. The Great War: (1) **Woodrow Wilson's** 14 points, (2) Self-determination, (3) Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, (4) Republics in Germany, Austria etc., (5) "Minorities" in the newly created so-called "nationality-states," (6) German *irredentas*, (7) League of Nations.

1915. **Barker**: lecture at Oxford on "*The Discredited State*" (an article in the *Political Quarterly*, London), *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day*: The state is not more important than other "associations," "groups" etc., in which individuals participate. But whatever rights such groups may claim or gain, the state will still remain a necessary adjusting force; and it is even possible that if groups are destined to gain new ground, the state will also gain perhaps even more than it loses, because it will be forced to deal with even graver and even weightier problems of adjustment. When the strict theorist urges that the state ought not to do so and so or ought even to stop doing so and so he is doing exactly what the conservative and the reactionary desire. Voluntary co-operation is only made possible by the state. The more there is of voluntary co-operation the more need there is of the state. Internationalism must pursue a legal development, not based on (though it may be aided by) economic facts, but based (as all legal development is based) on a sense of right inherent in a common conscience—the common conscience of the civilized world.

1915. **Michels** (1876—) Italian-Swiss: *Political Parties.* Modern democracy tends sociologically to be oligarchic. The masses are as a rule unthinking. The crowd-psychology tends towards domination and hypnotic influence by "supermen." The very need for organisation tends also to hierarchy, discipline, leadership etc., which are anything but democratic (*cf.* **Lecky, Le Bon** etc).

1916. **Lenin**(1870-1924): *Imperialism.* He offers a Marxian interpretation of the European developments since 1870. In his analysis imperialism=the politics of finance-capital, the latest form of capitalism. The exposition is based chiefly on German economic literature and not marked by aggressive radicalism or Bolshevik propaganda. Sharp criticism of **Kautsky's** "moderatism" is, however, an indication of the parting of ways that is coming.

1917. Two Revolutions in Russia in the course of one year —the second (November) known as the Bolshevik or Communist Revolution.

1917. On the eve of the November *i.e.*, Bolshevik Revolution **Lenin** publishes *The State and Revolution: Marxist Teaching on the State and the Task of the Proletoriat in the Revolution.* He begins by condemning "Plekhanoff Rubanovitch, Tchernoff and Co., in Russia; Scheidemann, David and others in Germany; Renaudel, Guesde, Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Hyndman and the Fabians in England and so on and so on," the so-called "leaders of socialism" as "socialist in words, chauvinist in deeds," "opportunists" and perverters of the genuine socialist gospel. Then he analyzes the teachings of the founder-prophets of socialism, namely, Marx and Engels, item by item, thus:—The State as the product of the irreconciliability of class-antagonisms, as an instrument of the exploitation of the oppressed classes—The Withering away of the state and revolution by force—The Experience of 1848-51—The

Experience of the Paris Commune of 1871 (Marx's analysis)—What is to replace the machinery of the state? The destruction of parliamentarism; Supplementary Explanations by Engels—The Housing question—The Dispute with the Anarchists—The Letter to Bebel, 1875—Criticism of the Draft of the Erfurt Programme, 1891—The Preface of 1891 to Marx's *Civil War in France*, Engels on the suppression of democracy.

The economic foundation of the withering away of the state is also elucidated, as manifest in the following topical analysis: Marx's *Criticism of the Gotha Programme*, 1875, published 1891—formulation of the question by Marx, transition from capitalism to communism through the "transitional" period of revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, first phase of Communist society; highest phase of communist society ("from each according to ability, to each according to needs"); while the state exists there can be no freedom, while there is freedom, there will be no state.

The heretical fallacies of the "opportunists," corruptors of Marxism such as dominated the Second International (1889-1914) are examined. Plekhanoff the Russian's *Anarchism and Socialism* (1894) which tried to coerce anarchism but not in the spirit of Marx and Engels is condemned. The brunt of the attack falls on specially **Kautsky**, a German, who although a *pucca* Marxist is alleged to have "distorted" and betrayed Marxism in the controversies with the moderates or opportunists, *e.g.*, in the attack on **Bernstein's** *Socialist Fundamentals* in Kautsky's *Bernstein and the Social Democratic Programme* (1899) and in his "more mature work," the pamphlet *Social Revolution* (1902). Although K. admitted the "possibility of the conquest of the power of the state" he did not speak of the "destruction of the state machine." This is a "concession to opportunism," says Lenin, indicating a "superstitious reverence" for the state. And again in his best work against the opportunists, the pamphlet *The Road to Power* (1909), Kautsky is said to have failed to rise to the height of the occasion.

The essential distinction between Marxism (Bolshevism, communism or scientific socialism) and anarchism was misunderstood by Kautsky in the controversy with Ponnekock (1912), and is made clear by Lenin as follows: (*a*) Marxists, like anarchists, aim at the destruction of the state but believe that a social revolution is *first* to destroy the classes. Anarchists want the destruction *over-night* and do not understand the process involved in it. (*b*) Marxists recognise a transitional stage in which the proletariat is dictator and establishes a new machinery of "armed workers" on the model of the Paris Commune. Anarchists have no idea as to what the revolutionary proletariat is to do and deny that it will have to undo the state and establish a dictatorship. (*c*) Marxists insist upon using the modern state as a means of preparing the workers for revolution. Anarchists reject this.

1917. **Freund** (1864—): *Standards of American Legislation.* These are to be found in the following seven items: (*i*) abrogation of personal slavery and serfdom; (*ii*) disappearance of legal class-distinctions; (*iii*) recognition of the legal rights of aliens; (*iv*) emancipation from domestic subjection; (*v*) freedom of thought; (*vi*) protection of public health and safety; (*vii*) growth of social legislation.

1918. **Joseph-Barthelemy**: *Le probleme de la competence dans la democratie* (The problem of efficiency in a democracy). Democracy is by nature inefficient, compared to monarchy. Hence France's weakness contrasted with Germany's strength (*cf.* Athenian democracy *vs.* Spartan royalty). Altogether he presents a conservative estimate of republics (*Cf. Le role du pouvoir executif dans les republiques modernes*, 1906). He is conservative also *re.* woman suffrage and feminism (*Le vote des femmes*, 1924).

1918. **Russell**: *Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism.* "Whatever bitterness and hate may be found in the movements which we are to examine, it is not bitterness or hate but love that is their main spring," says he. It is difficult not to hate those who torture the objects of our love. If ultimate wisdom has not always been preserved by socialists and anarchists, they have not differed in this from their opponents. In the source of their inspiration they have shown themselves superior to those who acquiesce ignorantly or supinely in the injustices and oppression by which the existing system is preserved. Marxian socialism gives too much power to the state; syndicalism would be forced to reconstruct a central authority in order to put an end to the rivalries of the different groups of proceedings; the best practical system is that of guild socialism, which combines syndicalism with socialism by a system of federalism among trades.

In his *German Social Democracy* (1896) he offers a whole-hearted appreciation, in general, of Marx's "social democracy" as "not a mere political party nor even a mere economic theory" but as a "complete self-contained philosophy of the world and of human development," in a word, "as a religion and an ethic." Russell's condemnation of Bismarck's "state-socialism" as military and bureaucratic despotism tempered by almsgiving is equally emphatic.

1918. **Mallock** (1849-1923) : *Limits of Pure Democracy, Critical Examination of Socialism* (1907), *Aristocracy and Evolution* (1898). He opposes equality and democracy and champions authority and obedience, representing the anti-democratic tradition in political philosophy since Tocqueville. *Cf.* **Faguet** :*Le Culte de l' Incompetence.*

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YOUTH MOVEMENT AND STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION

Verily doth History repeat itself—with necessary differences due to the operation of forces and laws ever changing and progressive as much as to circumstances and conditions chiefly social and political that must vary with different ages, countries and nationalities to suit the growing and changing needs of developing humanity. The dispassionate student of History as distinguished from the impassioned actors in the drama of human activities watches from a somewhat detached height this seething ferment pregnant with far-reaching results that shape the destiny of the whole human race. He is not, however, therefore a mere idle spectator like the gods of Epicurus who lie beside their nectar careless of the affairs of mankind, for who, that is not dead in soul, can forget the Latin dramatist's never forgettable " homo sum "?

We have thus been watching with a keen and living interest, which virtually makes one, in one's own way, to actually participate in the movement, the momentous Youth Movement in Bengal and its corollary the Students' Conferences and Associations which, we are sure, are destined to play a very important rôle in the academic life of the Province in the near future, and, as we hope they ultimately will, if rightly guided by cultured and well informed leaders who know how to properly control such a complex, if not dangerous, thing as a huge mass movement in these very trying times, bring about salutary changes in all stages of education—from the elementary to the post-graduate—necessary for placing on a sound national basis the problem, than which nothing is more important or essential for national regeneration and emancipation, of the right sort of training, for men and women alike, with which is closely allied the administrative problem of setting up in the country exactly that *machinery* which alone can give to seminal ideas a local habitation, where they may germinate and fructify.

In watching with keen and living interest, perhaps now and then with a little misgiving too, these two newly started kindred movements so radically inter-related, the historic parallelism of a highly suggestive nature with Germany in the first four decades of the 19th century has, of course, appeared to us to be extraordinarily striking. We aim to-day to present that important parallelism as briefly as we can which may serve as a comparative study of a valuable socio-political phenomenon and also as a beacon light.

The Napoleonic wars after having exhausted the nations and Governments competing for political or commercial supremacy left to Europe a legacy of highly complex difficulties to be solved. The outstanding dominant idea which guided the choicer spirits of the new age was that of the formation of a federation (or confederation) "by unity of codes, principles, opinions, feelings, and interests" to bind together the much-divided Europe of the previous century. But the Congress of Vienna practically failed to realise the dream of an authoritative centralised constitution for the whole of Europe. "Concerts," Conferences, Grand Alliance, Coalitions followed in succession as futile fragmentary embodiments of the fundamental idea of unity into the details of which we cannot here propose to enter. The political theories of "doctrinaires" and philosophers, the practical measures tried by Constitutionalists, Reformers, "Ultras" and Liberals resulting in reactions, loyalist or religious, and paving the way of as great a revolution as that of the 18th century minus its loathsome blood-shed—all these are matters of common history to-day. One momentous aspect of the far-reaching consequences of this disconcerting turmoil arrests our attention. We mean the literature of revolt and reconstruction and the part played by it among the youth of Germany. In a word, it is the German National Movement of the first half of the 19th century. Apparently this looks like a side-issue and nothing more. Yet it will, we think, throw a good deal of light on what is happening in this country at the present moment.

It may not be known to all our readers how important was the rôle of literature in effecting national independence, solidarity, and regeneration—specially after Jena in Germany and since 1810 in Switzerland. We shall dismiss for want of space the Swiss literary movement with simply pointing out the part played by culture centres like Zurich and Geneva, the latter of which two places became adorned by Rousseau, Madame de Staël, Sismondi, A. W. Schlegel, B. Constant, Bonstetten and mentioning Pestalozzi's educational reforms, the popular tales of Usteri and Hegner, the histories and novels of Zschokke (who was like our Bankimchandra), and finally, Pictet's famous Bibliothèque Britannique.

Who does not know how literature played its part in making the Germans united as one nation even though Napoleon's fascinating blandishments had succeeded somewhat with Goethe in his old age, with Wieland and Johann von Müller? The young generation of authors managed inspite of this to awaken in all hearts a passionate ardour and an insatiable longing for national freedom and national unity which worked wonders between 1806 and 1813 when popular reaction against Napoleon became *un fait accompli.*

Omitting all details one may say that roughly speaking the years 1800 to 1815 constituted the great era of German national reconstruction and of the democratic unification of Germany, for after 1815 came a period of terrible reaction in German political life—that of the Holy Alliance and the Metternich system—till a furious struggle of another half a century and Bismarck's policy restored the Fatherland to glory by 1870. It is not fanciful to suggest that the sudden supremacy gained after 1814 by extravagantly romantic tales of marvels recording a large variety of supernatural means of achieving by magic power anything intensely desired, such as that of the romantic *waldhorn,* the seven-league boot, *springwurzel* (open sesame), *alraunwurzel* (something like Alladin's lamp), *wechselpfennige* (change-penny), *raubtaler* (coin that returns with other coins it can once touch), Roland's *Kuappen* (napkin which only being spread provides a rich meal), the wishing cap, *glucks-seckel* (lucky purse), *zauber-ring* (magic ring) and, last but not least, the *wunderhorn* (magic horn), reflects in a wonderfully suggestive manner how the imagination is requisitioned by man baffled in actual realisation to give solace to the despairing heart. We know that *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* appeared in the autumn of 1805 from Heidelberg, then a very important centre of the German Romantic Movement, edited by Arnim and Brentano, as a remarkable collection of popular songs (of " The Youth's Magic Horn ") which inspired such patriotic writers as Uhland, Eichendorff, W. Müller (father of Max Müller) and even Heine. The 2nd and 3rd volumes of the " Youth's Magic Horn " came out in 1808. In this connection it may also be noted that a Scott-like (Jacobite) feeling for the fascinating glory of the Past creating the fervent hope of its possible revival occurs in Arnim's historical novel " Die Kronenwachter " (1817), *i.e.,* mysterious guardians of the crown of the ancient Hohenstaufen Emperors (1138-1204), of which the line became extinct with Konradin by 1268, under the fostering care of some descendant of Barbarossa (1152-90) who was supposed to be bidding his time to appear again in Germany to revive her buried glories. One becomes lost in strange surprise and limitless admiration caused by Wagner's idea of music as the soul of the universe and Schopenhauer's sanctuary of art fostering illusive beauty and insatiable impulse, which became strengthened by the whole host of German Romantics like Arndt, Arnim, Brentano, Chamisso, Eichendorff, Fichte, Fouqué, Hoffmann, Kerner, Kleist, Körner, Lenau, Novalis, Rückert, the Schlegels, Scheukendorf, Tieck and Uhland.

In metaphysical politics Fichte and later on in history

Treitschke upheld the supremacy of the indomitable **Will** followed in psychology by Wundt's "voluntarism" (*i.e.*, practically the subtle operation of infinite **desire**).

Even Leibnitz was modernised later on by Nietzsche the apostle of **passion for personality** which was considered as something so mysterious as to be unfathomable, nay, unique and irreducible to code, rule, law or formula—ending in the idea of **Ubermensch** (Superman). Fichte inspired the Germans with fresh vitality exactly when Napoleon and his lieutenants were mercilessly concentrating their efforts on the destruction of the German mind through the ruin of Prussia. Influenced by Kant's ideal of Duty, the stern voice of the Daughter of God, he delivered his famous course of 14 lectures at Berlin at the end of 1807 surrounded by the French troops garrisoning the capital. In these *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* he first of all emphasised the imperative need of an *enlightened* system of national education, so that the student world might rise above the petty temptations of selfish interests to a guiding vision of the common welfare of the German nation and of humanity at large. In one address he proclaimed that the nation must take precedence of the State and in others he fired the youthful imagination of his audience by fervently appealing to the vanished glories of the Fatherland and beseeching all to emulate the glorious achievements of their illustrious forefathers under the stimulating influence of enlightened patriotism which will make it easy for every one to sink his personal predilections in the weal of the nation or the race. Fichte purified the national freedom movement of its dross of vulgar passion stirred up by ignorant sentimentalism or the impulsiveness of demagogues by at once founding it on the solid basis of intellectual and ethical endeavours. Zeller's Normal School in Köningsberg adopting Pestalozzi's method bears testimony to this very important feature of Fichte's solid work proving, by contrast with the fuming fret and fury of unregulated instinctive passion which passed over Spain, the wisdom of Plato's far-sighted provision of government by philosophers. Improvement of the higher Schools (*gymnasia*) followed too immediately, under the guidance of Humboldt appointed to the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1809. What is more significant is the addition to the three older Universities of Köningsberg, Frankfort (on the Oder) and the recently suppressed Halle of two more higher centres of education at Breslau and Berlin. Stein was afraid at first, very rightly as we realise to-day in our country, of the moral temptations of a big city like Berlin and even Humboldt feared the strangling powers of the governing classes backed by the military !! But the process of national regeneration once given an impetus cares little for cautious misgivings and it was soon discovered that contact with learned men and an intellectual atmosphere prevailing at Berlin must prove in the long run "intellectually refreshing, thought-awakening, and naturally elevating" to the student community.

And lo! in August 1809 on the strength of Humboldt's recommendations a Cabinet Order allotted the very palace of Prince Henry for the new University's local habitation and a state grant of £27,500 per annum. Fortunate land with a noble Minister of Education!—for, as Fichte observed, "this highest example of practical respect for science and thought afforded by a State was shown at a time of the direst oppression and under *the greatest financial difficulties*. It was not an occasion of display or elegance that was sought for, but an instrument for giving new health and vigour to the nation." Thus in 1810-11 was sown at Berlin the seed of a patriotic spirit regulated by cultural ideas which bore fruit in 1813 when professors and students as one body rushed to arms to give effect to Stein's Reforms of 1807 which aimed at the expulsion of the foreigner (the French under Napoleon) from Prussia whom he had declared as equally the enemy of France and the Rhine Confederation.

Fichte's somewhat over-rationalistic appeal to Intellect, Reason and Ethics (the well-regulated Will) as that of a passionately patriotic yet hard-thinking philosopher was backed by a more popular and powerful *emotional* appeal to the youthful heart of the whole country from the Romantic School of writers, particularly lyrical poets.

Fichte's 14 addresses to (the embryonic) German nation yet in the making were delivered in 1807-8 in the Great Hall of the Royal Academy of Sciences, Berlin, on liberty and justice with a view to successfully oppose foreign despotism and domination by awakening in Young Prussia a keen and living desire for self-sacrifice, for national sense and national spirit, for moral regeneration. They "called upon his countrymen to emancipate themselves in the name not of the abstract rights of men but of the genius of the German people and they uttered the first poignant recognition of national life as a glorious vesture arraying the naked body of the individual member, not an aggregate of other units competing with or controlling him." These stirring addresses did yeoman's service in the regeneration of a fallen and prostrate people benumbed by the defeat at Jena. And political regeneration was in a way achieved by the War of Liberation (1813-15). The history of this tremendous upheaval is not, however, without its warning. For even philosophical addresses with a clear bias towards ethical emphasis can inflame passions and Kleist (1777-1811) actually suggested that some true liberator of anguished Germany "should put a bullet through the head of the Satan of his age (meaning Napoleon)!" It must here be noted that political Germany, as she was in 1808, is indeed represented in Kleist's "Hermann's Battle" in which the hero is the symbol of beaten Prussia and the dramatic action concentrates on the idea of political unity at any price. Similarly in the Robin Hood type novel "Michael Kohlhaus" the honest and upright citizen is shown as driven to sheer desperation because no legal redress is possible to obtain for any wrong or outrage.

The Younger Romanticists next followed with their extraordinarily rich harvest of popular literature consisting of (Arnim, and Brentano's and Uhland's) Volkslieder, (Görres' and Schwab's) Volksbücher, (the Grimm brothers') Volkssagen. Chamisso presented the poetry and romance of the life of the much-oppressed peasantry (for Germany as yet was mainly an agricultural country) but his satiric songs, like those of Burns attacking the *kirk*, openly advocated freedom and were modelled on Beranger's political lyrics (Les Missionaires, 1819). Goethe in his *Conversation with Eckermann* (1830) made the following observations :—

"You know that I am, upon the whole, no friend to what is called political poems, but such as Beranger has composed I can tolerate." Then the great Goethe points out the fundamental difference between France (or rather Paris) and Berlin saying that the Germans had "no country of which they could decidedly say—*Here is Germany*!" But, he adds, "Only 16 years ago (*i.e.*, about 1814) when we tried to get rid of the French, was Germany everywhere. Then a political poet could have had a universal effect, the universal necessity, the universal feeling of disgrace, had seized upon the nation like something dæmonic; the inspiring fire which the poet might have kindled was already burning everywhere of its own accord. Still, I will not deny that Arndt, Körner, and Rückert have had some effect." And when it was mentioned that Goethe was reproached for not co-operating with the political poets his reply was—"How could I take up arms without hatred, and how could I hate *without youth*?" (Italics mine). That is the crux of the whole matter regarding the connection between intense nationalism and the youth movement. So far as the economic side of the evil effects of foreign supremacy goes, we have only to remember that when between 1809 and 1814 the Continental System was given a free scope till its break-down especially in Russia, Sweden and Germany about 1812-13, its terrible rigour destroyed in Switzerland (between 1810 and 1812) quite a large number of local industries on which the masses depended for prosperity reducing the country to the verge of famine until relief came unexpectedly to the hard-pressed people in the shape of Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign.

To return to the work accomplished by the Romanticists. Arndt gave currency to the pregnant expression *Hermannsschlacht* which was adopted in 1808 by Kleist too signifying "freedom's battle to throw off foreign yoke." To-day some of our youthful leaders have, we know, made the expression their slogan against the alleged despotic authority of College Heads. Arndt was also the author of "Vaterlands Lied" (1812)—a prophetic song of freedom foreshadowing Prussia's revolt against Napoleon. In 1813 Rückert mercilessly attacked Napoleon, the tyrant, in a series of poems—*the Sonnets in Harness.* The first phase of German Romanticism (1796-1804) headed by the Schlegels, Novalis (who was a representative of the rising generation whose aspirations had been shaped by the ideas and ideals of Fichte) and Tieck who had their centres at Jena and Berlin, was followed by the ideals of the Heidelberg group who from 1805 to 1808 roused through folk-songs the very dormant soul of the masses in Germany and after 1812 made use of "Children's and Household Stories" disseminating their ideas through the organ known as *Journal for Hermits.*

The war of Liberation (1813) undertaken to destroy foreign tyranny while achieving that purpose favoured also the cause of reactionary German potentates and old dynasties somewhat in the manner in which the Non-co-operation Movement in India in 1921 by supporting the Khilafatists eventually helped the disruptive element of communalism. Fichte's philosophy like that of Gandhi sought to exploit that concentrated but narrow patriotism which held everything foreign in contempt and as a result admired everything German most enthusiastically. That is practically the *Swadeshi* spirit in a nutshell. It is a powerful lever to work with, no doubt, but it played in Germany on the Teutonic National arrogance which in the long run proved baneful. But the lyrical genius of the Romanticist Körner fostered a purer love of freedom in the name of humanity more than of the German Nation considered as the chosen people of God, borrowing its inspiring ardour from the spirit of the French Revolution. Enthusiasm for the glorious Middle Ages—for the Past—was the source of strength to a number of Romantic writers and Schenkendorf sang with intense yearning for the days—

> "When men of noble, knightly mien
> trod the banks of the Rhine."

Even Jahn (the founder of the gymnastic school at Hasenhaide, near Berlin, in 1811) bent on making all German youth warlike, able-bodied, active in habit and full of health and vigour, wrote patriotic pieces to inflame passions and create an intense love of the country's great Past, followed by the Grimms. German morality and the German form of Christianity began to be set over against scientific thought and soon the pietist Görres became the champion of Christian mysticism. This suggests to us some resemblance with the activities of the Hindu Shavas or Moslem Ulemas. This fanatical demagogue, Görres, brought out the "Red Journal" (a significant name) as the mouthpiece of the German Revolutionary party and continued to exercise sway over the youth till 1824.

The Heidelberg coterie became noted for intense patrotism who disseminated the Revolutionary ideas of liberty and democracy and of vigorous opposition to foreign domination. The last *motif* inspired the soldier-poet Körner (1791-1873) who threw himself heart and soul into the struggle for national liberation and his lyrics "Lyre and Sword" are full of patriotic thrills and his drama "Zeriny" of the grim joy of dying for the fatherland. Arndt (1769-1860) has combined religious devotion to the god of battles with his patriotic ardour and he in a somewhat narrow-minded way inspired all with the spirit of his hymns of hate for Frenchmen and denunciation of Napoleon in the "Spirit of the Time." He vehemently condemned (1) the apathetic and inert mass of the people (2) the intelligentsia for wasting time and energy over discussion of abstract political principles and (3) the short-sighted aristocracy and the princes for playing into Napoleon's hands and fighting for supremacy among themselves. He based his fiery appeals for nationalism and unity on the identity of language and ethnic traditions.

The German National Revival of the years 1806 to 1813 gave birth to Students' Associations simultaneously with the famous War of Liberation (1813-1815) which mainly aimed at freedom from foreign oppression and foreign domination. But as yet nobody thought of freedom for individuals in the State nor of political national unity. These were also days of stirring national songs, the pride of place being that of Arndt's *Bundeslied* (1815)—the German वन्देमातरम्—lustily sung in chorus by the University students and set to music by George Friedrich Hamtsch for the first meeting of the epoch-making German Burschenschaften at Jena on the memorable 12th June, 1815.

This Arndt's "Spirit of the Age" (1806) is the counterpart of Fichte's "Fundamental Principles of the Present Age" (1804-5). What Fichte sought to secure by philosophical speculation Arndt did by appealing to the nation's sense of honour, sense of self-respect, and the sense of its glorious heritage. Arndt dwelt on the formerly respected German name all over Europe, on Germany's cathedrals, merchant fleets, Hanse towns, works of art, on the deeds of Luther, and was acclaimed as the Blücher of German lyricism. Followed in quick succession a flood of romantic patriotic songs such as, to name only a few,

(1) Koningin Louise etc. (1807).

(2) Konig Friedrich William III von Preusze (1813) and Kleist's poem of 1810 on the same theme.

(3) Vaterland's Lied (1812).

(4) Des Deutschen Vaterland (1813).

(5) Körner's Brief an den Vater etc. (1813), preceded by Vor Rauchs Buste etc. (1811).

(6) Frühlings gruz an das Vaterland (1814).

(7) Körner's stirring verses on Männer und Buben (1813).

(8) Rückert's soul-stirring song-like Sonnets [as many as 67 sonnets in armour challenging the French oppressor, published at Heidelberg, in 1814, in which he refers to those stormy times of national travail and life and death grapple with Napoleon as *Wetternacht* (*i.e.*, tempestuous night)].

(9) Binzer's "Stoszt An ! Jena soll Leben !" (1817).

Most of these "Fatherland" pieces were quickly set to music like our own আমার দেশ or জন্মভূমি and became honoured as national anthems and some of the other pieces were full of appeals and warnings to "gentle and simple" alike that all separatist class interests should cease to interfere with national unity which alone can ensure national freedom. The German वन्देमातरम् was in due course proscribed by the police in 1819.

We have to refer just for a moment to the period of reaction, disruption, pessimism, personal and selfish motives of socalled patriots and leaders, operating against patriotic, national and democratic tendencies of 1805 to 1815. This period extended upto 1835. The forces at work were the nefarious press censorship of the day which strangled free expression of thought and criticism of administrative measures, rigid system of espionage filling good men's hearts with suspicions and despair, brutal police enactments and rigorous enforcement of lawless laws, illegal arrests and detentions, as if the War of Liberation came only to strengthen the grip of irresponsible authority and arbitrary power on the throats of the patriotic few to throttle the growing spirit of nationalism.

Poetry was hailed in the terrible gloom of such a benumbing despondency as the sole comforter of wounded and anguished humanity, at any rate in so far as poetry looked back to a past golden age of happiness and peace. Dreamy mysticism began to seek inspiration from the Oriental treasures of philosophy and poetry—for, verily, men believed in *ex oriente lux*. Goethe gave Germany West-Easterly Divan (of Hafiz) in 1819 and even Rückert **"Ghazls"** (1821) followed by Platen which infuriated Heine who could ill endure the sight of men "eating too much of the fruit of the Garden of Shiraz to vomit up **Ghazls** ! " All this followed from the Holy Alliance and Metternich's ruthless proscription of all ideas of political unity as sedition. Its aim was to kill the spirit of romanticism in literature and then to give a setback to all progress by condemning aspirations and idealisms, *i.e.*, in a word by destroying the spirit and privilege of **Youth.** But as is always the case, the net result was that Students' Unions, known as *Burschenschaften*, apparently ceased to exist only to change their name and outer form to become secret societies, till things changed after 1848 when the powers that be realised their blunders and shortsightedness. Briefly the history of the Students' Movement in Germany is as follows :

The *Burschenschaften* is a student member of the Students' Union (whence his name) started at the Jena University on the 12th of June, 1815, for promoting the growth of national feeling, effecting unity among students and fostering a corporate life to elevate it in accordance with the special circumstances and needs of particular areas representing conditions prevalent in different parts of Germany (*Landsmannschaften*). Arndt's famous *Bundeslied* was composed for the occasion of the celebration of this national event.

From Jena this new spirit strengthened by the impulses produced by the recent War of Liberation extended to other Universities. On the 18th of October, 1817, there was a great national celebration (known as the Wartburg festival of 1817) organised by the Jena students in commemoration of the Reformation and of the battle of Leipzig which created alarm in the Court Cabinets (except at Saxe-Weimar of which the Liberal Duke was a patron of the movement). It perturbed Richelieu in Paris, Hardenberg in Fr. William's court and even Metternich who winked at the *Landsmannschaften* confined to provincial and particularist interests but detected sedition in a national union. As is usual in such matters, the Government "dammed a river and made a flood." Students are nothing unless they are indiscreet and impulsive. Great loving vigilance over their movements prompted by genuine eagerness for their well-being is always necessary but a certain amount of concession to temporary effervescence is of the very essence of a sound ideal of academic discipline. At the Wartburg festival, for example, the young hopefuls of Germany. destined to be staid citizens through the salutary steadying influence of experience and personal responsibility, indulged in nasty pranks—they reconciled irreconcilable things by finishing off the days' prayers and sermons in a right youthful fashion with,—well, not only dinners and toasts of the most uproarious type but a blazing bonfire to which they piously consigned what they considered to be symbols of reaction and repression, of militarism and police rule and of foreign (French) fashions. The flames were fed with Kotzebue's History side by side with a corporal's cane, a sergeant's baton, a courtier's pig-tail and a corset! The rituals of the ceremony are indeed worthy of the "*future hope*" of the country. All this is, after all, comparatively harmless by the side of worse exhibitions of the revolutionary temper and there is the real danger of giving too long a rope to youthful indiscretion, specially when it is poisoned by the unrestrained harangue of irresponsible demagogues whose only skill lies in inflaming passions which they know they will never care to allay when things come to a dangerous pass. The Wartburg festival was responsible for such serious incidents as riotous tumult at Breslau, bloody affray among the Göttingen students, religious disturbances in Saxony followed by what to-day is called civil disobedience (refusal to pay taxes) in Swabia. Even for the most liberalminded man of go-ahead ideas and large-hearted sympathies there is no denying of the solid fact that if you sow the wind you must reap the whirl-wind. The Revolutionary leader of the young may, perhaps, even say that is quite a good harvest for a country or a people cherishing the ideal of national independence, a *summum bonum* for which no price is too high. Even if we cannot sympathise with this outlook on life we can understand it at any rate. We shall as dispassionately as possible discuss this aspect of the vexed question presently without either taking sides or importing into the study of a very difficult and complex problem—passion, prejudice or bias.

The next stage in the history of these Students' Unions is that of the conversion of this celebration into Allgemeine Deutsche Burschenschaft flying its tricolour flag (of black, red and gold) connected with the **War** volunteers of the Lützow corps till the Government felt it to be its imperative duty to suppress it after the assassination of Kotzebue, whom the revolutionists condemned as "a poisoner of souls" and a Russian spy, on 23rd March, 1819, at Mannheim, by a Jena student, Karl Sand, till then known as "a youth of most examplary conduct and of extremely pious sentiments." But we must remember—of such is made the kingdom of anarchism!" When Görres and others sought to defend such a deed Gentz was led to declare that "the Universities must be purified of men like Fries, Luden, Oken and Kiesser"—men who all the time had most vehemently and vigorously attacked Metternich's repressive policy in the press through the help of the *Isis*, the *Nemesis*, the *Friend of the People* and the *New Rhenish Mercury*. Something of the nature of the present-day Zenovieff letter created a great sensation by the alleged discovery by the enterprising London *Times* of Stourdza's pamphlet full of violent attacks on the Universities. Unfortunately this Jena student Sand was also a lecturer to the Burschenschaft. A double dose of vigilant police serveillance and of repression was the necessary consequence—due to some extent to panic. The Goddess of Discord did not miss her opportunity and the Duke of Saxe-Weimar's refusal to suspend from professorial chairs the Government "suspects" won him the nick-name of *Oberbursch*. The Fates too were not slow and by a curious irony there was next an attempt to assassinate the Nassau Minister, Ibell. Press-censorship, visitation of the Universities, removal of Professors from their Chairs, formation of special tribunals to investigate conspiracy cases, restriction of liberty, of franchise, of popular representation, resignation of popular ministers like Humboldt and Hardenberg—all immediately followed by 1821-22.

Though politically Prussia committed a temporary *felo de se* her end was indirectly secured by Customs' Unions (*Zollverein*) and Press-unions (with a common purse to indemnify editors, contributors and printers who suffered under the Press-laws), the latter of which actively distributed revolutionary sheets and pamphlets inspite of the censor and the police. When in 1827 the Burschenschaft revived at Erlangen there at once was an alliance between it and the Press-union. Nay, secret societies sprang up at Heidelberg which received the sympathetic and active support of Börne and Heine. "Southern Germany now seethed with revolutionary ferment" no more confined to Universities, academic circles and the student population. In May, 1832, at Hambach the mob toasted Lafayette and resolved on armed revolt! Thus the notorious Carlsbad Decree (of 1819) defeated its own end.

As Thuringia was the centre of the Students' Unions, so Berlin came to be the centre of the kindred **Gymnastic movement** (corresponding to our *Akharas* and *Byayamsamitis*) with Massmann as the foremost leader whom the Jena Professor Fries (already mentioned) ardently supported as an earnest advocate of unity and liberty among the youth of the Universities. Names of ardent lovers of freedom in Bengal to-day with tremendous sacrifice to their credit will easily occur to our readers' minds in this connection to indicate the nature of the parallelism we are engaged in studying.

To sum up the brief story of the Burschenschaften, we refer to their origin in the Wartburg celebration to which representative delegates from all student societies to the number of 500, headed by some Professors, marched with soul-stirring demonstrations from Eisenach which served as a signal for a life and death conflict between new ideals and the old in which two factors appear to us to have become prominent. These are, first, determined, well-organised state persecution of Liberalism of all types, press-censorship, the most rigorous prosecution of demagogues, arrests of suspects (including teachers), special legislation to curb the independence of too free or too nationalised Universities attempting to restrict official interference, and even espionage carried to the extent of employing spies and Government agents to keep a sharp eye on the conduct of students, over class-work of lecturers noted for advanced ideas, police surveillance and imprisonment merely on police report. The second factor is open rebellion, secret societies, revolutionary organisations, incitement to assassination, revolt against authority, against discipline, seditious meetings, circulation of seditious literature, and colourable evasion of the law, in a word, anarchism, and license in the name of liberty, fostering the unruly spirit of ferociously anti-social individualism. In the twenties of the 19th century these Students' Unions were temporarily checked and even here and there totally broken up to be resuscitated after 1827 with Germania as an inspirer. If on the side of Liberalism became enlisted passionate writers like Arndt, Brentano, Chamisso, Platen, Börne, Körner and even Heine; and after 1835 Karl Gutzkow became the proto-type of the young generation of Germans till the July Revolution in France and the Polish Revolt electrified not only the fiery youth but even Goethe's admirer Rahel, that gifted woman then verging on sixty, it is indeed sad to recollect that the great Hegel sided with the reactionary State in support of Metternich's programme and policy as the most conservative upholder of authority in his famous Philosophy of Right. Equally sad is the memory of the changed Wordsworth, the lost leader, who opposed Catholic Emancipation in his zeal for the church which was celebrated in his Ecclesiastical Sonnets.

In its last phase the youth (and student) movement of Germany is associated with Burschenschaftsdenkmal (the Students' Memorial) erected on a hill near Eisenach in memory of those German students who sacrificed their lives in the War of 1870—where an annual gathering of the German Students' Association takes place to fitly celebrate an anniversary and where is sung lustily in a deafening chorus August Binzer's well-known song beginning with "Clink glasses! Jena shall live! Hurrah"—as a national toast to offer thanks to the Eisenach citizens of 1817 who were generously hospitable to the students at the first Wartburg celebration in which the epithet "*Philistine*" was smartly hurled against all who were not with the students. Metternich's motto of order and peace was directly opposed to that of the youthful revolutionary party, *viz.*, Freedom and Honour or The Nation. For our purpose the dominant factor in the great movement of national regeneration and national unity was the heroic part played by the united endeavours of Professors and students to make political emancipation a realised actuality. The most ardent idealism of Shelley as a passionate socio-political reformer and a true child of the inner spirit of the French Revolution judged as a revolution in men's *ideas* and in their outlook on life curiously enough found a more congenial and fruitful soil in modern Germany than in his own country groaning under the reactionary policy of her Castlereaghs whose hands were strengthened by the unholy aims of a Holy Alliance which in Voltaire's style may be most aptly characterised as neither holy nor an alliance of good men for the good of humanity. Germany had not yet produced statesmen or literature of politics as great as her philosophers, scientists, theologians and musical composers. Political and administrative capacity of a high order in the middle classes and adequate education of the neglected masses did not develop side by side with the growing consciousness of the German's intellectual supremacy. That much needful development in all nations is more a question of opportunity than of inherent ability. Even ability has to depend on free scope for its exercise in actual political administration which is the only school where this discipline can be acquired. Through failure political responsibility and wisdom grow. Metternich's system deplorably failed in this political education of the German *intelligentsia.* After 1815 his artificial Settlement of that year not only left many problems unsolved but created new problems and what is more important raised Germany's political problem to the level of an international problem. Politicians suffering from an irrational horror for revolutionary ideas (born of the unfortunate memory of 1789) forgot that even that devoutly wished for thing called peace and order, which surely is a *sine qua non* of good government and uninterrupted progress, may at times be purchased by a struggling nation too dearly. They forgot that States, nations and individuals do suffer occasionally from evils worse than disturbance of peace and order. They forgot the supreme lesson taught by history that the sufferings of thousands and thousands of human beings may assume a form or proportion that dictate to humanity to hazard the terrible risks of a revolution (certainly more welcome when it is bloodless). They forgot that all this has to be done in the highest interests of self-realisation which is the goal of all human endeavours. This *human function* is sometimes better served by culture than diplomacy or policy or even so-called statesmanship. "The foundation of Universities" (at Breslau, Berlin, Bonn) in addition to the existing ones of Heidelberg, Göttingen, Jena, Leipzig, Munich and Tübingen "as a memorial of victory in the field and as indispensable organs of national strength and unification," says a thoughtful writer," remains a remarkable element in Prussian statecraft."

In India in the course of the present century quite a number of such centres of learning sprang quickly into existence.

The darkest period of hopeless struggle for nationalism and fiscal autonomy for Indians is not yet over but for the Germans it extended from 1805 to 1810. After all, Germany was not subjected to the same kind of political bondage as that of India. The great German administrator Stein had plenty of free scope for his extraordinary abilities which began to make themselves felt in the changes in the land system practically abolishing serfdom, in municipal administration which gave the initiative in real self-government, in the formation of national defence based on a national military programme, and, last but not least, in educational reform which placed both elementary and higher, cultural and vocational, education on a sound but popular basis. By 1813 national unity and mass prosperity passed from the stage of idealistic dream into that of practical politics. True, the *Bund* (after 1814) gave Germany a Confederacy and not a real popular constitution except in Weimar (1816) which possessed in Karl Augustus the pioneer of political freedom. As in this country, so in Prussia (in 1810) a Representative Government was promised and proclaimed with great noise only to be diplomatically held back as soon as the danger of the Napoleonic War was over by 1815-16 and the people's champion Görres received from the Chancellor the Lord Birkenhead type of reply to his representation to the King reminding him of his unfulfilled pledge that in making such a promise the King had surely reserved the right to judge of the proper time for its fulfilment. As a result of such representations, ruthless repression of popular demonstrations and rigorous enforcement of penal laws followed till the young Germans were crushed under the iron heel of oppression and espionage. Two popular movements particularly received careful attention from the reactionary Government of the day, *viz.*, (1) The Gymnastic Movement among the German Youth inaugurated by Fichte's disciple Jahn enjoining strict temperance in food and drink and perfect simplicity in dress and an open air life full of physical activity and (2) The Student Movement (Burschenschaft-wesen).

Up to 1815 Germany was the Germany of institutions and machinery. Then came the influence of a bewildering variety of free minds and thinking intellects which produced a clash and conflict of ideas and a fierce collision of trained wills with trained wills engaged in a contest of political theories, constitutional principles and ideals of nationalism. India is passing through a similar stage to-day. This continued in Germany till 1848. Then she passed through a prolonged intellectual travail of the **Idealogues** up to 1870. The battle of ideas darkened counsel making confusion worse confounded. Much dust was raised by metaphysicians, University Professors, pamphleteers, journalists and constitution-mongers clouding the common man's vision. Yet, on the whole, Germany was reshaped by the academic theories of intellectual aristocrats, political programmes of erudite University Chair-holders, and even by the contributions made by the class-rooms, College Societies and students' unions as much as by veteran administrators and masters of *realpolitik.* If India is just now divided into many political camps German statesmanship, too, had to reckon with Jacobins, Particularists, Liberals, Conservatives, Federalists, dynastic Loyalists, Social Democrats and Pan-German Nationalists.

The chief practical problem, before the 39 States to which the Germany of 1789 divided into 360 principalities became reduced in 1815, was well-nigh the same problem with which India is confronted. It is the question of a satisfactory political settlement and a corresponding system of government with its adequate and appropriate Imperial and Provincial machinery which will provide a much-distracted country with its numerous clashing interests and varied needs with that organisation which will preserve autonomy and independence, within due bounds, of all the constituent elements of a very complex State without endangering internal order and external peace while at the same time guaranteeing securities against all dangers of internal disruption and foreign aggression. Germany's most trying difficulty was the vexed question of reconciling the integrity of the State *as a whole* with sectional demands and aspirations of constituent members hardly working in harmony. The Napoleonic Confederation of the Rhine had placed the country's military and economic problems at the disposal of an alien dictator reserving the power of determining policy without caring at all for the popular voice or the decisions solemnly recorded by the unanimous opinion of the nominal representatives of the people. As in this country, so in Germany, the people were in the grip of the Metternich reactionary policy largely because of the antagonism of separatist interests of parties and groups disunited in ideas and ideals, in political principles, in administrative ends by keen jealousies, hopeless fears and nervous suspicions.

The self-interested opponents of Indian nationalism repeat *ad nauseam* that India is nothing better than a mere geographical name. Had not Germany too her semi-independent states of Bavaria, Würtemberg, the Hesses, Nassau, Hanover, Westphalia, Saxony in which, to quote a great authority, "dynastic particularism was the outcome and expression of deep-laid racial, cultural and economic differences"? "Prussian, Hanoverian, Westphalian, Saxon, Rhinelander, Franconian, Swabian, represented German types, the differentiation of whose original features had been heightened and deepened by the physical configuration of the German lands they lived in, internecine struggles, prolonged political rivalry and opposed economic needs and claims." The Germans too preferred on principle the divine right of a native German petty state to misgovern to the foreigner's illegitimate claim to govern well. If these opponents trot out the pretext of religious animosities in India, may not a thoughtful and well-informed Indian point out that when in 1818 Germany had to face the difficulty of devising a national *constitution,* one single petty state of Nassau with its 85 square miles of German territory was actually governed by no fewer than 27 *independent* sovereigns, two of whom—one a Catholic and the other a Protestant (!)—ruled over the two halves of the **one** town of Siegen?

And it is the failure of particularist and separatist individual governments to solve the urgent national problem of achieving unity that largely contributed to the formation in June, 1815, of the famous *Burschenschaft* system in order to inspire the German Youths of the day with a nobler and purer ideal of life than what the *Landsmannschaften* could furnish. In effecting this momentous change Fichte's *Liberal* disciples played an important rôle. The fundamental simple law is that in all progressive countries when the adventitious leaders enjoying undeserved power and prestige decline for whatever reason to march with the disconcertingly rapid movement of events keeping pace with ever-expansive public opinion, leadership is transferred to men of ideas, of letters, to able journalists, to Professors who are not professional politicians but to whom **natural** leadership should rightfully belong. So, in Germany when professional politicians were weighed in the balance and found wanting, the Universities and *Gymnasia* became the storm centres of political agitation—"professional chairs being," says Professor Pollard, "turned into platforms, lectures into harangues, and classes into public meetings." "The Revolutionists," complained Metternich, "conscious that the adult generation would not serve their nefarious project of German unity, turned their attention to those who are to be educated, a plan which commends itself even to the most impatient, for the student generation includes at most a period of four years.........A whole class of future state officials, professors, and incipient literary men, is here ripened for revolution." "The virtue of the *Landsmannschaften* in Metternich's eyes consisted in their provincial and particularist organisation whereas the vice of the *Burschens-*

chaft was in its neglect of these distinctions ; German students might be allowed to organise in Saxon, Swabian, Bavarian, and Franconian societies ; but to create a national union savoured of revolution.''

The lesson taught by history is that culture centres have often achieved what politicians and administrators have failed to accomplish by regulating men by the idea of *cultural* unity and of intellectual brotherhood of teachers and learners. Such intellectual bonds possess the advantage of standing above the fluctuation of the changing policy of kings and diplomats, ministries and even treaties. To the young mind ideas are powers the most efficacious because the most pervasive. In Germany the liberalising movement of intellectual renaissance joined hands with the Nationalistic creed. In the face of such a grand unifying ideal and machinery it is sheer shortsightedness or mere hypocrisy to trot out the plea of a country being merely a geographical expression and it is resorted to by the intellectual bankruptcy of those who fail to realise that a dead level of dull uniformity without the saving grace of variety is rather inimical to manifold and harmoniously complex cultural development. Natural differences or differentiating social and religious particularism need not necessarily militate aganist the fundamental idea of obedience to the laws of **one** organic whole. Besides, Culture-States can achieve a synthesis of apparently opposed elements as much as Nation-States (like England and France) can secure unity. The consciousness of a high and ancient culture heritage may, of course, make the youth of a country hyper-sensitive to real or fancied slight on the part of an alien but more virile nation of only yesterday's creation proud, if not arrogant, of its racial superiority and lend a sort of ferociousness of temper to their exasperated feelings of political slavery or industrial degradation. In Germany national salvation was furthered next by the fiscal unity mainly effected by the *Zollverein* (or Customs' Union of the thirties of the 19th century) and India's economic conditions have a close resemblance with Germany's economic history, Germany having continued up to late decades of the past century to be an Agrarian State. That country up to the middle of the 19th century was comparatively industrially backward, poor, with her land infinitely parcelled and her labour unorganised, scattered and immobile. Trade was undeveloped and hampered by political troubles and general unrest. Capital was shy and not yet pooled. The handloom flourished long side by side with machine power and factory organisation was in its infancy up to 1846, and even in 1843 about 60 per cent. of wage-earners were employed in rural pursuits. Foreign trade was almost nominal, and meant the exporting of raw materials and importing of manufactured goods and for her iron goods and cotton yarns Germany had to depend on foreign supplies. Things changed rapidly as in a revolution with the Constitutional Reforms and Settlement that followed the storm and stress of 1848. Joint-stock companies, Banks, Insurance and Shipping companies, appeared in quick succession in the wake of political advance in 1850-70. The masses at once became not only politically-minded but democratic and even socialistic. The year 1849 gave the German people a constitution making it possible for Bismarck to undo Metternich's work and replace the loosely-articulated *Bund* with its farcical representative Diet reminding us of the Indian Legislatures under the Reforms Act. Then came socialism with its potent leaven.

We have tried to work out, as comprehensively as practicable, within our limits, the parallelism between Germany and India so that the lesson of history and human experience may not be lost upon us.

We may next offer a few observations as dispassionately as possible without taking sides.

Educational reforms and developments, which cannot be logically dissociated from the student communities and their movements oftener than not follow the lead of a nation's social and political outlook and aspirations. A favourable and healthy atmosphere capable of fostering the growth of high educational ideals and helping their practical realisation can be created only by sincerely patriotic surrender of private, sectional, communal interest to collective welfare by means of personal and class sacrifices.

While intensely desiring and nobly fighting for true freedom a *cultured* nation cannot afford to ignore that (as Fichte in his Berlin Addresses reminded his audience) "true freedom can be obtained only by means of the highest obedience to law." To this noble sentiment we propose only to add that this law as a regulative principle of life is not a mandate from the outside—no, not even the Judaic stern voice of the Daughter of God which after all, is a thing external—mechanically imposed on a people against their will, their temperament, their tradition, their culture, by an alien authority, however wise. This law is an evolution from within, and if at all imposed, self-imposed by the divine right of man's free choice of the highest and best, by his deliberate election, and obeyed willingly by minds and wills thoroughly and systematically drilled and disciplined. Liberty we must never cry when license we mean.

Man as Aristotle's rational animal never truly **feels** that he is free when his passions, impulses, prejudices, self-interest are his masters or when he allows himself, however temporarily, to be carried away, if not led astray, by herd-instinct. Every free man's inalienable right it is to think, judge, decide, act for himself even though the end of all his mental and volitional activities is the common good of the entire nation, or, better still, of humanity, or even the highest good of the largest number. At every step he has to severely subject himself to analysis and to ask himself by way of a reliable test how far he is *obeying the true law of his being* by honestly, sincerely, whole-heartedly subjecting himself **consciously** to the discipline of a progressive individual and national life. The Breslau Professor Steffens rightly held—"If Prussia is to rise from her prostration, it must be accomplished not by physical but by moral force,'' and Wordsworth reminds us that by such a force alone can a nation be free and great repeating in effect the wise utterance of England's greatest champion of freedom, who also uttered nothing base, John Milton.

It is an old saying that always bears repetition that he alone possesses the right to command others (*i.e.*, be a leader) who knows how to obey.

An out-and-out modernist with a vengeance will rebel, we know, against such ideas and cheaply dispose of an eternal verity with the gay nonchalance of an irresponsible demagogue and he will enjoy his temporary hold on the easily impressionable heart of the idealistic youth so ready in their innocence to fall victims to the call of the blatant. Noisy patriotism is not necessarily the most self-less patriotism and indiscretion is no virtue. Obedience has come to stay with man lest he should be a prey to every chance desire and it stays as the bond of rule, and even misrule cannot prosper unless those requisitioned in its service can be held together, be it for the time being, by such a bond. Even anarchy organises anarchists into an association of men and that presupposes obedience. Let not the "*new morality*" of the newest brand forget that fundamental truth. Can *bolsheviks* achieve much by unco-ordinated, disjointed, scattered, aimless, merely destructive activities of men where each man is a leader and nobody is to follow ? And to have a following is to fall back upon that stale, antiquated, now much-hated thing—obedience, discipline! Even a gang of robbers must have cohesion of its members and the tie of comradeship or co-operation and unity of purpose. The spirit of disobedience means disruption for it is essentially anti-social. Obedience worth the name is surely not blind, traditional, conventional or mechanical. It is vitalising—a law by itself growing spontaneously from within and offered voluntarily to the ideal object of one's moral choice. Then and only then it is constructive. It is never subjection to a cast-iron, heartless system or institution. Surely we are no advocates of slavery masquerading as obedience. True discipline, we believe, is healthy and health-giving in its flexibility capable of embracing manifold differences in tone and temper and of adjusting itself to changing phases of national life and the progressive march of humanity suited to the expansive needs, varying with circumstances, of all its constituent elements and component parts. Thus obedience becomes the same as collective control. If modern Germany is to-day so well-organised and great by the help of its "*Kultur*" idea, the foundation was laid, well and truly, by the imperious demand for unquestioning obedience to the State (which, of course, was not a foreign domination any longer) made by Bismarck the Statesman, by Moltke the Strategist and Roon the Army Organiser. Mr. J. Holland Ross is not wrong in observing that "boys like little States sometimes rely on their littleness to move some ill-informed and sentimental bystander to side with them on the assumption, quite as disputable as that in a street quarrel, that the little boy must be the champion of justice and the big boy must be a bully."

The disciplinarian in his turn must also be on his guard that he does not degenerate into a discipline-monger. Mere framing of too rigid rules to be as rigidly enforced at all costs is surely not the last word regarding an academic ethical code by which the highest type of character can be evolved in the youth of a country, who have every right to expect from those who elect to shoulder the serious responsibility of claiming to be the friend and guide of students, large-hearted sympathy with their growing aspirations and a spirit of forgiveness when through youthful impulsiveness they occasionally overstep the bounds of correct behaviour. Moreover, like other ideas, the idea of discipline is subject to change. When a country moves forward economically, politically, socially and intellectually it cannot remain at a standstill in the one sphere alone of academic discipline We of the older generation must be able to adjust ourselves to modern conditions of life or wisely retire from positions of responsibility and trust to make room for men at least more suitable to the new needs of the day. Herbert Spencer holds that the test of culture in a man is his capacity for adjustment to enviornment. We who take our stand on the value of experience and the wisdom of age cannot claim to be immune in this respect. Professor Alexander Gray in a thoroughly Georgian piece of poetry humourously writes on an aging cat—

> " Life will go on for ever,
> With all that cat can wish;
> Warmth and the glad procession
> Of fish and milk and fish.
> Only —the thought disturbs him—
> He's noticed once or twice,
> The times are somehow breeding
> A nimbler race of mice ! "

LOVE AND DEATH

Who loves not love when lover's far
    Shall crave for love in vain.
My lover's far, O my friend,
    'Tis not my loss but gain.
The end of night was near life's end
    When lover was not near ;
Now night may go and day may die
    To heart mine lover's ev'r there.
O Love, be Thou alone my life
To end, of life and death, the strife !

MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJI

Reviews

Antiquities of Indian Tibet, by A. H. Francke, Ph.D., Part II. The Chronicles of Ladakh and Minor Chronicles, Texts and Translations, with Notes and Maps, Edited with Foreword by F. W. Thomas, M.A., Hon. Ph.D. (Munich), Calcutta. (Archæological Survey of India, New Imperial Series, Vol. L). Price Rs. 30 or 45s.

All serious students of South Asiatic history, and particularly those who are interested in the annals and antiquities of the northern borderland of India, will welcome the publication of this valuable work which seeks "to present in a connected text all the historical facts contained in the various MSS. of the West Tibetan Chronicles." The country to the north of the Himālayas has been the scene of the activities of many Indian worthies from the days of Kumara and Şila-mañju, Padma-sambhava and Sānti-rakshita to those of Saratchandra Dās; and ever since the days of Mahārāja Gulāb Singh and his able lieutenant Zorāwar Singh the fortunes of Western Tibet have been indissolubly linked up with those of th~~e fai~~r Indian province drained by the headwaters of the Indus and the Jhelum. No history of the great sub-continent of which Buddhism is one of the noblest products, and Kashmir one of the fairest lands, is complete without a knowledge of the antiquities of the northern realm which the missionary zeal of Buddhist Paṇḍits had civilized, and the valour of Zorāwar had conquered for the Dogra Sardars of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

Among the *pūrva sūris* who made the path smooth for Dr. Francke the names of Csoma de Körös, Cunningham, Schlagint weit and Marx stand pre-eminent. Dr. Francke has taken great pains to supplement the information collected by his predecessors, and bring out a complete edition of the *La-dvags-rgyal-rabs* (the History of the Kings of Ladakh), together with the chronicles and genealogical trees of several vassal chiefs of West Tibet and three short accounts of important events in the history of that little realm.

The Indian student will note with special interest the Tibetan account of the origin of caste (pp. 65, 69), of the divisions of Hdzam-bu-gliṅ (Jambu-dvīpa) (p. 65), of the genealogy of the Sākyas (p. 71*f*), and other Ikshvākus, and their alleged connection with the early Kings of Leh and Lhasa (76*f*), of the spread of Indian culture (art of writing, religion, etc.) to Tibet, (pp. 82*f*, 86*f*, 89*f*) , of the conquest of Kulu (p.96) by King Utpala, and that of Ladakh by Zorāwar Singh (pp. 127, 257*f*). The usefulness of the volume has been considerably enhanced by the inclusion of five maps which will doubtless be of great help in mastering the details of West Tibetan topography.

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Ourselves

THE LATE MR. SASANKAMOHAN SEN.

We are deeply touched by the sudden death of Mr. Sasankamohan Sen, Lecturer in the Department of Indian Vernaculars, Calcutta University, which tragic event took place on Monday, the 16th April, 1928, at his Calcutta residence. Mr. Sen, who hailed from Chittagong, had a brilliant academic career. He graduated in the year 1896 and stood first in Sanskrit. Next year he passed the Final Law Examination and began practice as a lawyer at Chittagong. In 1919 Mr. Sen presided at the Dacca Literary Conference and delivered a thoughtful address which drew the attention of the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee who invited him to the University of Calcutta and offered him the Gopaldas Chaudhuri Chair for Bengali. His vast erudition and his uncommon power of exposition built for him an enviable reputation as a teacher. Himself a poet of no mean order he struck out a new line of interpretation in his study of the poets of Bengal. His critical study of the Bengali poet Michael Madhusudan, several volumes of poetical works and *Banimandir*, recently published, bear testimony to his scholarship and his services to the cause of Bengali literature. We offer our sincere condolence to the bereaved family.

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THE LATE MR. M. N. BASU.

With deep sorrow we announce the death of Mr. M. N. Basu, M.A., LL.B., Bar.-at-law, which melancholy event took place on Wednesday, the 11th April, 1928. Mr. Basu had a brilliant academic career in Calcutta and got a Double First in History Tripos at Cambridge. He was called to the Bar in 1906 and in the same year he was enrolled as an Advocate of the Calcutta High Court. A man of deep scholarship and high character, he was a sound lawyer who maintained the best traditions of the Bar. In private life, he was the best of friends and possessed charming manners. He took an active part in many movements—social, educational and charitable—for the uplift of his countrymen. In his death the Bar has lost a distinguished scholar. Mr. Basu was attached to the Post-graduate Department in Arts (History and Politics) of this University for a number of years till professional success compelled him to sever his connection with the University. He was also a Professor of the University Law College and won everybody's esteem as a kind, amiable and popular teacher. He served the University as a Paper-Setter and Head Examiner in History. We fully share the grief of the aged mother and the numerous friends and relations of Mr. Basu for the irreparable loss that the bereavement has caused to them.

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THE NAGARJUNA PRIZE FOR 1927.

The Nagarjuna Prize for 1927 has been equally divided between Mr. Subodhgovinda Chaudhury and Mr. Manmohan Sen. Mr. Chaudhury submitted a thesis on "The Effect of non-Electrolytes on the Coagulation of Colloids" and Mr. Sen's theses were (1) Studies in the Chromone Series, (2) Pyrylium Compounds, and (3) Syntheses in the Triazine Series. Our readers may be interested to know that the prize is awarded every year out of the interest of a sum of Rs. 10,000 that was placed at the disposal of the University by Sir P. C. Ray, in 1922, for the best piece of research work in Chemistry (Pure or Applied), by any student working in the College of Science.

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THE UNIVERSITY MOSLEM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION.

We are glad to announce that a preliminary meeting was held by the Organisers of the Calcutta University Moslem Students' Association on the 1st of April, 1928, in the Lecture Hall of the Asutosh Building, Calcutta University, with the Hon'ble Nawab Saiyid Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., in the Chair. The aims and objects of the Association were defined, rules for conducting its business framed and office bearers selected. The Chairman very wisely gave a hint that the newly established institution should not prove a rival of the Calcutta University Institute nor enter into politics but should confine itself to social service and the fostering of a *esprit de corps* among the Moslem students. If these aims are carefully kept in view we are sure the institution will add to the amenities of student life in Calcutta and it has our hearty support and good wishes.

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

SIR ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

JUNE, 1928

CALCUTTA MEMORIES

One of the few privileges of old-age lies in the fact that a man who has reached life's evening can find relief from its inevitable miseries by looking down a long ~~vista~~ of past events. My recollections of Calcutta's external aspect in 1870 are extremely vivid, and I am fain to believe that many readers of this Review will be interested in the impressions which it left on the mind of a British lad. Prior to the Mutiny of 1857 India was a close preserve for nominees of the H.E.I.C. and a limited mercantile class. That cataclysm lifted a corner of the veil, and the market was flooded with books describing life in the East : but thirteen years later India was still unknown to the English public. The voyage thither was expensive, and tourist-agencies confined their activity to Europe. Thanks to railways, turbine steamers, motor-cars and aeroplanes the world has shrunk to comparatively small dimensions ; but these devices have robbed foreign travel of the glamour which clung to it in the Victorian era.

The Call of the East was keenly felt by eight young covenanted civilians who left Southampton for Alexandria on August 4th, 1870 in a P. & O. paddle-steamer of 1800 tons. The Bay of Biscay did not belie its reputation, and we were all prostrated by sickness until our storm-tossed vessel anchored in the Tagus, to deliver mails for Portugal ; railway communications having been interrupted by the Franco-Prussian war. On regaining our sea-legs, we gazed with awe on the frowning

Rock of Gibraltar, honeycombed with batteries which were even then obsolete. Malta was our next port of call : and there for the first time passengers were allowed to set foot on shore. So my companions and I chartered carriages for a trip across the island to the Governor's summer retreat, which seemed an oasis of verdure set in a wilderness of stones and stunted olive-trees. We were glad to leave our crowded ship at Alexandria, which contained nothing of interest except an Egyptian obelisk known as "Cleopatra's Needle." It now adorns the Thames Embankment, but then lay on the Mediterranean shore, half buried in sand. The Suez Canal had recently been inaugurated by the Empress of the French but was not ready to receive traffic. It behoved us, therefore, to cross the Desert by rail ; and my only recollection of the journey relates to an infamous meal of goat's flesh and tepid beer which was served at the junction for Cairo.

At Suez the P. & O. steamer *Candia* lay ready to convey us to Calcutta. I must describe that vessel in some detail, if only to illustrate the revolution in naval architecture that has taken place. She was an iron screw-steamer of 2000 tons, and had been launched in 1845. Her plates were enormously thick ; and I was not surprised to learn in after years that the *Candia* was sailing between England and Australia after the removal of her engines. The change was not so radical as it would seem ; for the stout old *Candia* was schooner-rigged, and hoisted sail in a fair wind. Her build did not differ materially from that of Elizabethan craft. The stern was topped by a lofty poop, with a range of hen-coops on either side. Beneath this superstructure lay the saloon. Being situated at an extremity of the ship, it was very lively in bad weather ; and our meals were often interrupted by sounds of woe issuing from the adjacent cabins. Forward of the saloon there revolved a huge wooden wheel armed with steel cogs, which operated others on the screw-shaft. The "Multiplying Wheel," as it was termed, prevented the screw from "racing" when the vessel pitched, but the loss of power involved led to its supersession by a more effectual device. A dread of fire, inherited from the days of wooden ships, relegated smokers to a tent rigged upon deck. Here they were supplied with live charcoal by a Bengali lad who came in answer to shouts of "Chokra!" The commissariat on board the *Candia* was lavish if somewhat coarse. One "saw one's dinner" in the days of Queen Victoria; *i.e.*, every course appeared on the table at the same time. A conspicuous feature was great joints of beef and mutton which the ship's butcher produced from animals awaiting their destiny in pens. Port, sherry and strong beer were included in the bill of fare, and passengers could procure a "peg" (always of brandy) by merely signing a chit. Although the *Candia* was anything but a floating hotel we accepted the discomforts of life at sea as inevitable. The rigid discipline of to-day was unknown, and officers mingled freely with passengers. Concerts and amateur theatricals kept people busy, and the younger folk indulged in bolster-fights after dark. The *Candia* swarmed with cockroaches, and rats sometimes visited the saloon, though they generally kept to the second class quarters—an inferno in the ship's bowels, inhabited by poor Europeans and Eurasians. As far as I recollect no Indians were included in the passenger-list.

Apropos of rats, our friendly purser told me a story illustrating their communal habits. During a previous voyage he was awakened in the dead of night by a quartermaster, who told him that the rats were having high jinks below. The pair crept barefooted into the hold, where they heard a warbling as of the song of many small birds. The space that lay between the cargo and the bulkhead above was lit by a swinging lantern. When the intruders' eyesight had accommodated itself to its feeble light, they saw several hundred rats ranged in a ring. In the central space a huge specimen sat up, casting agonised glances on every side. Suddenly, the chatter ceased; the whole crowd fell upon the culprit and devoured him.

Galle was in those days the port of call for Ceylon. Our ship deftly threaded its tortuous harbour, and passengers were allowed to land for a drive. I shall never forget the gorgeous tropical vegetation which delighted our eyes after a month's confinement. Madras was our next halting-place. The pier which now renders it accessible in most weathers had no existence, and communications with the shore were maintained by a fleet of clumsy Masula boats. The prospect of being drenched in the surf kept most of us on board. Here we parted with the brightest member of our band. He was a Londoner of infinite humour who subsequently blew his brains out in the despair engendered by life in a remote station.

We arrived at the Sandheads on the thirty-fourth day from Southampton, and the *Candia* hove to for a pilot. He came on board from the Lightship—a haughty personage wearing white kid gloves, who superseded our Captain during the perilous voyage up the Hughli ; that famous river disappointed us greatly. Its low banks, fringed with jungle, seemed but a sorry approach to the gorgeous East ; nor did the yarns told by seasoned passengers of tiger-haunted Sagar Island, and the danger of capsizing on the treacherous "James and Mary" Sands, tend to raise our drooping spirits. They revived when the *Candia* steamed slowly past a line of mansions embowered in lofty trees. Garden Reach had once been the choicest residential suburb of Calcutta ; but grandees deserted it when four of the largest houses were allotted to the ex-King of Oudh and his retainers. Here the dethroned sovereign used to employ his ample leisure in composing Urdu verses, and watching the graceful flight of a flock of pigeons. Here, too, the P. & O.'s depot was situated, and our long journey ended when the *Candia* made fast to the wharf. We shook hands warmly with her officers, none of whom did I ever see again. Our fellow-passengers were too busy to think of bidding us farewell. Such as had relatives or friends in waiting were whisked away in carriages to enjoy Calcutta's boundless hospitality ; the less fortunate, myself included, drove to the Great Eastern Hotel, which was then dubbed "Wilson's" after its enterprising founder.

On the morrow my colleagues and I gathered at a dilapidated house in northern Chauringhi which did duty for a Home Office, in order to learn the stations to which we were posted as Assistant Magistrate-Collectors. Then we trooped to Belvedere, with a view of paying our respects to the Lieutenant-Governor. Sir William Grey who held that office, gave us a formal reception and seemed to have an adequate sense of his position as Ruler of Bengal, Behar, Orissa and Assam. His pride had a severe fall a year or so later. On retiring from India he became Governor of Jamaica, and soon after his arrival at Kingston he busied himself in superintending the arrangement of the family portrait which he had brought from England. This was being done by an unusually ~~stupid~~ Negro. "A little more to the left," said Sir William, whereon the picture was pushed a foot the opposite direction. "No, more to the right!" roared the new Governor; and the picture was slued round to an angle of forty degrees. Then he was provoked to fury. Forgetting that Government House, Kingston, was not Belvedere, he gave the peccant carpenter a smart cut with his riding-crop. The Negro at once descended from the step ladder and gathered up his tools. Grinning from ear to ear he snarled, "You tink you're a mighty big Buccra (white man), but I'll run you in. Good marning!" Sure enough there arrived next day a missive inviting His Excellency to answer a charge of assault and battery. It cost him a matter of twenty pounds to escape the ignominy of a public appearance in the Police Court.

The present generation must find some difficulty in imagining Calcutta without pure water or scientific drainage; without motor-cars, autobuses, tramlines, electricity and the other conveniences which render life in the tropics more than tolerable. Bishop Heber declared in his delightful *Diary of a Residence in India*: "People talk of the luxuries of the East, but the only luxuries I am aware of are cold air and cold water—when one can get them." Half a century later things were but little better in this respect. The ministrations of a sleepy punkah-coolie were far less efficient than an electric fan, and the supply of ice was precarious. In the good Bishop's time wealthy Europeans cooled their claret with ice skimmed from shallow pans set out at night during the cold weather. In the 'twenties, however, an enterprising American made his fortune by cutting huge blocks from the frozen surface of a lake near Boston and exporting them to Calcutta, where they were stored in a massive edifice at Howrah. As the precious commodity arrived per sailing ship, stocks were apt to run short at the hottest season. In such cases every subscriber received a notice that ice would be supplied only to hospitals. In the 'sixties of last century a method was discovered of manufacturing ice cheaply by machinery, and several plants for that purpose arrived in Calcutta. Each was bought up and sent back by the powerful Tudor Ice Company: but its monopoly could not be sustained, and the Howrah donjon was demolished.

My last morning in Calcutta was spent in a tour of inspection, for which purpose I had to choose between a "*palki*" and a "ticca gari." The former, each with its quartette of Uriya bearers, abounded in the purlieus of Government House; they were cheap but slow. Ticca garis, *alias* licensed cabs, were ranged in three categories. Those of the first class were conspicuous by their absence; and rumour had it that the term was applied to funeral carriages. The second class ticca was less stoutly constructed but cleaner than the London four-wheeled cab of that epoch. Ticcas belonging to the third class were ramshackle contraptions drawn by half-starved ponies whose eyes betrayed their unutterable anguish. Hailing a second class ticca I managed to make the "Coachwan" understand that I wished to be driven about the streets for a couple of hours.

Calcutta was called the "City of Palaces" owing to the long line of stuccoed mansions which face the Maidan. Bishop Heber said that the general effect reminded him of St. Petersburg, but I saw a closer likeness between Chauringhi and London's Park Lane. Many a house in that famous thorough-fare has associations which should be snatched from oblivion. Take the United Service Club, for instance. It was occupied in the 'thirties by Thomas Babington Macaulay, who accepted the appointment of Legal Member of Council with the avowed object of saving money. An old Anglo-Indian with whom I foregathered in the *Candia* remembered him perfectly, and told me that the great man was noted for his parsimony. He narrated other happenings in Macaulay's brief Indian career which led me to doubt the justice of the virulent attack on Bengalis which I had read in his essay on Warren Hastings. Long after my retirement from the Indian Civil Service I met an elderly Colonel named Macaulay, whose days were spent in playing golf. After telling me that ~~he~~ was the histori~~an's~~ nephew he said :

" A couple of years before Uncle Tom's death he summoned me to his chambers in Piccadilly, and addressed me as follows : 'I have asked you to come here, my boy, in order to tell you some facts bearing on your future career. I am soon to become a Peer of the Realm, and Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to give me permission to insert the name of a blood-relative in the remainder. You are my brother's only son, and have *primâ facie* a right to carry on my title. But my Indian savings have been sunk in an annuity, and I shall not leave you anything to speak of. As far as I can judge you are not likely to earn an income sufficient to support a Peerage. So instead of being a prospective Member of the House of Lords, you shall have a cadetship in the Indian army.' "

Ten years after Lord Macaulay's departure another house in Chauringhi was tenanted by the Pattle family. Its head, the senior member of the Board of Revenue, was a rather morose person who lay under the imputation of having killed his man in a duel. Mrs. Pattle, however, was brilliantly clever, and her bevy of beautiful daughters brought every gilded youth to her house. There must have been many a sore heart in Calcutta when news arrived that three of the sirens had become Peeresses. The ladies of this family must have been exceptionally endowed, for the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, used to say that "mankind consisted of men, women and Pattles." A tragedy attended their departure from India. Old Mr. Pattle—he had come out as a writer during the 18th century—was gathered to his fathers. In pursuance of his death-bed injunctions, Mrs. Pattle had his body embalmed, and sailed for England with the coffin safely stored in the ship's hold. On the third day from the Sandheads a dead calm was encountered, and a poisonous odour pervaded the decks. It soon became evident that the embalmer had scamped his ghastly work, and the offending coffin was committed to the deep with hurried funeral rites. Next morning, however, the Indiaman still lay "like a painted ship upon a painted ocean," and old Mr. Pattle's coffin was seen floating serenely close to the stern windows! His widow never recovered from the shock caused by his reappearance.

Although I had been taught to consider London as the finest city in the world, I was forced to admit that Hyde Park could show nothing comparable with Fort William, Government House, the tropical foliage of the Eden Gardens, or the forest of masts which fringed the majestic Hughli. Indeed no other port could boast of such splendid specimens of nautical architecture; the display was unique and will never recur. There they lay, tier upon tier, ranging from the Liverpool three-master of as many thousand tons down to the graceful opium clipper gauging a third of that burden. The "country ships" which traded with the Persian Gulf and Burma, were even more interesting. That many of them had ploughed the main as Indiamen was evidenced by their lofty sides and their spacious portholes from which cannon had once protruded. They carried Lascar crews, and were often commanded by an Arab, who was styled "Nacoda." One of these ancient craft renamed *Futteh Islam*, was wrecked at the head of the Bay of Bengal. Her crew, however, came ashore in their boats, and as soon as weather admitted they set to work salving the timber with which the *Futteh Islam* has been laden, operations being directed by the Nacoda. Teak is heavier than sea-water, and the pile on which he stood was set in motion by the rising tide. He lost his balance, and both legs were pinned between two enormous beams. The crew launched boats in the hope of extricating their captain, but all their efforts were vain. Despite the agony caused by his crushed limbs, the plucky old man shouted instructions regarding the disposal of his property. Inch by inch rose the remorseless tide ; wave after wave swept over his head and set his long white beard afloat. When they emerged, he continued gasping out injunctions until his voice was stilled for ever.

In the mid-Victorian era, a procession of perfectly appointed carriages used to parade in Hyde Park every fine afternoon between May and July. The Calcutta Maidan offered a similar spectacle, but herein the resemblance between the two cities was superficial. The Viceroy's carriage with its escort of red-coated lancers, and those of three or four Indian millionaires might possibly have passed muster in Hyde Park, but few indeed of the other vehicles which thronged the Red Road would bear a close inspection. In fact every Calcutta *mem-sahib* of 1870 made a point of lolling in a carriage and pair between 4 and 6 P.M. Her vanity often meant short commons at home, and its tangible results were decidedly unimpressive.

After exhausting the European quarter, I drove through Northern Calcutta, where half a million Indians lived and moved and had their being. There my nostrils were assailed by the smell of tobacco smoke, burnt cow-dung, rancid *ghi*, fish being cooked with oil, and outlandish spices. Many years later I encountered the self-same odour in the bazars of Bokhara. At once a vision arose of crowded streets sweltering under a tropical sun, of flimsy shops exhibiting piles of sticky sweetmeats and Manchester piece-goods, of women poising earthen pots on their graceful heads, of half-naked coolies staggering under their burdens of creaking bullock-carts and ticca garis crammed with *Babus* clad in spotless white. I cannot but think the close connection between the olfactory nerves and the memory-cells might be utilized in educating children.

Calcutta left a deep and lasting impression on my mind. Young people seldom look beyond external things; I gave no thought to the tragedies that must have been enacted in its sumptuous mansions, or to the vice, misery and disease which cling to every great city. But, remembering Macaulay's New Zealander, who would perchance survey the ruins of St. Paul's Cathedral from a broken arch of London Bridge, I closed my eyes and fancied Calcutta sinking back into the swamps of the Gangetic Delta, and ~~the~~ Ochterlony Column emerging from a wide expanse of jungle. Verily

> Earth buildeth on earth castles and towers,
> Earth saith unto earth, "All shall be ours."

FRANCIS H. SKRINE

WHAT IS TECHNICAL EDUCATION

The work of the teacher becomes effective long after it is done, and has passed beyond his control. Much of it must inevitably be lost; much of what is not lost, become useless or positively harmful in the years that lie between the sowing and the reaping. If his work is to have any beneficial fruition at all (and unless it is very carefully planned and carried out it will probably not) it is essential that his mind should be pre-eminently a forward looking one. He will habitually look for the future, where alone it is to be found, in the tendencies of the past, and he will regard the momentary present as merely providing the standing point from which he assists as it is his duty to do, the operation of age-long movements, quite beyond his power permanently to deflect or to arrest. To misunderstand and fight against these movements is to waste his life. So much of apology for, or rather explanation of, the following discussion.

Man is distinguished from the other forms of life that are evolving with him by two characteristics which tend to mask his progress and make it seem much slower than it really is. They are his habit of forming large stable associations and his use of tools.

It requires no argument at this epoch to prove that the use of tools is a progressing feature of human life. There are men still living who have seen the coming of the electric telegraph, the electric generator and motor, the motor car, wireless telegraphy, and mechanical flight, to mention only a few of the most striking developments of the last hundred years.

It is, however, customary to conclude such a survey of material progress with a remark that all these things are external. The man himself, it is said, is in no essential different from the Cro-Magnon man of 60,000 years ago. But this is a pure delusion. Progress in knowledge is not commensurate with psychic and intellectual development, but it is easy to show that there has been a considerable change in the mentality of mankind within so short a period as the last 2,000 years. Knowledge accumulates through the mere lapse of time, and depends for its preservation on the existence of only a few studious men. It is far otherwise with political development. That depends absolutely on an intrinsic and parallel development in the minds of mankind at large; in the minds of men who have little knowledge of history, or, indeed, knowledge of any kind.

How far that development has proceeded can easily be gathered from a glance at any historical atlas. The progress in the size of the free political unit is even more striking than appears from the map, because a given area in these days represents an enormously more numerous aggregation than it did in those.

Now, one of the necessary conditions of a large free association is a considerable degree of uniformity in the units. It is perhaps quite true that this age can exhibit no minds more powerful than those of certain of the Greeks. But it is a matter not of supposition but of historical fact that the Greeks in spite of every encouragement were quite unable to form and maintain a political unit of more than a few thousand individuals. The nations of to-day comprise millions for their thousands. Nor can it be contended that this is in any way due to better communications. These are of yesterday and have still to affect the changes in the nature of man that must follow from them as intrinsic change always does follow on change of environment. The great spiritual advance of the past sixty generations has been an advance in toleration and mutual understanding. The uniformity which is a necessary condition of stable grouping, makes it very difficult to appreciate any change that is occurring at the present time, for much the same reason that no one afloat in mid-ocean notices the rising tide.

Any one can see from the ancient writings that there were minds in ancient times very much superior to the average mind of to-day. But we are considering not the potentiality of man as exhibited by those exceptional individuals in every age, but the actual state of mankind in general. And with regard to that there is no ground for pessimism and every reason to rejoice in a continuous and even accelerated progress.

It is not, as we know, accompanied by any physical change, for the simple reason that the use of tools has made such change quite unnecessary and quite futile. Much is being said in these days of sudden and great favourable mutations. But what mutation could endow man with the power of flight within a generation? What development of claws and teeth could arm a people as the Japanese have armed themselves within the last fifty years?

We have past the stage of physical evolution, as we have past the stage of the enormous growths of size which distinguished the antidiluvian reptiles. Growth of the individual soon reached the limits fixed by the ordinary laws of mechanics, and was replaced by group association. In its turn physical expertness has given way to the use of tools, because it is quicker to make and use a tool than it is to alter one's own body, and because a tool can be designed and made exclusively to serve its purpose, whereas a hand must necessarily be made out of a foot, and if wings are required they must be made out of the same unsuitable member. The result is that the hand thus made is very inefficient at everything it does: You *can* comb your hair with your fingers or screw on a nut, or write a letter, but the comb, the spanner, and the typewriter specially designed for their purposes serve them far better.

Physical mutations do emerge in these days but they are always sternly suppressed as a nuisance. The body left to itself would get rid of its vermiform appendix (at the cost of a few million painful deaths, the usual method of physical evolution) but it is not allowed to do so. The body which we actuate has long since solved the problems of its physical existence. A man has less need of physical efficiency than a tiger has, and has in fact never attained to such excellence, either before or since his emergence as the King of Life.

We have already remarked that the evolution of the hand or the wing from the foot is a change of function in a pre-existing organ. It is a first attempt in specialization of some one part of a body at first undifferentiated. A jelly fish is *all* stomach, and also all brain in as much as it has any brain. Many people would deny that it has but they would be wrong. It cannot be said that the creature is brainless that shrinks from what is harmful, and embraces what is beneficial. Most of a man's knowledge of what is beneficial to him or the reverse is quite as instinctive as that of the jelly fish. Large tracts, possibly most of our brains, are concerned with activities so instinctive as to be quite unconscious. We do not see, hear or feel by any conscious process.

On the other hand consider some of the phenomena of metabolism; for example, the control of breathing. An increase of the partial pressure of Carbon dioxide of 0·2 per cent. will cause an immediate doubling of the respiration. There is no evidence that the brain has anything to do with this action, but it is a far more intelligent act than most seeing, feeling and hearing. . Examples could be multiplied indefinitely all pointing to the conclusion that the association of mind exclusively with the brain is a superstition of the same character as the association of emotions with the heart. The brain is not noticeably changing in size, but that is no evidence whatever that no intellectual development is taking place. The relation between mind and body is a complete mystery, and it is merely ridiculous to suppose that thought can be measured with callipers and a foot rule. A man's true religion is known not from what he professes, but from what he does, and the nature of his mind is known from his behaviour, and in no other way.

In these days the great majority of men are engaged in peaceful pursuits. A hundred generations ago they were endeavouring (with few exceptions) either to kill or to avoid being killed. This is a change, and a growth, which we cannot help but conclude is an advance since it is a movement away from cruelty, pain, and death. It is good, it is an undeniable fact; and arguments about the size of the skull are irrelevant.

What (if anything) has all this got to do with technical education? In India, it has everything to do with it, because it is there a deeply rooted idea dating from time immemorial that all Arts and Crafts are purely mechanical, and as such contemptible, and conversely that abstract thought is essentially spiritual and to be revered. It is, and always has been, a wrong, and dangerous idea. Rigid classification is a fallacy to which the Indian mind, in spite of its remarkable penetration in most directions, is particularly liable. Classification is, like number, a rough expedient. No physical quantity can be exactly expressed as a number, and no exact thinking can be based on a system of classification. No manifestation of man's personality can be either purely intellectual or purely physical. The two aspects must be considered jointly if any useful result is to be deduced. The two activities, physical and mental, must both be exercised if the man is to be healthy; to have, as the old saying puts it, "A sound mind in a sound body."

We have seen that such an act as closing the eye against a grain of dust is the result of a subconscious act in the brain, is in fact a skilful act. The same is true of the movements of a trained fencer. Both are in the ultimate analysis mental. Now: the eyes can be protected and reinforced by spectacles, and the swordsman however skilful would be lucky if he escaped with his life from a quite unskilled opponent armed with a revolver or a bomb. These more effectual expedients are also due to a mental process, but they differ from the earlier ones in being conscious, and in that no long process of evolution is required to train the eye to use spectacles or the hand to use the revolver or the bomb. Again, consider the art of firemaking. Most people know that the earlier method was by means of friction, the usual formula being " rubbing two sticks together." This is one of the careless things teachers and parents tell their innocent children and, naturally, the poor kids immediately try it. (We all have.) What can they conclude except that their parents and teachers are shameless liars? The thing is impossible!—to this generation. The production of fire in that way was an act of great skill, requiring long training. The fire-maker of a paleolithic tribe enjoyed as much reverence as the Pope now does. Flint and steel requires much less skill than the two sticks, the lucifer match less still, and the electric lighter none at all, even in a gale of wind.

It would be wearisome to detail other examples. All, if examined over a sufficiently long period, would show that a well-established and invariable feature of human industry is a progressive decline of skill accompanied by an emergence of continuous consciousness of what is popularly called " brain work." This has taken some time, and perhaps a little tedium to establish, but this article would be justified by that alone if it convinced *all concerned with it that Technical Education in these days tends to be more and more exclusively a training in the art of logical thought, and less and less a training in skill.*

It is of great importance in this period of rapid progress that teacher and organizer should always be considerate of the fact that most of the students' training will have to be applied not now, but during the next thirty or forty years. A guildsman of Europe or the member of a working caste in India in past times might safely devote all his youth to the acquirement of manual skill and a large stock of empirical formulæ, with confidence that they would last his time.

It was even not too late to train a boy in coach-building in 1828, on strictly skilful and empirical lines. He could be trained to recognize a correct shape without calculation of strength, and trained to make it as an art. But that method could not be applied to the motor car in 1928. New models, and new engines come out every year. Few, if any of them, are made by skilled workers, and their shapes throughout, beautiful as some of them are, are the results of scientific calculation and only to a very minor degree due to aesthetic instinct.

It has been well said by a modern writer that we should "remember that we are mortal and seize our opportunity here and now of filling our lives with the things that are eternal." This is a maxim of very wide application and, transcendent as it may appear at first sight, it is in fact one of the basic principles from which have sprung the immense achievements of Applied Science. It is perhaps true that no theory, and no formula of science, is everlasting. But it is true that science proceeds on the basis of generalisations such as those of Galileo, Newton, and Carnot that last for centuries. These are the things that should constitute the back-bone of a modern technical education. It is right and proper that the principles should be constantly exercised on the engines, machines, and structures of the present moment; it is all wrong to make these the beginning and end of the instruction, or to force the lasting principles out of the student's mind by means of a plethora of evanescent details. He is being trained not for to-day, but for the years to come, when every one of these machines and structures will be out of date, but when it will still be true, as Carnot proved over a century ago, that no engine can be more efficient than a reversible engine; that impulse is equal to change of momentum, as Newton showed two centuries ago; and that heat is a form of energy. These great generalizations are for this generation and probably for a good many in the future "the things that are eternal" and therefore the things with which their education should be principally concerned. There *was* a time when mere manual skill was worth acquiring, and would provide a living for as long as its possessor lived but these days are no more. During the late War against Germany all the skill required to work modern machines producing work of an accuracy our forefathers never dreamed of was acquired by the women of the warring nations in a few weeks. All merely skilful men were easily dispensed with. The ones who could *not* be spared were those with technical knowledge.

There are many people who resolutely close their minds to the inevitable replacement of skill by thought. The tendency is disliked, and its very existence either denied or deplored as a symptom of decadence. It is not realized as a displacement of one form of self-expression by another more efficient. It is often said for instance, that the machine-made article turned out in tens of thousands reduces all men to a dead level of monotony which is a great change for the worse from the days when men made their own clothes and utensils. But it is simply not true. The diversity of clothes, of vehicles, of every accessory of life, is far greater in the streets of Calcutta, where everything is machine made, than it is in any tract of the mofussil containing millions of inhabitants, who make everything for themselves with their hands.

What is a work of Art ? Is it not the translation into visible and tangible form of some dream of the artist ? It cannot be a work of Art if its form, be it a picture, a sculpture, a building, or a garment, is not the form the artist intended to produce. It is only by dint of long practice that a skilled draftsman can divide a line an inch long into 200 parts. But almost anyone (including the artist) can divide it with the aid of a machine, into five thousand parts. Any form of line or surface may be produced with similar accuracy. In the pre-machine days the artist could only partly materialize his dream. He was strictly limited by the imperfection of his own hand, which was continually doing by pure accident things he never intended it to do. It is a false and contemptible idea of art that there is beauty in these pathetic failures. No man can see the difference between an inch and an inch plus one thousandth of an inch, and therefore it is possible by machinery to place a line *exactly* where the artist desires to place it. There is no necessity for approximation. Moreover these exact reproductions of the artist's (craftsman's) conception can be produced not only singly, but in thousands, to the immense enrichment of mankind in general. There are those who object to that, who think it desirable and right that they should be unique possessors of whatever they do possess. Of that desire it is only necessary to say that it is evil, anti-social, and undeserving of sympathy.

There was a time when books were reproduced by copying them out in handwriting. They were of course very costly. It was quite possible for one person to be the proud possessor of an unique copy. Examples were not wanting of such people refusing to allow a copy to be made. No doubt they were the ancestors of those men of to-day who so strongly dislike the idea of everyone having what they have. No honourable compromise can be made with tendencies of this character. They must be resolutely opposed wherever they appear, no matter how plausibly they may be disguised. Culture to the full extent of his innate capacity is the right of every man. Any endeavour to make it the monopoly of a class or of an individual is opposed to the natural direction of the development of mankind. Such endeavour must always fail in the ordinary course of events. Every healthy-minded man must wish it to fail. If and when it becomes possible for one class, or for one individual to rise more than a very little above or fall more than a very little below the level of his fellow men, the death of humanity as a whole will be at hand. The difference between one man and another may have immense effects on their personal destinies but it never is, never can be, and ought not to be, in itself more than a tiny difference. Those communities in which such differences are smallest are the most healthy. It is right and proper for a man to take pride in his difference from other animals. It is silly and wicked to take pride in any difference from other men. It is such a very minute difference if it exists at all.

A pound of coal which costs one-fourteenth of an anna can be applied to do the mechanical work of 6 men for one hour. These six men could not be maintained alive for less than three annas for every hour they work. The measure of man's effectiveness in mere brute labour when he uses modern machinery as compared to his effectiveness when he works mechanically with his hands is therefore as three is to one-fourteenth, or as forty-two is to one. This final consideration clinches the argument against the view, upheld by many people in India, that discussions on technical education are unnecessary because the extension of the use of machinery is undesirable.

It is very desirable, and might under certain circumstances be right, that large numbers of the people of a nation should devote themselves to purely spiritual contemplation "the world forgetting by the world forgot." But it could not be right if it meant that their hungry brethren should go still more hungry in order to support them, or that the already overburdened should be still more cruelly laden.

What and where are the people of India? They are not, I think, those few that inhabit her great cities. They are those who go forth to their labours, men, women and children from a million villages while the stars are still bright in the sky to return only when they are bright again. And what is their reward for this endless, monotonous, unintelligent labour? A home like a pig-sty, a poor cloth to cover their nakedness, and no more than enough food to keep them alive. How can any culture however refined be honourably supported on the backs of such as these?

Every now and then there is born in these villages a divine child ; one who, if he ever came to know the world into which he is born, could be a lamp to light the world for generations. But he never emerges. The far horizons of space and time are not for him. He perishes like the rest. He has his dreams for a few years no doubt, and is happy in them. The loss is more ours, than his.

They say that India is an overcrowded land ; poverty-stricken because its area is not sufficient to support the multitudes that inhabit it. It is very strange. The Census of 1921 showed that the population of India is 177 per square mile, rather less than a third as dense as the population of England and other European countries. I do not think that India is less rich in natural resources than England or the United States. On the contrary, it is probably richer than either. The number of people that can be supported on a given area depends on the use they make of it. A vegetarian population can be much denser than a meat-eating one of course. It is a very wasteful way of using the products of the earth to consume them at secondhand. The animal preyed on is a very small proportion of the food that was required to bring it to maturity.

The misery of India's "teeming millions" has nothing to do with their number. Ample material for a scale of living quite as luxurious as obtains in the West is lying at their feet. Provided they eat what they grow, directly, instead of feeding it to animals; a thousand people can be amply fed, clothed and housed from a square mile of average land. Of course the land must be fertilized and cultivated by modern methods, which require the co-operation of the engineer and the chemist. Given that, it can be done, and is being done over considerable tracts of the world. The principal barriers to a similar achievement throughout India are conservatism and lack of education. She has a great initial advantage in the fact that the majority of her inhabitants are already vegetarian. A vegetarian diet gets a maximum of nourishment out of the soil, is healthier, and supports laborious days far better than meat does. It was on a vegetarian diet that the Roman people conquered the world, and on a meat diet that they lost it. A meat diet is proper for an animal whose life is a long lethargy punctuated by brief intervals of fierce and murderous violence. It is the worst possible for hard and continuous labour either physical or mental (there is no distinction between these as regards the food that sustains them).

As the arguments of this chapter are dispersed over a wide field, in which their logical sequence may not have been very obvious we will conclude with a brief summary of the principal conclusions. In the first few pages it was shown :—

(1) *That the maturing of an educational effort is slower, and human evolution faster, than most people suppose them to be.*

(2) *That, therefore, the educational plan should take account of the fact that it will be effective in a changed world.*

(3) *That it is possible to foretell in some degree the nature of the future from a study of the past.*

(4) *That as regards technology the main tendency is to less skill and empiricism, and towards more brain work, and more application of seietific method.*

Social results were then considered for the benefit of those who shrink from mechanisation as materialistic in tendency, and it was shown :—

(a) *That no curtailment of spiritual activity, and no mechanisation of the mind of man is involved but that the tendency is in the opposite direction.*

(b) *That the extended use of power-driven machinery means (in accordance with the desire of its users) either more leisure for general culture, or more wealth, or both.*

Finally it was suggested :—

(1) *That there is nothing in the Indian land or the Indian social system to prevent mechanisation except conservatism and lack of the right kind of education.*

(2) *That the possibilities were on the contrary greater than in typical European countries already mechanized to the fullest extent.*

L. D. CONESLANT

BRAHMANISM AND SCIENCE

It may not be wholly unprofitable to examine the present conflict between Science and Christianity in the light of Brahmanism. The rule of faith and conduct of Brahmanism is contained in the ten Upanishads, traditionally known as the Mahā or great Upanishads, namely, Isa, Kena, Katha, Mundaka, Mandukya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Chhandogya and Brihadāranyaka as also in the Brahma Sutras and the Bhagavad Gita. These three sets of Scriptures are similarly known as the " Prasthanatrayam " or the " three-fold path." It is noteworthy that the ten Upanishads, between them, represent the four Vedas, Isa being merely a selection of mantras or stanzas of the Yajurveda. The Brahma Sutras are a collection of aphorisms or sutras, classifying Upanishadic doctrines for convenience of the student. The Bhagavad Gita, which is widely translated, is an exposition of the same doctrines in a more popular form and language. All other scriptures, recognised in Brahmandom, are for edification and not authoritative, except in so far as they echo the teachings of the "three-fold path." In case of the slightest disagreement they are to be put aside, as wholly devoid of authority.

Savara Swami, the exegetist of Vedic Ritualism, technically called Purva Mimansa, gives a very clear exposition of the rational basis of Scriptural teaching which is obviously super-rational. His exposition is founded on technical logic and psychology, not easy for general grasp in the present day. An attempt to modernise his thought may not be inexcusable. The normal sources of right knowledge are sense-perception and the logical faculty. The sphere of sense-perception is confined to sound, touch, visible form, taste and smell responding to ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. The work of the logical faculty is either deductive or inductive. Induction leads only to probability and not to certainty which, along this line, can only be attained by omniscience, unclaimed by all users of the inductive method of acquiring knowledge. In deductive logic the major premise must be more extensive than the conclusion. Obviously, therefore, the all-comprehending cannot be the conclusion of any process of deductive reasoning. And yet the Scriptures declare that the ultimate Reality—the Being *per se* is none of the objects of the senses or their aggregate. Nor can that Reality or Being be spoken by speech or minded by the mind. So the Scriptures teach. Whence these teachings? Their source is designated Revelation in English, in which the substance of Scriptural teaching indicated can be stated thus :

God can be apprehended and not comprehended. That God is can be conceived but what and how He is is inconceivable. This truth is received by faith and not by knowledge with the full assent of reason which points out that if the words, giving birth to faith, did not indicate truth their very existence is inexplicable. Exegetists teach that the Scriptural teachings are correctly understood only when they are seen to point to something, untouched by sense and the logical faculty. "Apurvata," that is, dissociation from sense and reason is the essential characteristic of the truth, declared by the Scriptures. All scriptural statements whose meaning lies within the sphere of sense-perception or of the logical faculty, must be taken as "Arthavāda" or figurative and not literal or Yathārthavāda. There are other tests of true spiritual interpretation, though not of great use in the present connection. They have to be stated only for the sake of completeness. Harmonious relation between the beginning and the end (" Upakrama," " Upasanhāra") repetition in different forms (" Abhyāsa ") and usefulness (" Falasruti ").

In these observations relating to Brahmanic faith an attempt has been made to avoid all theological technicalities, not necessary as a disclaimer of originality of the present effort.

They are intended to serve as preparatory to the consideration of the present-day conflict between Science and Religion. The apparently rational basis of the conflict will disappear on consideration of the respective spheres of Science and Religion—Science lies within the sphere of sense and logic while Religion is admittedly super-sensuous and super-rational as distinguished from irrational. Reason, though not the generator of Religion, cannot be discordant with it. The relation with sense is similar. Religion is hospitable to sense which, however, cannot touch Religion.

To descend to particulars. The main conflict is between narratives of creation, contained in some writings, regarded as holy, and the scientific doctrine of organic evolution.

In the most authoritative scriptures of Brahmanism different descriptions are given of creation. For instance compare Chāndogyopanishad (III, 19) and Aitareyopanishad (IV). Sankara in his commentary on the text, last referred to, clearly states :—

“नहि सृष्ट्या ख्यायादिपरिज्ञानात् फलं किञ्चिदिष्यते ।”

(No benefit can, in truth, be expected from knowledge of narratives of creation and others of that kind.)

The only object of such narratives seems to be to teach the value of super-temporal peace against unresting change and the contingent character of all our existence.

Some Brahmanic scriptures give the fœtal history of the human individual which is practically identical with what Haeckel calls the doctrine of recapitulation. One wonders how Science will explain the existence of types. Specks of waggling matter, called protoplasm, which Science cannot distinguish from one another, develop very differently—one into a vegetable, another into an animal and the third into a human being. Imagine the absence of pre-existing individuals of these types and and then search for explanation of the difference in typical development, estimating the chances of success in the search.

Then comes the question of speech, the vehicle of Revelation. At the outset one is met with the distinction between sound (in Sanskrit *Dhvani*) and word (in Sanskrit *Sabda*). The sound of a loud explosion startles, frightens and may result in the hearer's running away. But it generates no idea for intellectual apprehension, capable of being connected with other ideas and communicated to others. While a word, for instance, "love" or "fear," gives rise in the mind to a definite and abiding impulse, operative in action, feeling and thought, long after it is for the first time heard and it capable of communication to others independently of gesture. The most noticeable peculiarity of word is its pervasiveness in regard to the whole of conscious life and freedom from the restraint of individual life and its conditions. In short, word generates mental modification, dissociated from the body and its functions and is pervasive, permanent and communicable.

In an authoritative Sanskrit treatise on the subject, though not of the highest spiritual value, the genesis of Word is traced through four stages. A ray of thought impinges on the individual consciousness from a source to that consciousness unknown. This immediately generates the impulse to find for it an expression in word which, when found, excites the effort for its utterance with which the cycle is completed. The thought impulse, undefined, is known as "para," the supreme, in the next stage it is named "pasyanti" or watching (literally, the seeing one). In the stage immediately following it is "madhyamā" or the middle one, when the word, though unuttered, is known to the would-be utterer and when uttered it is "vaikhari" or the sharp one.

In the universal aspect word is known as the Word-God (Sabda Brahma). Lakshmanacharya of Kanauj in his "Sarada tilak" sums up the Tantric teaching on the subject.

The first in thought, but not in time, is Nāda (literally, sound) but in this connection unconditioned consciousness—**नादात्मानदति स्वयम्** (literally, the sound spirit sounds of itself). Thence is determination or the determining point, Vindu. From Vindu are the three powers, namely, cognition, impulsion and inhibition. Consciousness or sentience, thus viewed, is Sabda Brahma or Word-God. He says : "It is my conviction that Sabda Brahma is the consciousness of all individuals—**चैतन्यं सर्व्वभूतानां शब्दब्रह्मेति मे मतिः** ."

The enquirer may be usefully referred to the opening chapter of the Gospel of St. John.

The above summary may be guilty of prolixity. But some reference to the subject seems necessary for an examination of the relation of speech to organic evolution.

The subject for consideration is the absence in the animal world of word, as distinct from sound. In brief, words have a meaning independent of the sound, as is evidenced by the existence of synonyms in the same language, apart from figurative expressions. In the animal world are found bark, grunt, twitter, chirp and other forms of acoustic expressions. They are useful in maintaining individual and associated life. Impulses of fear and other preservative and associative instincts are expressible by the animal call. The sphere of word is far more comprehensive. Word can express the ideas of cause and effect substance and form, certainty, contingency and so forth. A shout may be helpful in avoiding danger to life and limb but can it, independently of word, express the emotion of fear, apart from its bodily effect? This peculiarity of word is called "sphota" by the school of Panini. Take, for example, the word "go" (गो) meaning cow. On its utterance images of cows, different in colour and form, present themselves to different hearers. *Sphota* is the potency of a word to evoke in individuals thought-images of different forms but all belonging to the same class. Sankar accepts the existence of "sphota" but rejects its eternal character as maintained by the Panini school.[1]

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[1] Sankara's commentary on the "Brahma Sutra." Thibaut's translation (S. B. E., Vol. I, pp. 204-209).

Thus viewed, word appears to be *sui generis*. Will it be unpardonable to invite the attention of Science to the peculiar characteristic of word? In conclusion Religion may well say to Science—" Now let us shake hands and part, each to his business."

MOHINIMOHAN CHATTERJEE

THE NEW CONTENTS OF SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND NATIONHOOD

II.

1918-20. **Pethick Lawrence:** *A Levy on Capital.* He believes that the hardship inflicted on the very rich by a severe levy on capital at the end of the war will be a less evil to the country as a whole than any other measure that might be adopted to meet the situation. "Rich men have increased their wealth during the war without special exertion and as a result of the necessities of the nation; they can hardly complain if they are called upon to give the whole or part of this increase." The levy is to be extracted *once and for all* for the "specific purpose of expunging or reducing the National Debt (£m. 6,000). The rate will be "graduated" on all the wealth in the hands of individuals but "fixed" on *part of the wealth* in the hands of clubs and institutions. The "general capital levy" thus raised can not only sweep away the entire national debt but render unnecessary the corporation tax, profits taxes and taxes on food as well as remove the floating debt and reduce normal income tax from 6*s.* to 4*s.* and the other rates of income tax and supertax to two-thirds of their present level. *Cf.* **Snowden,** *Labour and National Finance* (1920). Proposals of capital levy have been made in Germany in 1919 as well as by the Giolitti Ministry in Italy. Snowden does not want the capital levy to be a permanent feature in the public finance. It is not to be periodical. "The possibility of a periodic levy on capital would discourage saving, it would keep the commercial world in a continual state of uncertainty and it would arrest trade enterprise." The words "capital levy" convey to the popular mind the idea that it is proposed to tax only capital invested in industry. The scheme would be "more accurately described as a tax upon accumulated wealth in all its forms, *e.g.*, land, minerals, houses, Government and municipal bonds, shares, mortgages, stock-in-trade, furniture, pictures, jewellery, etc.

SECTION 2.

Some Post-War Political Philosophies (1919-1927).

1918-22. New constitutions are established in Soviet Russia, the German Republic (1919), the Tchechoslovakian Republic (1920), the Austrian Republic (1920), the Polish Republic (1921), the Jugoslavian Kingdom (1921), and the Irish Free State (1922).

1919. Elections to Italian Parliament: 150 "communists" (Leninists) and 100 "popolari" (democratic, Catholic, popular party) are returned. There is a genuinely democratic parliament for the first time in Italy. Russian influence is preponderant. The **Nitti** Ministry fails in one year and is succeeded by the **Giolitti** Ministry which attempts legislating against the war-profiteers—"a sort of sugared Bolshevism." Workingmen on strike take possession of factories (1920).

1919-27. **Zaghlul Pasha** (1861-1927): *Autobiography* and *Letters* (in Arabic manuscript, in part summarized in German by an Egyptian friend Dr. Sabit). He begins to take interest in politics in 1911 with the commencement of the Kitchener regime; establishes the National Party in 1918 and is interned by the British in Malta while proceeding to Paris to take part in and otherwise influence the Peace deliberations (1919).

According to him no political party should consider the interests of the party superior to those of the country. Every party should always attempt to unite all the political groups. Party fanaticism is to be thoroughly condemned. The best statesmen are those that keep close to the joys and sorrows of their people and avoid mysterious and secret cabinet politics.

He attaches no importance to the "political education of the youth" of which so much is talked of everywhere to-day. The greatest statesmen have had hardly any political schooling in their younger days. The politician is different from the poet. The latter has to give expression to emotions, and needs the faculty of speech, but the politician has to express himself through deeds and needs character.

Zaghlul imparts a "nationalistic" bent to Egyptian politics and earns the opposition and hatred of the religious coteries that are the staunch upholders of extra-national tendencies in Islam. Against the attacks of the religionists, from the Pan-Islamist camp he defends his nationalism on the ground of requirements suited to the modern age. In regard to the universalistic, international tradition of Islam his nationalistic attitude is clearly embodied in the following slogan: "March separate but strike united." It is not possible to achieve anything to-day as in the Middle Ages through fanaticism and religious wars, says he. The construction of strong states is the first desideratum of modern times.

Japan, according to him, should be the object of imitation to all Asian races on the question of relations with Western civilization. Zaghlul spurns the idea of boycotting or standing aloof from European culture and advises all Oriental nations to assimilate as much as possible the advantages afforded by it. In his judgment the countries and peoples of Asia have derived more benefit than loss, both economic and political, from the influence of Europe. He believes also that the economic and financial development of Egypt through English co-operation since Lord Cromer's time is remarkable.

Zaghlul's nationalism is positively against pan-Islam, as indicated above. But it is quite pan-Asian. The presenting of a united front by all the Asian peoples, when it should come to be a reality, would mean not an aggressive war upon Europe, says he, but only an act of self-defence against all imperialistic attacks.

One reason why the Asian is behind the culture of the West lies in his unreasonable repression of women. Zaghlul endorses with sympathy Kemal Pasha's efforts to enancipate the Turkish woman and would like to see the same attempted among the other Moslem nations.

Zaghlul knows that politics is only the art of what is possible. He is a *Realpolitiker* even in his orientations to the British Government. In other words, he is not an "extremist."[1]

1919. J. A. **Hobson** (1858-): *Taxation in the New State.* He thinks that though modern state finance has been moving empirically towards a recognition of the fundamental truth that only surplus income, *i.e.*, economically unnecessary payment to owners of some factor of production, possesses a true ability to bear, economists and statesmen alike still cling to the looser and defective statement of this principle conveyed in the first of Adam Smith's four maxims of taxation. In his judgment, all economic rents of land, whether scarcity or differential rents, all interest, profits and other payments for the use of capital, brains or labour, which are due to superior economic opportunities and are not necessary incentives to secure such use, will rank as surplus, and accordingly have a full ability to bear taxation. He would make the state the "residual owner of all income which exceeds the requirements of maintenance and normal growth." It need be observed that Hobson endorses the capital levy.

1919. *Fasci italiani di combattimento* (Italian Fasci of Soldiers), established at Milan, amalgamates all the different groups of *fasci* in Italy. The extremists are known as *futuristi* and *arditi.* The programme is determined by **Mussolini** in consultation with **Marinetti, Bianchi, Rocca** and others as follows: (1) Political: proportional representation, woman suffrage, lowering of age-limit of deputies from thirty-three to twenty-five, abolition of Senate, a three-year National Assembly to draw up a new constitution for Italy, national council for labour, industry, transport, etc. (2) Social: eight-hour day for working men and peasants, participation of workers' representatives in the technical and organisational management of factories, administration of railways by railway men's union. (3) Military: formation of a national militia, nationalization of munition and equipment factories. (4) Financial: heavy supertax upon capital, sequestrations of a percentage of the wealth of religious bodies, appropriation of 85 per cent. of war profits. Fascism "in power and office" (since 1922) has, however, almost completely repudiated the whole of this radical programme.

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[1] Dr. Essad Sabit's article on "Zaghlul Paschas Memoiren" in *Deutsche Rundschau,* Berlin, January, 1928. Zaghlul is known to have been an inspirer of Sarwat Pasha's negotiations with Sir Austen Chamberlain in regard to an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. In March, 1928, the provisions of the proposed treaty are found to be too moderate for Young Egypt since Great Britain is not prepared to renounce the control over Egypt's foreign relations, communications with the world as well as intercourse with the Sudan.

1919-21. Indian National Congress: Sessions at Amritsar, Calcutta and Ahmedabad. Presidents: **Motilal Nehru**, **Lajpat Rai**, **Chitta Ranjan Das** (in gaol, replaced by **Ajmal Khan**). The ideology is embodied in the following items: (1) protest against the Government of India Act, 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford Act), (2) preparedness for individual and mass "civil disobedience," (3) non-co-operation with the existing Government, implying (*i*) the giving up of official titles, (*ii*) the boycott of official Durbars, (*iii*) the boycott of Government schools and colleges, and (*iv*) renunciation of candidature and voting for councils as constituted by the Act, (4) revival of hand-spinning,—*charkha*—to combat imports of British cloth.

India protests against the Treaty of Sevres in behalf of Turkey and starts a vigorous Khilafat agitation, thus taking an active part, for the first time perhaps in modern history, in international diplomacy. Altogether, the activities, inspired as they are by both internal and external stimuli, assume the character of a more or less "mass" movement in which the popular elements in both Hindu and Moslem communities function as self-conscious and politically minded items. The Indian nationalism of these days is no longer an aspiration of the mere middle-class and English-educated circles but is to some extent, and this also for the first time since 1905, a genuinely popular (peasant and workingmen) ideology. This mass upheaval in India is in no inconsiderable degree to be interpreted as an after-math of the feelings and ambitions awakened by the Great War and by the Russian Revolutions throughout the world and has its Eur-American counterparts in the ultra-radical, socialistic and labour achievements of the period.

This is the epoch of Mohandas Karamchand **Gandhi**, who, in spite of external and circumstantial differences, plays the role of a half-Lenin and a half-Mussolini in the utilization, to a certain extent, unconscious although, of the mass-forces. In his social philosophy, his ostensible anti-Westernism notwithstanding, Gandhi is, besides, a disciple of Ruskin as regards condemnation of industrialism and an almost literal paraphraser of Tolstoy as regards denunciation of the state and advocacy of non-violence. Stripped of all metaphysics, his non-cooperation = away from the state = anarchism (*cf.* Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tolstoy). One remembers likewise the anti-statal, Spencerian indifferentism of **Tagore's** *Swadeshi Samaj* (1904).

It need be observed, however, that Lenin, the *avatar* of proletarianism, is the exact antipodes of Mussolini, the destroyer of Bolshevism and embodiment of aggressive neo-nationalism. Likewise is Ruskin, the anti-democratist and upholder of the authoritarian state as well as champion of social control, paternal interference and " state-socialism " (?), the farthest removed from Tolstoy and the other democrats, individualists and anarchists. But the eclectic alchemy of Gandhi's political philosophy has evolved an amalgam out of heterogeneous world-forces, not excluding the traditional *ahimsa* (non-killing) of his ancestral Jainism. And paradoxically enough, his idealism of love and soul-force finds the most realistic expression in his unmystical and perfectly positive cult of enmity to the textile industry of Lancashire.

1919-22. **D'Anunzio** captures Fiume. The *Fasci di combattimento* (association of soldiers) begins to get support from the " war-profiteers " and other sections of the financial aristocracy in order to work against (*i*) the rising tide of socialism (Leninism) and (*ii*) the Giolittian legislation of semi-expropriation. Propertied classes destroy the socialist organisations in Southern Italy (1920). An epoch of Fascism *vs.* Socialism (1921) and growing Fascist opposition to Parliament, universal suffrage and democracy begins. **Mussolini** marches on Rome (October 1922).

1920. **Webb.** *Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain.* The commonwealth would levy "revenue on the citizens in proportion to their relative ability to pay. It would offer compensation for the industries expropriated. In regard to the burden of compensation the idea is that the taxes are to fall almost entirely on the property-owners as a class. The same principles are advocated by **Kautsky** in *Labour Revolution.*

1921-22. The "New Economic Policy" re-establishes capitalism and private property in Soviet Russia. At this stage **Lenin** declares that "capitalism is an evil in comparison with socialism but capitalism is a blessing in comparison with medievalism, with small industry, with fettered small producers thrown to the mercy of bureaucracy." He would not prevent the development of capitalism but "direct it in the path of state capitalism."

The N.E.P. comprises, among other things, the abolition of "nationalization," the replacement of confiscation by a regular system of taxation, the grant of concessions to private businessmen and organization of trusts.

1921. **Bryce** (1838-1922), *Modern Democracies*, presents a conservative and cautious estimate of the achievements of the republics.

1921. **Laski** (1893-): *Foundations of Sovereignty. Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (1917), *Authority in the Modern State* (1917), *Grammar of Politics* (1925). Justice is more important than government,—hence anarchy preferable to injustice. Justice is a question of "inherent" natural rights of the "individual." Some of the "natural rights" of to-day are freedom of speech, living wage, proper amount of leisure, power to combine for social effort, and economic minimum for all. Decentralization of authority or diffusion of freedom among individuals or groups is one of his slogans. Administration is to be subject to law. Sovereignty of the state is negatived. He makes extensive use of French thought bearing on the sovereignty of law (*cf.* translation of Duguit's *Les Transformations du droit public* as *Law in the Modern State,* 1917) and popularizes DeMaistre, Bonald, Lamennais, etc.

1921. **Spann:** *Der wahre Staat* (The Real State), *Gesellschaftslehre* (Theory of Society). He condemns Darwinism because of its absence of metaphysics, and materialism because of its antipathy to "moral worth." The three types of individualism, namely anarchism (*e. g.*, Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum,* 1844, The only one and his property), Machiavellism and Natural Right, are theoretically untenable in his judgment. The prevailing types of universalism *e. g.*, (1) the environmentalism of Buckle, Taine, Gumplowicz and Karl Marx, (2) the "social instincts or impulses" theory of the psychologists who begin with Aristotle's definition of man as a "political animal," and (3) the "ideal" philosophy of Plato, the Scholastics, Hegel and the Romanticists, are likewise inadequate to explain the value of the individual, says he.

"Kinetic" universalism is established by him as a theory that does justice as much to the independence of the individual as to the vitality and genuineness of the whole. He believes that the spirit of an individual realizes itself and begins to function only when it is enkindled and excited by another spirit. A pure, *i.e.*, exclusive individualism, is psychologically inconceivable. No spirit without the contact of other spirits, *i. e.*, a "two-ness" (*Gezweiung*) or community. The child and the mother create each other's individuality so also do the pupil and the teacher. He analyzes the categories of justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, functions of the state, and law from the standpoint of his kinetic universalism and advocates the *Kultur-staat* as opposed to the minimum-functioned police-state of individualists but objects to the all-interfering, " to-death-governing " state of Plato. Free play is allowed to " revolution " in order that the society-forming processes in individuals may be reorganised, reformed and re-knit.

He complains that the leading German economists, *e. g.*, **Sombart, Buecher, Brentano, Philippovich, Schaeffle, Wagner** and others have failed to expose the theoretical fallacies of **Karl Marx** and have virtually surrendered themselves to him, and although to a certain extent critics of Marxism are spiritually half-Marxists or Marxists in disguise. A front-attack is attempted by Spann on the Marxian theories in economics, sociology and politics.

His own political philosophy is based on two postulates : (1) equality among the equals, (2) the spiritually (mentally and culturally) higher to discipline and rule the spiritually lower. Internal equality is the characteristic of all communities. This leads automatically to the formation of " small groups " or associations. In opposition to individualism which encourages " atomistic equality " as well as " direct and centralized " state-organisation, the philosophy of kinetic universalism believes in the dictum " to each one his own."

Characteristics of this system of politics : (1) Organic inequality although equal importance of the parts, (2) hierarchical differentiation in values, *i. e.*, inequality of the different parts according to their worth, (3) the members of the state are not individuals but " communities " in and through which the individuals have their existence. These communities function as wholes, although partial wholes, in a larger whole. Hence the constitution (*a*) is not to promote centralisation but must respect the independence of these partial wholes, (*b*) is to help forward " indirect " instead of direct participation, and (*c*) is to further the organic interdependence of the partial wholes and discourage their atomistic separatisms. Instead of one people the theory recognises "many communities," "groups," societies, circles or classes (*Staende*). Hence instead of "one government" there are to be "many partial governments" or group-administrations.

He analyses these "partial wholes," "communities," "groups," or "classes" psychologically as well as anthropologico-historically with reference even to ancient Iran and India, criticises Plato's class-state or group-state as defective because it makes no distinction in economic class between the leader and the others and because it gives the philosophers the right to lead in political matters. Spann's decentralized *Staende-Staat*, community-state or group-state will render a complex bureaucracy unnecessary. The primitive peoples did not possess an alleged "communism" as taught by **Laveley, Buecher, Morgan, Engels-Marx, Kautsky, Bebel,** etc., but possessed group-hierarchical community-states. In the place of the old "communities" new communities have arisen in the epoch of capitalism. These are (1) cartels and monopoly-organisations among employers, (2) trade unions among workingmen. He discusses the future potentialities in the organisation of groups or communities from the standpoints of the existing classes including the latest *Arbeiter-rat*, *i. e.*, "works-council." According to Spann this institution, although "Sovietic" in external form, can in reality be to a certain extent traced back to **Bismarck** who wanted to get some substitute for "boring parliamentarianism."

The *Staende-staat* (class-state, community-state, or group-state) will give so much of the economic and administrative functions to the groups that the central state itself will be left in charge mainly of the "idealistic" functions (higher politics and culture), *e. g.*, religion, education (not technical, however, which belongs to the group, but general), law (not economic legislation however), army, etc. Political parties of contemporary types will cease to exist. This community-state possesses only an external affinity with the gild-socialist state but is essentially different from it. He considers gild-socialism to be defective because it tends to create equality among the unequals by establishing national productive societies, abolishing the distinctions between proprietors and property-less and allowing every individual the right to consume out of the public wealth. Gild-socialist state is in the last analysis very centralized and therefore as utopian as communism. In his judgment the tendency of political reconstruction in recent times has been in the direction of establishing the groups or communities as political factors; *e.g.*, the *Reichswirtschaftsrat* (Imperial Economic Council) of Germany is an anticipation of an Economic Parliament, a House of *Staende, i.e.*, groups, communities or classes.

1923. **Pound** (1870—), American : *Interpretations of Legal History, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (1922), *The Spirit of the Common Law* (1921). He develops **Jhering's** theory of the satisfaction of human interests, claims or demands as the chief item in law. Compromise between the group interests is an objective reality. Social engineering as achieved in legal history is not all " conscious " law-making but includes tradition and custom as well. He lays stress on " social purposes " rather than on " sanctions."

1923. **Ferrero.** *Tragedia della Pace* (Tragedy of Peace), *Da Fiume a Roma* (From Fiume to Rome), 1919-23. For a century the peoples of Europe have recognised only two principles of authority, the dynastic and the democratic principles. They do not yet recognize as a principle of authority the dictatorship of any organized minority, either of the proletariat, or the trade unions or the saviours of the country. Now that the world-war has virtually destroyed the dynastic principle there remains only one principle, the democratic. Everything outside is sheer force or terrorism, Red or White. Fascist Government is " illegitimate." The constitution was violated : an act of revolution. But it was not overthrown; the revolution was thus not complete. The constitution remained but tolerated a reduplication of the principal organs of the state; parliament and Fascist Grand Council, army and Fascist National Militia, prefects and Fascist delegates. A parliamentary democracy with a small private army in its midst, at the disposition of one party is an absurdity which cannot have a long life. Liberty, understood as the right of opposition, is a vital organ of the modern state. There are too many people in the world, there is too much diversity and confusion of passions, ideas and interests. Every country will be split up into at least three or four great parties, some even more. The two-party system is no longer a possibility. The Mussolini regime is a system of personal government reproducing that of Giolitti and his predecessors.

1923-27. Post-war currency-reform, consisting in " deflation " and in the march " back to gold " begins with Soviet Russia (1922-23), is then consummated in Germany (1923-24) and finally reaches Great Britain (1926) and Italy (1927).[1]

1924. Deposition of the Caliph and abolition of the Caliphate by the National Assembly of Angora. The humiliating Treaty of Sevres (1920) is set at naught by **Kemal Pasha's** triumph over Greece and the Treaty of Lausanne (1922). Abolition of the Sultanate is consummated (1922). The New Turk becomes democratic and secular.

1924. **Mussolini** speaking at Costanzi Theatre (Rome) before 4,000 Fascist mayors says in part : " The postulates of democracy were good enough for the nineteenth century. They must now be replaced by the principles of the *national state.* I am antidemocratic because the evils which have befallen Italy and which would have brought the country to the verge of ruin are to be ascribed to democracy and democratic scepticism."

1924. **Mellon**, Secretary to the Treasury (American) : *Taxation—The People's Business.*

He takes his stand against the surtaxes, the inheritance from the Great War. During that time normal tax rates were increased, and a system of surtaxes was evolved in order to make the man of large income pay more proportionately than the small taxpayers. He wants people to understand that high rates of taxation do not necessarily mean large revenue to the government and that more revenue may often be obtained by lower rates.

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[1] For the theories and experiments, see the chapters on currency in Sarkar's *Economic Development* (1926).

Most of the European countries, except Great Britain, attempted to finance the war largely on borrowing. America, on the other hand, attempted to raise one-third of the current war expenses by taxation. New taxes such as income and excess profits taxes were developed. But there is a limit to the amount of taxes that can be levied without absorbing the profits which should be put back into business for increased production. Altogether his argument is directed against the "levy on wealth" (*cf.* the "capital levy" policy of British Labour). Taxation, says he, is "not a means of confiscating wealth but of raising necessary revenues for the Government." "Our civilization, after all, is based on accumulated capital." "Any policy that deliberately destroys that accumulated capital *under the spur of no necessity* is striking directly at the soundness of our financial structure."

Just as labour cannot be forced to work against its will so it can be taken for granted that capital will not work unless the return is worth while. It will continue to retire into the shelter of tax-exempt bonds, which offer both security and immunity from the tax collectors.

The Treasury has accordingly recommended that a maximum surtax of 25% plus 6% normal tax be imposed in lieu of the 50% tax now levied on the largest incomes. Such a reduction is necessary in order to attract the large fortunes back into productive enterprise.

1924-27. On April 12, 1924, **Sun Yat-sen** enunciates at a conference his three principles for the reconstruction of the "national government" (Southern China with capital at Canton). In the first place, the government is to attempt everything in the line of ministering to the "livelihood of the people," for example, by developing agriculture and textile industry, constructing houses, and building up the means of communication. In the second place, the "authority of the people" is to be promoted by the government. In other words, the government is to take upon itself the task of educating the people in the exercise of suffrage, recall and referendum. And thirdly, the government is to assist the people in the efforts at achieving "autonomy," oppose all external aggressions and render itself independent of foreign control.

Sun Yat-sen believes that these principles can be realized in three successive periods or stages. The first stage is to be characterised by the "rule of force" as embodied in a military government. The "education of the masses" is to be the feature of the second period while a "real constitutional government" can be established during the third. It is in the first period that China finds herself to-day, in his judgment.

The *Kuo Mingtang* (nationalist, democratic party), accepts the three principles in which is to be read the latest "nationalistic" philosophy of Young China. Sun Yat-sen, however, seems to die (1925) as a confirmed labourite and communist, for in order to realize his nationalism he formulates a three-fold policy. And this is embodied in (1) co-operation with Soviet Russia, (2) assimilation of Chinese communists as an integral limb of the nationalist party, and (3) promotion of the working class and peasant movements.

His mantle falls on **Chang Kaishek**, who for a time combines bolshevism with nationalism and is well supported by Russia. But by the end of 1927, Chang develops a thoroughly anti-bolshevik policy and attempts purging the *Kuo Mingtang* party and Southern China of all communistic and pro-Russian elements. He is in fact alleged to be responsible for the "white terror" which has involved the execution of 5,000 to 28,000 communists.

There are, then, three leading currents in Chinese politics to-day (end of 1927). First, there is the thoroughly anti-bolshevik and perhaps "anti-democratic" nationalism of the northerner **Chang Tsolin**, head of the government at Peking. This current is condemned as militaristic and unconstitutional by Sun Yat-sen's party. The second current is that represented by the moderate Southerner Chang Kaishek, who is perhaps democratic and constitutional as far as Sun Yat-sen might have wished to go, but who is not idealistic enough to carry on the latter's labour-philosophy, communism or pro-Russian sympathies. He is an ally and promoter of "capitalistic" interests, both Chinese and foreign, and is therefore condemned as a "traitor" and "betrayer" of Young China's cause by the radicals or extremists. These latter represent the third force and consider themselves to be the inheritors of Sun Yat-sen's last political testament and will, namely, democratic *plus* communistic nationalism. It may be noted that the widow of Sun Yat-sen is an extremist and an exile in Russia, while the son a "moderate" or "realist" belonging, as he does, to the Chang Kaishek group.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA.

During the Great War, the district of Shantung is won from Germany by Japan (1915). But Japan is compelled by the Washington Conference (1922) to part with it and restore it to China.

In the meantime civil war breaks out in China as several times before since the republican revolution of 1911-12. By 1920 in the struggle against Tuan Sihuem's dictatorship, China becomes the battle-ground of four parties in four more or less well-marked regional jurisdictions. The whole of South China belongs to the "nationalist," "democratic" and anti-foreign party, the *Kuo-Mingtang*, headed by Sun Yat-sen, who establishes the government at Canton. Sun Yat-sen enjoys the friendly support of Soviet Russia. In the North there are three generals contending for supremacy. General Chang Tsolin holds Manchuria in the extreme north. His supporter is Japan. Chihli, Shantung and Kiangse, *i.e.*, the middle-north is occupied by General Sao-kun who enjoys American friendship. The third power in the north is General Wu Peifu, who holds the south-western districts. His patron is Great Britain.

In 1926-27 "mass activities" in the communistic sense are prominent features in the political life. The main brunt is borne by the Chinese capitalists and landlords. Besides, the *Kuo Ming-tang* party, officially established in the government at Nanking (as opposed to the government at Peking), cultivates financial and military *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia and succeeds in de-concessionizing Hankow,—virtually through the "direct action" of the mob. And this leads to the rupture of diplomatic relations in Europe between England and Russia. The representative of the Southern China government, Chen, confers with O'Malley *re* the retrocession of the British concession and comes to an agreement (Feb. 1927).

The agreement marks, however, the end of communistic revolutionary activity, and Chang Kaishek, the leader of the Southern government, becomes a "moderate" or "reformist," in his orientations to Soviet Russia and in regard to foreign political and economic influence, especially that of Great Britain and Japan. In the North, the head of the Peking government, Chang Tsolin, continues during the entire period quite amenable to British and Japanese influence, and thoroughly immune to Bolshevik overtures.

At the end of 1927 Soviet Russia is dislodged from Southern China and the main block of the *Kuo Ming-tang* becomes non-communistic and even aggressively anti-bolshevik and anti-soviet. And both in the North and the South the foreign powers seem to regain their traditional prestige, both economic and political, with slight modifications, if any. The problems of extra-territoriality, concessions, tariff autonomy and political sovereignty as well as North *vs.* South, remain virtually as they ever were.

Young China's history, so far as nationalism and constitutional democracy are concerned, is tending to repeat itself once more. The situation is rendered complicated on account of the existence of the "left wing" of the *Kuo Ming-tang* party as a radical communistic element, although for the time being muzzled and inarticulate, in the political life of the people, both at home and abroad.[1]

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

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[1] "The Eternal Chinese Question" in Sarkar's *Politics of Boundaries* (Calcutta, 1926) and "The Problems of Young China" in *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta, 1927); Millard: *Conflict of Policies in Asia*, London and New York, 1924; Dubarbier: *La Chine contemporaine politique et economique* (Contemporary China, Political and Economic), Paris, 1926: Duboseq: *La Chine en face des puissances* (China facing the Powers), Paris, 1926; Mazzaleni: *L'antagonismo anglorusso in Asia nell ultimo ventennio* (1907-1927), Anglo-Russian Antagonism in Asia during the last two decades, Pavia, 1927.

In spite of the political feuds China has been steadily advancing in industrialism, says Dubarbier. The love of the fatherland that has been awakened in China need not necessarily become anti-alien, but its character will depend upon the attitude of the Powers, according to Duboseq, who says, further, that Southern China is not a mere tool in Soviet Russia's hands, as generally suspected, but is nationalist and statesmanlike enough to be able to utilize Russian assistance in her own way.

A GERMAN INVADER OF THE ENGLISH STAGE IN THE EARLY DECADES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

For centuries previous to the era of the Romantic Revival, Germany figured in the balance-sheet of literary historians as a debtor country to England. The latter since the Restoration had been dominated by ideals imported from France. For a whole century or more England lay at the feet of her neo-classical neighbour. But the whirligig of time brought its revenges and the opening years of the nineteenth century saw Gothicism reigning in the world of poetry, fiction and drama. It is true that even before the arrival of the German invaders the neo-classical fortifications had been breached from within by the wave of Celtic Revival, though sometimes, so far as the stage was concerned, the results were most amusing. It is said that in the production of *The Fatal Discovery* (1769) by John Home—the author of *Douglas* (1757)—the hero of the play was decked out "in gold and purple, and a Grecian palace was allotted to the monarch of the rock."[1] But soon the scene-painters were busy transforming the Grecian palaces into slimy old caverns, mouldering graves and *rococo* castles, till with the advent of Kotzebue Gothicism was fully established on the stage.

For nearly thirty years this "profane Marsayas of the German Parnasus" dominated the English as well as the continental stage, acclaimed as the greatest dramatist of Europe since Shakespeare, while his betters—Schiller and Goethe—enjoyed only a very short spell of success. In 1800 the English stage versions and translations of his plays reached the record number of seventy-one, and his popularity became so immense that it fairly threatened to destroy all indigenous efforts.

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[1] Nicoll, *British Drama*, p. 312 (quoted).

Then began a systematic and often not too scrupulous campaign against Kotzebue in particular and the German drama in general by Canning and Frere. Schiller's *Die Raüber* was parodied in the *Rovers*,[2] the satirists alleging that the author had put robbery in such a fascinating light that "the whole of a German University went upon the high way."[3] Goethe's *Stella* was sneered at as "a genteel comedy which ended by placing a man Bodkin between two wives like Thames between his two banks."[4] But Kotzebue was the strategic point and the main battery was trained upon him. The patriotic party saw in him one who trafficked in the forbidden fruit of revolutionary ideas and their policy became the proverbial one of throwing as much mud as they could, in the hope that some was bound to stick. Their attacks on that account were not always frontal. Their organ *The Anti-Jacobin* set about this business with more zeal than honesty. According to it Kotzebue was a revolutionary—a Godwinian; his Elvira in *Pizarro* was denounced as "a complete Godwinite female, a stark, staring Mary all over."[5] He was one of the Illuminati—an order founded at Ingoldstadt in 1776, whose general aim was moral enlightenment, but like all secret societies terribly mysterious in its dealings. The English people had their dread of the Jesuits unabated and the attack told particularly well in an age of organised prejudice against freedom of thought. Rationalism, Jesuitism, Jacobinism and all the rest of the flesh-creeping 'isms' of the day were at once associated with him. Even the translators of Kotzebue were threatened. "It is not for me to class Miss Plumtre amongst them (*i.e.*, the Illuminati), nor even Mr. Sheridan—but if I were, who should disprove my assertion" thundered the *Anti-Jacobin*.[6] Much of this artillery-action calls for nothing more than a smile to-day, but it impressed the middle-class playgoers and readers at a time when the memory of "the red fool-fury of the Seine" was still vivid in their minds.

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[2] *Poetry of the Anti-Jacobin*, ed. C. Edmunds, p. 152 ff.

[3] *Cf.* Poetry of the Anti-Jacobin, p. 153.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] The Anti-Jacobin Review, Vol. 3, 1, p. 209.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 208.

There were others who accused the German dramatist of immorality. An anonymous London gentleman wrote of Kotzebue's plays in the following terms which anticipate in a manner Byron's attack in the *English Bards.*

> "There passion lawless, wild and unconfin'd
> Usurps its empire o'er the yielding mind ;
> Spurns at all rule, and owing to control,
> At length to frenzy drives the feeling soul "[7] etc.

And Sheridan is condemned for joining "the translating crew" and banishing "Avon's bard for Kotzebue." Another poetic critic arraigns the German author for corrupting the taste of the age with "pangs unfelt before and crimes before unknown" and concludes his rueful ode in the following strain—

> "The fair, by vicious love misled
> Teach me to cherish, and to wed,
> To low-born arrogance to bend,
> Established order spurn, and call each outcast friend."[8]

Snobbery and nothing less is the curt judgment of the present day accustomed to calling a spade a spade.

There is yet another group of critics whose animus against Kotzebue was better grounded. Lord Byron was one of them. He laments that

> " Shakespeare, Otway, Massinger forgot,
> On stalls must moulder or in closets rot "[9]

and appeals to Sheridan to give "one classic drama and reform the stage."

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[7] *On the Prevalence of German Drama on the English Stage* (1800). It was noticed for the first time by Koeppel Englische Studien, Vol. XIII, p. 530.

[8] The Annual Register :- Ode on the German Drama.

[9] *English Bards,*

Thomas Datton similarly in the *Dramatic Censor*[10] argues against Kotzebue from the nationalistic point of view. "For," says Dr. Gillet, "the threatened contract between the London managers and Kotzebue for a regular supply of his newest manuscripts might have imperilled the existence of English drama in this age of weakness had it been carried out."[11] Thus, during the opening years of the century Kotzebue flourished on the English stage, supremely and exclusively dominating it; but to-day he has apparently faded from memory like Prospero's cloud-capped, gorgeous palaces leaving scarcely a rack behind. It may therefore be of interest to analyse the reasons for the extraordinary popularity as also the equally extraordinary fall of this theatrical Charles X.

Kotzebue arrived on the English stage during the lean years of native talent and consequently had no serious rival in the field. Secondly, he passed current ideas and sentiments already spreading in England through the novels of doctrine and the revolutionary pamphlets. His attacks on positive law and the tyranny of the idle-rich struck in with the vein of advanced thought that had already found its way into the country through the influence of Rousseau and Tom Paine. Besides his prevailing tone is sentimental and therefore in harmony with the temper of the contemporary stage. While this readily gained him an audience it made him at the same time false to reality, to those eternal verities of human nature upon which the greatest dramatists of the world have founded their plays. Often he is charged with immorality, but this is not true; he may be weak but he is never wicked. Nothing can demonstrate his strength and his weakness better than an analysis of some of his plays.

The Stranger is perhaps his most significant contribution to the English stage of the Romantic Revival. In it we have at once a restatement of the problem of Thomas Heywood's *A Woman Killed with Kindness* (1607) and an anticipation of the problem of Ibsen's *The Lady from the Sea* (1888). Adelaide, the young and immature girl-wife heroine is a sort of Ibsenian doll-wife. But Ibsen keeps closer to reality and his play is more thought-provoking. Heywood's tragedy, though giving free scope to sentiment is still truer to life and is of harder grain. The reconciliation in Kotzebue's play between the injured husband and the faithless wife is rather facile, and the hero's invective against Europe—"this cultivated moral lazaret" seems hysterical. But as a new type the value of *The Stranger* is not to be lost sight of.

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[10] *The Dramatic Censor*, 1800, Vol. I, pp. 62-63.

[11] *The Nineteenth Century*, April, 1912 : A Forgotten Creditor of the English Stage by Jos. E Gillet. In 1811 Kotzebue was again ridiculed, and perhaps for the last time as the craze was dying away, in a burletta called *The Quadrupeds of Quadlinburgh*, (1811).

The tragedy of *Adelaide of Wulfingen* is violent, unnatural, savage, and much in the nature of the Post-Shakespearian horror-drama of the Ford-Marston-Shirley group. As a matter of fact the whole tragedy is summarily anticipated and may have even been suggested by one of the speeches of Malevole (Altofronto)[12] in the *Malcontent* (1604) the joint work of Marston and Webster. The tragedy is blood-curdling, the theme is altogether unsavoury, yet the question raised may not be altogether unreal. *The Virgin of the Sun*, another of Kotzebue's stage-successes, is all Rousseauism and revolution. It is the dream of the hero of Tennyson's *Locksley Hall* come true, and an early anticipation of the theme of Laurids Brunn's *Van Zanten's Happy Days*. There is in it a note of broad humanitarianism of doubtful sincerity. The theme is not altogether new but the spirit is of the age. The result, more often than not unhappy, of the impact of aggressive Western civilisation on the life of a primitive race had before been touched on by Shakespeare in the *Tempest*. But Kotzebue's point of view is that of the political propagandist and the revolutionary enthusiast enlivened with something of the Immanental Philosophy of Germany.

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[12] See *The Malcontent*, I.3.11, 155-162.

> "This is but a heathen temple—yet God is everywhere—
> here, too, where in the image of the Sun, the creature worship his Creator."

Don Alonzo Molina is a Rousseauesque hero who forsakes his countrymen because of their abhorred cruelties towards the Peruvians, whom the hero offers to defend in the name of God and humanity. But inspite of its tone of liberalism the reader cannot help suspecting that the author is perhaps in sympathy with Valverde's sentiment.[13] On the whole, however, Kotzebue touches something abiding here. It is his one play that may win the suffrage of a modern audience. The only objectionable feature is his want of artistic reticence in certain parts (notably in the dialogue scene between Cora and Alonzo outside the temple wall when Cora reveals her precarious condition). Here in the effort of being outspoken he is merely vulgarly suggestive in the manner of some modern musical comedies.

His *Pizarro*, which took the contemporary stage by storm, is a sequel to *The Virgin of the Sun* and is drawn from French sources.[14] It is a tragedy with the features of a "*drame*." The only thing that is tragic in the whole play is the death of Rolla—who is too theatrical to be convincing. The death of Pizarro awakens neither pity nor awe. "Its beauties," as Gifford correctly sums up, "consist in pathetic sentiment and energetic declamation ; an attention to dramatic situation and stage effect." [14] Its phenomenal stage success was due, as Darley says, "to all the transatlantic bewitchery of leopard-skin petticoats, belts and baldrics of beads, baubles, clinquant tin and shining braziery, etc.," [15] that is, to its spectacular character, its melodramatic surprises, and its full-gallop of sentiment ridden to froth. It is the lineal ancestor of modern Drury Lane dramas like *Rose Marie* and *Aloma*, wherein we see the persistence of those delights which charmed a British audience a century ago.

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[13] Valverde (to Elvira). You are a sweet disciple of the doctrine called humanity. Nothing so easily excites enthusiasm as words which have no meaning : *Pizarro*.

[14] The Anti-Jacobin Review, Vol. 6.11, p. 454.

[15] London Magazine, Vol. 8, p. 83.

In the Elvira-Pizarro relationship, however, there is a truly modern note. Perhaps the author is touching here another social problem which had come into existence with the far-flung colonies and dependencies of the European nations both in the old world and the new.

In the *Lovers' Vows* we pass more definitely into the realistic atmosphere of problem drama—into a study of problems nearer home. The story of the play is that of a simple country girl named Wilhelmina who has been seduced on a promise of marriage by Baron Waldenhaim. Frederick is born of this relation and his mother brings him up with the greatest difficulty. In the meanwhile the Baron marries a rich heiress more suited to his position. Of this marriage a daughter Amelia is born but her mother dies soon after. The play opens with Frederick's return home from the war, poor and destitute. He encounters the Baron on the way, attempts to rob him and is taken captive and thrown into the castle-dungeon. His identity is known and the repentant aristocrat makes amends by marrying the mother and legitimising the offspring. Amelia is wooed by a Frechified German Count but is in love with the pastor. Ultimately she is happily wedded to the adored pastor with her father's blessings and the Frenchified suitor is dismissed with ridicule for want of patriotism. The Pastor-Amelia sub-plot is a modification of the romantic love-interest of *Romeo and Juliet* and a definite anticipation of John Westland Marston's *The Patrician's Daughter* (1842) as well as that of H. Granville-Barker's *Marrying of Ann Leete* (1899) without any of the latter's biological interpretations of love. The main theme of the play is still more modern in tone. The unmarried-mother problem has been touched on by many a modern writer including Bernard Shaw and the solution that Kotzebue offers is certainly not to be despised. It must, however, be admitted that Kotzebue's treatment of these social themes leaves much to be desired.

For one thing, he is too sentimental and strains situations in order to bring about a heart-easing conclusion. Thus he lacks the severity and uncompromising truthfulness of the modern writers on these problems.

In *Count Benyowski* Kotzebue in manner points the way to Tolstoi, Dostoievsky and Gorky. In this play the scene is laid in the criminal settlements of Siberia, and we are told of the horrors and sufferings of those unfortunates whose only crime is the love of liberty.

> "Days and weeks creep slowly after each other, and the victims of despair perish imperceptibly. Putrefaction alone enforces from tyranny the last favour of being buried in the snow."

But here again Kotzebue misses fire. His rhetoric is unconvincing and his picture does not become real as such pictures do in the pages of Tolstoi or Gorky. His bias towards verbiage and the claptrap leads him off the scent into romance, love-making and sensationalism and a great opportunity is thus lost. The opening scene of the play deserves notice as supplying Tennyson with the model of the opening scene of his *Becket*. The game of chess here as also in Tennyson's play becomes symbolical of the contest in which the interest of the plot centres.

Many were the reasons for Kotzebue's success some of which we have already considered above. The stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century was changing, and the new stage called for a new technique. Kotzebue had grasped this fact as nobody else in his time had done. He, therefore, conformed more strictly to the limitations imposed by the new stage, relying for effect on action, and unfolding his plots in prose dialogues, not however, of irreproachable merit but still easily understood by his audience recruited mostly from the lower orders of society to whose uncultivated taste the intricate beauty of blank verse was caviare. Often his plots, *e.g.*, in the

Lovers' Vows, involved a past drama in the present, which was not revealed in the sleepy narrative-wise of Shakespeare in *The Tempest* but rather in the manner of Ibsen in the *Pillars of Society.* This method of interweaving and involving a drama of the past with a drama of the present gave to some of his plays a depth and richness of texture hitherto unpractised in an age when the Elizabethan method of bringing the whole action within the dramatic framework still passed current.

It is perhaps true that Kotzebue did not follow a high standard in his art; that he followed the taste of his audience instead of leading it. His audience wanted excitement, thrills, sensations and he gave them all that they delighted in. His characters again, are all set-types without subtlety, variety or depth. The young, innocent maiden, the artful villain, the immaculate hero, the philanthropic friend, are repeated from play to play. But even in these he showed he knew the possibilities of such characters in the hands of actors who knew their business. Thus, when the rather shadowy sketches of Kotzebue were filled with the life and body that Kemble and Mrs. Siddons gave them, they never failed in becoming effective. This absence of fulness of characterisation in his plays made them all the more welcome to the actors who were always eager to create original parts. Besides, all his plays contain star-roles, the secondary characters being often unimportant. Their successful production therefore did not call for an all-round cast such as, for example, Shakespearian plays do. The high-flown rhetorical speeches in which they abound offered an additional attraction to the players in an age when 'spouting' was still the proper business on the stage and the absence of which poor Telfer in Pinero's play lamented in a later age.[16] Not only did Kotzebue thus enlist the support of the great actors, his plays offered opportunities to the decorator, the scene-painter and the machinist alike—men who had come into considerable importance in the nineteenth century theatre and were not to be put by, if the audience were to get their money's worth. To all his plays he gave a rich, romantic setting—the mountains and forests of Peru, the temples of the Sun, the fortresses and castles of middle ages, the ice-wastes of Siberia. No playwright offered such a bill of fare; nor were these all. Masses of men and women in rich and striking costumes, artillery that banged and banged again, and perhaps realistic water, too were there to make his hare-brained audience stare and gasp, and applaud him to the echo.

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[16] Telfer the old-fashioned actor in Pinero's *Trelawny of the Wells* complains of the plays being lacking in speeches such as one could dig one's tooth into. P. 176.

Apart from the above reasons there was yet another and a powerful one, too. The most popular of his plays were pronouncedly of the "*drame*" type, which while retaining some amount of tragic seriousness and passion secure an ending that is comforting. To him perhaps belongs the credit of establishing this type which had a special appeal for the auditor of the age, who, according to Professor Schelling, " had long lost the robustness of constitution necessary to the endurance of the rigours of tragedy; and while willing to be harrowed and thrilled by situations at which good taste in any age must revolt, demanded to be sent home satisfied that no real harm had been done to any human creature, that morals had been upheld, the wicked reformed rather than punished, the good substantially rewarded for being good."[17]

Thus, this "profane Marsyas of the German Parnasus" gave to the English stage a turn which continued almost throughout the whole century to influence its course. He has been a most powerful factor in demonstrating that literary or poetic gift is not essential for the success of a playwright. He has shown that the point of view of the theatre and that of the study are far apart; that a play to be successful on the stage does not call for great ideas greatly expressed, but requires a well-knit intriguing plot, situations, incidents and such other absolutely non-literary qualities. It is perhaps on this account

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[17] F. E. Schelling, *English Drama*, p. 311.

Dr. Gillet makes him responsible for the severance of the idea of poetry and literature from the drama, "And now," says he, "after more than a century has elapsed if you hear critics complaining about the poverty of the English stage, say Kotzebue. If you wonder at the number of tragedies in verse with or without 'pageant,' announced in the publishers' lists, which have never been, and will never be on the playbill............................... say Kotzebue."[18] This statement in spite of its exaggeration has considerable truth in it. Kotzebue by giving exclusive importance to the acting qualities helped in the growth of the erroneous belief which is noticed even at the latter end of the century among some of the popular playwrights, that literature is not only non-essential for dramatic purposes but is positively devastating to the drama.[19]

The real fact, however, is that a crisis was shaping itself even from the era of the Restoration—the drama of the old tradition was dying, though dying hard, and Kotzebue hastened the inevitable. But the animus against this German adventurer has been so strong since his own time that his true significance in the development of modern drama is more often than not ignored. His cynical indifference to literary and poetic qualities is now a matter of common complaint against him. His use of outworn devices like the soliloquy and the aside, his indiscriminate mingling of rhetoric and imitation, his rather crude theatricality have all been repeatedly censured by his critics. But his definite contributions to the theatre have nearly always been passed over. It is not to be denied that he established though he did not originate the *drame* type; that he definitely began the modern problem drama; but above all, he emphasised the value of construction, and demonstrated more palpably than anybody else before him the composite character of the dramatic art by acknowledging the intimate relation of the drama with the theatre, where the playwright, the actor, the scene-painter, the decorator, and the machinist must each have his own place if the highest results are to be obtained.[20] Hence it is that Professor Robertson says, " When the worst has been said of Kotzebue, he remains one of the most fertile and ingenious writers for the theatre that ever lived; and he has influenced as no other playwright, the entire development of the drama down to the present day. Indeed, in the evolution of modern dramatic technique his work was even a more important factor than that of Scribe a generation later." [21]

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[18] The Nineteenth Century, April, 1912, *op. cit.*

[19] *Cf.* Sidney Grundy: "How many a sound and stirring play has held the audience firmly in its grip until—thud! down comes a piece of literature like brickbat.................. Away goes the play, away go the players, and we see nothing but a dismal library and an old professor, in blue spectacles, with a wet towel round his head." In his attack on John Palmer's *The Future of the Theatre*, Grundy indulges in similar invectives. See S. Grundy's *The Play of the Future*, pp. 8-9.

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[20] Not a little of Shakespeare's unequalled popularity in his own day was due to his capacity for utilising to the fullest and best advantage the resources of the stage such as his theatres could command. Judged by this test alone he would still be the foremost dramatist of his age.

[21] J. G. Robertson, *A History of German Literature.*

N.B.—In the preparation of this essay I have consulted Benjamin Thompson's translations of Kotzebue's plays in his *German Theatre* in six volumes published in 1800.

SECONDARY EDUCATION IN BENGAL[1]

I feel overcome by the kindness with which you receive me and it is now incumbent on me to return sincere and respectful thanks for the very high honour you have done me. When a few days ago I was approached by the representatives of the All-Bengal Teachers' Association to preside over your deliberations in the present session, I felt very diffident. I could not at first persuade myself to occupy a chair which had been so worthily filled on previous occasions by educational experts—to mention only two—the first and the last—Acharjya Praphullachandra Ray and my revered teacher, Principal Herambachandra Maitra; but when I was reminded that I might be of some assistance to you, I thought it my duty not to lose this opportunity of placing my services, however humble or meagre, at the disposal of my brother teachers.

In a country like ours, torn asunder by party factions—religious and communal, political and sectarian—it is really refreshing and encouraging to find thousands of school teachers presenting a united front and acting in concert in all matters of common interest. In every department of life, unity is the greatest source of strength. Sinking all differences of opinion with regard to details may you continue in your noble endeavours.

The objects of your association are twofold—(1) "Advancement of the cause of Secondary Education" (2) "Promoting and safeguarding the professional interests of teachers of Secondary schools." Persons in high position, not too well disposed towards your association, ignore altogether your first object and characterise the body as a mere trade-guild, working only for higher wages and better conditions of service. This uncharitable estimate of you and your aims is falsified by the thought bestowed and the proposals made by you for the improvement and reorganisation of Secondary Education in Bengal. We all know how within a comparatively short period, this association has already justified its existence.

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[1] Address delivered by Mr. Ramaprasad Mookerji, as President of the eighth session of the All Bengal Teachers Conference at Mymensingh on the 7th April, 1928.

The problem of Secondary Education in Bengal has been engaging the attention of the authorities and the public for many years, and, at one time, it was held that the control of all schools, including even "private" schools was the indefeasible right of Government. But in 1906 when the New Regulations were formulated, the Government of India had already abandoned this position and admitted that the University alone was competent to deal with these institutions. The relation, however, between the University and the Recognised Schools was a somewhat peculiar one. The University has no inspecting agency of its own, nor has it funds at its disposal to give grants-in-aid to deserving institutions. On the one hand, the University has to depend entirely on Government Inspectors for reports and on the other it has no voice in the matter of distribution of grants-in-aid to the different schools.

The present condition and the future needs of the Calcutta University were carefully considered by the Sadler Commission. The Commission recommended fundamental changes in all the different stages of education—Secondary, Post-Intermediate and Post-Graduate. It proposed the creation of a Board of Secondary Education, but that proposal depended on other important factors. Under its recommendation, the Matriculation Examination would no longer be regarded as an examination, the passing of which would be a prerequisite for entering the University, the proposal being to replace it by the Intermediate Examination. All the existing Colleges would therefore cease to have any connection with Intermediate Classes, these being either developed as independent Intermediate Colleges or attached to the more important High Schools in the Province. The Board proposed by the Commission would be in charge of the Schools and the Intermediate

Colleges while Post-Intermediate and Post-Graduate education would be left under the control of the University. The suggested redistribution of the classes and the introduction of a new system of education would require very substantial grants from Government and it was further stated by the Commission that these reforms could be taken in hand only when Government was ready to provide the necessary funds. This has not been found possible and it also appears that it would not be feasible in the near future to spend the amounts proposed by the Commission. It is, therefore, necessary to consider modified proposals. It has since then been agreed between Government and the University that control over the Matriculation Examination, the courses of study and the texts prescribed, would continue with the University but the inspection of schools, their recognition and the giving of grants-in-aid would be left to the Board. The principal point of difference between Government and the University now is about the relation between the Board on the one hand and the University and Government on the other. The proposal made by the Senate was that in all executive matters the Board should be an autonomous body. But questions of general policy or rules and regulations (unless they dealt merely with details of administration) should be subject to the approval of the Senate. The regulations would be communicated to Government for approval. The University further proposed that a majority of the members of the Board should consist of elected non-officials, but Government suggested that the majority of the members should be nominated, and that in case of difference of opinion between the Senate and the Board in the matter of any rules or regulations, Government would finally decide the question. Now that the conduct of the Matriculation Examination and the selection of courses of study are to be left to the University, the position is that unless there is harmonious co-operation between the Board and the University, the creation of the Board will be of little, if any, benefit. It may, on the other hand, lead to complications detrimental to the truest interests of education.

I have already expressed my opinion regarding what I consider to be the best way of meeting the difficulty when there is any difference of opinion between the Board and the Senate. Briefly it is as follows :—In the case of any difference of opinion between the Board and the Senate, the opinion of the Senate ought to prevail, the more so because the Board will be a very much smaller body which is not expected to discharge the functions of a legislative authority. When I mention the Senate, I do not mean by it the Senate as at present constituted. The present Senate, in my opinion, is not a perfect body as it does not contain, among representatives from other interests, any representative of the secondary school teachers under the Calcutta University. Even if it is not found possible to reconstitute the whole University at once, the Senate at least should be modelled anew so that it might contain a decided majority of elected members who would represent all shades of public and educational interests. It is only such a Senate as this which would prove to be an effective ally of the Board.

We cannot but remember in this connection that the problem of secondary education in Bengal is peculiar in many respects being unlike that in other provinces. Of the 1,040 schools recognised by the University, only 40 are Government Schools, 462 aided and the remaining schools do not receive any aid from public funds. The Commission has rightly pointed out that any plan of educational reform based upon a transference to the Department of Public Instruction of the control over the schools, now exercised by the University, would be regarded as a reactionary measure and as a menace to educational reform. The proposal to invest the Department of Public Instruction with larger powers over schools has somehow become associated in the public mind with designs unfavourable to the wider diffusion of educational opportunities. The Sadler Commission was of opinion that, in Bengal at least, such transference would jeopardise the good understanding between Government and the educated classes, upon which the prospects of an effective reform in the existing system of education mainly depend. No responsible person can gainsay that in a province where the major portion of the expenditure is met either from private benefactions or from fees realised from students, the ultimate control ought to be left in the hands of a body with a decided majority of elected non-officials. It may be stated here that in the year 1925-26, the figures only of which are available at present, out of a total expenditure of Rs. 3,76,94,290 Government spent only Rs. 1,43,68,358, the fee-income during the same period was Rs. 1,55,20,789 and the rest was met from private benefactions. During the last few years, Government no doubt has increased to some extent the amount paid to schools as grants-in-aid ; but the conditions attached to the grants are such as to make a thoughtful person think twice before accepting them. The very wide powers of interference exercisable by the Department, even in the detailed administration of schools, make the position of Managing Committees and Head Masters unenviable. Nobody can legitimately question the right of Government to satisfy itself that the amount paid is properly utilised, but this ought not to be used as a means to invest the department with very wide and arbitrary powers over the local authorities. It must be admitted that unless the experienced local authorities are trusted and given some latitude, the aim for which the grant is made is altogether lost. Some of the existing rules are so manifestly improper that they need only be mentioned. The Inspector is entitled under the rules to interfere with the discretion of the Head Master in the matter of the promotion of students to the next higher class or of the sending up of candidates to the Matriculation Examination ; even when the Head Master thinks a student fit to be promoted or sent up for the University Examination, the local Inspector is entitled to override the decision of the Head Master. Under the existing rules, the guardians or the teachers are allowed to elect their representatives on the Managing Committee. The election in the case of aided schools is subject to approval by the District Magistrate and a person duly elected may not be permitted by him to sit on the Committee. Instances are on record to show that such interference with the elective powers of parents and guardians are not so rare as outsiders may be prone to think. There are cases where the elected members are sought to be kept out of the Committees mainly on account of their political views. Unless the grant-in-aid rules are thoroughly overhauled, it will not be possible for a very large number of the more independent schools to avail themselves of State help. In Burma, we are told, grants are made to schools on the simple condition of satisfactory audit. It is inexplicable why the same system should not be introduced in Bengal.

Attempts at school reform made in recent years during the Vice-Chancellorship of Sir Ewart Greaves, resulted in the passing of the School Code. No doubt, under the University Regulations, every school must have a properly constituted Managing Committee, but as the details were not set out, there were not a few cases where the Committees were not functioning properly and the Head Master had no real power in the management of the school. The Code requires that there should be at least two elected representatives of the teachers, the Head Master to be the Secretary, or at least the Assistant Secretary, *ex-officio*. Teachers have thus been given a voice in the administration of the schools in which they serve. The guardians also are permitted to elect their representatives on the Committee. Another important point settled in the School Code is the clear specification of the position of the Head Master. In all matters of internal administration and discipline, the Head Master is rightly given a pre-eminent position and his action in such matters is not allowed to be interfered with by any authority, not even by the Committee. The last and the most important provision in the School Code is about the creation of what is termed "Arbitration Boards." This is really the pivot of the whole scheme. It is through these rules that the University attempted to ensure security of service for the teachers of Bengal; but I regret to be compelled to acknowledge that the University has not up till now given effect to the Arbitration Board scheme. The School Code was made applicable to all non-Government schools in the Province, but, recently, the present Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate have decided to exempt the aided schools from the operation of the clauses about the Arbitration Boards "during the experimental period." The aided school teachers are to be left under the "protection" of the Department. "Protection" indeed, when even in an aided school if a teacher with ten years' service to his credit falls out with the authorities, he may be turned out on a month's notice on the alleged ground of economy, and when enquiries are made, the ground of economy is not substantiated but new charges are brought forward in order to justify the action of the Committee. I trust it may yet be possible to rectify matters. I may here mention that Government did not suggest the procedure adopted by the Syndicate as the only procedure acceptable to Government. Government proposed that in cases where an aggrieved teacher in an aided school appealed to the Inspector instead of to the Arbitration Board, he would not be allowed subsequently to appeal to the Board against the Inspector's decision. The Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate in their zeal to safeguard the control of Government over the aided schools now recommend that the Arbitration Board should take cognisance of the appeals of unaided school teachers only, the aided school teachers being left during the experimental period under the protection of the departmental staff. It is one thing to give the option to the teachers to appeal either to the Arbitration Boards or to the Education Department and quite another to limit them to the latter only.

Such a state of things seems very strange to me, for while under the School Code we are giving more and more powers to the teachers of "private" schools, the teachers of "aided" and Government schools are still where they were before the School Code was passed. Surely what is good for the teachers of "private" schools must also be equally good for the teachers of "aided" and Government schools. I am fully aware of the fact that in the first instance the School Code was framed for the management of non-Government schools, but I feel that with the march of progress, the time has come when the School Code, at least so far as it concerns the constitution and functions of the Managing Committee and the powers and duties of the Head Master, should be made applicable to Government schools also.

Next to security of tenure comes the question of the pay and prospects of the teachers. I do not overlook the fact that the great prizes in the way of income everywhere fall to those who attain high eminence in one of the distinctly practical walks of life. The more ideally minded man who looks upon the training of young minds as the main object of life, or at any rate of *his* life, will probably be prepared to make some sacrifice on the material side and will in many cases be content to do so gladly. But however self-denying the person may be, it is the duty of society to give him at least enough to provide him with the necessaries of life. The salary that is paid to the vast majority of teachers in this country is abnormally low. The University has up to the present laid down the minimum salary of Head Masters at Rs. 70 and the lowest pay of any teacher at Rs. 25, although many of the schools as at present conditioned find it difficult to pay even Rs. 25 per month.

Equally important is the question of the starting of Provident Funds. Three years ago Government provided money in the Budget to help private schools to start Provident Funds. Unfortunately, Government allowed the money budgeted for to lapse not once but twice in succession. It is indeed gratifying to hear that this year a beginning is expected to be made. It is only just and proper that the amount saved in the past and the present years should be re-allotted and be spent for the purpose for which they had been provided. Any one conversant with the Provident Funds for teachers in England would feel surprise as to why they have not as yet been introduced in this country. In England the State contributes from the public exchequer an amount equal to that paid by the teacher. I trust that the proposals for introducing such a scheme will materialise in the near future.

Considering the fact that the pay of the teachers is very low, the introduction of Provident Funds only will not solve the whole difficulty. Anybody who cares to inquire about the lot of teachers in this country will agree with me that it is not possible for a very large majority of them to save anything ; the position becomes very grave when the teacher is cut off in the prime of youth. I would suggest that the life of every teacher should be insured for an amount proportionate to the salary paid to him ; the premium in each case to be paid either by the school, or by the teacher and the school in equal shares. Even if it be not possible for all schools to pay this additional contribution, I for one would suggest the immediate starting of this scheme, the payment to be made for the time being from the Provident Fund account of the teacher. So far as the younger teachers are concerned, the premium payable will be very small ; for the older members of the staff there may be some difficulty, either because the premium will be heavy or because they will not be able to pass the medical test. But these considerations ought not to stand in the way of making a beginning—a start in the right direction. I know that in these days in no department of life is compulsion relished but what I propose is of such vital importance to the interests of teachers that I am sure that they, as a body, will subscribe fully to what I have suggested.

The starting of Co-operative Societies which you have been advocating for some time past would also be another definite and forward step for the amelioration of your condition.

Whenever any proposal to improve the pay and prospects of teachers is made, the suggestion, on the face of it quite innocent, is thrown out that the types of teachers ought to improve or in other words—'first deserve then desire.' Nobody can raise any objection, on the other hand would eagerly welcome any attempt to improve the qualifications of the teachers. But no right-thinking man would agree to the improvement of the teachers out of existence. A proposal has recently been made by the University on a suggestion from Government about the improvement of the qualifications of teachers of English in schools. This, I regard, as defective in one and very important particular. It is provided in the proposed rules that even an experienced teacher must resign his post unless the Inspector of Schools or some other similar authority exempts him from appearing in an examination. It is not fair to old and experienced teachers to ask them to pass a test on which would depend their right to continue in the office which they have been filling for years. The proper course, to my mind, is to establish training schools where every teacher may be asked to take a course of instruction only. During this period he would be placed on deputation by the school where he serves. The system of summer-schools in vogue in other countries may very profitably be introduced here. We must remember in this connection that a large majority of the Inspectorate consists of officers who themselves have had practically no teaching experience, yet are expected to set the standard of proficiency among the teachers. When the inspecting staff as a whole is recruited from experienced teachers, then and then only can the Inspectorate be expected to have the necessary qualifications to sit in judgment on the teachers of the schools. It is not on theoretical training alone that the usefulness of a successful teacher depends. Experience shows that the teacher who has had practical knowledge becomes very useful when he is given some theoretical training. Teaching is one of the most practical of sciences and it is by the experimental method, rather than by emphasizing the theoretical side only, that real improvement can be made in the teaching in schools. The laudable practice that has recently been started by Government to send every year a few school teachers to Europe for training has, up to the present, been confined to teachers of Government schools. I do not see any reason why the same opportunity should not be made available for teachers of " private " schools as well.

The attempt now being made to replace present-day teachers by a new band of " trained " teachers was brought up not because of the importance of the question itself but incidentally in connection with the Vernacularisation scheme. For the last six or seven years, the University has been vainly attempting to make the Vernacular the medium of instruction in the schools. Time and again Government has been raising all kinds of objection—at one time with regard to the desirability or practicability of the principal question itself and on other occasions with regard to the details of the scheme. Two years ago when Government agreed to introduce the Vernacular medium, on condition steps were taken by the University to ensure the efficient teaching of English, certain tentative rules, which have already been referred to, were framed by the University. Government has asked the University to have them incorporated in the Regulations. The only object of this proposal, to my mind at least, is to make these rules hidebound so that no modification in them can be made hereafter without the sanction of Government. To put it bluntly, Government either does not or cannot trust the University in the matter of the application of these rules. It seems surprising that even a Senate, which as at present constituted is an official-ridden body, is not trusted as it ought to be. Whatever may be the opinion of the University, the official sitting in the Secretariat must have an opportunity of either accepting or rejecting the University point of view. His opinion has to be reckoned with not only about these new rules but also for determining the limits of the subjects for examination. "Incorporate everything in the Regulations" is the cry, but it is raised only because this gives Government the means to interfere even in purely academic matters. This is a position which would not be tolerated in any other country. Conditioned as we are, we have to be guided from the Secretariat in all conceivable matters, for according to some at least our period of tutelage is not yet over. In no other civilised country is the student from the very earliest period compelled to gain his knowledge through a foreign language. The sooner our Vernaculars are introduced as the medium of instruction in the schools, the better for the country. The daily waste of energy and intellect under the present system is appalling. In the new Matriculation Regulations other proposals of a far-reaching character had been made, for instance the introduction of manual training in the school curriculum. Government not having sanctioned the new Regulations, these very necessary innovations are also being delayed.

On this occasion I cannot but refer to one other aspect of the problem of Secondary Education in Bengal. Reference has been made, sometimes with a feeling of anxiety, sometimes with a feeling of alarm, to the increase in recent years in the number of recognised schools and of candidates for the Matriculation Examination. Even the highest officials of the Education Department openly state both by word and in print that there are too many high schools existent in Bengal in the present day and secondary education would be very much improved if many of these were immediately abandoned. We have to remember that looking at schools from the standpoint of the Inspecting Officer, there are some which may be regarded as "inefficient." I do not think it at all a difficult task to prove that, within their own limits, these so-called inefficient schools are doing very good work and are as useful to the country as their more efficient congeners. No adequate provision has yet been made for primary education, neither has it spread all over the country as it ought to have done. These so-called inefficient schools, I contend, are proving a most useful means for stimulating a hankering after education among otherwise unapproachable bodies of men living in out-of-the-way villages of Bengal. Very few of them are "aided" schools, for the Department would refuse to help such institutions. They are therefore run partly out of the fee-income which is never large and partly out of contributions raised from the local public. In this connection it is perhaps necessary for me to point out that one cause of their "inefficiency" lies in the fact that these schools are located in such remote places that they can never expect to have a very large number of boys on their rolls. The result of course is that the fee-income is poor and they are "inefficient" in the departmental sense. I ask you to consider whether the man who puts his hand into his pocket does or does not feel an interest in education. The very fact that the public helps in the maintenance of these institutions conclusively proves, at least to my mind, that there is an earnest and ever-present desire among them for education. The proper remedy is not abolition of such institutions but their gradual improvement. In my opinion the Department should try to improve these schools by giving them small grants in the first instance and gradually increasing them with the increase in the improvements. As regards the increase in the number of candidates appearing in the different University examinations, we must not forget that the population of Bengal is over 4½ crores and that the total number of examinees is infinitesimally small when compared with the total population.

I have so long been dealing with the facilities which ought to be provided for encouraging education, but every one here, after all, must confess that however good the machinery, however fine the buildings and furniture and however well-equipped and well-kept the library, ultimately everything will depend on two things—the teacher and the material he will mould. Confining myself for the present to the student undergoing training, I am compelled to say that what matters most about him are his body and his mind and soul. Physical deterioration has slowly and insidiously made its way among students and adults of both sexes in this country. We have nothing to do here with the problem of improving adult health, but surely it is possible to take steps in time so that the school-going boy may not through ignorance lose that health without which his life and education would be more or less useless to him. Besides, taking care of the health of students ultimately means improvement of adult health and race betterment. It is therefore wise that we should go to the root of the matter by trying to save the coming generation from physical degeneration.

I consider it to be the duty of the teacher to encourage everything by which the strength and endurance of his students would be increased. I am not in favour of introducing costly western sports and games in our schools. My personal experience is that when sporting clubs modelled on western lines are started, a very small fraction of the boys, namely those who are good at games, derive all the benefit though all the students are taxed to meet the expenses. I therefore suggest that an earnest attempt should be made by teachers to introduce indigenous games and exercises. Physical exercise might also be taken with the help of drill and the use of such simple, cheap and easily procurable apparatus as Indian Clubs, Dumb-bells and Lathi. Exercise would not only tend to make the boys strong and healthy in body but it would also keep their minds clear and their bodies pure.

I have heard some people objecting to the introduction of physical exercise on the ground that many students reading in schools situated in villages have to walk long distances in order to attend their classes. It would not of course be desirable to insist on these boys taking exercise in school. To do so might mean overtaxing their strength. The other objection that physical exercise is not calculated to do any good, but may on the other hand do harm to students who cannot always get a sufficient amount of nourishing food may be answered by my reminding you that it is too much to assume that every student is underfed. There are undoubtedly some students who do not get the right sort of food in proper quantities. Such cases can always be put into a separate group and if the exercises are graduated, as I think they ought to be, their bodies can, little by little, be made strong so that with the gradual improvement in the powers of assimilation consequent on the taking of exercise, there would be a corresponding improvement in their general health.

You know only too well the long hours during which students have to stay in school. I believe you will agree with me in thinking that boys should not be allowed to undergo any physical exertion after school hours without taking some food, for it would mean giving work to the body when it is already tired out with the day's labour. There is at present one school where tiffin consisting of cheap and easily procurable food-stuff such as parched rice, grated cocoanut, etc., is supplied to all students. Such articles of food are easily available and may be supplied free to those students who cannot afford to spend any money on tiffin. The number of such is not likely to be very large and giving them this help will not strain the finances of a school to any appreciable extent.

Speaking as an Indian to brother Indians, is it necessary for me to labour the point that after all nothing counts so much in this world, at least from our standpoint, as the most important part in us—the soul ? Shall we teachers concern ourselves with giving intellectual training only and shall we be justified in thinking that we have done our duty towards our students when we have made an honest attempt to do so? Whenever I visit an educational institution, I always feel a curiosity to know whether anyone has thought of making any attempt, however humble, to give some sort of moral or religious instruction to the students. As the subject has always interested me, I have interchanged views with many veteran teachers and the opinions with which I have been favoured have all gone to show that there is practically no organised attempt for imparting religious and moral instruction in schools and that here we have an admirable opportunity of doing most valuable services to our country. To train up thousands of young people into honest, God-fearing citizens, true lovers of their country, conscientious, not afraid of hard work, physical or mental, dutiful, brave, honest, and straightforward, not afraid of taking the consequences of mistakes committed by them instead of trying to shield themselves behind falsehood, courageous in doing the right thing and showing fear only when the question of doing wrong comes up—this is the glorious work entrusted to us—to build up our nation by training up men, not mere apologies for men. May God give us strength and ability to do our duty in this particular direction.

When I talk of moral and religious instruction, I do not mean instruction along sectarian lines. Broadly speaking, we have Hindu and Mahomedan students in our educational institutions in many of which a "period" is set apart on Fridays so that the Moslem students might have an opportunity of saying their prayers. Why I ask should not this period be utilised for the religious and moral instruction of the Hindu boys? Surely they require instruction in these matters as much as their Mahomedan classmates. I think it both easy and feasible to arrange matters in such a way that our Hindu boys can get moral instruction as often as their Moslem fellow students. Under the policy pursued by Government, religious instruction cannot be made a part of the University curiculum. The results of such a policy have been disastrous. This state of things has been characterised as "a national calamity," which indeed it is when we remember that in this country our culture ultimately rests on religion. Many of our students are without any tincture of religious belief. I do not mean to suggest that want of religion must always be associated with immorality in life, but experience has amply demonstrated the fact that when a man has to meet a crisis, to face unexpectedly a great temptation, nothing helps him so much to preserve his uprightness as religious training imparted and imbibed in youth. Whatever religion and moral training is to be given to our students will therefore have to come from the teachers. Whether the experiment would be successful or not would depend primarily on the teachers themselves. If the instruction imparted comes from their heart and is the result of their own spiritual experience, it is bound to create an effect on their students. On the other hand, if "head" knowledge on matters spiritual is sought to be conveyed and specially if the students note a divergence between theory and practice, and students, as we all know, show special aptitude to do so, not only would such an attempt prove a failure, but the teachers concerned would lose whatever respect they had formerly commanded as hypocrites and insincere men.

Last but not least is the most momentous question of the status in society of a class of persons whose life-work is nothing short of building up the character of the youth of this country destined at the end of the period of their training in schools and colleges to occupy the position of leaders in the liberal professions, in politics and in the social regeneration or moral uplift of the entire nation. Ill-paid, not adequately recognised with due reference to their social function, teachers are called upon in every country to discharge very onerous responsibilities. You gentlemen are, to my humble mind, men whose life in the truest sense of the word is what Haldane calls "The Dedicated Life." Great as is your responsibility, the greater should be the recognition of your selfless services to the country. I therefore feel that even in the matter of leadership in the country, the claims of the teachers of the youth of Bengal are at least on a par with those who at the present moment happen to occupy the position of leaders in political thought. If you kindly permit me to enjoy the privilege of making a personal appeal, I would then conclude with a solemn and earnest request to my brothers belonging to the same profession with me, to so adjust themselves to the present-day needs that posterity may, with gratitude, remember that even in the most trying situation of a period of storm and stress you never failed to be true to yourselves, which eventually means being true to the highest interests of the country and the nation.

In conclusion, let me say that younger and less experienced as I am than many of you, I feel greatly honoured for being asked to place these few ideas before you. Most of these were imbibed by me at the feet of my late revered father. May these passing through a most unworthy channel not prove utterly fruitless.

PEACE

Peace is here, and sweetly lies
Slumbering on the fragrant lea,
His bed a riot of dewy flowers
So near, so dear to see.
Birds are singing o'er his head
Sweet, sweet they sing and soft,
Whilst fairy clouds scud thro' the sky
On dreamy wings aloft.
Still he slumbers, a silent lute
Lies near his heedless hand,
Not long ago his music thrilled
And sung to sleep the land.

LELAND J. BERRY

W. B. YEATS

IV

Third Stage (*continued*).

The appearance in March, 1928, of new poems by Yeats under the suggestive title of "The Tower," with its implication of a vigilant survey of life from a detached height in a *meditative mood*, compels me to make a little addition to what I had written about the last stage of his development in the paper read in September, 1927. I do not find, however, any reason to **materially** alter my conclusions with which, I find, I may fit in what I have to say about his latest production. It will be remembered that I have already[1] noticed this new addition to his poetry and included it in the list of the works belonging to what I have described as his "Third Stage" or "Third Period." This latest volume of poems, "The Tower" (1928), contains, we are told, "part of an unfinished set of poems," those written at Yeats's country residence of Ballylee castle on legends, traditions and old stories already used by him in his prose works, "two songs for a chorus in a play with Christ's appearance to the Apostles after the Resurrection" for its theme (intended for a drawing-room performance), one poem on the Civil War of 1922, and a few **symbolic** pieces of which the symbols are explained by the poet in the Notes.

The influence of Neo-Platonism is easily discernible here.

"Youth and Age" (a quatrain, comp. 1924), "The Wheel," "The New Faces," "Among School Children," "A Man Young and Old"—are, with slight individual variations, practically treatment of the same theme having a bearing on the development I have attempted all along to trace.

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[1] *Vide* Calcutta Review of May (1928), p. 161 and p. 157 with its footnote.

The key-note may be said to be struck in the lines—

"Better to smile on all that smile, and show
There is a comfortable kind of old scare-crow",

and

"The abstract joy,
The half-read wisdom of dæmonic images
Suffice the ageing man as once the growing boy."

To this may be added the 4th stanza of "From Oedipus at Colonus"—

"Never to have lived is best, ancient writers say;
Never to have drawn the breath of life,
Never to have looked into the eye of day;
The second best's a gay good night and quickly turn away."

The title-piece (comp. 1926) strangely begins—

"What shall I do with this absurdity—
O heart, O troubled heart—this caricature,
Decrepit age, that has been tied to me
As to a dog's tail?
Never had I more
Excited, passionate, fantastical
Imagination, nor an ear and eye
That more expected the impossible—"

* * *

"It seems that I must bid the Muse go pack,
Choose Plato and Plotinus for a friend
Until imagination, ear and eye,
Can be content with argument and deal
In abstract things." * *

Here, we observe, a new note is struck—showing the brilliant activity of "unageing intellect" which seems to get the better of emotion by which Yeats once set store.

Does it not strike us as something strange that peace and[1] contentment towards which (as we have been noticing in this study of his poetry) the poet seemed to have been gradually and somewhat painfully working—after the temporary disillusion and sadness that disturbed the balance of his soul—is once more allowed to be disturbed, however temporarily and slightly?

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[1] *Vide* pp. 152, 154-55, 157-58, 161 and 164 of the Calcutta Review for May, 1928.

Not knowing what to do with old age, despite all its wisdom, he proclaims—while "pacing upon the battlements" of his tower resembling that in which "*Il Penseroso's* Platonist toiled on"—

> "And (I) send imagination forth
> Under the day's declining beam, and call
> Images and memories
> From ruin or from ancient trees,
> For I would ask a question of them all."

Yea,

> "Images in the Great Memory stored,
> Come with loud cry and panting breast
> To break upon a sleeper's rest."

and, to "question all, come all who can" is now his free and liberal invitation. As freely does he dismiss all, impatient to be gone, after having found an answer **in their eyes,** —only Hanrahan must be left with him, "for I need all his mighty memories." From this "old lecher with a love on every wind" the poet's peremptory demand is

> "Bring up out of that deep considering mind
> All that you have discovered in the grave."

And, further, if the imagination dwells more upon a woman lost than a woman won,

> "Admit you turned aside
> From a great labyrinth out of pride,
> Cowardice, some silly over-subtle thought
> Or anything called conscience once."

In "Meditations in Time of Civil War"[1] he elucidates his new creed by falling back on the idea that "only an aching heart conceives a changeless work of art" and that "none could pass heaven's door that loved inferior art," and his fear is that his

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[1] Yeats lays great stress on meditation in this piece as well as in the title-piece and not on emotion pure and simple. Light is thrown on this attitude by a valuable remark in his "*Autobiographies, Reveries*, etc.," made in the course of his interpretation of the life and art of Dante and Villon in accordance with his own speculations. "They and their sort alone earn," he observes, "contemplation, for it is only when the intellect has wrought the whole of life to drama, to crisis that we may live for contemplation, and yet keep our intensity" (p. 339).

> "Descendants may lose the flower
> Through natural declension of the soul,
> Through too much business with the passing hour."

The whole is summed up in the two lines—

> "Nothing but stillness can remain when hearts are full
> Of their own sweetness, bodies of their loveliness."

It is not possible to quote the whole of Sec. III of the poem which gives the volume its name as it runs to 75 lines beginning with "It is time that I wrote my will."

Here he avers—

> "I choose upstanding men,
> That climb[1] the streams until
> The fountain leap, and at dawn
> Drop their cast at the side
> Of dripping stone ; I declare
> They shall inherit my pride."

He next defines this pride and proceeds to declare his faith—

> "I mock Plotinus' thought
> And cry in Plato's teeth,
> Death and life were not
> Till man made up the whole,
> Made lock, stock and barrel
> Out of his bitter soul,
> Aye, sun and moon and star, all,
> And further add to that
> That, being dead, we rise,
> Dream and so create
> Translunar Paradise.
> I have prepared my peace
> With learned Italian things
> And the proud stones of Greece.

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[1] This reminds us of Browning's "Grammarian."

Poet's imaginings
And memories of love,
Memories of the words of women,
All those things whereof
Man makes a superhuman,
Mirror-resembling dream."

Contrasting the present with the past he says in "Nineteen-Nineteen"—

"So the Platonic year
Whirls out new right and wrong"

and in a half-cynical sorrowful way confesses—

"O but we dreamed to mend
Whatever mischief seemed
To afflict mankind, but now
That winds of winter blow
Learn that we were crack-pated when we dreamed."

Here we have the disillusionment of romance and idealism produced by the terrible experiences of the Great War and the post-war *malaise* ; but Shelley, we cannot forget, in the face of the most discouraging realities, can hearten us by reminding all faint-hearted idealists that if winter comes spring cannot be far behind. Yet after mocking at the great, the wise, the good in this bitterness of the soul, the poet goes on—

"Mock mockers after that
That would not lift a hand may be
To help good, wise or great,
To bar that foul storm out, for we
Traffic in mockery."

This is, we exclaim, in the right spirit of the Second Part of Goethe's *Faust.*

Yeats evinced even in early life a genuine eagerness for *self-possession* even when his days and nights were given to impassioned recitations of poetry, hot political debates of the Young Ireland Society in York Street, socialist propaganda (at the gatherings in the house of Morris), enthusiastic activities as an initiate to the Hermetic Society founded by MacGregor Mathers in Charlotte Street, noted for alchemical and magical experiments dominated by Liddle Mathers (who later on joined the Celtic Movement) or while he plunged furiously into the very eddies and cross-currents of the Young Ireland Movement (as recorded in the *Autobiographies, Reveries,* etc., Book II, under the heading of "Ireland after Parnell"). From Blake he learnt to hate all mere abstractions and wild mysticism. Contact with Madame Blavatsky (in a house at Norwood when she had practically no followers) produced the same result, for, she too was a strong advocate of self-control and mastery over one's mind. This is one of the reasons why even as a great admirer of Shelley and while burning with an intense desire for Ireland's emancipation, he systematically refused to be a revolutionist like Shelley in his advocacy of radical changes (*cf. Autobiographies, Reveries,* etc., Book V, "The Stirring of the Bones," pp. 433-444 relating to 1897-1898).

In this connection I have to note an important art principle by which a poet's personal emotion is merged as it were into something universal in appeal, making lyrical revelation of self less offensive than purely egotistic self-confession (say, of the Byronic type), without at the same time ceasing to unburden the laden heart of a sensitive person who has really felt and personally suffered and through suffering realised something unique which every man and woman in the world cannot be expected to do. In Yeats's view, it appears, powerful yet intimate and simple emotions, resembling those of all mankind in general, should be able to avoid the modern malady of psychological analysis of feeling. In his lyrical poetry, he tells us in his *Autobiographies, Reveries,* etc., he made it a point to weave "personal emotion into a general pattern of myth and symbol" (page 187). He then adds that he sought next "to create that sensuous musical vocabulary that comes at need" and without which a poet fails to move his readers' heart. He proposed to leave this new style as a legacy to later Irish poets. Here we detect a faint desire to found a " school " which, however, Yeats, we must have the courage to say, was hardly fit to achieve even though he happened to be the originator of the neo-Celtic movement and equally the central figure of a group of writers and admirers who formed round him something better than a mere cöterie or clique.

Suggestive hints may be gathered from such lines as—

> " And then I laugh till tears run down
> And the heart thumps at my side,
> Remembering that her shriek was love
> And that he shrieks from pride."
>
> * * *
>
> " I could recover if I shrieked
> My heart's agony
> To passing bird, but I am dumb
> From human dignity." ("A Man Young and Old.")

In "All Souls' Night " there is reference to "a discourse in figurative speech by some learned Indian on the soul's journey " and in his *Autobiographies*, speaking of Theosophy, Yeats refers to his conviction that " If wisdom existed anywhere in the world it must be in some lonely mind admitting no duty to us, communing with God only, conceding nothing from fear or favour " which forcibly reminds us of an Indian sage or a Moslem *Faqueer* (or a Tibetan Mahatma) and the Theosophist's Master. Despite his insistence [1] in this last volume of 1928, on *isolation*, Yeats, we know, was made by nature gregarious, one fond of commerce with men (never gloomy or solitary) and even " ready to deny from fear or favour his dearest conviction that he loved proud and lonely things." We further know from his *Autobiographies*, etc., that in later years his mind gave itself to the gregarious Shelley's dream of a young man,—his hair blanched with sorrow, studying philosophy in some lonely tower or of his old man,—master of all human knowledge, hidden from human sight in some shell-strewn cavern of the Mediterranean shore (*cf. Hellas* for the Wandering Jew, *Ahasuerus* and *Autobiographies, Reveries,* etc., Bk I, Sec. XVIII).

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[1] *Cf.* " All Souls' Night " in " The Tower," p. 103.

Sec. XXI of his *Autobiographies* serves as a valuable commentary on the contents of some of the new poems in " The Tower " volume (published March, 1928). It indicates a development in Yeats from the early emotionalism of 1890 onwards to intellectualism and thence back again to a new emotionalism of what I have called the third stage of his poetic career. In this process of growth his mind and art pass from abstraction to pre-Raphaelitism and again from the concrete to a more developed type of abstraction and from Science and Philosophy to Poetry and Art.

To put this whole complex movement briefly, I may say that Yeats generalised a good deal yet felt ashamed of it, prayed for rescuing his imagination from abstraction and became, like Chaucer, thoroughly pre-occupied with life in its [1] abundance, fulness, variety and complexity, as a poet ought to be. For about a dozen years he was full even of remorse till his abstractions composed themselves into imagery, picture, dramatisation and brought him contentment. A similar artist's soul-tragedy is very skilfully and elaborately worked out, for example, in Mr. Middleton Murry's excellent study of Keats and Shakespeare.

Now, this remorse injured somewhat Yeats's early poetry by affecting it with just a touch of sentimentality (through his refusal to permit his intellect to have its due share in that poetry, for he then considered his intellect to be impure). Some of his important convictions may here be briefly stated to serve as our guide.

"Our intellects at 20 contain," he records, "all the truths we shall ever find" and what he calls "*The Mask*" is an "emotional antithesis to all that comes out of the internal nature ;" and, again, that "as life goes on we discover that certain thoughts sustain us in defeat or give us victory, whether over ourselves or others," and " it is these thoughts, tested by passion, that we call convictions."

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[1] *Cf.* " Gift of Harun Al Rashid " (pp. 88-89 of " The Tower ")—" But what if I," etc., to "And yet herself can seem youth's very fountain, *being all brimmed with life.*"

" The world is but a bundle of fragments."

Subject-matter in art or literature is very important and the arts were not independent of one another (as Huxley, Tyndall, Duran, and Bastien-Lepage held).

Yeats believed that "in man and race alike there is something called "*Unity of Being*" using the term as Dante did when he compared beauty in the *Convito* to a perfectly proportioned human body. He believed that "in true love there is as much desire as in lust," only desire in true love "awakens pity, hope, affection, admiration."

"Abstraction is the enemy of this Unity of Being." Renaissance by its differentiation broke up Europe's homogeneity of thought and from Chaucer's day music became isolated from verse. From the 17th century painting was isolated from religion, machinery from handicraft, and modern class distinctions have produced isolation of man from man and in the arts creation of division among generations of men through technique, till

" Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned."

Hence there was in Yeats and his friends an eager groping for founding a new poetic art for himself and for the whole of Ireland and an earnest quest of unity like what existed from the 11th to the 13th century in Europe, to be achieved not by the eclectic method of epitomizing all human knowledge but by a philosophical outlook on the totality of life *vitalised by passion.*

These vague yet sure, though somewhat instinctive, first preludings in Yeats of the idea of forming a new intellectual and artistic movement was destined to form later on the basis of the Celtic Movement (after 1891). It is significant that young Ireland as it then was cared like young Bengal only for politics as the means of national regeneration, leaving literature and the arts in a subservient position. Rabindranath has accomplished for Bengal something parallel to what Yeats in the 90's did for Ireland.

This rapid survey of speculations in Yeats is necessary for a proper appreciation of the real significance of intellectual inquisitiveness, outburst of indignation, note of deep sadness and personal disquietude caused by memories and associations, doubt and despondency, which pervade these new poems which stand so much apart from his earlier work. "Images" have a prominence in this volume and this feature will not disconcert readers acquainted with Yeats's speculations about images and their function, about Race Memory, age-long memorised Self, genius, personified spirits and passions, with which Sec. IV of Book III of his *Autobiographies*, *Reveries*, etc., entitled *Hodos Chameliontes*, abound.

The last poem "All Souls' Night" so full of reminiscences elaborately recorded in his *Autobiographies* and the immediately preceding one, "The Gift of Harun Al-Rashid" (written somewhat in Browning's manner) arrest our attention by the quality of their imaginative beauty and the exquisite charm of melody and metrical skill. We realise here how "Violent great hearts can lose their bitterness and find the honey-comb." We learn that

> "The Soul's own youth and not the body's youth
> Shows through our lineaments,"

and that though the great prince accepting the Bedouin saying "change the bride with spring," thinks that love has seasons, Kusta Ben Luka, the Bagdad philosopher (and the sender of an epistle to the Caliph's learned Treasurer), brought up in the Byzantian faith, must assert that "when I choose a bride I choose for ever," for, love

> "Must needs be in this life and in what follows
> Unchanging and at peace, and it is right
> Every philosopher should praise that love."

The story tells us in the poem that a girl touched by the philosopher's life-history was moved to bestow on him a woman's care and, out of love for him or on account of the mystery that dazed his sight, she proposed one moonless night to expound "what's bowed his shoulder and made pale his cheek," while she was yet half awake and half asleep.

In that mystic hour "she seemed the learned man and he the child," till

> "Truths without father, came, truths that no book
> Of all the uncounted books that I have read
> Nor thought out of her mind or mine begot
> Self-born, high-born, and solitary truths,
> Those terrible implacable straight lines
> Drawn through the wandering vegetative dream,
> Even those truths that when my bones are dust
> Must drive the Arabian host."

We also know that

> "The voice has drawn
> A quality of wisdom from her love's
> Particular quality. The signs and shapes;
> All those abstractions that you fancied were
> From the great treatise of Parmenides;
>
> * * * *
>
> Are but a new expression of her body
> Drunk with the bitter sweetness of her youth.
> And now my utmost mystery is out.
> A woman's beauty is a storm-tossed banner;
> Under it wisdom stands, and I alone—
> Of all Arabia's lovers I alone—
> Nor dazzled by the embroidery, nor lost
> In the confusion of its night-dark folds
> Can hear the armed man speak."

Charmed by the exquisite beauty of this mystic piece in which imagination is harmoniously wedded to music, we exclaim—

> "Can poet's thought
> That springs from body and in body falls
> Like this pure jet, now lost amid blue sky
> Now bathing lily leaf and fishes' scale,
> Be mimicry ?"

Marvellous too is the metrical effect achieved by skilful handling of Alexandrines in the last poem of the volume or in "Nineteen-Nineteen," and of long and short lines in "The Tower."

Romantic melancholy is now deepened into humour born of pathos roused by grief which ever is at the core of things. A detached aloofness too now grows upon Yeats by virtue of which

> (He has a) "mind that in the common sound
> From every quarter of the world, can stay,
> Wound in mind's pondering
> As mummies in the mummy-cloth are wound."

Memories of man, events, past imaginings, and æsthetic experiences reappear here in a vivid form, set over against actualities of the present, and even in this stage, possibly his last, we note that **moods** predominate.

If called upon to name one single outstanding quality or dominant note as significantly characteristic of Yeats as a poet of the new order and new age, I shall say that throughout the best part of his works shines an ardent steady light of the burning flame of spiritual fervour expressed in melodious language and in simple yet beautiful imagery directly connected with Ireland. Now it flickers with a faint dimness, now it blazes out with a dazzling glamour till the ordinary reader may feel that he is painfully groping for that clear brightness which common mortals need as an illuminating guide in the perplexing ways of life. Here Yeats is with another great brother artist who is a pronounced mystic too, *viz.*, W. Blake. Such poets, it must be admitted, sometimes drive the majority of poetry readers by their heavy demands to Wordsworth whose sober shining glory is surely much easier to follow as a safer guide.

(*To be continued*)

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

THE CHARIOT

In temple-chariot of this human-form
My Prince with lightning-lash has come to guide,
Thro' forests all aflame, 'mid thundering storm
The flashing chariot flies with fearless pride,
To cut the flanks of *Rakshas* ranks !

Yet oft he grows invisible; the soul
In haunted, lonesome awe sobs wantonly !
" I AM ! " the answer comes, " dark doubt-thieves stole
Your vision ! Yonder golden portals see,
Bright, of the Sun, that's where we run !"

Desire's steeds his touch all-loving know,
And neigh, and chafe, yet dare not fondly shy !
The virgin soul clings to his arm : below
A yawning chasm, overhead the sky !—
He smiles " I died to gain your side ! "

CYRIL MODAK

HINDU PHILOSOPHY IN THE MAKING

A word or two are necessary by way of introduction. We propose to trace the stages of the development of philosophical thought in the Upanishads and not the chronology of the six systems of Hindu Philosophy, which sprang up later from them.

The dualistic conception of God is noticeable in the earlier stage of thought. This stage is lower than that of the pantheism and idealism that developed later. I do not, of course, mean thereby that there might not have been persons who could conceive of pantheism even then.

In this theistic stage of religion, people thought that God creates the individual soul and the world out of nothing. But in pantheism, the individual soul or the world is not a creation of God but manifestation of the Absolute. The identity, though it may not be mathematical identity, of the Absolute with the individual soul is maintained by the Chhandogya (**छान्दोग्योपनिषत्**) and Brihadāraṇyaka (**बृहदारण्यक**).[1]

This was, however, incomprehensible to the popular theistic view, which distinguishes a plurality of souls, different from one another and from the Absolute—the creative source of the universe. This distinction between the Supreme Soul (**परमात्मा**) and the individual soul (**जीवात्मा**) is involved in the conception of Prajāpati (**प्रजापति**) evolved in the Mantra period of the Rig-veda. It is developed for the first time in the Kaṭhopanishad (**काठोपनिषत्**) where God and the soul are contrasted as light and shade.[2]

In **श्वेताश्वतर** 4.6 and **मुण्डक** 3.1 also, we notice that the same distinction between the individual (जीवात्मा) and the Supreme Soul (परमात्मा) is recognised. The passage द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा संखाया, etc., is well-known. Prof. Deussen asserts that this conception is only a re-assertion of the old theistic view. The Absolute and the individual in these Upanishads are represented as two birds, living on the same tree—one feeding on the fruits (of action) and the other abstaining from eating and only looking on as a spectator. These passages have, of course, been explained in the light of pantheism by Śaṅkara and others, but this, I think, came much later. It cannot, however, be asserted that there were not thinkers in the Upanishadic period who could conceive such things. But our task is to trace the development of the general conception of Godhead in the days of the Upanishads.

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[1] तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो...—छान्दोग्य ६।८।७; यद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्गि अदृष्टं द्रष्टृ, अश्रुतं श्रोतृ, अमतं मन्तृ, अविज्ञातं विज्ञातृ, नान्यत् अतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ, नान्यत् अतोऽस्ति श्रोतृ, नान्यदस्ति मन्तृ ; बृ: आ:, ३।८।११।

[2] ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके । गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्द्धे ॥
छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति । पञ्चाग्नयो ये च त्रिनाचिकेताः ॥

Next came an age of conflict—that between theism and atheism. The latter was a natural consequence of the former. Theism distinguishes three realities : (*i*) the world, (*ii*) the creative power—God, and (*iii*) the individual soul (जीवात्मा). Recognition of the independent existence of nature and of individual soul exercises a prejudicial influence on the creative soul—(परमात्मा) or God. Thus, when separated from the living individual soul and nature, this परमात्मा or God becomes a mere abstraction altogether superfluous, because the creative power, attributed to him, might be transferred to nature and individual souls, separately or collectively, known respectively as Prakriti or Māyā (प्रकृति or माया) and Hiraṇyagarbha or Prajāpati (हिरण्यगभ or प्रजापति) in the later सांख्य and वेदान्त systems of philosophy. Thus the way was prepared for doing away with the superfluous Īśvara (ईश्वर) and for the development of atheistic theory, which in the post-Vedic age was represented by the atheistic systems of philosophy of the Cārvākas, the Jains, and the Buddhists, who were स्वभाववादिन् and कार्य्यवादिन् as well as the orthodox सांख्य school, which maintained सत्कार्य्यवाद.

The next stage was the stage of harmony. In this stage grew pantheism and subjective idealism—abstract and negative pantheism and subjective idealism of Yājñavalkya (याज्ञवल्क्य). Before proceeding further, I wish to say something here about pantheism. Hindu pantheism means not only that all that is is God but that all that is is in God, in other words, that the phenomenal world has no separate independent existence of its own but is dependent on God or Brahman, who, Himself independent, transcends the changeable phenomenon. The universe is but a very very inadequate manifestation of God. As the spider is personally the efficient and, by virtue of its body (in which it is located), the material cause, as regards its thread, so God, by virtue of His nature, is the efficient and, by virtue of what He is located in, *i.e.*, the aggregate of the phenomenal, the material cause. No effects or changes can entirely exhaust or completely manifest the nature of the cause. The cause is not therefore the sum-total of its effects but is something more. The changes appear in the cause ; they are sustained by it and they ultimately merge in it. The effects are all distinct (व्यावृत) from one another, but the identical (अनुगत) cause is what pervades them. He is beyond the spatial and temporal order of the world which cannot enter into the essence of His being—His immanent activity directing and controlling the process of the world. The divine end is working from within and fulfilling itself in and through the order of nature. The consequent generation is not "all is one" but "all depends on one."

Pantheism, as defined above, marks the third stage of thought. By way of protest against the atheistic doctrine of a प्रधान or असत्कार्य्यवाद, there is developed by याज्ञवल्क्य in the बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत्, in his disputations with his adversaries or with his patron Janaka of Videha, the boldest abstract and negative pantheism and subjective idealism, culminating in the assertion that Âtman is the only Reality and that nothing exists beyond it. We sum up the doctrine below.

(*i*) The only reality is the आत्मन् or the Self and it is thus the essence, the soul, the central principle of the universe, which exists in it only as a veil or mask, concealing its essential unity, The unreality or the illusive character of the world and the individual soul is implied in the doctrine of the sole reality of **ब्रह्मन्** and in the oldest Upanishads. The doctrine that the world is an illusion (**माया**) produced by **ब्रह्मन्** as a magician (**मायिन्**), is expressly met with in the **श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत्** (*cf.* **मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्**—4.10) and in such passages of **बृहदारण्यक**, where **द्वैत** (duality—the distinction of Ego and Non-Ego: Self and non-Self) is spoken of as only apparent like the creations of our dream which is resolved, when real enlightenment is attained, into the unity of absolute cognition in which there is no distinction of subject and object.[3]

(*ii*) The Âtman is the subject of knowledge in us. This **आत्मन्** is no other than the knower of all knowing in us; for this only is our real self: mental phenomena, which were often mistaken for **आत्मन्**, are as much an object to it as the external world.[4]

(*iii*) The Âtman, the pure Subject, is itself unknowable by reflection or any mental operation. All the inner mental states being foreign to it as an object to subject, it follows that the real Subject, the knower of all the states can never be made an object of knowledge like other objects.[5] The Âtman as pure Subject is cognition in itself, lying behind the relation of the phenomenal self (**जीवात्मा**) and the objects known by it, the mental phenomena and the world of perception.[6] Finally, we come to the last stage. This also was a natural consequence of the previous one. The subjective idealism of **याज्ञवल्क्य**, which denied the reality of the world, though it did not say that it was false like शशविषाण or खपुष्प, was gradually changed into concrete pantheism and absolute idealism, which became more popular, by the admission of the reality of the world in a qualified sense, by making it a part and aspect of the transformation of the Âtman. In this way, the theory of development of eternal aspects of ब्रह्म explains the origin and existence of the world *from* and *in* the Âtman and *for* the Âtman, and thus reconciles the existence of the world with the sole reality of ब्रह्म.

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[3] *Cf.* 4.5.15 of बृहदारण्यक—यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति, etc.

[4] *Cf.* तद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्गि अदृष्टं द्रष्टृ, etc.—3.8.11 of बृ: आ:।

[5] *Cf.* विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्।

[6] *Cf.* स एष नेति नेति इत्यात्मा, न हि गृह्यते, etc., 4.2.4 of बृ: आ:। अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते, स आत्मा, स विज्ञेयः (माण्डूक्य)। 4।

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह। आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कदाचन। (तैत्तिरीय, 2/9.)

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्। (केन, 2/3.)

This stage of development is attained in the छान्दोग्योपनिषत् in "सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलान्"—3.14.1, in "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, तत् प्रयन्ति, अभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, तद्ब्रह्मेति" of तैत्तिरीय. The idea is also found in बृहदारण्यक, 2.1.10, which runs, "Just as a spider can retract its thread, etc." or in the अग्निस्फुलिङ्ग example. The culmination of this synthesis of monism and dualism (द्वैत and अद्वैत) is found in Śvetāśvatara (श्वेताश्वतर), where nature, the finite spirit, and Iswara (ईश्वर) are conceived as together forming Brahman, the totality of all, which contains them as its factors.[7]

This, in brief, is the history of the successive stages of development of Hindu Philosophy, as revealed in the Upanishads. From this, it will appear how India developed a philosophy of her own as early as the Vedic Period, how even then she dreamt that dream of peace, that dream of seeking after God that has made her different from the rest of the world. India's essential greatness consists in this. We must—it is our duty—uphold this first of all. Rightly has it been said, as Sir John Woodroffe puts it, that when a man loses faith in his own historic past, he cannot have any faith in, and respect for, himself.

KUNJALAL DATTA

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[7] *Cf.* ज्ञाज्ञौ, द्वावजावीशानीशावजा ह्येका भोक्तृभोग्यार्थयुक्ता, अनन्तश्चात्मा, विश्वरूपो ह्यकर्त्ता त्रयं यदा विन्दते ब्रह्ममेतत्।

EVOLUTION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LIVING AND NON-LIVING FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MĀYĀ-VĀDA

The old controversy over the question of evolution in which Huxley and Gladstone played such prominent parts has been revived after the trial of the school-master of Tennessee, sharply dividing American thought into Fundamentalism and Modernism. In England also the question has once more become a living issue after the last British Association presidential address (1927) by Sir Arthur Keith, F.R.S., and the bold plea put in by the Bishop of Birmingham (Dr. Barnes, F.R.S.) in a Westminster Abbey sermon on September 25, 1927, for an entire reconstruction of theology on the basis of the Darwinian hypothesis. Here in India we are but lookers-on. The fanaticism of the Fundamentalist is inconceivable to us as Mosaic cosmogony, is no part of our creed. The doctrine of evolution or *Satkārya-vāda* or *pariṇāma-vāda* has been a leading tenet with the Sāṅkhyas. The Adwaita-vedāntists accept neither the atomism of the Nyāya-vaisheshikas nor the theory of creation of the crude Dualist, nor do they accept the Sāṅkhya doctrine of evolution. To them they are all unsatisfactory, and they have subjected all these theories of the universe (Jagat) to a vigorous criticism. They say that as no explanation of the universe (Jagat) is satisfactory, so it should be called *Māyā* or *Indrajāla*. To them it is hardly a problem at all, for it is *tuccha* (a matter of indifference). It has got to be renounced. The only thing that matters to them is Atman or Brahman. In the Samādhi or *turīya* state the world simply vanishes. This is the highest spiritual experience and Sankarācharya has very pithily recorded it in verse 485 of his Viveka-chuḍāmaṇi, beginning with the words : *Kva gatam, kena vā nītam* (where is it gone, who has absorbed it!). Because it vanishes therefore it is false.

It is the *vivarta* of Brahman. It is the rope mistaken for the snake. Why worry about that which is false? This is strictly the position of the Advaitist. According to Huxley, the position is one of "inverted agnosticism;" but the statement is not correct, for the Advaitist does not say that the world is unknowable in the sense in which God is unknowable to Herbert Spencer or Huxley. According to Huxley, God may or may not exist and even if He exists, He is unknowable. According to Herbert Spencer, He exists but is unknowable. They do not say that God is false. The Advaitist's attitude to the world is different. He says that it is false but *bhava-padārtha*, that is, it is not like the horn of the hare (absolutely non-existent) but it is like the rope mistaken for the snake, or in other words, it is false, though existent in a certain sense. The latest conclusion of Science also supports the doctrine of Maya in its own way, for Science now says that matter is immaterial.

2. Just as the old Vedantist rejected the evolution of the Sāṅkhyas, so the new Vedantist rejects the modern doctrine of evolution. The new Vedantist also rejects the attempt that is made by some well-meaning people at the reconciliation of creation with evolution when they say that the idea of evolution is not opposed to that of creation, but evolution should be regarded as a method of creation. He rejects the attempt, as no reason has been given why evolution should be so regarded at all.

3. Evolution is at best a hypothesis. It is not a name for the *cause* of the order of the external world. It merely describes the *process* or *effect*, or, in other words, it does not explain *why* but tries to explain *how*. "Variation just happens as Topsy 'growed.'" Even the description of the process or answer to the question "how" is very halting and unsatisfactory, for variations are not always slight. There are so many chasms and gulfs that are simply un-bridgeable, so many 'missing links' that the wonder is that this disjointed world stands together at all. For these breaks and chasms a reference is invited to an article in the Nineteenth Century and After,

January, 1928, contributed by J. A. Fleming, D.Sc., F.R.S., President of the Victoria Institute or Philosophical Society of Great Britain. The title of the article is 'Truth and Error in the Doctrine of Evolution.' The term 'emergent evolution' has been invented to get over the difficulty presented by the breaks, but it does not explain anything whatever, for naming is not explaining. The Vedantist then may very well say that it is all *indrajāla* or illusion. He may very well say that it is all Māyā.

4. From the standpoint of Einstein's theory of Relativity also, evolution is an illusion. Let me quote the summary of the conclusion of Dr. Robb in Evolution in the light of Modern Knowledge—A Collective Work published by Blackie in 1925. The summary has been given in the Times Literary Supplement, August 27, 1925. It runs as follows :

"In one serious matter, however, a recent use of scientific material by philosophy has seemed to disturb the theory of evolution either in its general or in its restricted sense. Evolution implies a real past or present, and infers a real future. But if time is only one of four dimensions describing or determining an event, and if the time determinant for any event has any indefinite range of variation in accordance with the choice of the other determinants, *evolution must be an illusion of a particular observer.*" The italics are mine.

5. Darwin tried to explain nothing more than the origin of species by the hypothesis of evolution and he modestly confined himself to the phenomena of living organisms, but some of his imaginative successors try to explain everything by the term 'evolution.' In our country Sir J. C. Bose is bold enough to maintain that there is no such thing as Non-Living and so many of our uncritical countrymen think that he has made the path of evolution extraordinarily easy.

6. Evolution is a very large subject and I am not going to write an exhaustive dissertation on the theme. I propose nothing more than to examine very briefly the claim of Sir

Jagadis that he has bridged the gulf between the things that are called Non-Living and the things that are called Living and its implication that evolution is a continuous process without any break, chasm or hiatus.

7. In 1857 Pasteur once for all demolished the mediæval theory of abiogenesis and triumphantly established the theory of biogenesis. If Sir J. C. Bose is right, then all this quarrel between biogenesis and abiogenesis is nothing but a fight with shadows, for according to him non-living phenomena simply do not exist, or, in other words, there is nothing in the world but the living. Sir J. C. Bose has been iterating and re-iterating this theory since the year 1900 in which he read his paper. On the similarity of effect of electrical stimulus on inorganic and living substances before the International Congress of Science, Paris, Sir J. C. Bose summarises his conclusion thus: "In all the phenomena described above there is no break of continuity. It is difficult to draw a line and say 'here the physical phenomenon ends and the physiological begins' or 'that is a phenomenon of dead matter and this is a vital phenomenon peculiar to the living;' such lines of demarcation do not exist." Again, in his Friday Evening Discourse, Royal Institution, May, 1901, Sir Jagadis says that "electrical response is regarded as the criterion between the living and non-living", and then, after showing that the so-called non-living also respond to the electric stimuli, concludes that "the physiological is, after all, but an expression of the physico-chemical, and that there is no abrupt break, but a continuity". Then again in his latest discourse on the occasion of the tenth anniversary meeting of the Bose Institute on the 29th November, 1927, Sir J. C. Bose says: "In the pursuit of my investigations I was unconsciously led into the border region of physics and physiology and was amazed to find boundary lines vanishing and points of contact emerging between the realms of the Living and the Non-Living". And in the same address he makes the astounding pronouncement

that "the dust particle and the earth are thus instinct with sensibility and with an enlarged cosmic sense we may come to regard the million orbs that tread their path through space as something akin to organisms, having a definite history of their past and an evolutionary progress for their future. We then realise that they are by no means insensate clods, locked in rigour of death, but active organisms, whose breath perchance is luminous iron vapour, whose blood is liquid metal and whose food is a stream of meteorites."

8. It is difficult to say whether the picture of the march of evolutionary progress with the 'breath,' 'blood' and 'food' of the million orbs is poetry or science. The corrective of the extravagance of Sir Jagadis will be found, however, in the following words quoted from the *Times Titerary Supplement,* August 27, 1925, page 550, column 2, para. 3 :

"Evolution in the restricted sense as a process towards the complex from the simpler, is the best description of what we know of the present and the past of organic life. The causative principle which has gained most assent and encountered the fewest difficulties is natural selection or the survival of the fittest, very much in the form propounded by Darwin and Wallace. But the reality of this agency and still more the extent of its operation are still matters in dispute. They have had their great historical justification, inasmuch as they led to knowledge of the process. *Any transference of the conception of evolution from the organic to the inorganic is at the most a metaphor. There is no scientific justification for any extension to the inorganic world of a conception of evolution which implies any notion such as the survival of the fittest or indeed of progress. If metaphor be useful with regard to the changes of the inorganic world, in the present state of knowledge it seems more reasonable to speak of a running down towards annihilation than of a running up towards perfection.*" These remarks are based on the monumental work "Evolution in the light of Modern Knowledge". The italics are mine.

9. Now from Sir J. C. Bose's picture of the march of evolutionary progress and his 'breath,' 'blood' and 'food' of the million orbs let me come to what according to him is regarded as *the criterion* of life.

10. If Sir J. C. Bose's premiss that *the criterion* of life is response to the stimuli, be true, then his conclusion that there is no such thing as Non-Living must also be true. If his premiss be false then his conclusion also must be false.

11. The main issue being *the criterion* of life, the most important question for us is: **What is the fundamental fact of life**, since the fundamental fact of life is only another name for its criterion? For an answer to the question we must go to the physiologist who alone can speak with authority on the point. It will be seen that physiology does not regard response to the stimuli as the criterion of life.

12. According to the physiologist "**the fundamental fact of life is the metabolism of living substance** which is continually and spontaneously undergoing decomposition, and building itself up anew with the help of the food-substances it takes in. These processes of decomposition and of reconstruction may be briefly designated as dissimilation (catabolism) and assimilation (anabolism) respectively" (*Encyclopædia Britannica,* eleventh edition—Article, Physiology).

13. Now, Sir J. C. Bose in his anxiety to give importance to his own experiments and discovery has perhaps unconsciously not only avoided the main issue altogether but has raised a false issue which hopelessly vitiates his conclusion.

14. Let me briefly indicate the nature of Sir J. C. Bose's experiments and discovery in the words of *Nature*, July 31, 1926, page 158.

"He (Sir Jagadis) incidentally observed, in the course of his researches, that the metallic receivers of the electric waves showed 'fatigue' after prolonged service, and regained their activity after a period of rest and conversely, that they became inert after too long a rest but could be revived by an electric shock. He was so struck by the close resemblance of these phenomena to those presented by living muscle and nerve under similar conditions that he proceeded to make a series of comparative experiments, the results of which were embodied in his book 'Response in the Living and Non-Living' (1902). It is there established beyond doubt that metals (but apparently no other form of non-living matter) possess to a certain degree the 'irritability' which had hitherto been regarded as peculiar to living protoplasm."

15. And what are the conclusions? Let me quote the words of the writer in *Nature* again :

"This leads to the remarkable conclusions that 'irritability' is not exclusively the property of living matter, that the '*negative variation*' *response is* **not** *a sign of life.*" The italics are mine.

16. And what is the conclusion of Sir J. C. Bose?

Just the opposite. According to him, it is not only a sign of life but **the criterion** of life.

17. Sir J. C. Bose's experiments are all right. Only his logic is bad. His theory is therefore unacceptable.

18. The criterion of life, as I have already said, is metabolism. This metabolism is nowhere to be found in the existences known as non-living mechanisms. Great scientists have therefore called life unique. An eminent writer in *Nature* (May 21, 1927, page 740) has called life a " miracle ", which is as much as to say that it is all *indrajāla* or Maya.

19. In a very sensible article entitled Biology and Personality contributed by Professor D. Fraser Harris, M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S. (Edin.), to the *Hibbert Journal* of July, 1926, the learned professor, a specialist in Physiology, says that " the possession of affectability or response to a stimulus is not a characteristic only of living beings." The most characteristically vital act, he stoutly maintains, is metabolism. This is not only Science but also common sense. The wonder is that so cardinal a distinction should be ignored by Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose.

20. It is a matter of regret that the distinguished Vice-Chancellor of the Nagpur University, Sir Bepin Krishna Bose, in his lecture on the phenomena of Life reported in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of January 1, 1928, has lent support to the theory of Sir Jagadis Chandra Bose. The comparison he has instituted in the course of the lecture between crystals and living beings is peculiarly sterile. When he says that inorganic crystals 'grow' and therefore growth is no test of life, he entirely misconceives the meaning of the word 'growth.' The growth involved in metabolism is radically distinct from the growth of crystals. "The comparison of living beings to crystals is one that has often occurred to the minds of biologists, because crystals, like organisms, have a specific form which they preserve, with minor modifications, as they grow; but the difficulties of this comparison are obvious, and until now have appeared insuperable. Crystals grow by accretions to their outer surface; organisms by the inter-position of new living molecules amongst those already existing. The additions to the body, like those to crystals, come from the surrounding medium, but the molecules added to a crystal exist as such in the mother liquor and are merely precipitated on the crystals' surface, whereas those that build up the organism are elaborated by the organism itself out of simpler ones which it takes in as food. The crystal is a mass of similar molecules, whereas the organism is composed of different chemical substances arranged in a definite manner so as to build up a structure which will work... ...a crystal is a relatively static form of material, whilst every particle of a living being, so long as it is alive is in a continual state of destruction and reconstitution and this reconstitution is effected from relatively simple materials. Nothing at all similar to the miracle of assimilation is to be found outside the domain of life." (*Nature*, May 21, 1927—Article, Mechanism and Vitalism).

21. Let us turn now from the conclusions of science of the modern West to the wisdom of the *rishis* of the Upanishads

and the *āchāryas* of the Vedānta. Sir Jagadis and Sir Bepin Krishna receive no support from the ancient sages of India any more than they do from the modern Western Science. When we compare the conclusions of the Western science of to-day with those of our Upanishadic *rishis* and Vedantic *āchāryas,* we are struck with the wonderful agreement in their views on the phenomena of life, for the Vedānta clearly distinguishes between living organisms and non-living mechanisms. The former it calls *chetana* and the latter *achetana.* The Brahma-sūtras recognise a distinct life-principle and designates it as the *mukhya prāṇa.* "Badarayana, while combating the Sāṅkhyas, who ascribe the origin of the universe to one unconscious material principle—*Pradhāna,* has clearly indicated the differences between the *chetana* and the *achetana* classes. Āchārya Śaṅkara in his memorable Bhāshya to the sūtras has recognised this well-known distinction (Śaṅkara's Bhashya, 2-1-4). But he has by way of explanation pointed out that this distinction obtains in the sphere of *vyavahāra* or convention only ; in the sphere of *paramārtha* or true knowledge there cannot be any such distinction" (*Jīvātman in the Brahma-sūtras,* Calcutta University publication, 1921, page 52). Now *vyavahāric* knowledge belongs to science which is *aparā-vidya* and Sir Jagadis speaks as a Scientist from the standpoint of evolution. He should therefore observe the distinction and by observing the distinction admit like other Scientists that evolution does not explain the emergence of life and thus prepare the ground for Māya-vāda. We shall then be able to understand the *pāramārthic* standpoint of Śaṅkarāchārya.

22. "The Chhāndogya Upanishad in a text (6-3-1) speaks of the three *vijas* or seeds of the living beings, *viz., aṇḍaja* (born of egg), *jīvaja or Jarāyuja* (born of uterus) and *udbhijja* (plants)" *Ibid,* page 53). There is no mixing up of *chetana* and *achetana* here.

23. The confusion between the living and the non-living owes its origin to a crude idea of evolution. In the words of

Sir Oliver Lodge, " Old doctrines of creation were crude; new doctrines of evolution are equally crude." Some people are so obsessed by the unscientific idea of infinite progress that they crudely think that evolution gives them the philosophy of life they seek. But their mind should be completely disabused of the false impression they are labouring under. *They should think of individual destiny first.* The 'evolution' of Science has nothing whatever to do with infinite progress. The world, Science says, moves in a cycle. "I believe that is the essence of the physical universe, to follow a cycle, round and round:—The plant assimilating inorganic materials, elaborating them into food for animals, the animals returning them in the inorganic form, ready for the plant; energy taking the potential form, then the kinetic, then the potential again, and so on alternately for ever; water evaporated, rising as vapour, then falling as rain, getting back into the sea, and being evaporated again. Everywhere we find a cyclical process in the material universe." (*Huxley Lecture on Evolution* delivered by Sir Oliver Lodge, at Charing Cross Hospital on Thursday, December 3, 1925, and reported in *Nature*, December 26, 1925, pages 939, etc.)

24. It is in the fitness of things that Huxley's "Cosmic process" should receive confirmation, though in a much milder form, from Sir Oliver Lodge in his Huxley Lecture on Evolution. Even the "gloomy Dean" is frightened at the idea which he calls "radical pessimism," and in his anxiety to make out that Christianity is an optimistic religion which it is not, delivers a lecture on Scientific Ethics. Dean Inge is not consistent, for he has spoken of the cyclical movement elsewhere. It is a pity he should not be able to shake off completely his theological prejudice.

25. We, Hindus, need not be frightened at the depressing picture of the cosmic process, for we have been consistent believers in the cyclical movement of the world. This is the ABC of our philosophy and religion. We know the world

to be a vicious circle which cannot be explained, and because it is vicious, therefore it is false, and its right name is Māyā. In the words of Śaṅkarāchārya :

दिनयामिन्यौ सायं प्रातः, शिशिरवसन्तौ पुनरायातः ।
कालः क्रीड़ति गच्छत्यायुस्तदपि न मुञ्चत्याशा वायुः ॥

(Day and Night, Morning and Evening, Winter and Spring return again and again. It is thus that Time sports. It is thus that Life runs out. Still men are dupes of false hope.)

We do not see teleology anywhere, neither immanent finality nor teleology related to a transcendent Deity or a Being at once immanent and transcendent. It is dysteleology all through. 'The whole creation' is not moving to 'a far-off divine event,' in the words of the poet ; nor can it be said with Hegel that the ideal is real and the real ideal.

26. Is there no hope then ? The Advaitist says : Yes. There is Hope, though it will sound 'too like despair' to many. It need not, however, so sound, for

स्वल्पमप्यस्य धर्मस्य त्रायते महतो भयात् ।

(Even the least of this *Dharma* saves from great fear.)

The Advaitist says : The spiritual value is supreme and you can get out of the vicious circle. How to get out ? How to realise ? Through *Nivritti*, through the denial of the will to live, through the voice of Ought, another name for the ethical process, the very reverse of the process of the material universe. This belongs to the *Sādhan adhyāya* of the Brahma Sūtra. What is the end, the goal ? The end is *Mukti*, *Brahma-nirvāṇa*, absolute freedom, absolute renunciation, absolute good, perfection. This belongs to the *Phalādhyāya* of the Brahma Sūtra.

27. It is the message of strength. Very brave hearts alone can receive it. Very brave hearts alone can say : I am That ; I am That. Very brave hearts alone can say : I am the

Infinite, the Eternal. I am the Infinite as I have struck off all fetters and destroyed limitations—and as the infinite cannot be two, so I am the Only One that exists, the *Ekamevâdvitīyam. Om tat sat Om.* This is mysticism and this is also logic —and this is the roar of the lion of Vedānta, the highest philosophy and the highest religion.

KAMAKHYANATH MITRA

PARTED

I pray God guide thee along pathways fair
Throughout each day, from dawn to setting sun,
And bless with loving care thy every choice,
For tho' we are apart, and life is void of fun,
Whilst there are song-birds, I shall have your voice !

I pray God keep this love for ever in thine heart
To light thy way thro' moments dull with tears
To help thee on with song and azure skies,
For tho' we are apart, and life is dark with fears,
Whilst there is sunshine, I shall have your eyes.

I pray God leave one hope to still endure
One hope for each to hold till I return,
And with our faith and this great blessing from above,
Tho' we are apart, along life's pathway I shall learn,
Whilst there is life, I shall have your love !

LELAND J. BERRY

Reviews

Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 127. Pageant of King Mindon. By Chas. Duroiselle, M.A. Price Rs. 7-6 as. or 12*s*. 6*d*.

In this issue of the Memoirs, the Superintendent, Archæological Survey, Burma Circle, has reproduced a number of fine pictures from paintings in a Burmese folding book at Mandalay, which represent the pageant of King Mindon Min, the immediate predecessor of Thibaw, leaving his palace on a visit to a marble image of the Buddha. This remarkable specimen of Burmese art with its display of quaint dresses, gorgeous uniforms and finely delineated figures of elephants, certainly deserves preservation. A short note on the development of this art and a brief account of Burma in the days of Alompra, Badôpayâ and Mindon Min would have added to the interest of the general reader.

Historicus

Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 32. Fragment of a Prajnaparamita Manuscript from Central Asia. By Pandit B. B. Bidyabinod. Price Re. 1-12 as. or 3*s*.

This fragment of a work on "Transcendental Knowledge" comes from the land of the Daradas (in the north-west corner of Kashmir) which, together with the land of the Khasas and Kuchikas, has yielded priceless treasures of Indian culture. The document is written in upright Gupta characters of the calligraphic type and resembles, in subject-matter and phraseology, the Śatasāhaśrikā-Prajñāpāramitā published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. While the student of Indian history in general and of Mahāyāna Buddhism in particular will be grateful to the department of Archæology for publishing similar fragments, it is permissible to observe that the value of such publications will be increased by longer introductory notes giving the general reader some idea of the class of literature to which the particular texts belong and their importance in the culture history of this country.

Historicus

The Commission and After. By a Liberal, Bombay, D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 1928. Price Rs. 3.

In this little book of one hundred and sixteen pages the author, who belongs to the Liberal school of politics, and apparently hails from Western India, gives a brief account of the *personnel* of the Simon Commission, the reception which the announcement of its constitution met with in India, and the attitude of British politicians, and particularly of the Labour party, towards Indian questions in general and the Simon issue in particular. He seeks to demonstrate the hollowness of the pleas urged in justification of the total exclusion of Indians—even of those who are members of Parliament—from the Commission, and points out the anomaly of "Parliament sitting in judgment over its own conduct" (p. 65). He sounds a note of warning against the harmful effects of "decennial inquests" (p. 96). Discussing the question of the future constitution of India, he exposes the sophistry of those who assert that Western institutions are not fit for India. He makes a good case against the doctrinaire believers in village autonomy as the panacea for India's ills, and draws pointed attention to the undoubted fact that "the country was most prosperous w henever there was a strong central government and that the moment that the central government lost its power and initiative the progress towards disintegration and decay became quick." The problem of the Feudatory States receives attention from the author who shows a predilection for the Mont-ford plan of an Indian Privy Council for the transition period, "the members of which will be Rulers of Indian States, as well as their subjects and prominent men from British India." Speaking about "the position of India *vis-a-vis* the Empire," the author, while admitting that Indian participation in Imperial Conferences has hitherto yielded little fruit, says "the Empire is not static. It is continually moving and progressing. The relations between its various members are being continually readjusted on new bases with reference to the new and changing conditions of the world. We have Dominion Self-Government before us as our political goal. It would, therefore, be a mistake to cut ourselves off from the contact with progress in the Dominions by non-co-operating with the Imperial Conference."

Referring to the question of social reform which looms large owing to the publication of a certain work by an American woman, the author expresses his agreement with the view that the strongest forces working for social emancipation are to be found outside Government circles, and that political liberty is sure to be followed by social progress. Discussing the lines of future reform, the author refers to the activities of the All

Parties' Conference and expresses his preference for a qualified franchise, the abolition of communal electorates and "a geographical redistribution of provinces which would emphasise the unity of the country as a whole and keep forces of disintegration in check."

The book is a useful contribution to the literature on the subject but is disfigured by too many misprints.

Historicus

I. **The Hindu Colony of Cambodia.** By Prof. Phanindranath Bose, M.A., published by the Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras 1927. (*Demy 8vo.*, pp. 410.)

Here is another book of Prof. Bose, probably the last of his series of works, on the history of the Indian colonies in the Far East. It is to be recognised that he was the first to undertake this interesting work as early as 1917-18 and has continued it with an admirable steadiness. He has written on Champa, Siam and China, and has tried his best to make the history of the Indian influence on those countries accessible to laymen as well as to scholars of this country. I had occasion to point out that though his works cannot claim any originality yet they have rendered a valuable service in popularising the subject at a time when all the scholarly works on it were existing only in French. There was absolutely nothing in English which the average Indian reader could utilise.

The present work of Prof. Bose appears to me to be the best of all that he has published till now. It is well printed and well presented. In this work also he follows the order previously adopted by him. Up to Ch. XIV he gives a sketch of the political history of Cambodia and from Ch. XV onwards he tries to trace the cultural history of the country. Except in certain details the author follows faithfully the previous researches on the subject and has presented them correctly. The attempt is a success and we recommend it to all interested in the subject.

P. 37. Prof. Pelliot's "Monumental Book Le Funan" (BEFEO III). It is simply an article of about 55 pages..

P. 272. "We know Vāgīśvarī to be the Buddhist goddess of Learning." Vāgīśvarī does not seen to belong to the Buddhist pantheon.

P. 281. "The people of Cambodia did not pay so much attention to Viṣṇu." It is not correct.

Pp. 373-374. Angkor Vat was never a Buddhist Monastery—but a Viṣṇu temple.

P. 374. "The Indo-Chinese Museum of Trocadèro."—Trocadero Museum is in Paris and does not exclusively contain Indo-Chinese antiquities.

II. **Indian Cultural Influence in Cambodia.** By Dr. Bijanraj Chatterjee, Ph.D. (London), D. Lit. (Punjab); published by the Calcutta University, 1928 (8 *vo.* pp. 303).

Here is another book on ancient Cambodia which has a more serious tone than the preceding one. As is evident from the author's preface he had the opportunity to work with some of the best specialists on the subject and his knowledge not only of the French but also of the Dutch language has enabled him to take a comparative standpoint. The work, it should be admitted to the author's credit, is a distinct improvement on all previous literature on the subject. It was M. Georges Maspéro who made the first attempt to write a systematic memoir based on inscriptions and documents available at his time. His book *L'Empire Khmèr—Histoire et documents* appeared in 1904 but since then an enormous amount of work has been done on the subiect. During the last 25 years the French School of Hanoi has systematically carried on their work of excavation and preservation of ancient monuments in different provinces of Cambodia and in course of its work a large number of ancient inscriptions have been discovered and edited by MM. Finot, Cœdès and others. Meanwhile similar work in Champa and Java and valuable informations supplied by Cœdès and Ferrand on the forgotten empire of Çrivijaya have enabled scholars to modify their previous theories and widen their angle of vision. Dr. Chatterjee has profited by these recent researches and has spared no pains in making his book up-to-date.

Cambodia or, to call it by its original name, Kambuja, was under Indian influence for more than a thousand years. A sort of colonial empire was established there by the Indian immigrants and *Kṣatriya* dynasties of rulers, of apparently Indian origin, ruled the country for a long time. The early history of this colonisation is shrouded in mist. There are no inscriptions prior to the 6th century A.D. and the only sources of information for this period are the Chinese documents. Some legends relating to the early Indian colonisation, of Cambodian origin, are preserved in Chinese and a study of these legends and other documents has permitted scholars to ascertain that by the first century A.D. Cambodia already received a stream of Indian immigrants. It was one Kauṇḍinya who came from India first and founded the kingdom of *Fu-nan* (a name still undeciphered ; and supposed to be the transcription of the Khmer word *Bhnam* meaning 'mountain'). The dynasty founded by

Kauṇḍiṇya ruled till the first half of the 6th century A.D. when Kambuja, originally a vassal state, overthrew *Fu-nan* under Citrasena who on ascending the throne assumed the name of Mahendravarman. From this time onwards we hear of *Fu-nan* as a name of the past ; Kambuja rises in power and flourishes almost uninterruptedly till the end of the 13th century A.D.

Dr. Chatterjee treats the history of these twelve hundred years. He follows the chronological order but it is the cultural history which he paints in a political *cadre*. The very title of his book is noteworthy—"*Indian Cultural Influence in Cambodia.*" We are not absolutely justified in calling the ancient kingdoms of the Far-East categorically "Indian colonies." Titles like that are probably justifiable in common *parler* but from a more sober standpoint they have no justification.

While treating the history of these Far-Eastern kingdoms we have no right to ignore the people of that sub-continent—the Austric people—who were the recepients of the Indian culture. If it be admitted that the people of the same ethnic group occupied the Gangetic valley before the arrival of the Aryans and the Dravidians we have to wait and see to what extent the Eastern Indian culture, which was brought to the Far-East in later times, was impregnated by the ideas of this ancient people. The Austric people, even in historic times, appear as hardy navigators and it is this people who used to traverse the whole Indian Ocean from the coast of Africa to that of Australia and from the coast of Indo-China to that of America. It still remains to be seen if the ancient ports on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, Takkola, Tamluk, *Che-li-ta-lo*, etc., ports from which the Aryan colonisers sailed to the Far-East, came into existence before the Aryanisation of that coast. Besides it has been pointed out that the names of some of these ports and those of the provinces like Aṅga, Vaṅga, Kaliṅga, Triliṅga, Utkala, Mekala etc., cannot be explained either by Sanskrit or Dravidian morphology. The beginning of the colonisation of the Far-East cannot be explained until these problems are properly tackled.

The numerical strength of the Indian immigration to those countries, it should be pointed out, was never sufficient to cause radical changes in the outlook of the vast indigenous population. They accepted certain elements of the Indian culture, imposed on them, for developing their own. If a large number of Sanskrit inscriptions have been found in those countries it should not be assumed on that account that Sanskrit was the current language there. The Khmer language in Cambodia as well as Cham in Champa continued to exist as proper vehicles of the respective cultures of those countries. The languages developed under Sanskrit influence and borrowed some Sanskrit vocabulary but ultimately they supplanted Sanskrit. The Indian art and architecture were imported but as soon as their guardians, the rulers of Indian origin, disappeared there was nobody to continue their tradition. Their exotic character became the sole cause of their decadence and ruin. The indigenous architect went back to his wooden model while introducing some Indian element in it.

Indian immigrants consisted of merchants, religious missionaries and adventurers of noble families and these people in course of time succeeded in establishing a supremacy in those countries which lasted for over a thousand years. They intermarried with the aristocracy of the land and with its help ruled the kingdom. They built royal cities and palaces, temples and monasteries and recorded their vanity in Sanskrit inscriptions. Autocratic rulers as they were, their culture influenced to a certain extent different domains of the peoples' life. But with their extinction the Indian domination was gone. The history of those Indians as gathered from their inscriptions and as deciphered from their monuments is only a passing phase in the history of the land. Under these circumstances the only thing we can speak of, without any violation of truth, is "Indian cultural and political influence in those countries." Dr. Chatterji, well acquainted with these difficult problems, has chosen a modest title for his book.

Another important feature of Dr. Chatterji's book is the comparative standpoint he has taken. The ancient history of Kambuja and Champa, Çrîvijaya, Java and Bali are interconnected with each other. The Indian immigrants followed the same route and when settled in these countries entertained relations, with each other, which were at times hostile when interests clashed. Thus a comparison of the legends current in those countries (pp. 7-11) is of great interest to those who want to make further investigation on the early history of the Indian immigration.

In presenting the data already known Dr. Chatterji has his own method of looking at things. He has added a new interpretation of certain facts in the concluding chapter of the book. The influence of Magadha and Bengal on the Mahāyāna and Tantrayāna in Çrîvijaya and Kambuja (pp. 253-259), the intercourse between Bengal and the Archipelago (p. 264) are important additions to our knowledge. The echo of the popular Bengali tale of Çîta-Vasanta is of great interest and the influence of North-Indian architecture (specially of Magadha) in the Far-East will be a starting point for future research on the subject. The synchronistic Table will be a great help to readers who want to have the important events of the history of Further-India in a nutshell. Dr. Chatterji has fulfilled his task in a successful manner and his book, written as it is in a simple and lucid style, will be of interest to the specialist as well as to the layman. His book is not encumbered by too many foot-notes which have now-a-days become a positive terror to the reading public.

Coming to details, we are sorry to notice that there are a series of mistakes in transcription of proper names. The corrigenda rectify only a few of them. We hope the author will correct them properly in the second edition.

P. 2, (bottom) *kiao* seems to be the correct form meaning only a *pratyanta-janapada.*

P. 22, *che*(sic. *she*) *li-pa-mo* seems to be Çrîvarman.

P. 26, Dr. Chatterji forgets the name of another Buddhist monk of Fu-nan, Subhûti (*Siu-p-u-ti*) who went to China in 557-558 A.D. and translated the *Mahāyāna-ratnamegha Sūtra*, now lost (*cf.* Bagchi—*Canon Bouddhique* I, p. 431).

P. 162, The *Madhyavibhāga çāstra* is without doubt the work of that name attributed to Vasubandhu, now existing in two Chinese translations prepared by Hiuan-ts'ang in 661. A.D., and Paramartha in 557-569 A.D. *Cf.* Nanjio's Catalogue nos. 1244 and 1248. *Madhyantavibhâga çâstra.* The *Tattvasamgraha* with its commentary is a well known work, now published in the *Gaiekwar Oriental Series*, Vol XXX, 1926. The work is attributed to Çântarakṣita (first half of the 8th century) and the commentary to his disciple Kamalaçîla who was his junior contemporary.

P. C. Bagchi

Hindu Mysticism.—By S. N. Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D (Cal)., Ph.D (Cantab.), Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.

This work from the pen of the author of "History of Indian Philosophy" is an attempt within the compass of about 170 pages to bring home to Western readers one aspect—perhaps the most salient aspect—of Indian thought, namely, its mysticism.

The author defines mysticism as "a spiritual grasp of the aims and problems of life in a much more real and ultimate manner than is possible to mere reason." The essence of mysticism, then, is the perception that the highest truths cannot be revealed by reason. As I have pointed out in my book, "The Neo-romantic movement in contemporary philosophy," this perception characterises contemporary philosophy in the West. All the most important currents of present day thought—pragmatism, Bergsonism, voluntarism, the philosophy of values—owe there inspiration to the recognition that truth cannot be grasped in its totality by conceptual thought.

But mysticism does not represent merely a negative attitude. Its positive element, in fact, is more pronounced than the negative. It believes it possesses a positive consciousness which reveals to it the highest truth. Its attitude is the attitude of a discoverer not merely that of a critic or analyst. It is, in fact, its positive content, its certainty that it is in actual possession of the highest truth, that explains the tremendous hold that it has upon mankind.

Mysticism has mainly two forms. In the first form, it takes for its principle something which is pre-reflective, something which is of the nature of a bare feeling. Feeling, it is supposed, is absolutely unsophisticated. Thought on reflection spoils the purity of the original feeling and takes one away from reality. To get into the heart of reality, what is needed is to remove all excrescence of thought and restore feeling to its original purity. In the West, mediæval mysticism has been mainly of this pre-reflective type.

Indian mysticism has always been of the second kind. In India what the mystics sought was not the pre-reflective feeling but the post-reflective consciousness which only emerges after reflective thinking. To show its post-reflective nature, our author always cults the experience sought by the Indian mystics 'Supra consciousness.' "The mystic experience," says our author, "cannot be expressed in words or understood by conceptual thought: it reveals itself only to supra-conscious experience." This 'supra-conscious experience' is Bradley's "Experience with a capital 'E'," which, as Bradely is careful to point out, is higher and not lower than reflective consciousness. The Vedantist's *turīya condition* also refers to this 'supra-conscious' experience.

This 'supra-concious experience' is the first round which moves the whole of Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy never believed in an abstract Reason dissociated from concrete experience. It is for this reason that it has always been able to maintain an intimate contact with the currents of life. Philosophy has never exhibited any antagonism to Religion, such as it has done in the West. In fact, the very idea of Philosophy opposing Religion or Religion opposing Philosophy is absurd from the standpoint of Indian thought. And it is for this reason that philosophy has always had such a controlling influence upon the minds of the people in India. To the Western mind such an influence seems very strange, for the simple reason that he is accustomed to the quarrels between Philosophy and Science and Philosophy and Religion.

In taking as the theme of his lectures the development of Indian mysticism, the author therefore has chosen a subject which brings out the most essential characteristic of Indian thought. No better subject could possibly be chosen to illustrate the main features of Indian thought, and the author has dealt with it with the easy mastery of an expert. For the Western student, it is difficult to conceive of a better present than this little volume of six lectures. The six lectures deal respectively with the Vedic mysticism, the mysticism of the Upanishads, Yoga mysticism, Buddhist mysticism, classical forms of devotional mysticism and popular forms of devotional mysticism. The six lectures are not arranged at random but they represent successive stages in the development of the mystic consciousness. From the beginnings of the mystic experience in the Vedas to its culminating point in the experience of the *bhakta* who completely surrenders himself to his Lord, saying “त्वया हृषीकेश हृदि स्थितेन यथा नियुक्तोऽस्मि तथा करोमि” we notice a continuous development.

One great thing mysticism has done. It has saved Indian philosophy from the barrenness of logicism such as at one time threatened to engulf philosophy in the West after the great wave of idealism that swept Europe in the early nineteenth century. Thanks to our mysticism, we in the East have found in truth not a rigid, lifeless logical formula but a gushing, sparkling, vitalising stream that irrigates the entire region of our life. If we had not had this conception of truth, we would not have said with our author, "what have you gained if you have never tasted in your life the deep longing for deliverance and supreme emancipation? And the spirit of the saints of ages whispers in my ears: what have you gained if you have not tasted the joys of self-surrender, if your heart has not longed to make of you a flute in the hands of Krishna, that master musician of the Universe, and if you have not been able to sweeten all your miseries with a touch of God?"

The best answer that India can give to the vile slanders of Miss Mayo is to send out to the world a dozen books of the type of Dr. Dasgupta's little volume.

SISIRKUMAR MAITRA

Ourselves

THE LATE MR. SISIRKUMAR RAY.

It is with a heavy heart that we have to report the premature death of our Manager, Mr. Sisirkumar Ray, which melancholy event took place on the 5th of May, 1928. He had been ailing for about 6 days, and before we could realise the gravity of his condition all was over in a trice. A career of great promise has thus been cut off at the prime of life—Mr. Ray being only 34 at the time of his death. After taking his Master's Degree in History, he joined the staff of the *Bengalee* and subsequently was taken into the Post-graduate Department as the Inspector of the University Messes in 1917. When the Review was taken over by the University in 1921, he was appointed by Sir Asutosh to take up the duties of the Manager in addition to his work in the P.G. Dept. Mr. Ray proved a success ; nay, for a youth of his age, it was a tremendous success. Intelligent far above the average, sedulous and conscientious to a degree, he was well-informed and resourceful beyond compare. His winning manners and uniform courtesy contributed no less to the singular success he achieved as Manager of the Review ; and death has doubly revealed his worth, for we do feel that we shall not be able to replace a fine youngman of his character and abilities. To know him was to love him, and in the midst of this dire calamity, it is really a solace to contemplate that his death is being mourned by everybody in the University, from the highest official to the humblest menial. His simplicity, his vivacity and his attachment to his friends are traits we can never forget. He was married only in 1923 and he leaves behind him an old aged mother, a young widow and a child of only 8 months, with whom the greatest sympathy will be felt. We offer our sincere condolence to the bereaved family. And while mourning with them his tragic and lamentable death, we record our high appreciation of the



SISIR KUMAR RAY

excellent services he has rendered to this University.

> "The Bird of Time has but a little way
> To flutter—and the Bird is on the Wing."

> "Whether at Naishápúr or Babylon,
> Whether the cup with sweet or bitter run,
> The Wine of Life keeps oozing drop by drop,
> The Leaves of Life keep falling one by one."

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ASUTOSH ANNIVERSARY

The fourth death-anniversary of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee was duly celebrated on the 25th May last at the Darbhanga Building by a large number of students, friends and admirers. Representatives of all important and influential sections of the residents of Calcutta and of the student community congregated at 5 p.m. over the Grand Stair-case round the marbl bust to pay homage to the departed Great, whose inspiring memory, earnestly cherished in their loving hearts, the nation cannot afford to let die. The hall was fumigated with burning frankincense and the marble bust of Sir Asutosh was richly decorated with motely flowers. The function commenced with Principal G. C. Bose, of the Bangabasi College, a veteran educationist and, for years, a Member of the Senate, leading the prayer in all solemnity in which the grateful assemblage joined in silent chorus, signalising the conclusion by bowing down in reverence before the profusely garlanded figure.

We reproduce below, from the speech of Professor Radhakrishnan, an appreciation of the builder and reformer to whom Bengal owes a Teaching University :

Speaking at the Sir Asutosh Memorial meeting held at the

Calcutta University Institute on Friday, the 25th May, 1928, Prof. Radhakrishnan said :—

"It is a great privilege to be able to participate in the events of this day and pay my humble tribute to the memory of the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee. As the days pass, his services to the country will be appreciated in their proper perspective. Among the makers of modern India he is in the front rank. The historian of the Indian Renaissance will accord to him a place second to none among those who contributed to it. In days of great political excitement and obsession he had the vision to see that life was not all politics. We have the economic, social and cultural sides of the nationalist movement. The cultural is the vital part. It is the soul which will slowly gather for itself a body. Even though the body may be hidden, if the soul is alive, it can assume another body. If the soul is dead, nothing can save us.

NATIONAL SELF-RESPECT.

At a time when attempts were being made to instil into us the spirit of defeatism, he made the University of Calcutta an instrument for increasing national self-respect and self-confidence. He looked upon the Indian problem as of international significance; for the first time in the history of the world, a progressive European nation has come into continuous contact with a distinctive and disciplined Oriental people, and the effects of this are visible all round.

Two alternatives, both equally deficient, suggest themselves : crude invitation or cowardly withdrawal. The radicals under the impression that the Indian civilisation has failed us, has played us false, has exposed us to the invader and the spoiler, ask us to give it up and imitate the Western culture. But no nation can rise without a conscious contact with the past. We cannot borrow souls as we barter goods. Silent withdrawal is equally ineffective. Whatever be the value of character, fellowship and good feeling are not easy; when w pursue the delights which are not diminished by sharing, co-operation and fellowship on a plane of equality become natural and moral. He did his best to free the University fro all politics. The greatest tribute that we can pay to t memory of Sir Asutosh is to remember his ideals of self-respect national efficiency and international understanding—ideals t which he clung in spite of occasional deviation and difficulties. Let our loyalty and love for him enable us to make the University a centre of cultural pursuits and not a cockpit of party strife. Let us free it from all pettiness and politics."

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Preonath Ghosh and Gagantara Dasi Medal.

Dr. Jogendranath Ghosh, L.M.S., has offered G. P. Notes to the value of Rs. 500 to create an endowment for the annual award of a medal (gold or silver) to perpetuate the memory of his parents the late Preonath Ghosh and Srimati Gagantara Dasi on the following conditions :—

(1) That the medal be called "Preonath Ghosh and Gagantara Dasi Medal" bearing the words "Awarded to........................ year" on one side and the University Arms on the other.

(2) That the medal be publicly awarded every year at the Annual Convocation to the successful candidate who obtains the highest number of marks in English in the Honours Course at the B.A. Examination of the year, provided that he pursues his studies as a regular student for the degree of M.A.

(3) That the endowments and the names of the medallists be regularly published in the Calcutta Gazette as also in the University Calendar.

(4) That the medal be awarded for the first time on the result of the B.A. Examination of 1929, if possible.

The offer has been thankfully accepted by the University.

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non-co-operation as a political weapon, in matters of culture it is utterly futile. We were never too proud to learn. Our hospitality and willingness to learn are well known. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee adopted as his practical policy what the founder of non-co-operation movement himself has said, that while we should expose ourselves to all the winds that blow, we should not be blown off our feet. He, therefore, made provision for the humanities, especially on the Indian side, and the sciences as well. He felt again that the hope of the future lay in international understanding. The nations we hate are the nations we do not know. Newman as a child saw the French prisoners of the Napoleonic wars pass through the streets of London when the onlookers lifted up their coats to see their tails—so simply and so seriously did the English crowds believe Frenchmen to be monkeys. Even if we do not believe our antagonists to be monkeys literally, we attribute to them racial qualities which are more animal than human. We had recently a sensational book about India justifying the removal of the Indian population from the earth's surface. I was reminded of Carlyle's pungent metaphor that nations like dogs seem sometimes to approach one another only to sniff at the shameful parts.

INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING.

Sir Asutosh demanded that we should learn the best of other nations and give to them our best. The servants and scholars of the Western countries like Vinogradoff, Oldenberg, Sylvain Lèvi and Pope found a hospitable welcome in this University, and the best of our men were sent to foreign countries to represent our culture. Within the Calcutta University he brought together European and Indian, Hindu and Mahomedan, all interested in the higher pursuits of the mind. When we are devoted to politics and economics, which are competitive in

RESULTS OF THE I.A. AND I.SC. EXAMINATIONS, 1928.

I.A.—

The number of candidates registered for the Intermediate Examination in Arts was 3,741, of whom 106 were absent, 5 were disallowed. Of the remaining 3,614 candidates 1,879 passed, of whom 697 were placed in the First Division, 920 in the Second Division, 259 in the Third Division, and 16 passed in one subject.

The percentage of passes is 52.

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I.Sc.—

The number of candidates registered for the Intermediate Examination in Science was 3,737, of whom 100 were absent and 4 were disallowed. The number of candidates who actually sat for the Examination was 3,604.

The number of candidates who passed the Examination was 2001, of whom 1,008 were placed in the First Division, 858 in the Second Division and 135 in the Third Division. The number of candidates who passed in one subject only was 12.

The percentage of passes is 55.